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On the Pathway to Violence: West German Right-Wing Terrorism in the 1970s

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ABSTRACT

West German society faced the emergence of a new calibre of right-wing terrorism in the 1970s. Right-wing terrorist groups evolved that showed themselves willing and able to commit violent attacks such as bombings and murder. This article explores the genesis and development of right-wing terrorism in West Germany between 1970 and 1980 while examining 22 identifiable groups and lone actors and taking into consideration the radicalization within the far right as well as the prevailing social conditions. West German right-wing terrorism until 1990 has remained a blind spot in historiography to this day. This article contributes to historical terrorism studies as well as to studies into the far right while applying historical-qualitative methods and interpreting primary sources. Using an approach informed by social history, this paper sheds new light on the individual participants, groups, and networks of right-wing terrorism as well as on its topics and targets. While taking into account a more dynamic definition of right-wing terrorism, this paper disengages from definitions that identify terrorism solely as a threat to the state itself. This makes possible a multidimensional approach employing contemporary history and studies in both terrorism and right-wing extremism.

KEYWORDS

Right-wing terrorism; right-wing extremism; Germany; 1970s; historical study; far-right; radicalization

Introduction

The year 1980 can be considered the climax of a decade of far-right violence in West Germany, starting in the early 1970s. During this 10-year period, the extreme right became radicalized, culminating in 1980. That year saw the most fatalities of right-wing terrorism in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG); 20 people, including two suspects, died as a direct result of right-wing terrorist attacks or related activities. The most significant incident was a right-wing motivated bombing at the *Oktoberfest* in Munich on September 26, 1980; 13 people were killed.

This article uses a historical-qualitative approach to outline how this phase of radicalization developed as well as to place it in its historical and political context. After defining the term “right-wing terrorism” and discussing its features, this article will turn to the question of what might have contributed to the escalation of violence and how right-wing terrorism developed and manifested itself in the 1970s.

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In recent years, scholars in Germany as well as in other countries, especially from Western Europe and the U.S., have increasingly studied terrorism on the far right.¹ The focus in the existing literature on right-wing terrorism in Germany has primarily been on the terrorist group *Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund* (NSU, National Socialist Underground). While this group operated underground from 1998 to 2011, it was responsible for several bombings and the murder of 10 people.² Yet the literature on German right-wing terrorism in the 1970s and 80s remains less extensive. Most of the works on this period either focus on the *WSG Hoffmann* and the attacks perpetrated by followers of this group or provide only a general overview of the far right, and include a chapter on terrorism.³ Only very little research on the 1970s and 1980s has been published over the past 20 years. Most of it came out in the 1980s and 1990s; however, some researchers have more recently provided an overview of the groups and the individual attacks during these two decades.⁴

Still, an in-depth and up-to-date historical analysis based on primary material, one that illuminates the emergence of right-wing terrorist actors, groups, and networks in the 1970s in their entirety, has yet to be produced. A comprehensive historical analysis of the ideology, objectives, and targets of the groups and actors in question is sorely missing from the scholarly landscape. Given the conspicuous violence of this era, as well as the abundance of literature written about right-wing extremism in general, this gap is quite surprising. One way to explain this omission is the fact that until 2011, when the NSU crimes came to light, scholarship saw right-wing terrorism as only a niche issue. Many scholars had determined its risk potential for German society to be low.⁵ Post 2011, research then mainly focused on the origins and deeds of the NSU, while a historical approach remained marginalized. Furthermore, the specific concept of terrorism in German-language literature, which for a long time required a threat to the state as a definitional criterion,⁶ limited the scholarly analysis of what constituted right-wing terrorism. A more dynamic and broader definition, which is at the centre of this paper, makes it possible to view terrorism as a process, not just a static phenomenon, and to base the analysis on a multidimensional approach, while also including social change as a central aspect of the analysis.⁷

This article addresses the following research questions:

First, the article proposes a definition of right-wing terrorism based on existing theories. It also discusses the evolution of this specific definition while identifying critical differences to other definitions. In the context of 1970s West German right-wing terrorism, the article then assesses whether the three large violent groups on the far right—the *Wehrsportgruppe (WSG) Hoffmann* (Hoffmann Paramilitary Sports Group), the *Aktionsfront Nationaler Sozialisten* (ANS, Action Front of National Socialists), and the *Volkssozialistische Bewegung Deutschlands/Partei der Arbeit* (VSBd/PdA, People's Socialist Movement of Germany/Workers' Party)—can indeed be considered terrorist. They are frequently mentioned when it comes to right-wing terrorism in the 1970s. In that regard, the question arises as to whether both the aspects of terrorist violence—that it reaches beyond a geographically limited space and that it involves conspiracy—can be applied to these groups.

A very commonly held understanding of West German far-right terrorism in the 1970s is that it came “all of a sudden.”⁸ However, a closer look indicates that the scene underwent a radicalization process over the course of the decade. The militant scene

experienced a generational change; younger and more radicalized activists entered the stage. The second part of this article delves more deeply into this development and addresses why a considerable number of right-wing activists set out on this pathway to violence. In what way was the escalation of terrorist violence an after-effect of changes within the scene? How did far-right campaigns and violent groups, evolving in the early 1970s, make their mark? Which right-wing terrorist groups emerged and by what means did these groups carry out their violent actions? What changes did the terrorist scene undergo throughout the decade until the escalation of violence in 1980?

In its conclusion, this article brings up the question of what consequences we can note for the 1980s and later.

This article contributes to historical terrorism studies as well as to studies of the far right while using historical-qualitative methods and interpreting primary sources. Its analysis is grounded in a social history perspective to shed new light on the individual participants, groups, and networks of right-wing terrorism, as well as on its motives and targets. Furthermore, the objective is to highlight the social and political context in which far-right terrorist groups emerged. Such an analysis aims at historicizing the findings, namely by tracking concrete changes and continuities over the course of time.⁹ The suggested definition of right-wing terrorism in this article draws a clear distinction between terrorist and other violent groups of the far right, which has not always been done in the existing literature on this topic.

Social science research of the extreme right “has been characterized by a focus on either macro- or micro-pathological conditions, with more limited attention to the meso-organizational level,”¹⁰ as Manuela Caiani, Donatella della Porta, and Claudius Wagemann put it. This article’s approach considers the behaviour of individual actors as well as the mechanisms of structures and institutions, in order to take into account the micro, meso, and macro levels. This approach makes it possible to map out the influence of individuals, the dynamics of individual groups or milieus, as well as terrorism as a structural phenomenon in order to show the intersectionality of these three distinct areas.¹¹

The data used in this paper were mainly gathered at the *Bundesarchiv* (Federal Archives), where the archival records of the Federal Republic of Germany are held. In addition, material from other archives, contemporary media reports, domestic intelligence reports, and academic literature were consulted. Based on that data, a total of 22 groups and lone actors were identified for the time period between 1970 and 1980, which were analysed for this paper (Table 1).

The features of right-wing terrorism

In its activities and choice of targets, German right-wing terrorism post World War II was heterogeneous. It ranged from anti-communist attacks on symbols and representatives of the GDR, which had grown out of an attitude of vigilantism,¹² and plotting assaults and murders of Jews, political opponents, and members of the judiciary, to the *Oktoberfest* bombing in 1980. A consistent definition that includes these different activities is challenging, as one needs to consider the diversity among the groups, while at the same time develop clear criteria that mark the boundaries between terrorism and political violence.



Table 1. Right-wing terrorist groups, lone actors, and publicly operating groups facilitating right-wing terrorism, 1970–1980.

Period	Group/Actor	Activities	Targets and Goals
1969–1970	Europäische Befreiungsfront (European Liberation Front)	Planned robberies; maintained hit lists of politicians and journalists; acquired weapons arsenal	<i>Targets:</i> Institutions of the GDR and the USSR, federal politicians, journalists, communists
1970	Ekkehard Weil	Shooting of a Soviet soldier in Berlin-Tiergarten	<i>Targets:</i> USSR
1970–1971	Nationale Deutsche Befreiungsbewegung (National German Liberation Movement)	Planned attacks targeting the Berlin Wall and Soviet institutions; acquired weapons arsenal	<i>Targets:</i> Political opponents, institutions of the GDR and the USSR
1971	Hengst Group	Planned armed operations against political opponents and traffic facilities; planned robberies; acquired weapons arsenal	<i>Targets:</i> Political opponents
1972	Nationalsozialistische Kampfgruppe Großdeutschland (National Socialist Battle Group of Greater Germany)	Acquired weapons and explosives	<i>Targets:</i> Communists, Jews
1973–1974	Neumann Group	Arson attack on a leftist book shop; destruction of Jewish cemeteries in Lower Saxony and Rhineland-Palatinate; acquired weapons arsenal	<i>Targets:</i> Political opponents, Jews
1973–1980	Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann (Hoffmann Paramilitary Sports Group) (publicly operating group)	Paramilitary training and radicalization of right-wing terrorists; advocacy of violence; acquired extensive arsenal of weapons and explosives	<i>Targets:</i> Political opponents, Jews, state institutions, U.S. institutions
1975–1982	Volkssozialistische Bewegung Deutschlands/Partei der Arbeit (People's Socialist Movement of Germany/Workers' Party) (publicly operating group)	Organizational base for right-wing terrorists; advocacy of violence	<i>Targets:</i> Political opponents, Jews, state institutions
1976	Dieter Epplen	Attempted bomb attack against the U.S. military broadcaster AFN in Munich	<i>Targets:</i> U.S. troops
1977–1978	Otte Group	Bombing targeting judges and prosecutors; stockpiled explosives; planned bombing of a synagogue	stockpiled explosives; planned bombing of a synagogue <i>Targets:</i> Jews, public reckoning with the Nazi past, judges and prosecutors
1977–1978	Kühnen/Schulte/Wegener Group	Robberies and bank raids; planned attacks on concentration camp memorial; planned rescue of Rudolf Hess; acquired weapons arsenal	<i>Targets:</i> NATO troops, political opponents, institutions of the GDR, concentration camp memorials
1977–1979	Eisermann Group	Bombing targeting prosecutors who were involved in proceedings against neo-Nazis; planned bombing of a Freemasons' lodge; acquired weapons arsenal	<i>Targets:</i> Political opponents, judges and prosecutors
1977–1983	Aktionsfront Nationaler Sozialisten/Nationale Aktivisten (Action Front of National Socialists/National Activists) (publicly operating group)	Support and advocacy of violence	<i>Targets:</i> Political opponents, Jews, state institutions
1978	Werewolfgruppe Stubbemann (Stubbemann Werewolf Group)	Planned bombing of the offices of a leftist organization; planned robbery of a theatre box office	<i>Targets:</i> Political opponents

1979	Wehrsportgruppe Schlageter (Schlageter Paramilitary Sports Group)	Planned attacks on concentration camp memorial, U.S. Army facilities, and the Berlin Wall; planned rescue of Rudolf Hess; acquired weapons arsenal	<i>Targets:</i> Public reckoning with the Nazi past, institutions of the GDR
1979–1987	Naumann Group	Bombing of two public television transmission towers	<i>Targets:</i> Public reckoning with the Nazi past
1979–1980	Wehrsportgruppe Ruhrgebiet (Paramilitary Sports Group Ruhrgebiet)	Bank robbery; motor vehicle theft; acquired weapons arsenal	<i>Targets:</i> Jews, migrants
1980	Gundolf Köhler	<i>Oktoberfest</i> bombing	<i>Targets:</i> Visitors of the <i>Oktoberfest</i>
1980	Deutsche Aktionsgruppen (German Action Groups)	Arson attacks and bombings	<i>Targets:</i> Migrants; public reckoning with the Nazi past
1980	Uwe Behrendt	Murder of Shlomo Levin and Frieda Poeschke	<i>Targets:</i> Jews
1980	Frank Schubert	Shooting of two police officers at the German-Swiss border	<i>Targets:</i> Police agents
1980–1981	Wehrsportgruppe Ausland (Paramilitary Sports Group Abroad)	Military training in a PLO camp in Lebanon; planned attacks on an oil refinery and Israeli task forces	<i>Targets:</i> State institutions; Jews, Israeli army; U.S. troops

Despite the wide range of existing definitions of far-right terrorism, two groups can be identified: The first and narrower appears mostly in German-language studies and is based on the definition provided by the *Verfassungsschutz* (VS), the domestic intelligence service of the FRG. The VS defines terrorism as the “persistent fight for political goals enforced by attacks on life, limb and property of others particularly through severe criminal acts as named in § 129a *Strafgesetzbuch* (StGB, the German criminal code) or through other acts of violence meant to prepare these criminal acts.”¹³ This definition follows the West German anti-terrorism law, the § 129a StGB, a law that was issued in the context of prosecutorial measures against left-wing terrorism in 1976. This law punishes the formation of or the membership in a terrorist organization that aims at committing severe offences (e.g., murder, arson, causing an explosion via explosives). Scholars either took this definition as the basis for their work or used offences against § 129a StGB as the core of their definitions.¹⁴ The study of the sociologist Friedhelm Neidhardt in 1982 serves as an example for this type of work. It has been frequently cited in German-speaking literature.¹⁵ In his study, Neidhardt examined the profile of 51 right-wing terrorists. He classified these terrorists by using their legal prosecution according to § 129 (formation of a criminal organization) and/or § 129a StGB.¹⁶ This approach focuses on the use of violence while requiring the catalogue of felonies outlined in the § 129a StGB. However, the downside of this approach is that it almost exclusively relies on the definition in the anti-terrorism legislation, which was tightened and modified several times in response to changes in the political situation over the years.¹⁷ Plus, the law only targets groups of three or more, thereby ignoring lone actors and groups of two.¹⁸

The second group is much broader. Scholars who have used this approach commonly emphasize the aims of terrorism as producing a state of fear and intimidation through the use of violence.¹⁹ Some add that the actors are driven by far-right attitudes and behaviour with regards to nationalism or racism.²⁰ Apart from these common features, the definitions vary widely: While some include a firm organization and the goal to challenge the state or a political order,²¹ others consider the fight against the state or against a government an unnecessary feature.²² Most pay particular attention to groups’ and actors’ communicative strategy. They argue that terrorism aims to send a message in order to “achieve an effect on others besides the direct victim or target of the violence.”²³

This article uses a working definition in line with the second group of definitions. In regards to the goals of right-wing terrorism, it is oriented towards the definitions of Leonard Weinberg²⁴ and Tore Björge²⁵ and extended to accommodate the aspect of vigilantism. In this article, right-wing terrorism is understood as the calculated action of groups or individuals with far-right ideology and/or who are coming from the far-right milieu, who, with attempted or actual severe violence against people or property, conspiratorially pursue at least two of the following goals: a) to create a climate of fear in the general population or in certain sections of the population; b) to attract public attention (including through symbolic actions); c) to influence the actions of state representatives, or civic or political leaders, and/or to provoke an overreaction from the authorities; d) to destabilize political and social order (which can include challenging the state and its policies); and e) to defend political and social order (vigilantism).

To the extent that groups and actors support their intent to carry out acts of terrorism, this definition can also encompass preparatory and underground operations, such as robbing banks and creating caches of firearms and explosives. Victims and targets of

right-wing terrorism are often chosen arbitrarily because they “represent a larger human audience whose reactions the terrorists seek”²⁶—for even when the terrorists do not immediately publicize their motivations, their goal is to send a symbolic message.

This definition of right-wing terrorism, at the centre of this article’s analysis, differs from other definitions in two crucial ways. First, this definition does not include the use of political violence with the primary goal of physical destruction or gaining territorial hegemony. Second, it assumes that right-wing terrorists clandestinely plan or carry out their activities, a feature most definitions ignore.

These two elements make it possible to distinguish right-wing terrorist groups from both conspiratorial right-wing circles that do not (intend to) turn to terrorist violence, and from groups that commit violence but that do not engage in conspiracy.

The exclusion of political violence with the primary goal of physical destruction or gaining territorial hegemony is critical in distinguishing right-wing terrorism from other forms of far-right violence. Other, non-terrorist forms of far-right violence are not in pursuit of a terrorist strategy. In other words, right-wing violence that is not terrorism does not seek changes within society. This type of violence does not achieve an effect beyond a specific target or victim group. It mainly uses violence in a spatially limited area, for example at demonstrations fighting political opponents or in a specific neighbourhood in order to repel migrants.²⁷ Right-wing terrorism, on the other hand, is characterized by calculating and systematic strategies, and it does not require a violent public performance (for instance at a demonstration or during a riot). Consequently, the goals that terrorists aim to accomplish reach beyond a geographically limited space.²⁸

The example of the right-wing group *WSG Hoffmann* illustrates this difference. Founded by Karl-Heinz Hoffmann in 1973 and banned in January 1980, the WSG was a neo-Nazi group which, as a main objective, provided paramilitary exercises for its members.²⁹ Many scholars have considered the *WSG Hoffmann* to be a terrorist organization because several followers of this group became terrorists after the WSG was banned.³⁰ However, based on the definition of right-wing terrorism developed in this article, this group does not fit all the criteria of a terrorist group due to its exclusive use of spatially limited violence, e.g., in fights with its political enemies. The most significant instance was a mass brawl between members of the *WSG Hoffmann*, the affiliated far-right *Hochschulring Tübinger Studenten* (HTS, Association of Tübingen Students), and leftist counter-protesters in Tübingen (Baden-Württemberg) during an HTS event on December 4, 1976. Although the neo-Nazi participants armed themselves with clubs and other striking tools, there is no evidence that they were working strategically towards a superordinate goal other than attacking and repelling the political opponent from this particular location. In other words, this clash was limited to the specific place and occasion.³¹ The activities of the right-wing terrorist *Eisermann Group* serve as a counter-example. In 1977, this group clearly acted beyond a territorial and temporal limit when a member planted a bomb at the building that housed the public prosecutor’s office in Flensburg (in the state of Schleswig-Holstein) on September 2, 1977. This bombing had been covertly prepared for and carried out by the perpetrator with the goal of attacking the local public prosecutor, who had brought charges against the far-right functionary Manfred Roeder. The terrorist message went far beyond the immediate target: The “judiciary was supposed to be terrorized in order to keep it from convicting right-wing extremist criminals,” as

the judges stated in the subsequent trial; the perpetrator “effectively wanted to hit the state.”³²

The second essential feature of this article’s definition of right-wing terrorism is the aspect of conspiracy. The right-wing terrorist groups that were analysed for this article planned or carried out their attacks in secrecy. This challenges the categorization of three publicly operating far-right groups of the 1970s as terrorist. The previously mentioned WSG *Hoffmann*, the ANS, and the VSBD/PdA all have repeatedly been characterized as terrorist by academia and the public.³³ Indeed, they played a crucial role in facilitating terrorist activities in the FRG. With their activities, such as paramilitary training, provocative demonstrations, or mass brawls, these groups contributed enormously to the radicalization process of the right-wing scene.³⁴ Also, their leaders, Michael Kühnen (1955–1991, ANS), Karl-Heinz Hoffmann (born in 1937, WSG *Hoffmann*), and Friedhelm Busse (1929–2008, VSBD/PdA) wielded significant influence on the development of right-wing terrorism in the FRG as ideological leaders, since they proclaimed the notion of a violent overthrow of the democratic order to their followers.³⁵ Scholars as well as security experts rated these groups as the most important melting pots of the terrorist far right during the 1970s and the early 1980s in West Germany.³⁶

However, all three groups share a common feature. All three operated in public with open events and advertising campaigns. The ANS and the VSBD/PdA were even registered as political parties with statutes.³⁷ The WSG *Hoffmann* organized public meetings and promoted them with leaflets, and Hoffmann allowed journalists to photograph and film his paramilitary training exercises.³⁸ Right-wing terrorist groups in the 1970s, on the contrary, neither held open events in public nor did they openly advertise for their causes. Also, many groups—e.g., the *Europäische Befreiungsfront* (EBF, European Liberation Front), the *Kühnen/Schulte/Wegener Group*, the *Eisermann Group*, the *Wehrsportgruppe* (WSG) *Schlageter*—focused on creating secret underground organizations.³⁹

Emergence and development of right-wing terrorism in the FRG

The considerable rise in right-wing terrorist activity in the FRG, starting at the beginning of the 1970s, was preceded by a longer period with no significant violent incidents. This relatively peaceful period can be credited to three developments.

First, to the criminal prosecution of far-right offenders and the banning of far-right groups in the 1950s and 1960s, such as the *Sozialistische Reichspartei Deutschland* (Socialist Reich Party of Germany) in 1952 or the *Bund Deutscher Jugend* (League of German Youth) in 1953.⁴⁰

Second, in those early days of the Republic, anti-communist sentiment was still strong, and the discourse regarding the Nazi era was generally one of exoneration and re-interpretation. This meant that right-wing terrorist groups had less occasion and impetus for violence. This, however, changed starting at the end of the 1960s when anti-Bolshevism was declining due to the decreasing confrontational nature of the Cold War.⁴¹ The détente policy of the Social Democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt and his Social-Liberal Coalition, which took power in 1969, triggered feelings of anxiety and rage among the far right. These sentiments led to a noticeable increase in anti-communist attacks against the rapprochement of the two German states, and, related to this, against institutions and representatives of the GDR and the Soviet Union.

The German government's *Neue Ostpolitik* ("New Eastern Policy") particularly added a lot of impetus to the rise of the militant far right. This new political strategy consisted of a package of negotiations and treaties with Eastern bloc countries, including the GDR, that aimed at the normalisation of political, cultural, and economic relations with communist states. Besides a general process of détente, Brandt's professed goal was the rapprochement and, finally, reunification of the German states. In actuality, this policy also led to the de-facto acceptance of post-war realities such as the existence of the GDR and the loss of the former German territories in Eastern Europe.⁴² The strong emotions that had accompanied the division of the German states and the status quo of the eastern borders (Oder Neisse line) in the 1950s and 1960s were gradually fading away. Nevertheless, the *Ostpolitik* was a pervasive political issue throughout the early 1970s and drew a line between the majority of the population and their political representatives who favoured this development on the one hand and a minority who audibly refused it on the other.⁴³

This minority, around 30 percent of West Germans, strictly objected to the partition of Germany and the acceptance of the Oder Neisse line as the East German border. This opposition against the government's social-liberal policy was backed by a conservative faction in parliament, conservative media, several groups that represented Germans who had been expelled from Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe during and after 1945, and right-wing activists;⁴⁴ however, this did not necessarily result in joint action among those groups. Right-wing activists opposed this new *Ostpolitik* mainly because they rejected the social-liberal government, but they also despised Chancellor Willy Brandt, who fought against Nazi Germany during the war. Most of all, they perceived the *Ostpolitik* as too close of a contact with the "Bolshevik foe" and as the acceptance of national division and the loss of territory. It meant, in their opinion, to relinquish everything that could provide Germany with its old territorial magnitude and to push the restoration of the German Reich into a distant future.

Third, after the creation of the right-wing *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (NPD, National Democratic Party of Germany) in 1964, and its subsequent rise, the far-right scene transferred its expectations of success through parliamentary victory; this also led to a strategic restraint with regards to openly violent activities.⁴⁵

The federal election in September 1969, however, ended with the NPD only receiving 4.3 percent of the votes. This result was short of the five percent required for the party's entry to the Parliament. It "triggered feelings of stunned outrage"⁴⁶ in adherents of the extreme right. The far right compensated for its disappointment with greater radicalization and an open tendency towards violence, e.g., by publicly threatening Chancellor Willy Brandt with murder in objection to his government's *Neue Ostpolitik*. "Brandt an die Wand" ("put Brandt against the wall") was a common right-wing slogan during this time.⁴⁷ This development corresponds with the general observation that terrorism from the extreme right is more likely to emerge when there is no or insufficient representation through a political party, or when the channelling effects of electoral victories fail to appear.⁴⁸

To overcome the crisis in which the NPD found itself after its electoral defeat, the party instigated the campaign *Aktion Widerstand* (AW, Action Resistance) in 1970, which was to serve as a unifying movement for the far-right scene.⁴⁹ In reality, however, it led to the differentiation and fragmentation of the extreme right. The AW's call to "resistance" helped turn the scene towards militancy in such a way that it can be seen as both initiator and stimulator of the far-right violence that followed.⁵⁰ In addition, a new generation of

neo-Nazis became active in the 1970s. Born in the 1950s, they wished to distinguish themselves from the NPD, which they increasingly saw as bourgeois and stuffy. Nonetheless, the party still took on an essential role as a politicizing organization. Furthermore, the three above-mentioned groups—WSG *Hoffmann*, ANS, and VSBD/PdA—served as critical feeder organizations. With their radical ideology that promoted violence and terror, these groups met the needs of a new generation of militant activists who underwent a process of radicalization inside these groups. Several right-wing terrorist actors of the late 1970s and the 1980s had been members of at least one of these organizations.⁵¹ The growing militancy became noticeable in rising crime rates. The number of extreme-right incidents between 1970 and 1980 rose from 184 to 1643 incidents, including violent attacks, a trend that continued into the 1980s.⁵²

The period between 1970 and 1980 can be divided into three distinct phases of far-right terrorism: the emergence of right-wing terrorist groups in the early 1970s, the increase of smaller and more violent groups in the mid-70s, and the escalation of violence in 1980.

Right-wing terrorist groups in the early 1970s

The first groups emerged in the context of the previously described founding of the “*Aktion Widerstand*” and were mainly directed against political opponents, especially communists, social democrats, and the GDR. The two largest groups in the early 1970s were the *Europäische Befreiungsfront* (EBF) and the *Hengst Group*, both active in the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia.

The EBF was founded in December 1969. Its goal was to fight communists and left-wing radicalism through armed operations. The group maintained a “hit list” of enemies among politicians and journalists, acquired weapons, and met for firing practice. On May 20, 1970, police searched the houses of 16 suspected EBF members, all of them men aged between 21 and 66 years; altogether, the authorities investigated 19 people who were all associated with the NPD. With this raid, the police were able to stop the EBF before it executed attacks against union representatives, communists, and leftist journalists; moreover, the group had planned a burglary of a *Bundeswehr* (German Armed Forces) camp nearby Düsseldorf.⁵³

The story of the EBF is also remarkable for another reason: During the investigations, information came to light that revealed an active member of the group, Helmut K., as a *Vertrauensperson* (confidential informant, CI) of the *Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (the state agency of the domestic intelligence service) in North Rhine-Westphalia. His involvement caused a public debate on the extent to which an informant in a right-wing terrorist group was allowed to play a leading role.⁵⁴ The following years revealed that K. was only one of several CIs used by the *Verfassungsschutz* agencies to help investigators observe and analyse the right-wing terrorist scene. Based on the instances known to the public, the informants were recruited while already being activists; they were thus not actively planted in the scene by the intelligence service agencies. The disclosure of those CIs was almost always accompanied by critical public debates on their possibly illegal activities. A remarkable example was the case of Hans-Dieter Lepzien, a member of the *Otte Group* in 1977/1978 and—as it turned out during the trial against the group—confidential informant of the Lower Saxon *Verfassungsschutz*. Lepzien had supplied several right-wing terrorist groups in the area with explosives.⁵⁵ To this day, however, little is known

about the number and overall contribution of CIs in the right-wing terrorist scene since the *Verfassungsschutz* files are still classified and hinder reliable information about that topic from coming to light.

In the context of the EBF, one of the very first serious acts of right-wing terrorism, directed against the Soviet Union, needs to be mentioned. In November 1970, Ekkehard Weil, who later became a notorious right-wing terrorist, shot and gravely injured a Soviet soldier guarding the German-German border in Berlin.⁵⁶ Weil left anti-bolshevik graffiti and leaflets near the crime scene—undersigned with *Europäische Befreiungsfront*.⁵⁷ The EBF, which had been uncovered half a year prior to this incident, considered itself an anti-communist stronghold; according to its manifesto, it aimed at forming a “joint fighting group of European Nationalists who are ready to face off against the impending doom of this continent by any means available.” Furthermore, the group claimed to “eliminate those individuals who were subversively acting on behalf of bolshevism in the mass media.”⁵⁸

The 1960s have often been associated with a period of modernization and liberalization in German society. As a matter of fact, “1968” has become a quintessential term to describe this trend. The example of the EBF makes obvious that the social transformation of the 1960s cannot be underestimated in its effect on and in its interpretation by the far right, which perceived this change as a concrete and destructive Marxist threat.⁵⁹ This assumption may explain why the 1970s marked the increase in numbers of attacks against the “enemy within,” especially against Jews and political opponents, but also against representatives of the state and judiciary. Right-wing terrorists viewed them as advocates of a social order that was fundamentally opposed to their own vision of a German *Reich*.

Other groups felt the same. For example, members of the *Hengst Group* used pictures of Brandt and GDR functionary Walter Ulbricht as targets in their firearms training.⁶⁰ This group formed around the 29-year-old NPD member Bernd Hengst in the Bonn area (the then capital of the FRG) and was disbanded by the police in February 1971. Twelve members were temporarily arrested for having acquired weapons such as a machine pistol, guns, and pistols, and planning terrorist attacks. Altogether, the group had 18 members. According to the public prosecutor in Cologne, the *Hengst Group* had been planning several strikes in February 1971, for instance bombings of SPD leadership’s headquarters in Bonn and on public transportation.⁶¹

Both the EBF and the *Hengst Group* serve as examples for typical right-wing groups emerging in the early 1970s. Similar groups were the *Nationalsozialistische Kampfgruppe Großdeutschland* (NSKG, National Socialist Battle Group of Greater Germany) and the *Nationale Deutsche Befreiungsbewegung* (NDBB, National German Liberation Movement).⁶² Radicalized NPD members—the *Hengst Group* actually formed directly out of a local district association of the NPD⁶³—were inspired by the AW and found common ground through sharing their dismay about governmental policy. They started with acquiring weapons, followed by target practice, and ultimately planned attacks against the political enemy. None of them ever exhibited any signs of planning to go underground. In the end, these groups of 15 to 20 members were stopped from executing their plans by the police and state prosecution.

The increase of terrorist violence

During the second phase of far-right terrorism, starting in the mid-1970s, smaller groups emerged. Unlike their predecessors of the early 1970s, they managed to carry out bombings, assaults, and robberies. Examples of these are the previously mentioned *Eisermann Group* as well as the *Otte Group*, the latter of which planted a bomb at the local court in Hannover in October 1977.⁶⁴ Furthermore, from the middle of the 1970s, right-wing terrorism broadened its focus from the GDR and the Soviet Union as perceived enemies of Germany to the U.S. In May 1976, Dieter Epplen, a follower of the *WSG Hoffmann*, attempted to bomb the U.S. military broadcaster AFN in Munich. This failed endeavour resulted in severe injuries for Epplen.⁶⁵ Odfried Hepp also considered attacking U.S. army barracks in the FRG with his *WSG Schlageter* as well as followers of the *Wehrsportgruppe (WSG) Ausland* (Paramilitary Sports Group Abroad).⁶⁶ The aggression against the U.S. was ideologically motivated by a defensive narrative that viewed the United States' "foreign occupation" of Germany as "Jewish." Far-right anti-Americanism, however, was also a manifestation of a reorientation of the extreme right, which presented the struggle against the "capitalist West" as explicitly anti-imperialist, and whose influence continued to be felt in the 1980s.⁶⁷

This article will focus on the *Kühnen/Schulte/Wegener Group* (KSWG) as a prime example for a group that emerged during this time period. Active in northern Germany, it was the first right-wing group in the FRG to be prosecuted as a terrorist organization according to § 129a StGB. With its robberies and raids, the KSWG showed a degree of brutality rarely employed before by right-wing terrorists in West Germany. Furthermore, its activities attracted nationwide attention, and the group quickly became a role model to other neo-Nazi terrorists.⁶⁸ The KSWG emerged in 1977 and consisted of six men between the ages of 20 and 40. The most prominent person involved was Michael Kühnen, founder of the ANS and a key figure of the far-right scene. Although he engaged in the group's strategic planning, he did not himself participate in the assaults as far as we know today. The other members carried out several robberies, for instance of a bank in Hamburg on December 19, 1977, and of a camp of Dutch soldiers on February 5, 1978, in order to obtain money and weapons. The group held clandestine meetings and discussed ideas to build an underground "werewolf" organization that would execute terrorist attacks, i.e. on the Berlin Wall, or to free Hitler's former deputy Rudolf Heß, who had been imprisoned for war crimes.⁶⁹

In addition, the KSWG planned an attack on the Bergen-Belsen Concentration Camp memorial site, which the group members reconnoitred in January 1978. When the terrorists stood trial, the judges felt convinced that the group members were "seriously resolute" in their intentions to bomb this site. Lutz W., one of the defendants, stated his resolve in court, stating his conviction that Bergen Belsen was a "memorial of gassing and shooting lies."⁷⁰ It was not surprising that right-wing terrorists set their sights on the media treatment and the public commemoration of National Socialism during the late 1970s. The question of how that era should be remembered had become progressively more significant in West Germany. Since the late 1950s, increasingly critical attitudes in politics and the general public allowed contemporary German society to confront its not-so-distant past role in the mass murder of European Jews.⁷¹ The reckoning with the Nazi past (*NS-Vergangenheitsbewältigung*) was a highly relevant political undertaking that

served to delegitimize National Socialism, a system that was glorified by the far right and sparked right-wing terrorists to focus their efforts on preventing the critical treatment of the Nazi years.

In February 1978, police uncovered the *Kühnen/Schulte/Wegener Group* and detained its members; in 1979, the trial started in Bückeburg, Lower Saxony, where the group's members were prosecuted in the first trial against right-wing terrorists in the history of the FRG. Kühnen was charged with being the group's ring-leader, but was subsequently acquitted of that count. He was sentenced to four years in prison, while his accomplices were convicted and received sentences of eight to 11 years.⁷²

This second phase of the 1970s saw more radicalized groups that were ready to commit severe offences. Partly interconnected (the *Eisermann Group*, the KSWG, and the *Otte Group* for example maintained contacts among each other⁷³), far-right terrorists pursued much more specific terrorist strategies than they had in the early 1970s. They planned or executed specific attacks, discussed underground activities, and started to commit preparatory offences such as bank robberies to fund their plans.

Additionally, a phenomenon widely discussed in the 1970s, namely how the radical left implemented concepts of armed struggle, affected debates inside the terrorist right. From the middle of the 1970s, it was left-wing terrorist groups in particular, such as the *Rote Armee Fraktion* (RAF, Red Army Fraction), that were shaping West German domestic policy, especially after 1977, when targeted assassinations of political and economic leaders occurred with increasing frequency. Statements and texts issued by far-right activists allow for the assumption that right-wing terrorists felt both inspired and repelled by the RAF's strategies and activities. To give an example, after the RAF had killed the *Generalbundesanwalt* (Public Prosecutor General) Siegfried Buback on April 7, 1977, the neo-Nazi magazine *Wille und Weg* (Will and Way) celebrated the assassination, calling it a "relieving act."⁷⁴ Statements by right-wing terrorists, such as Christine Hewicker, indicate that they admired the RAF for its determinedness.⁷⁵ However, other activists at the same time deeply objected to the group; a member of the NSKG, for example, called it the "nucleus of a red terror army" and demanded to "deal in short order with members of this terror group."⁷⁶ An explanation for this ambivalent approach might be that the RAF's terrorist strategy as sign of notable political potency appealed to the actors rather than the left-wing ideological framework; following this logic, the fight against the radical left as a political enemy while embracing, even admiring, its tactics was not contradictory.

The escalation of terrorist violence in 1979/1980

The third and last phase of this decade, 1979/80, is marked by a remarkable radicalization among right-wing terrorists and the increasing willingness to build up terrorist structures. This can be traced from two observations:

First, the intensity of terrorist violence rose dramatically, which can be measured by the 20 fatalities in 1980. Between February and August, the *Deutsche Aktionsgruppen* (DA, German Action Groups), founded by Manfred Roeder, caused the deaths of two Vietnamese refugees; this article discusses this group in greater detail later. In addition, the most devastating bomb attack in the history of the FRG, the bombing at the *Oktoberfest* in Munich, took place on September 26, 1980. It was committed by 21-year-old student Gundolf Köhler, who had participated in several military training exercises

organized by the WSG *Hoffmann*. A pipe bomb exploded at the festival, killing 12 visitors and injuring over 200. Köhler, who died in the explosion, would be identified as the perpetrator in the days following the attack.⁷⁷ However, the identity of those responsible for the *Oktoberfest* bombing in 1980 has remained the subject of particular controversy and debate up until the present day. The *Generalbundesanwalt* (Public Prosecutor General) closed the investigation in 1982 because he assumed that Köhler had acted alone. Public discussions continued though to question whether the attack was in fact carried out with the help of accomplices. In 2014, the federal prosecutor's office re-opened the investigation; it has not yet been concluded.⁷⁸ The motivation for this terror attack has remained another unresolved issue. One explanation might be that the perpetrator—or perpetrators—wanted to add fuel to an already divisive political climate and to lay the blame on left-wing terrorists. It is also possible that the Munich attack was inspired by the right-wing terrorist Bologna railway station bombing which took place on August 2, 1980, and killed 85 people.⁷⁹

Another event in 1980 points toward the increase in violence. On December 19 of that year, Uwe Behrendt, a long-standing member of the WSG *Hoffmann* and a close confidant of Karl-Heinz Hoffmann, killed the Jewish publisher Shlomo Lewin and his life companion, Frieda Poeschke, in an execution-style attack at their home in Erlangen, Bavaria.⁸⁰ The police tracked down Behrendt several weeks later and also investigated Hoffmann's suspected involvement: Behrendt had accidentally left sunglasses at the crime scene that belonged to Hoffmann's life companion, Franziska B. Moreover, Behrendt was living with Hoffmann and B. at their private castle in Ermreuth, Bavaria, not far from Erlangen, at the time of the murder. He had confessed the homicide the same evening to Hoffmann, who helped him flee the country, first to the GDR and then to Lebanon, where Behrendt presumably killed himself in September 1981.⁸¹ Furthermore, witnesses testified that Hoffmann had built a silencer similar to the one used for the crime—the murder weapon itself was never found—several weeks before the homicide. Hoffmann and his partner were arrested in June 1981, but evidence of a direct order for the assassination or their involvement could never be found. Both were charged with murder in 1984, but were acquitted. However, Hoffmann was sent to prison for nine years and six months for other offences.⁸² The Lewin/Poeschke murder fits in with a long tradition of far-right action against the “enemies of the *Volksgemeinschaft*,” a political concept that had outlasted the era of National Socialism.⁸³ It was most likely driven by anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist sentiment. “Shlomo Lewin was to be killed,” the prosecutors wrote, “since he was considered . . . to be a representative of that population group whose members the accused designated as ‘subhuman beings’ (*Untermenschen*).”⁸⁴

The last incident in the year 1980 can be classified as a preparatory act of terrorism, namely purchasing weapons. The VSBD/PdA functionary Frank Schubert procured weapons in Switzerland in December 1980 and then killed two Swiss border agents on December 24 after they surprised him as he was preparing to transport the weapons to West Germany. Schubert killed himself after the murder; his death triggered a further radicalization of the VSBD/PdA followers, who treated Schubert as a martyr.⁸⁵

A second trend deserves attention: With increasing frequency, terrorists decided to go underground. In earlier years right-wing terrorists had, alongside their terrorist activities, led regular lives with jobs and families. At the most, they were unemployed and involved in petty crime.⁸⁶ Later we can observe the growing willingness to take greater personal

risks. The decision of around a dozen activists to follow the call by Karl-Heinz Hoffmann to join a group called *WSG Ausland* in Lebanon after the ban of the *WSG Hoffmann* exemplifies this change in behaviour. Hoffmann was able to not only recruit former WSG members, but also far-right activists like Odfried Hepp (*WSG Schlageter*) and Peter Hamberger (VSBD/PdA), who were willing to take the next step by going into hiding.⁸⁷

The *WSG Ausland*, which existed for about a year starting in the summer of 1980, was based at a PLO camp in Lebanon where its members received paramilitary training. Although the group members discussed terrorist attacks both in Germany and in Israel, they neither participated in the Lebanese civil war nor did they take any measures to carry out attacks. In fact, the group was isolated in a foreign country and shattered by internal conflicts, power struggles, and Hoffmann's autocratic leadership style. Several members tried to desert the camp but were restrained and detained by Hoffmann and his closer confidants. One member of the group, Kay-Uwe Bergmann, was imprisoned after an escape attempt; other group members tortured and presumably killed him with incredible brutality in February 1981. The group finally dissolved in the early summer of 1981. The failure of the *WSG Ausland* might have dissolved the group itself, but it did not impede former members from becoming active terrorists shortly after they had returned to Germany (such as Hans-Peter Fraas and Odfried Hepp in the *Hepp/Kexel Group*, and Peter Hamberger in the *Uhl/Wolfgram Group*).⁸⁸

The year 1980 also saw another underground group, this time on German ground, the *Deutsche Aktionsgruppen* (DA), led by the well-known right-wing functionary Manfred Roeder (1929–2014). In the 1970s he had built up an extensive network of far-right activists as well as maintained excellent international connections. To avoid a prison sentence for hate speech, he fled abroad in 1978; early in 1980, he returned to the FRG under a false name and founded the DA.⁸⁹ Roeder argued openly that the movement should go underground. He wrote to his supporters in April 1980 that the “legal path” had been exhausted: “We have to either give up or go underground. . . . The struggle must now be continued on another level with even greater determination, for we shall never look idly on as Germany is destroyed. We must either conquer or perish!”⁹⁰

Surrounded by a network of supporters, the core group of the DA consisted of Sybille Vorderbrügge, a 26-year-old medical employee, physician Heinz Colditz, 50, and Raymund Hörnle, a 50-year-old worker; Roeder had recruited them from his private network.⁹¹ The group carried out bombings and arson attacks directed against exhibitions and memorial sites engaging with the Nazi era as well as against refugee homes. On August 22, 1980, Hörnle and Vorderbrügge killed two young Vietnamese refugees in an arson attack in Hamburg. Ten days later, the police managed to arrest the members and supporters of the DA. In 1982, the higher regional court in Stuttgart sentenced Hörnle and Vorderbrügge to life in prison for murder. Manfred Roeder was sent to prison for 13 years for being the group's ring-leader. Colditz was sentenced to six years for being a member of a terrorist organization, and other supporters were imprisoned for sentences of 10 months to four years.⁹² Roeder was the first neo-Nazi leader to instigate explicitly racist acts of terrorism. Since the 1980s, violence against migrants has come to dominate all other areas of right-wing attacks, a development that intensified following the reunification of the two German states.

The trend of groups going underground also increased during the early 1980s. Several groups, such as the *Uhl/Wolfgram Group* and the *Hepp/Kexel Group*, operated in hiding.

They managed to maintain terrorist infrastructures such as secret apartments or hiding places, which were provided by supporters, and they robbed banks to finance their life in the underground.⁹³

Conclusion

The 1970s was the decade in which the terrorist far right in West Germany was first able to build structures and networks that outlasted criminal prosecution. While police dismantled the groups that were active at the beginning of the 1970s before they had the chance to move on to more serious activities (e.g., EBF, *Hengst Group*, NSKG), clandestine and more effective groups emerged starting in the middle of that decade. Activists from dissolved groups managed to find new political home bases in other groups; this fluctuation indicated loose group affinities, and does not correspond to the common understanding of small terrorist cells working in secret over a long period of time.⁹⁴ It was not until the mid-1980s that right-wing terrorism decreased for a short period before violence spread again and became a major problem in the early 1990s, following German reunification. Interestingly, the political approach to left- and right-wing terrorism differed in fundamental ways. While the former, at the end of the 1970s, was considered profoundly threatening to the state not only by authorities and politicians, but also by the general public,⁹⁵ the latter had been downplayed and disregarded by politicians and, in some cases, by prosecutors and judges.⁹⁶

The study of far-right terrorist groups and their targets in the 1970s also reveals that terrorist activities were related to developments within the far-right scene and to general social conditions. Right-wing terrorists saw the processes of political, cultural, and economic change that shaped West German society after 1968 as a fertile ground to focus their efforts on opposing German-German rapprochement, society's critical handling of the Nazi past, political opponents, and state representatives. While in the early 1970s, anti-communist undertakings had priority, the effects of liberalization and modernization led to a shift of objectives toward the end of the decade. Right-wing terrorists directed their attacks against the *NS-Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, the "internal enemy," and against U.S. troops deployed in the FRG.

The analysis of the 1970s brings to light three crucial preconditions for the extreme-right terrorism that would continue to play out in the following decades. First, in the 1980s, multicultural migrant society became the predominant target of right-wing violence and terrorism, a topic particularly pushed by Manfred Roeder and his DA. Since then, the "fight against foreign infiltration" has been a focus of the militant far right. From the 1980s, acts of terrorism motivated by racism occurred with increasing frequency. On June 25, 1982, for example, the NPD sympathizer Helmut Oxner shot two African-Americans and an Egyptian in Nuremberg, before killing himself; his crimes were racially motivated.⁹⁷ From 2003 to 2004, the right-wing terrorist group "Freikorps Havelland" committed 10 attacks, mainly arson, against shops and snack bars run by migrants.⁹⁸ The attacks and murders eventually carried out by the NSU were racist in all respects. This thematic shift can also be interpreted as reactions to contemporary discourses about (labour) migration in the Federal Republic, which had been a constant part of the (West) German labour market since the 1950s.⁹⁹ Second, a growing knowledge transfer among members of the scene enabled subsequent right-wing terrorists to more effectively handle explosives, weapons, and living

underground. While there were only a handful of manuals and concepts in the early 1970s that served as instruction guides—such as “Der totale Widerstand” (“Total resistance”), a guerrilla warfare manual written by the Swiss major Hans von Dach in 1957¹⁰⁰—the number of handbooks and manuals circulating in the scene noticeably increased over the following decades. Since the 1980s, numerous right-wing pamphlets have propagated various strategies of the terrorist struggle, such as the idea of an independently acting “lone wolf” or the concept of “leaderless resistance.”¹⁰¹ It was also, as a third aspect, the activists themselves who ensured continuity in terms of strategy within the scene. The right-wing terrorist Peter Naumann, for example, was an active NPD functionary of national prominence after he was released from prison in the 1990s. He had participated in several bombing attacks during the 1970s, such as on the Mausoleo Fosse Ardeatine Memorial in Rome in 1978, or on two transmission towers belonging to the German television broadcaster ARD in 1979, in order to prevent the broadcast of the American TV miniseries “Holocaust” on German television.¹⁰² The most significant example was Manfred Roeder, who played a notable role as right-wing leader and role model for the scene. He participated in militant activities after serving his prison sentence; when he was brought to trial for one of his deeds in 1996, a new generation of violent activists was already entering the stage, with Roeder as their idol. As the general public only realized in 2011, the nascent NSU terrorists Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Böhnhardt had attended this trial and had expressed sympathy for Manfred Roeder, one and a half years before they themselves went underground.¹⁰³

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Notes on contributor

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1. See, for example, Tore Bjørgo, ed., *Terror from the Extreme Right* (London: Frank Cass, 1995); Ehud Sprinzak, “Right-wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: The Case of Split Delegitimization,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 7, no. 1 (1995): 17–43; George Michael, *Confronting Right-wing Extremism and Terrorism in the USA* (London/New York: Routledge, 2003); Max Taylor, P. M. Currie, and Daniel Holbrook, eds., *Extreme Right Wing Political Violence and Terrorism* (New York/London: Bloomsbury, 2013).
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 9. Klaus Weinhauer, "Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik der Siebzigerjahre. Aspekte einer Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte der Inneren Sicherheit," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 44, no. 44 (2004): 221.
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 11. Donatella della Porta, "Politische Gewalt und Terrorismus: Eine vergleichende und soziologische Perspektive," in *Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik. Medien, Staat und Subkulturen in den 1970er Jahren*, eds. Klaus Weinhauer, Jörg Requate, and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (Frankfurt/New York: Campus 2009), 38.

12. According to Waldmann, vigilantism purports “to defend an existing order outside—and sometimes in defiance—of the law, against alleged deviants.” Vigilante groups are characterized by the presumed or real assurance that authorities and parts of the population at large approve of, or at least condone, their efforts. Peter Waldmann, *Terrorismus. Provokation der Macht* (München: Gerling Akademie Verlag, 1998), 17.
13. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/2544, September 17, 2014, 3–4.
14. See, for example, Gräfe (see note 2), 61, 66; Rosen (see note 3), 49.
15. Michail Logvinov, “Terrorismusrelevante Indikatoren und Gefahrenfaktoren im Rechtsextremismus,” *Totalitarismus und Demokratie* 10, no. 2 (2013), 269, 276, 286, 291; Rosen (see note 3), 73–74; Fromm (see note 3), 27, 318, 323–29, 402, 466; Rabert (see note 3), 276, 332–34; Gräfe (see note 2), 291; Dudek (see note 3), 193–96.
16. Neidhardt (see note 3), 447.
17. Heinrich Wilhelm Laufhütte, Ruth Rissing-van Saan, and Klaus Tiedemann, eds., *Strafgesetzbuch. Leipziger Kommentar*, vol. 5, 12th rev. ed. (de Gruyter: Berlin, 2008), 382–429.
18. § 129, subsection (2) StGB (Germany).
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20. Wilhelm Heitmeyer, “Right-Wing Terrorism,” in Bjørgo, *Root Causes* (see note 19), 142; Sprinzak (see note 1), 17; Gräfe (see note 2), 66; Pfahl-Traughber (see note 4), 59; Jacob Aasland Ravndal, “Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe,” *Journal for Deradicalization* 2, no. 3 (2015): 15.
21. Jesse (see note 6), 26; Pfahl-Traughber (see note 4), 57.
22. See, especially, Sprinzak (see note 1), 17.
23. Bjørgo, “Terrorist Violence” (see note 19), 30; Ravndal, “Right-Wing Terrorism” (see note 19), 13; Jeffrey M. Bale, *The Darkest Side of Politics, I: Postwar Fascism, Covert Operations, and Terrorism* (London/New York: Routledge, 2018), 4.
24. Leonard Weinberg, *Global Terrorism* (New York: Rosen Publishing, 2009), 10–13.
25. Bjørgo, “Terrorist Violence” (see note 19), 30.
26. Crenshaw (see note 7), 379.
27. Gräfe (see note 2), 66.
28. Crenshaw (see note 7), 379; Ravndal, “Thugs” (see note 20), 15; Bale (see note 23), 4.
29. Rosen (see note 3), 53; Chaussy (see note 3), 46; Dudek (see note 3), 156.
30. See, for example, Rosen (see note 3), 53–58; Koehler (see note 2), 79, 235–36, who lists the group among “German right-wing terrorist actors 1963–2015”; Hendrik Hegemann and Martin Kahl, *Terrorismus und Terrorismusbekämpfung. Eine Einführung* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2018), 32, 40.
31. Verdict by the regional court Tübingen, October 16, 1977, *Bundesarchiv* (BArch, Federal Archives) B 106/78959, non-paginated; Chaussy (see note 3), 162.
32. Verdict by the regional court Flensburg, February 2, 1983, BArch B 141/64285, 188–196, 202; Indictment by the public prosecution office Flensburg, March 10, 1981, BArch B 141/64285, 154.
33. See, for example, Matthias Quent, “Sonderfall Ost – Normalfall West? Über die Gefahr, die Ursachen des Rechtsextremismus zu verschleiern,” in Frindte, Geschke, Haußecker and Schmidtke (see note 2), 102; Stefan Heerdegen, “Nicht vom Himmel gefallen. Die Thüringer Neonaziszene und der NSU,” in Frindte, Geschke, Haußecker and Schmidtke

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34. Dudek (see note 3), 153–96.
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66. Indictment by the public prosecution office Stuttgart, March 26, 1980, BArch B 136/32156, non-paginated; Bavarian state criminal police office, suspect interrogation, June 24, 1981, BArch B 362/6511, 41–42; Blumenau (see note 4), 4.
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