European Journal of Political Research **57**: 845–866, 2018
doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.12254

Explaining right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe: Grievances, opportunities and polarisation

JACOB AASLAND RAVNDAL
Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX), University of Oslo, Norway

Abstract. What explains cross-national variation of right-wing terrorism and violence (RTV)? This question remains largely unanswered in existing research on the extreme right because (1) events data suitable for cross-national comparisons have been lacking, and (2) existing analyses fail to capture RTV's causal complexity, which involve multiple causal paths (equifinality) comprising causal conditions that become sufficient for the outcome only in combination (conjunctural causation). To help fill these gaps, this article uses new events data in a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) research design, aiming to explain variation in the extent of RTV in 18 West European countries between 1990 and 2015. In doing so, the article identifies two 'causal recipes' that consistently distinguish countries with extensive RTV experience from those with low or moderate RTV experience. The first (North European) recipe involves the combination of high immigration, low electoral support for anti-immigration (radical right) parties, and extensive public repression of radical right actors and opinions. The second (South European) recipe involves the combination of socioeconomic hardship, authoritarian legacies, and extensive left-wing terrorism and militancy. Notably, both recipes contain elements of 'grievances' and 'opportunities', suggesting that these two theories, which are conventionally seen as contrasting, may be more fruitfully seen as complementary. Furthermore, a highly polarised conflict between far right activists and their enemies represents a third necessary condition for extensive RTV to occur. The article concludes by highlighting the paradox that countermeasures intended to constrain radical right politics appear to fuel extreme right violence, while countermeasures that may constrain extreme right violence would imply an advancement of radical right politics.

Keywords: right-wing violence; right-wing terrorism; Western Europe; qualitative comparative analysis

Introduction

Why do some Western liberal democracies experience more right-wing terrorism and violence (RTV) than others? While this question has been debated among scholars of the extreme right for decades (Bjørgo & Witte 1993; Caiani et al. 2012: 76–102; Koopmans 1996; Mudde 2004: 205–208; Wilkinson 1995), few if any studies have provided any consistent findings concerning RTV's underlying causes (Heitmeyer 2003, 2005; Mudde 2007: 286). The main reason is simple; updated, reliable and – perhaps most importantly – comparable events data have been lacking. As a result, theories and hypotheses proposed in existing research (e.g., Bjørgo 1997; Hoffman 1982; Koopmans 1996; Sprinzak 1995) have yet to be investigated systematically across more than a handful of cases.

To help fill these gaps, this article uses new and unique events data to compare the extent of RTV in 18 West European countries between 1990 and 2015.[1] Besides injecting new and updated events data into an old and stagnated academic debate, the study also feeds into an ongoing and increasingly polarised public debate about the threat posed by the extreme right in contemporary Western Europe. On the one side, governments and national security

services tend to downplay the threat from the extreme right compared to other forms of extremism such as jihadism. On the other side, anti-racist groups and journalists tend to exaggerate the threat, often through use of anecdotal evidence rather than systematic events data.

If we turn to existing research, it suggests that RTV comes in waves, and scholars seem to agree that the most recent wave in Europe began around the late 1980s and ended during the early 2000s in most countries (Bjørgo 1997: 74–75; Koopmans 1996; Merkl 1995). Thus, following a relatively peaceful period, experts are now warning that a new outbreak of RTV could be brewing in Western Europe (Bartlett & Birdwell 2011; Fekete 2016; Ramalingam 2014). These concerns have in turn been intensified by the recent migration crisis, a prolonged financial crisis, rising Islamist terrorism and growing support for radical right parties. However, because we lack consistent explanations of these wave-like patterns, we do not know if, when or how such conditions can be expected to fuel more right-wing violence.

One key problem is that in those few instances where scholars have been able to generate systematic events data, they tend to investigate the isolated effects of only one or two causal conditions, such as unemployment (Falk et al. 2011), immigration (Garcia 2015) or at best the interaction between the economy and immigration (McLaren 1999). Yet there are reasons to believe that more complex models are required to explain consistently why RTV has been more extensive in some countries than in others, or during certain time periods. For example, grievances caused by high immigration may be relevant for explaining why countries such as Sweden and Germany have experienced extensive RTV. At the same time, immigration has (until the recent migration crisis) been limited in countries such as Italy and Spain where RTV has nevertheless been extensive, indicating equifinality (multiple causal paths to the same outcome). Furthermore, high immigration alone does not necessarily lead to extensive RTV, as illustrated by cases such as Switzerland and France, unless it is combined with other conditions, indicating conjunctural causation (conditions that only in combination become necessary or sufficient for an outcome).

To resolve this problem, I apply qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) – a method designed precisely to capture causal complexity such as equifinality and conjunctural causation (Ragin 2014: 19–33; Schneider & Wagemann 2013: 78–79).[2] More specifically, I use QCA to investigate how six causal conditions frequently proposed as conducive to RTV in existing research (immigration, socioeconomic hardship, authoritarian legacies, radical right support, radical right repression, and left-wing terrorism and militancy) relate to the extent of RTV in each West European country. This analysis results in two 'causal recipes', each containing three causal conditions, the combination of which appears to fuel hostility, polarisation and violence. The first (North European) recipe involves the combination of high immigration, low electoral support for anti-immigration (radical right) parties, and extensive public repression of radical right actors and opinions. The second (South European) recipe involves the combination of socioeconomic hardship, authoritarian legacies, and extensive left-wing terrorism and militancy.

Notably, both recipes contain elements of grievances and opportunities, suggesting that these two theories conventionally seen as contrasting (Koopmans 1996) may be more fruitfully seen as complementary (Bara 2014). In addition, a highly polarised conflict between far right activists and their enemies represents a third necessary condition for

extensive RTV to occur. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that in Northern Europe, these three conditions relate mainly to a newer conflict (or cleavage) concerning the question of immigration, whereas in Southern Europe an older political conflict between the far left and supporters of former fascist regimes still appears to divide these countries into opposing blocs with extremist elements on both sides.

The article proceeds as follows. I begin by outlining some key concepts used in this analysis, before introducing a new events dataset used to capture cross-national differences of RTV in Western Europe. I then draw on existing theory and literature to identify the most relevant causal conditions for explaining this cross-national variation, before briefly introducing the QCA method, and outlining how each condition included in the analysis has been measured and scored. After presenting my QCA results, I draw on them to reflect upon the paradox that countermeasures intended to constrain radical right politics appear to fuel extreme right violence, while countermeasures that may constrain extreme right violence would imply an advancement of radical right politics.

Concepts

The far right is a highly contested concept that usually includes a diverse set of actors, ranging from political parties via militant extra-parliamentary groups to lone actor terrorists. Common denominators for all these actors is that they are strongly opposed to liberal democracy – that is, they have authoritarian inclinations (Stenner 2005), and promote some nativist (Mudde 2007: 15–23) or anti-egalitarian (Bobbio 1996) agenda. Furthermore, it is useful to distinguish between, on the one hand, radical right actors who use conventional democratic means to influence politics and, on the other hand, militants or extremists who openly reject democracy and favour violent or other non-conventional means to generate revolutionary change (Mudde 2007: 24–26). One may then refer to the 'far right' as a collective term comprising both actor types when appropriate.

Not all right-wing extremists or violent perpetrators are terrorists. Terrorists deliberately use or threaten violence to trigger far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target (Hoffman 2006: 40). However, in the case of right-wing terrorism, such deliberate use of violence can be hard to document because the perpetrators rarely issue demands or claim responsibility for the attacks they carry out (Koehler 2017). Opinions on whether such attacks should qualify as terrorism are therefore divided (Mills et al. 2015). Most attacks are never claimed or explained, but they generally involve demonstrating hostility towards and instilling fear into some target group represented by the victim. Thus, although specific demands may be lacking, these attacks do contain a clear political message about the target group being unwanted. As such, the target selection may be seen as a political message in and of itself, and the larger target group may be seen as the primary audience to be influenced by the attack. One could therefore consider an attack as right-wing terrorism if it was premeditated, and if the victim was targeted only because she or he belongs to a group predefined as an enemy or as unwanted by the far right. By contrast, right-wing violence does not require premeditation, and includes spontaneous attacks against perceived enemies or people regarded as unwanted by the far right. RTV covers both types of attacks (Right-wing Terrorism, and Violence).

The RTV dataset

A critical weakness in existing research on RTV in Western Europe has been a lack of systematic events data suitable for analysing cross-national variation (Heitmeyer 2003, 2005; Mudde 2007: 286). By comparison, research on RTV in the United States has progressed because systematic events data have been developed (Adamczyk et al. 2014; Chermak et al. 2013; Freilich et al. 2014; Hewitt 2003; Kerodal et al. 2015; Perliger 2012). To overcome this challenge, I use new events data from the RTV dataset, which covers right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe between 1990 and 2015 (Ravndal 2016). In line with the above definitions, the RTV dataset includes only events whose target selection – minority groups, political adversaries or the government – is based on far right beliefs. The dataset has been developed using a wide range of open sources – newspaper articles, activist autobiographies, official and unofficial RTV chronologies, anti-fascist blogs and bulletins, communication with RTV experts, online videos and secondary literature – to document the most severe types of RTV. More specifically, the dataset includes: attacks with a deadly or near deadly outcome; attacks involving the active use of deadly weapons; and extensive plots and preparations for armed struggle.

The RTV dataset currently comprises 578 events, including 190 deadly events causing 303 deaths. Due to both the clandestine nature of RTV and the limited information available, the dataset may not include all relevant events that occurred in Western Europe between 1990 and 2015. However, it should include (nearly) all deadly events. Considering that political and racist murders rarely occur in complete isolation from less severe forms of violence, such deadly events arguably also constitute a reasonably good indicator of right-wing violence more generally. The RTV dataset can therefore be used to compare frequencies of deadly events across time and space, and to make causal inferences about RTV more generally from these patterns with reasonable confidence.

Theoretical framework

The existing RTV literature may be characterised as diverse, disorganised and discontinuous, which is also reflected in existing reviews of it (Heitmeyer 2003, 2005). A number of different and at times conflicting explanations of RTV have been proposed, including but not limited to immigration (Garcia 2015), social isolation and disintegration (Heitmeyer 1993), a search for meaning and purpose in life (Griffin 2003), threat perceptions (Sprinzak 1995), elite behaviour and public discourse (Koopmans 1996), and apolitical factors such as low socioeconomic status, identity formation or criminal dispositions (Bjørgo 1997). However, few of these explanations have been tested systematically using comparative designs.

The first (and as far as I know only) attempt so far to explain cross-national variation in right-wing violence in Western Europe was published by Koopmans in 1996. In this study, Koopmans aims to test what he portrays as two contrasting theoretical models: the grievance model, which sees protest and mobilisation as a result of grievances caused by increased immigration and feelings of anomie among the socially marginalised; and the opportunity model, which emphasises the role of political institutions, elites and parties in shaping mobilisation opportunities for social movements (Koopmans 1996). Koopmans merits recognition for having offered the first comparative cross-national study of this kind.

However, his analysis leans on a rather cursory depiction of right-wing violence in only eight of Western Europe's 18 countries. In particular, he excludes highly relevant countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece. He also compares events data from different datasets that cannot be compared because they rely on different definitions of right-wing violence, different data collection methods and different types of sources (Bjørgo 2003: 793–794). Furthermore, by approaching these two explanatory models as competing, Koopmans creates a potentially false dichotomy between grievances and opportunities – two aspects of reality that may well co-exist and influence the level of right-wing violence, not only as different causal paths to the same outcome (equifinality), but also as causal conditions that become sufficient for the outcome only in combination (conjunctural causation). Koopmans (1996: 199, 208) is forthright about the inherent ambiguity of his findings. It is therefore surprising that no one has attempted to conduct a similar study, only with more reliable data, or with a different research design.

Aiming to do just that, I investigate how six causal conditions frequently proposed as being conducive to RTV (immigration, socioeconomic hardship, authoritarian legacies, radical right support, radical right repression, and left-wing terrorism and militancy) relate to the extent of RTV in 18 West European countries. My selection of causal conditions relies on three theoretical premises derived from existing research: sufficient militant mobilisation; combining rather than contrasting grievances and opportunities; and polarisation.

First premise: Sufficient militant mobilisation

Based on a chronology of more than 3,000 terrorist attacks in the United States between 1954 and 2004, the majority of which were right-wing, Hewitt found a strong relationship between the numbers of active militants, or what he labels 'mobilised activists', on the one hand, and levels of terrorism and violence, on the other. At the same time, the number of unorganised sympathisers did not seem to influence terrorism and violence in the same way (Hewitt 2003: 46). Assuming that these causal relationships apply also to the European context, a key condition to explain varying levels of terrorism and violence would be the number of active militants at any given time.

Both grievances and opportunities come across as relevant in this regard. From the grievance side, factors such as immigration, modernisation and socioeconomic hardship have been proposed as being conducive to extreme right mobilisation and violence (Garcia 2015; Heitmeyer 1993; Lipset & Raab 1970). However, this approach has been criticised by social movement scholars for failing to 'explain the causal mechanisms that intervene between macro-causes and micro-behaviours' and for emphasising conditions that in isolation are 'neither necessary nor sufficient' for the outcome of interest (Caiani et al. 2012: 9). For example, one can easily find countries in Western Europe, such as Switzerland and France, where immigration has been extensive but where RTV has been low or moderate.

From the opportunity side, social movement scholars have proposed looking at how political and discursive opportunities might shape militant mobilisation. More specifically, extreme right mobilisation has been proposed as more likely in countries where support for radical right parties is limited or blocked, thereby channelling people with far right sympathies into more extreme forms of activism (Koopmans 1996), and in countries where

former authoritarian (fascist) experiences create favourable discursive opportunities for militant mobilisation (Gattinara & Froio 2014).

Some social movement scholars also argue that racist violence is more likely to occur when the political elites and the media create favourable discursive opportunities for the extreme right, most notably by framing immigrants as a societal threat (Koopmans 1996; Koopmans & Olzak 2004). The idea is that such discursive opportunities legitimise, and thus facilitate, extreme right mobilisation and violence. However, while elites' negative framing of immigrants may have contributed to racist violence in some countries, particularly during the early and mid-1990s, it does not explain why countries with a more restrictive public debate on immigration, such as Sweden, have nevertheless experienced extensive RTV (Jørgensen & Meret 2012). Furthermore, although immigrants constitute the largest target group in the RTV dataset, they represent less than half of the registered victims. The second largest target group are left-wing activists. Other significant target groups include homosexuals and homeless people. Western political elites and the media have hardly framed these target groups as societal threats, and elite framing therefore offers a less helpful explanation of these types of violent attacks.

Second premise: Combining rather than contrasting grievances and opportunities

Grievances and opportunities were originally introduced as useful ordering concepts for the study of war (Starr 1978), and have since become recurrent themes in the civil war literature (Collier & Hoeffler 2004). While conventionally approached as two competing theories, civil war scholars have more recently found that they may be more fruitfully approached as complementary because their implied causal mechanisms do not logically exclude one another (Ballentine & Sherman 2003; Korf 2005). By contrast, one may argue that opportunity-oriented explanations follow logically from grievances, and that grievances are necessary for explaining why some actors choose to exploit existing opportunities while others remain inactive.

The potential complementarity between grievances (or incentives) and opportunities has also been convincingly demonstrated empirically to explain civil war onset using QCA (Bara 2014). This method may therefore provide a useful tool for investigating how elements from grievances and opportunities might combine to explain cross-national variation in RTV in Western Europe. However, unlike countries experiencing civil wars, a belligerent conflict is not necessarily present in all West European countries. To explain why some West European countries have experienced considerably more RTV than others, a third component might therefore be fruitfully added to the grievance and opportunity models: polarisation.

Third premise: Polarisation

The polarisation premise concerns the nature and dynamics of ongoing conflicts between the far right and its enemies. This premise, too, builds on research derived from the civil war literature, but this time on the violent consequences of highly polarised conflict environments (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005; Østby 2008). Applying this concept to the West European context, I assume that extensive RTV is more likely to occur in countries with a highly polarised left-right conflict than in countries where the left-right divide is

less pronounced. Polarisation may in turn be accentuated via different mechanisms, such as violent confrontations between left- and right-wing militants, or through public repression and stigmatisation of radical right actors and opinions, pushing some of the most ardent activists onto more extreme and clandestine paths.

Such mechanisms are well documented in existing RTV research, although rarely analysed comparatively or systematically across cases. Notably, Sprinzak (1995: 21) argues that extreme right 'violence, and gradually terrorism, will only emerge when the group involved feels increasingly insecure or threatened [by their enemies]'. A number of other studies have also documented these types of confrontational mechanisms, which appear to be of a universal nature (Bjørgo 1997: 211–235; Fangen 2001: 54; Lööw 1993; Merkl 1995: 111; Weinberg 1995). The most systematic exposition to date is provided by Della Porta in her recent book *Clandestine Political Violence* (Della Porta 2013), tracing causal mechanisms such as 'escalating policing' and 'competitive escalation' (within and between extremist groups) across different contexts and ideological spaces, including the extreme right.

Furthermore, several scholars have noted that repressive measures meant to curb radical right actors and opinions have a tendency to fuel more extreme forms of activism (Art 2011: 44–49; Klandermans & Mayer 2006: 272–273; Minkenberg 2006). These observations tie into larger academic debates on the relationship between violence and repression (Della Porta 2014), and on so-called 'backlashing' – that is, an unintended negative effect produced by state interventions originally meant to deter political violence and terrorism (Argomaniz & Vidal-Diez 2015; Lafree et al. 2009; Pridemore & Freilich 2007). They also tie into an ongoing debate on how to approach radical right parties, and whether repression and stigmatisation of such parties and their sympathisers have the desired effects, or if such measures only contribute to further polarisation (Van Spanje & Van Der Brug 2007). On this note, existing research finds that while high stigmatisation might constrain recruitment, it also increases the inner spirit of extreme right groups (Simi & Futrell 2009). Furthermore, different forms and degrees of stigmatisation appear to have opposite effects on different types of extreme right activists (Linden & Klandermans 2006). While extensive repression and stigmatisation might fuel violence and militancy, a complete absence of repression and stigmatisation might also lead to the same outcome (given that a sizeable militant movement exists), as seems to have been the case in Russia (Enstad 2015). High or low repression and stigmatisation should, in other words, not be seen as mutually exclusive conditions, but rather as two alternative paths that may lead to a similar outcome (equifinality).

Not all conditions proposed as being conducive to RTV come across as equally relevant for explaining cross-national variation. Furthermore, the number of causal conditions to be included in a QCA should be kept at a moderate level (Schneider & Wagemann 2013: 276–277). Consequently, using the three premises discussed above to inform my selection, I have opted for the six conditions listed in Table 1.[3]

Method: A short introduction to fuzzy set QCA

QCA is a comparative method for the social sciences invented and developed by the American sociologist Charles Ragin (1987, 2000, 2008). The method is becoming increasingly popular among scholars and methodologists as an alternative to conventional statistical analysis (Roig-Tierno et al. 2017). To investigate causal complexity such as

Table 1. Causal conditions included in the analysis

Conditions	Theoretical foundation
Ethnic diversity or immigration	Grievances
Socioeconomic hardship	Grievances
Radical right support	Opportunities
Authoritarian legacies	Opportunities
Left-wing terrorism and militancy	Polarisation
Radical right repression	Polarisation



Figure 1. Venn diagrams illustrating set-theoretic example.

equifinality (multiple causal paths to the same outcome) and conjunctural causation (conditions that only in combination become necessary or sufficient for an outcome), correlation-based methods require extensive interaction modelling whose results may be difficult to interpret meaningfully once the number of interacting variables exceeds two or three. By contrast, QCA is specifically designed to capture such causal complexity (Ragin 2014: 19–33; Schneider & Wagemann 2013: 78–79).

In QCA, both the outcome and the independent variables – or 'causal conditions' in QCA terminology – are treated as partially overlapping 'sets' in which cases may be members or not. For example, one may look at how the set of Western liberal democracies with extensive RTV experience (outcome) overlaps with the set of countries with high immigration and the set of countries with authoritarian legacies, as illustrated by the Venn diagrams in Figure 1. By quantifying and then cross-analysing such set memberships in a truth table, QCA helps identify (combinations of) causal conditions that may be regarded as *necessary* or *sufficient* for the outcome. In the (imagined) example from Figure 1, we see that all countries with extensive RTV experience have experienced either an authoritarian regime, or high immigration, or both. However, we also see that none of these conditions are necessary for the outcome because they only cover a portion of the outcome set. Furthermore, because

they also include cases outside the outcome set, they are not sufficient and must be combined with additional conditions to become part of a consistent explanation.

Fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) also allows cases to have partial set memberships, reflecting the often fuzzy boundaries of many social science concepts such as 'democracy' (Goertz 2006). In doing so, the researcher assigns scores of between 0 and 1, where 1 means full membership, 0 means no membership and 0.5 represents the critical cut-off point separating those cases that are considered to be more in than out of the set, based on the researcher's substantive and theoretical knowledge (Ragin 2008: 82–83). Because of the asymmetric nature of set relations, crossing the cut-off point has much greater inferential implications than moving up or down on either side of this point. To critically assess any given fuzzy scores, one should therefore primarily consider which cases are above or below the cut-off point before examining the relative position of cases to each other on either side of the fuzzy scale.

Finally, in terms of causal explanation, it should be noted that uncovering necessary or sufficient relationships between sets does not automatically imply that they are causally related. In fact, from a pure mathematical perspective such set relationships say nothing about causality (Thiem & Baumgartner 2016). However, given that the selection of causal conditions is theoretically informed, QCA represents a systematic method for identifying empirically consistent (combinations of) conditions whose implied causal mechanisms may then be further investigated using process-tracing or similar case study methods (Schneider & Rohlfing 2013). As such, QCA may be complemented by case studies in the same way as large-N statistical analyses may be (Sambanis 2004). However, as opposed to large-N statistical analysis, QCA may also be used for medium- and even low-N studies.

Measurements

This section outlines how my outcome set and causal conditions have been measured and scored according to standard QCA procedures. Each condition has been calibrated as a four-level fuzzy scale with the following thresholds: 1.0 / 0.75 / 0.25 / 0.0. A more detailed description, including tables with raw scores and case distributions for all measurements, the truth table, the negated set analysis and robustness test scores, can be found in Online Appendix I.

Outcome set

My outcome is the extent of RTV in each West European country between 1990 and 2015. To obtain a reliable measurement of this set, I combine a quantitative measure with a qualitative assessment. My quantitative measure is the number of deadly RTV events per million inhabitants in each country between 1990 and 2015. Deadly RTV events arguably represent the most definitive and reliable measure of RTV. However, some countries, such as Italy and Greece, have experienced extensive non-lethal violence (Sunderland et al. 2012; Sunderland & Ward 2011) but relatively few deaths per capita, and it could be misleading to place such cases below the cut-off point. In addition, small countries with only a handful of deadly events, such as Norway and Ireland, would get disproportionally high scores if only the number of deadly events per capita counts. I therefore use a second qualitative

Table 2. RTV events by country

Country	RTV events	Deadly RTV events (number killed)	Deadly events per average million inhabitants, 1990–2015
Austria	23	1 (4)	0.1
Belgium	6	3 (5)	0.3
Denmark	19	1(1)	0.2
Finland	8	–	–
France	16	9 (11)	0.1
Germany	122	82 (104)	1
Greece	55	6 (7)	0.6
Iceland	–	–	–
Ireland	4	3 (4)	0.8
Italy	99	5 (6)	0.1
Luxembourg	–	–	–
Netherlands	10	3 (3)	0.2
Norway	25	3 (79)	0.7
Portugal	3	3 (3)	0.3
Spain	39	22 (22)	0.5
Sweden	89	17 (20)	1.9
Switzerland	1	1 (1)	0.1
United Kingdom	59	31 (33)	0.5
Sum	578	190 (303)	

Note: All 23 events in Austria were carried out by one person: Franz Fuchs.

assessment to inform and adjust the ranking resulting from my quantitative measure. This qualitative assessment is based on a variety of sources documenting RTV across Western Europe, most notably events data from the RTV dataset, but also national hate crime statistics on right-wing violence (see Online Appendix II), as well as existing reports and literature on racist violence in different West European countries (see Online Appendix III). The cut-off point is set at 0.5 deadly events per million inhabitants, at which point a gap appears in the distribution of cases, effectively separating Spain and the United Kingdom (both 0.5) from Belgium and Portugal (both 0.3). Table 2 shows the number of RTV events, deadly events and deadly events per average million inhabitants in each country. Online Appendix I gives a more detailed explanation of how each case has been scored.

Causal conditions

Ethnic diversity or immigration (diversity) has been operationalised as a macro condition (one that combines two measures) using the logical OR operator to combine measures of ethnic diversity with asylum seeker frequencies. I use the OR operator because low scores on one of these measures become less meaningful if the score on the other measure is

high (violent far right activists do not seem to care about foreigners' citizenship status). My measure of ethnic diversity relies on Eurostat's 2014 figures for the relative share of a country's population born outside the EU – a measure used in previous research on ethnic diversity (Lolle & Torpe 2011). Asylum seeker frequencies are based on Eurostat data documenting the number of asylum seekers registered annually between 1990 and 2014 in each country. Note that I have intentionally left out figures for 2015, when the migration crisis hit Europe with full force. The reason is that one may expect a temporal lag between increased immigration and militant mobilisation and violence. Therefore, including these latest figures might give a misleading impression about the effects of immigration on RTV. Cut-off points and interval levels are in both measures based on case distributions, as well as a few cases whose raw scores indicate a middle position, but which are generally considered as having experienced either high ethnic diversity (the United Kingdom) or high immigration (Germany and Denmark).

Socioeconomic hardship (hardship) was measured using Eurostat's so-called 'at risk of poverty or social exclusion' (AROPE) measure, reflecting a population's share of people either at risk of poverty, or severely materially deprived, or living in a household with a very low work intensity. *Hardship*'s fuzzy scores are based on each country's average AROPE scores in the period 2004–2014 (data on previous years are unavailable), and high and low thresholds are set according to the case distribution and the positions of cases known for their good (e.g., Germany) or bad (e.g., Greece) socioeconomic performance. The cut-off point was set at 25 per cent, at which point a gap appears in the distribution of cases, effectively separating Spain (26) from the United Kingdom (24).

Radical right support (support) was measured using data compiled by Minkenberg (2015: 8). Data have been added for seven cases not included in Minkenberg's study: Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Finland and Greece – countries where radical right parties have been electorally irrelevant, except for more recently in Finland (Finns Party) and Greece (Golden Dawn). I use 5 per cent intervals based on the average percentage of votes given to radical right parties in parliamentary elections between 1990 and 2014. The cut-off point is set at 10 per cent, at which point a gap appears in the distribution of cases, effectively separating Belgium (10.2) from the Netherlands (6.7). This cut-off point is also based on the theoretical expectation that support for radical right parties should exceed 10 per cent to discourage alternative and more extreme forms of mobilisation.

Authoritarian legacies (legacies) was scored using a mini-survey sent to a group of experts on former authoritarian regimes, asking them to rank West European countries according to their authoritarian experiences and legacies.[4] More specifically, I asked them to rank countries on a 4-value scale where the full membership score (1.0) is given to countries still heavily influenced by extensive authoritarian experiences. The more-in-than-out score (0.75) is given to countries with significant authoritarian experience still influencing parts of the population. The more-out-than-in score (0.25) is given to countries that have some authoritarian experience, but are being influenced to a lesser extent by that experience today. Finally, the fully out score (0) is given to countries with insignificant or no authoritarian experience. Interim Nazi governments during the Second World War have not been considered as a relevant experience here because they arguably generated more resistance than support.

Radical right repression (repression) was scored using relevant academic accounts, most notably Art's (2011: 44–49) discussion of repressive versus permissive environments for radical right parties in Europe, Van Spanje and Van Der Brug's (2007) research on ostracism of anti-immigration parties and Bleich's (2007; Bleich & Lambert 2013) research on government responses to hate crimes and racist associations in West European countries. Some countries included in my analysis are not referred to in these studies, primarily because they never had any prominent radical right parties. Such cases (e.g., Spain and Iceland) have been assigned the 0 score, while being mindful that extensive repression might have existed if radical right parties were more prominent and that the non-existence of such parties could be interpreted as a result of extensive repression. The full membership score (1.0) is given to countries where existing academic accounts leave little doubt about a repressive environment. The more-in-than-out score (0.75) is given to countries where existing academic accounts portray somewhat milder forms of repression, or to countries that have evolved from a repressive towards a more permissive environment, or the other way around. The more-out-than-in score (0.25) is given to countries for which existing academic accounts testify to some, but no consistent, repression. Finally, the fully out score (0) is given to countries described as permissive or not mentioned in existing academic accounts.

Left-wing terrorism and militancy (aggression) has been operationalised using three different measures: (1) left-wing terrorism in the period 1990–2004 as indicated by the Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED, Eugene 2007) and the Domestic Terrorist Victims (DTV; De la Calle & Sanchez-Cuenca 2011) datasets; (2) left-wing terrorism and militancy in the period 2006–2015 as portrayed by Europol's annual Terrorism Trend and Situation (TE-SAT) reports; and (3) a mini-survey conducted among contemporary left-wing militants ranking their own movement's size and visibility in different West European countries.[5] The full membership score (1) is given to countries that score high on all three measures. The more-in-than-out score (0.75) is given to countries that score high on two of three measures. The more-out-than-in score (0.25) is given to countries that score high on one of three measures. Finally, the fully out score (0) is given to countries with low scores on all three measures. All fuzzy scores are presented in Table 3.

Analysis and results

Any QCA should begin by searching for necessary (non-trivial) conditions. The fsQCA software has a specific function for the necessity analysis which should be conducted independently from the truth table analysis (Schneider & Wagemann 2013: 69–75). Table 4 shows the scores produced by this necessity analysis.

These results show that none of the conditions included in my analysis are necessary for RTV (which would require consistency and coverage scores at least above 0.9). Conditions with fairly high consistency scores (*diversity* and ~*support*) have low coverage scores, meaning that the outcome set constitutes a relatively small subset of these two conditions. In other words, while *diversity* (grievances) and ~*support* (opportunities) may constitute important preconditions for right-wing violence in some cases, these features are also present in a number of cases that are not members of the outcome set. Therefore, they must

Table 3. Fuzzy score matrix

Country	RTV	Diversity	Hardship	Support	Legacies	Repression	Aggression
AUT	0.25	1	0	1	1	0	0
BEL	0.25	1	0.25	0.75	0.25	0.75	0
DEN	0.25	0.75	0	0.75	0	0	0.25
FIN	0.25	0	0	0.25	0	0	0
FRA	0.25	0.75	0	0.75	0.25	0.75	0.25
GER	1	0.75	0.25	0	1	1	0.75
GRE	0.75	0.75	1	0	1	0	1
ICE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IRE	0.25	0.75	0.75	0	0	0	0
ITA	0.75	0.25	0.75	0.75	1	0	0.75
LUX	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
NED	0.25	0.75	0	0.25	0	0.75	0
NOR	0.25	1	0	0.75	0	0	0
POR	0	0.25	0.75	0	1	0	0
SPA	0.75	0.75	0.75	0	1	0	0.75
SWE	1	1	0	0	0	1	0.25
SWI	0.25	1	0	1	0	0.25	0
UK	0.75	0.75	0.25	0	0	0.75	0

be combined with other conditions to become part of a consistent explanation, indicating conjunctural causation. This brings us to the test for sufficiency.

The most critical measure of the sufficiency analysis – solution consistency – expresses the combined consistency of the proposed causal recipes derived from a truth table analysis. In other words, do the proposed combinations of conditions consistently explain the outcomes across the cases involved in the analysis? The second measure – solution coverage – expresses how much of the outcome set is being covered by these proposed causal recipes. The consistency cut-off level decided by the researcher also influences solution consistency and coverage scores. In my case, the truth table generated by the fsQCA software (see Online Appendix I) leaves two possible cut-off options: 1.0, including four of the six cases that are more in than out of my outcome set; or 0.82, including all six cases plus one case (the Netherlands) that is more out than in (0.25) of my outcome set. Setting the cut-off level at 1.0 logically yields higher solution consistency (0.93 for the intermediate solution) but lower solution coverage (0.45 for the intermediate solution).[6] Conversely, setting the cut-off level at 0.82 yields a somewhat lower but still acceptable solution consistency score (0.88 for the intermediate solution) and a higher solution coverage score (0.76 for the intermediate solution), as illustrated by Table 5.

Opting for the 0.82 cut-off level, two causal recipes (intermediate solution) are derived from the logical minimisation performed by the fsQCA software. Note that I have changed the order of the conditions according to the logical direction of the assumed causal path: grievances*opportunities*polarisation → RTV

Table 4. Analysis of necessary conditions

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
diversity	0.86	0.50
~diversity	0.41	0.55
hardship	0.45	0.68
~hardship	0.72	0.40
support	0.38	0.44
~support	0.86	0.53
legacies	0.55	0.62
~legacies	0.52	0.33
repression	0.52	0.71
~repression	0.66	0.37
aggression	0.52	0.94
~aggression	0.62	0.32

Note: ~ symbolises set negation.

Table 5. Solution terms from the intermediate solution

Frequency cut-off: 1.00
Consistency cut-off: 0.82
Assumptions: diversity*hardship*~support*legacies*repression*aggression → rtv

Causal recipes	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
repression*~support*diversity	0.45	0.41	0.87
aggression*hardship*legacies	0.34	0.31	0.91
Solution coverage: 0.76			
Solution consistency: 0.88			

(* symbolises the AND operator, ~ symbolises the negated set, → symbolises sufficiency):

$$\text{diversity}^{*}{\sim}\text{support}^{*}\text{repression} \rightarrow \text{RTV}$$

$$\text{hardship}^{*}\text{legacies}^{*}\text{aggression} \rightarrow \text{RTV}$$

Discussion

If we look at the different cases covered by these two recipes, an interesting geographical pattern emerges: the first recipe covers North European countries with extensive RTV (Sweden, the United Kingdom and Germany) while the second recipe covers South European countries with extensive RTV (Italy, Spain and Greece). In the first recipe, grievances related to high ethnic diversity or immigration appear to have become

particularly pronounced in a handful of North European countries that also lacked influential anti-immigration (radical right) parties during the period under investigation (i.e., 1990–2015), thereby creating mobilisation opportunities for the extreme right. Such militant mobilisation may in turn have been fuelled by extensive public repression and stigmatisation of radical right actors and opinions in countries such as Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom (Art 2011: 48; Bleich 2007; Van Spanje & Van Der Brug 2007). In other words, these findings suggest that while repression and stigmatisation may discourage some people from joining radical and extreme right groups, they may also push some of the most ardent activists onto more clandestine and revolutionary paths, ultimately leading to violence and terrorism.

In the second recipe, grievances related to socioeconomic hardship combined with the legacies of former authoritarian regimes create opportunities for militant mobilisation on both sides of the political spectrum, intensifying an already polarised left-right divide. Once a sufficient number of militants have been mobilised on both sides, a reciprocal spiral of violence and terrorism is then likely to follow (Weinberg 1995; Weinberg & Eubank 1987). These dynamics are also echoed by the RTV dataset, most notably by the Italian and Spanish cases, where a majority of the registered attacks have targeted left-wing militants as opposed to most other countries where immigrants constitute the largest target group. While attacks against left-wing militants in Greece are less covered by the RTV dataset (most likely because of limited data), newspaper reports describe an ongoing street war between the militant left and the militant right in Greece (Faiola 2014; Spillius 2012) – a conflict that according to local experts is best understood in light of Greece's former authoritarian regime (Sotiris 2012). The continuity of this 'old' left-right political cleavage is also indicated by the fact that Italy, Spain and Greece still have active communist parties (sometimes with parliamentary representation) – a rare phenomenon in the rest of Western Europe (March & Mudde 2005).

Summing up, a consistent explanation of RTV requires a combination of grievances, opportunities and polarisation. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that in Northern Europe, interaction between these three elements relates mainly to a newer conflict (or cleavage) concerning the question of immigration, whereas in Southern Europe it relates mainly to an older conflict between the far left and supporters of former far right authoritarian regimes.

Uncertainty and robustness

What might we infer from these findings and are they robust? Importantly, the explorative character of QCA implies provisional results that should always be followed by additional case studies and/or statistical analysis (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 400). Considering the causal distance between many of the conditions included in this study and actual terrorism and violence, more in-depth case studies tracing the causal mechanisms implied by each causal recipe are therefore needed before drawing any conclusions with confidence. It is beyond the scope of this macro-comparative study to provide such detailed case studies, which would require different types of data and methods, including inside information generated by ethnographic field work as well as interviews with former perpetrators.

With regards to robustness, Schneider and Wagemann (2013: 284–295) propose three types of robustness tests for QCA: changing calibration thresholds; changing consistency

levels for truth table rows; and adding or dropping cases. The general rule is that the analysis can be regarded as reasonably robust if slightly adjusting any of these three elements does not result in substantive changes in the solution formulas' parameters of fit (consistency and coverage scores) or in the composition of the solution formulas. Thus, to experiment with different calibration thresholds, I ran a robustness test where the cut-off points for *diversity*, *hardship* and *support* (my frequency-based conditions) were determined by the median score rather than by the case distribution and the position of a few key cases, and where the intervals were set to be equally large irrespective of how the cases cluster. This test gave fairly similar results as those found in my original analysis, except that *hardship* was added to the North European recipe because the United Kingdom was included in the set of countries with socioeconomic hardship with these alternative calibration thresholds. In addition, a third causal recipe mainly reflecting the German case was derived from this alternative analysis, combining all the elements from the other two recipes except for *hardship*, but with a unique coverage of only 0.07. The solution consistency score of these three recipes was 0.94, while the solution coverage score was 0.59. This robustness test thus suggests that socioeconomic hardship may be more important than suggested by my original analysis, but only if we accept that the United Kingdom experienced socioeconomic hardship between 1990 and 2015, which is debatable. I therefore consider my original findings as reasonably robust after having performed this test.

Regarding consistency cut-off levels, I have already described how different consistency cut-off levels (1.0 versus 0.82) yielded different parameters of fit, especially on solution coverage, because the 1.0 cut-off level included only four of six cases from the outcome set. By setting the consistency cut-off point at 1.0, and thereby defining the 0.82 row (containing Sweden, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) as insufficient for the outcome, the 'North European' causal recipe is replaced by a new recipe that is substantially reconcilable with the original recipe (because *diversity* * ~*support* * *repression* are still included) but more restrictive because two conditions are added to the recipe (*legacies* and *aggression*). Conversely, by including the 0.82 row, all six cases from my outcome set are included plus the Netherlands, which is the only fully inconsistent case, being a full member of the North European recipe, but with an RTV score of only 0.25. As such, the Netherlands represents an interesting case for further investigation (perhaps the Dutch liberal mind-set is a barrier against RTV?). The QCA convention is not to include rows with a consistency of lower than 0.75. Excluding a 0.82 row therefore makes little sense, and, considering that in doing so, one of the proposed recipes remains identical and the second substantially reconcilable, I consider my original findings to be reasonably robust after having performed this test.

The final robustness test (dropping or adding cases) entails certain practical barriers in terms of finding relevant cases. To be sure, by dropping some of the most contradictory cases, such as Portugal (*legacies* + *hardship* but *aggression* = 0) or the Netherlands, my consistency and coverage scores would indeed improve. Adding East European cases is not an option for the time being, because comparable RTV data are lacking, perhaps with the exception of Russia where RTV has definitely been extensive since 1990 (Arnold 2010; Laryš & Mareš 2011). However, considering Russia's current semi-autocratic regime and recent political history, this case may not fit well into the theoretical framework used here to explain RTV in the context of Western liberal democracy. Finally, the United States represents a relevant case with available RTV data (Freilich et al. 2014). However, in the Unites States,

RTV appears to occur under somewhat different conditions (more emphasis on religion, survivalism and anti-federalism) than in Western Europe.

Summing up, despite being fairly robust, the findings presented here should be seen as provisional rather than definite, and the analysis would benefit from being completed by case studies or statistical analysis documenting variation over time (inherently difficult with QCA). One could also conduct a similar QCA treating the years during which the events occurred as the outcome. However, because the number of deadly events is zero for most years in most countries, one would then have to analyse Western Europe as a whole to generate meaningful variation. A second alternative would be to gather systematic data on less severe forms of RTV in a specific country to facilitate QCA or statistical analysis of within-country variation over time. In any event, the analysis presented here may serve as a useful point of departure for such more fine-grained future RTV research.

Conclusion

Existing research on the extreme right offer few consistent explanations of why RTV has been more extensive in some countries than in others. To help fill this gap, I have used new events data in a QCA research design to test six causal conditions frequently proposed as being conducive to RTV (immigration, socioeconomic hardship, authoritarian legacies, radical right support, radical right repression, and left-wing terrorism and militancy). This analysis arrived at two causal recipes, each containing three causal conditions, the combination of which appears to fuel hostility, polarisation and violence. First, there is a North European recipe that involves the combination of high immigration, low electoral support for anti-immigration (radical right) parties, and extensive public repression of radical right actors and opinions. Second, there is a South European recipe that involves the combination of socioeconomic hardship, authoritarian legacies, and extensive left-wing terrorism and militancy. Notably, both recipes contain elements of grievances and opportunities, suggesting that these two theories portrayed as contrasting by Koopmans (1996) in his pioneering study of extreme right violence may be more fruitfully seen as complementary.

Furthermore, the North European recipe provides some support to Koopman's study, in particular that the relationship between radical right support and RTV may (under certain conditions) be negative. However, unlike Koopmans' findings, in which such limited support is combined with elites' negative framing of immigrants to trigger racist violence, my findings suggest that it is rather elites' negative framing of radical right actors and opinions that distinguishes countries with extensive RTV (e.g., Sweden and Germany) from those with moderate or low RTV experience (e.g., Denmark and Switzerland). As such, this finding challenges the dominant view on how the public discourse on immigration might influence extreme right mobilisation and violence. It suggests that a predominantly pro-immigration elite perceived as hostile towards people with anti-immigration concerns might be exploited by the extreme right to mobilise new followers and to motivate terrorism and violence.

This argument ties into a more general finding emerging from this analysis, suggesting that a highly polarised conflict between far-right activists and their enemies, including leftists, political elites and the public at large, represents a necessary condition for extensive RTV to occur. From a social movement theory perspective, the extent of polarisation may

thus be seen as a key factor determining whether the final outcome will be non-violent mobilisation only, or if extensive terrorism and violence is likely to occur. Furthermore, as explained previously, there appears to be a strong relationship between extremist or militant mobilisation on the one hand, and violence on the other. As such, explanations of non-violent extremist or militant mobilisation should be seen as a necessary but not sufficient part of explanations of extensive terrorism and violence.

The relevance of polarisation and threat perceptions have also been emphasised in previous research aiming to explain RTV (Sprinzak 1995), political violence more generally (Della Porta 2013), and intolerant attitudes and behaviours across a wide range of countries and contexts (Stenner 2005). By implication, a potentially effective cure for RTV could be to limit immigration and be more accepting towards radical right actors and opinions. However, considering the inherently intolerant policies these actors seek to implement, this cure comes with a bitter aftertaste from a liberal democratic perspective. This liberal dilemma has no easy solution, as is also demonstrated in previous studies (Kirshner 2014; Pedahzur 2001). It warrants a demanding balancing act between upholding core liberal democratic principles such as the freedom of expression and political freedoms for all people, including those on the far right, on the one hand, while trying to prevent any form of antidemocratic or violent behaviour, on the other.

The ongoing migration crisis has been fuelling fear, uncertainty and polarisation in a number of West European countries. A main ambition must be to stop such fears from translating into intolerant and violent behaviour, and thereby risking a new wave of RTV in this region. Recognition, open-mindedness and dialogue might then work better than exclusion, public repression or aggressive confrontation. At the same time, we should be mindful that too much lenience towards people and parties with authoritarian inclinations – just like too much repression or aggression – may have adverse effects and could result in limited freedom for all, especially those who think and act differently.

Acknowledgements

A previous version of this article was presented at the 10th ECPR General Conference in Prague, 2016. A special thank you goes to Claudius Wagemann for providing encouragement and QCA expertise along the way. In addition, I would like to thank Oliver Kossack, Michael Minkenberg's colloquium at European University Viadrina, Tore Bjørgo, Jon Hovi and Anders Ravik Jupskås for commenting on previous versions of the article. Finally, I thank the three anonymous reviewers for tough, uplifting and constructive feedback.

Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's web-site:

Appendix I: Measurements, truth table and supplementary analyses
Appendix II: National hate crime statistics
Appendix III: A selection of country-specific sources on RTV in Western Europe

Notes

1. By 'Western Europe', I mean all European countries that did not form part of the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War.
2. I have also experimented with statistical analysis using the number of deadly RTV events per country-year (N = 450) as my dependent variable. Although several statistically significant relationships were discovered, different statistical models (the most relevant being a negative binominal count model) yielded different findings, most likely reflecting the causal complexity underlying the phenomenon under investigation (RTV), but also limited variation in the variables included in the analysis, making conventional statistical analysis less appropriate.
3. Recent research from the Unites States has also found a positive relationship between the extent of social disorganisation and various forms of terrorism, including right-wing terrorism (Freilich et al. 2015; Lafree & Bersani 2014). Social disorganisation is not included in this analyses because it is rather difficult to compare cross-nationally. Thus, social disorganisation could be fruitfully added to the theoretical framework proposed here in future research aimed at explaining within-case variation of RTV.
4. This ranking exercise was given to relevant researchers at the Norwegian Centre for Studies of Holocaust and Religious Minorities (www.hlsenteret.no/english/).
5. This survey was given via E-mail through an intermediary person. All respondents were informed about who and what the survey was for.
6. The fsQCA software offers three solutions – complex, parsimonious and intermediate – reflecting different degrees of simplifying and theoretical assumptions. I prefer the intermediate solution, where the researcher's theoretical assumptions are used to calculate logical remainders – that is, logically possible rows that are consistent with the empirical data, but lacking empirical cases.

References

Adamczyk, A. et al. (2014). The relationship between hate groups and far-right ideological violence. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 30(3): 310–332.

Argomaniz, J. & Vidal-Diez, A. (2015). Examining deterrence and backlash effects in counter-terrorism: The case of ETA. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 27(1): 160–181.

Arnold, R. (2010). Visions of hate: Explaining neo-Nazi violence in the Russian Federation. *Problems of Post-Communism* 57(2): 37–49.

Art, D. (2011). *Inside the radical right: The development of anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ballentine, K. & Sherman, J. (2003). *The political economy of armed conflict: Beyond greed and grievance*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Bara, C. (2014). Incentives and opportunities: A complexity-oriented explanation of violent ethnic conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* 51(6): 696–710.

Bartlett, J. & Birdwell, J. (2011). Rise of the radical right. *Foreign Policy*, 25 July. Available online at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/07/25/rise-of-the-radical-right/

Bjørgo, T. (1997). *Racist and right-wing violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, perpetrators and responses*. Oslo: Tano Aschehoug.

Bjørgo, T. (2003). Violence against ethnic and religious minorities. In W. Heitmeyer & J. Hagan (eds), *International handbook of violence research*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Bjørgo, T. & Witte, R. (eds) (1993). *Racist violence in Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bleich, E. (2007). Hate crime policy in Western Europe: Responding to racist violence in Britain, Germany and France. *American Behavioral Scientist* 51(2): 149–165.

Bleich, E. & Lambert, F. (2013). Why are racist associations free in some states and banned in others? Evidence from 10 liberal democracies. *West European Politics* 36(1): 122–149.

Bobbio, N. (1996). *Left and right: The significance of a political distinction*. Trans. A. Cameron. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Caiani, M., Della Porta, D. & Wagemann, C. (2012). *Mobilizing on the extreme right: Germany, Italy and the United States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chermak, S., Freilich, J. & Suttmoeller, M. (2013). The organizational dynamics of far-right hate groups in the United States: Comparing violent to nonviolent organizations. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36(3): 193–218.

Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers* 56(4): 563–595.

De la Calle, L. & Sanchez-Cuenca, I. (2011). The quantity and quality of terrorism: The DTV dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 48(1): 49–58.

Della Porta, D. (2013). *Clandestine political violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Della Porta, D. (2014). On violence and repression: A relational approach. *Government and Opposition* 49(02): 159–187.

Enstad, J.D. (2015). 'Glory to Breivik!' The Russian far right and the 2011 Norway attacks. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 29(5): 773–792.

Engene, J.O. (2007). Five decades of terrorism in Europe: The TWEED dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 44(1): 109–121.

Faiola, A. (2014). In Greece, a low-grade street war brews with neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party. *Washington Post*, 8 February. Available online at: www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-greece-a-low-grade-street-war-brews-with-neo-nazi-golden-dawn-party/2014/02/03/c2329550-8cdb-11e3-98ab-fe5228217bd1_story.html

Falk, A., Kuhn, A. & Zweimüller, J. (2011). Unemployment and right-wing extremist crime. *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 113(2): 260–285.

Fangen, K. (2001). Pride and Power: A Sociological Study of the Norwegian Radical Nationalist Underground Movement. Doctoral thesis, University of Oslo.

Fekete, L. (2016). The shifting shape of the European far right. *Sicherheitsplitik-blog*. Available online at: www.sicherheitspolitik-blog.de/2016/03/17/the-shifting-shape-of-the-european-far-right/

Freilich, J.D. et al. (2015). Investigating the applicability of macro-level criminology theory to terrorism: A county-level analysis. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 31(3): 383–411.

Freilich, J.D. et al. (2014). Introducing the United States Extremis Crime Database (ECDB). *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26(2): 372–384.

Garcia, B.E. (2015). International Migration and Extreme-Right Terrorism. Doctoral dissertation, Texas A&M University. Available online at: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/155240

Gattinara, P.C. & Froio, C. (2014). Discourse and practice of violence in the Italian extreme right: Frames, symbols and identity-building in CasaPound Italia. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 8(1). Available online at: www.ijcv.org/earlyview/339.pdf

Goertz, G. (2006). *Social science concepts: A user's guide*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Griffin, R. (2003). Shattering crystals: The role of 'dream time' in extreme right-wing political violence. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15(1): 57–95.

Heitmeyer, W. (1993). Hostility and violence towards foreigners in Germany. In T. Bjørgo & R. Witte (eds), *Racist violence in Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Heitmeyer, W. (2003). Right-wing extremist violence. In J. Hagan & W. Heitmeyer (eds), *The international handbook on violence research*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Heitmeyer, W. (2005). Right-wing terrorism. In T. Bjørgo (ed.), *Root causes of terrorism*. London: Routledge.

Hewitt, C. (2003). *Understanding terrorism in America: From the Klan to al Qaeda*. London: Routledge.

Hoffman, B. (1982). *Right wing terrorism in Europe*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.

Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Jørgensen, M.B. & Meret, S. (2012). Framing Scandinavian conceptualizations of irregular migration. *Nordic Journal of Migration Research* 2(4): 289–297.

Kerodal, A.G. et al. (2015). A test of Sprinzak's split delegitimization's theory of the life course of far-right organizational behavior. *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice* 39(4): 307–329.

Kirshner, A.S. (2014). *A theory of militant democracy: The ethics of combating political extremism*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Klandermans, B. & Mayer, N. (2006). *Extreme right activists in Europe: Through the magnifying glass*. London: Routledge.

Koehler, D. (2017). *Right-wing terrorism in the 21st century: The 'national socialist underground' and the history of terror from the far-right in Germany*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Koopmans, R. (1996). Explaining the rise of racist and extreme right violence in Western Europe: Grievances or opportunities? *European Journal of Political Research* 30: 185–216.

Koopmans, R. & Olzak, S. (2004). Discursive opportunities and the evolution of right-wing violence in Germany. *American Journal of Sociology* 110(1): 198–230.

Korf, B. (2005). Rethinking the greed-grievance nexus: Property rights and the political economy of war in Sri Lanka. *Journal of Peace Research* 42(2): 201–217.

Lafree, G. & Bersani, B.E. (2014). County-level correlates of terrorist attacks in the United States. *Criminology and Public Policy* 13(3): 455–481.

Lafree, G., Dugan, L. & Korte, R. (2009). The Impact of British counterterrorist strategies on political violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing deterrence and backlash models. *Criminology* 47(1): 17–45.

Laryš, M. & Mareš, M. (2011). Right-wing extremist violence in the Russian Federation. *Europe-Asia Studies* 63(1): 129–154.

Linden, A. & Klandermans, B. (2006). Stigmatization and repression of extreme-right activism in the Netherlands. *Mobilization* 11(2): 213–228.

Lipset, S.M. & Raab, E. (1970). *The politics of unreason: Right-wing extremism in America, 1790–1970*. New York: Harper & Row.

Lolle, H. & Torpe, L. (2011). Growing ethnic diversity and social trust in European societies. *Comparative European Politics* 9(2): 191–216.

Lööw, H. (1993). The cult of violence: The Swedish racist counterculture. In T. Bjørgo & R. Witte (eds), *Racist violence in Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

March, L. & Mudde, C. (2005). What's left of the radical left? The European radical left after 1989: Decline and mutation. *Comparative European Politics* 3(1): 23–49.

McLaren, L.M. (1999). Explaining right-wing violence in Germany: A time series analysis. *Social Science Quarterly* 80(1): 166–180.

Merkl, P.H. (1995). Radical right parties in Europe and anti-foreign violence: A comparative essay. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 7(1): 96–118.

Mills, C.E., Freilich, J.D. & Chermak, S.M. (2015). Extreme hatred: Revisiting the hate crime and terrorism relationship to determine whether they are 'close cousins' or 'distant relatives'. *Crime and Delinquency* 63(10): 1191–1223.

Minkenberg, M. (2006). Repression and reaction: Militant democracy and the radical right in Germany and France. *Patterns of Prejudice* 40(1): 25–44.

Minkenberg, M. (2015). Pattern, Process, Policies: Conceptualizing Radical Right Impact. Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, Montreal. Available online at: http://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/37f31939-2ecb-4a71-9026-928ef890c1ed.pdf

Montalvo, J.G. & Reynal-Querol, M. (2005). Ethnic polarization, potential conflict and civil wars. *American Economic Review* 95(3): 796–816.

Mudde, C. (2004). Conclusion: Defending democracy and the extreme right. In C. Mudde & R. Eatwell (eds), *Western democracies and the new extreme right challenge*. London: Routledge.

Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist radical right parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Østby, G. (2008). Polarization, horizontal inequalities and violent civil conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* 45(2): 143–162.

Pedahzur, A. (2001). Struggling with the challenges of right-wing extremism and terrorism within democratic boundaries: A comparative analysis. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 24(5): 339–359.

Perliger, A. (2012). *Challengers from the sidelines*. West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center. Available online at: www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/ChallengersFromtheSidelines.pdf

Pridemore, W. & Freilich, J. (2007). The impact of state laws protecting abortion clinics and reproductive rights on crimes against abortion providers: Deterrence, backlash or neither? *Law and Human Behavior* 31(6): 611–627.

Ragin, C. (1987). *The comparative method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Ragin, C. (2000). *Fuzzy-set social science*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Ragin, C. (2008). *Redesigning social inquiry: Fuzzy sets and beyond*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Ragin, C. (2014). *The comparative method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Ramalingam, V. (2014). The European far right is on the rise, again: Here's how to tackle it. *The Guardian*, 13 February. Available online at: www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/13/european-far-right-on-the-rise-how-to-tackle
Ravndal, J.A. (2016). Right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe: Introducing the RTV dataset. *Perspectives on Terrorism* 10(3). Available online at: www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/508
Roig-Tierno, N., Huarng, K.-H. & Ribeiro-Soriano, D. (2017). Configurational comparative research methodologies. *Quality and Quantity* 51(5): 1921–1923.
Sambanis, N. (2004). Using case studies to expand economic models of civil war. *Perspectives on Politics* 2(02): 259–279.
Schneider, C.Q. & Rohlfing, I. (2013). Combining QCA and process tracing in set-theoretic multi-method research. *Sociological Methods and Research* 42(4): 559–597.
Schneider, C.Q. & Wagemann, C. (2010). Standards of good practice in qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and fuzzy-sets. *Comparative Sociology* 9(3): 397–418.
Schneider, C.Q. & Wagemann, C. (2013). *Set-theoretic methods for the social sciences: A guide to qualitative comparative analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Simi, P. & Futrell, R. (2009). Negotiating white power activist stigma. *Social Problems* 56(1): 89–110.
Sotiris, P. (2012). The Greek left and the rise of neo-fascism. *Global Research*. Available online at: http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-greek-left-and-the-rise-of-neo-fascism/5312125
Spillius, A. (2012). Golden Dawn offices damaged by bomb. *The Telegraph*, 4 December. Available online at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/9721596/Golden-Dawn-offices-damaged-by-bomb.html
Sprinzak, E. (1995). Right-wing terrorism in a comparative perspective: The case of split delegitimization. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 7(1): 17–43.
Starr, H. (1978). 'Opportunity' and 'willingness' as ordering concepts in the study of war. *International Interactions* 4(4): 363–387.
Stenner, K. (2005). *The authoritarian dynamic*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sunderland, J. & Ward, B. (2011). *Everyday intolerance: Racist and xenophobic violence in Italy*. New York: Human Rights Watch. Available online at: www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/italy0311WebRevised.pdf
Sunderland, J., Cossé, E. & Ward, B. (2012). *Hate on the streets: Xenophobic violence in Greece*. New York: Human Rights Watch. Available online at: www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/greece0712ForUpload.pdf
Thiem, A. & Baumgartner, M. (2016). Back to square one: a reply to Munck, Paine and Schneider. *Comparative Political Studies* 49(6): 801–806.
Van Spanje, J. & Van Der Brug, W. (2007). The party as pariah: The exclusion of anti-immigration parties and its effect on their ideological positions. *West European Politics* 30(5): 1022–1040.
Weinberg, L. (1995). Italian neo-fascist terrorism: A comparative perspective. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 7(1): 221–239.
Weinberg, L. & Eubank, W.L. (1987). *The rise and fall of Italian terrorism*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Wilkinson, P. (1995). Violence and terror and the extreme right. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 7(4): 82–93.

Address for correspondence: Jacob Aasland Ravndal, Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX), University of Oslo, PO Box 1097, Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway. Email: j.a.ravndal@c-rex.uio.no