Comparative Political Studies
45(5) 547–574

DOI: 10.1177/0010414011427851
http://cps.sagepub.com
SAGE

Who Fears What? Explaining Far-Right-Wing Preference in Europe by Distinguishing Perceived Cultural and Economic Ethnic Threats

Geertje Lucassen[1] and Marcel Lubbers[1]

Abstract

This contribution aims, first, to determine whether support for the far right is based on perceptions of cultural or economic threats posed by immigrants in 11 European countries. Second, it seeks to reanalyze the question of whether class is an important explanation for support for the far right using new measures of class and, related to this, to determine the extent to which class interacts with perceived threat to explain support for far-right parties. The study reveals that perceived cultural ethnic threats are a stronger predictor of far-right preferences than are perceived economic ethnic threats. This cultural versus economic distinction is also depicted in social class differences in far-right preference. These are particularly evident between sociocultural specialists and technocrats, as anticipated by the new social class scheme. Sociocultural specialists particularly perceive fewer cultural ethnic threats compared to technocrats and consequently have a smaller likelihood to prefer the far right. On the contextual level, the authors find that higher levels of GDP in a country result in greater far-right preference, whereas

[1]Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands

Corresponding Author:
Marcel Lubbers, ERCOMER/ICS, Interdisciplinary Social Sciences, Utrecht University, PO Box 80140, 3508 TC Utrecht, Netherlands
Email: m.lubbers@maw.ru.nl

higher levels of GDP do result in lower levels of ethnic threats. The effect of proportion of Muslims on far-right preference is nonsignificant. The study shows that the choice of countries in cross-national research can heavily influence the results.

Keywords

far right, Europe, economic threats, cultural threats, social class

Support for far-right parties in Western Europe has grown substantially since the 1980s; a recent example is the Netherlands, where the Islam critical Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom) attracted 15.5% of the votes in the 2010 general elections. The growing popularity of far-right-wing parties drew much scientific interest (for an overview, see, e.g., Kitschelt, 2007; Rydgren, 2007), showing a shift from economic to cultural theoretical explanations for their successes. The aim of this study is twofold. First, it analyzes the extent to which far-right-wing preference in Europe is affected by perceived economic and/or cultural ethnic threats. Second, it studies the extent to which these threats and their relation with far-right-wing preference are affected by individual and contextual socioeconomic circumstances.

The unique selling point of far-right parties is their anti-immigrant or anti-immigration standpoint (Ivarsflaten, 2006; van der Brug & Fennema, 2007, p. 474). Unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants have therefore been demonstrated to be the most important predictors in explaining far-right-wing support (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Norris, 2005; Rydgren, 2008; van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2005). It is argued that these unfavorable attitudes are induced by experiences of threats from immigrants, both economically and culturally (Lubbers & Güveli, 2007). Previous research has shown that these two threats are often highly correlated and, consequently, are mostly used as a single factor (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004). However, recent studies have revealed that cultural and economic ethnic threats independently affect prejudice (Sniderman et al., 2004; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007) and Euro-skepticism (McLaren, 2004). These studies have shown that perceived threats to cultural identity are more likely to evoke exclusionary reactions than those to economic well-being. Although other predictors have turned out to be relevant for predicting far-right-wing voting behavior, such as political dissatisfaction, authoritarianism, and nationalism (Mudde, 2007), in this contribution we focus on what

previous studies found to be the strongest predictor by far: ethnic threats (Ivarsflaten, 2008).

Explaining the successes of the far right in Denmark and France, Ivarsflaten (2005b) emphasized that, indeed, it is not so much the economic factors that are important but the cultural threats to identity. Both Lubbers and Güveli (2007) and Sniderman and colleagues (2004) stressed the importance of cross-national research to distinguish perceived economic from cultural ethnic threats and their effect on far-right support and prejudice to reveal whether their findings reflect a general pattern. Moreover, the study of Lubbers and Güveli (2007) sheds light on the important differences between cultural and economic ethnic threats to explain new social divisions within the service class in voting far right in the Netherlands. However, it is unknown whether the distinction between these threats can explain these new social class divisions for other European far-right-wing parties as well. In this article we use a cross-national approach to study the effect of individual and contextual ethnic threats on far-right preference. With this approach we continue the study on the micro level (Goodwin, 2006) and how it interferes with the macro level.

Expectations

Perceived Economic and Cultural Ethnic Threats

Various theories have stressed the importance of ethnic threats for understanding exclusionary reactions (Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002). One of the first theories concerning intergroup threat was the realistic group conflict theory. The realistic group conflict theory's axiom is that in every society scarcity exists, and social groups have conflicting interests over these scarce goods. The theory focused foremost on the conflict over economic interests (Sniderman et al., 2004). However, group interests can clash over many valued goods, such as cultural identities and values (Blumer, 1958; Coser, 1956). As proposed in previous research (Coenders, Gijsberts, Hagendoorn, & Scheepers, 2004; Schneider, 2008), this study distinguishes the economic interpretation from the cultural one, involving conflict over material resources versus value conflicts. Recently, an attempt has been made to combine different types of ethnic threat theories into a more comprehensive threat model of prejudice labeled the integrated threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). In the integrated threat theory, realistic economic threat encompasses any threat to the welfare of groups or its mem-

bers. Despite this broad focus, it is operationalized in terms of economic threats (see, e.g., Stephan et al., 2002). Cultural or "symbolic" threats are similar to the ideas fundamental to symbolic racism. According to symbolic racism approaches, racism arises from conflicting values rather than from perceived competition over material resources (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1982).

There are two main ways in which studies have shown that different types of exclusionary reactions are influenced differently by cultural and economic ethnic threats. First, studies including contextual measures of realistic threat circumstances have revealed that economic indicators influence xenophobic reactions increasingly less. Important contextual economic measures, namely (rising) unemployment levels, did not show significant effects on far-right-wing preferences (see, e.g., Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Coffé, Heyndels, & Vermeir, 2007; Knigge, 1998; Lubbers et al., 2002). Although effects from the proportion of immigrants and/or asylum seekers are sometimes also interpreted as economic ethnic threats, others see them as indicators of cultural ethnic threat (Schneider, 2008). The proportion of immigrants and/or asylum seekers is a relatively strong predictor of far-right-wing preference (Knigge, 1998; Lubbers et al., 2002; Swank & Betz, 2003; van der Brug et al., 2005).

Second, former studies on the relevance of attitudes in explaining exclusionary reactions revealed different effects of perceived economic and cultural ethnic threats. In two studies Sniderman and colleagues (2004; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007) distinguish threats over economic well-being and cultural identity to explain exclusionary reactions toward immigrant minorities in the Netherlands. Yet they show that the measurements of economic and cultural ethnic threats are not distinguishable when tested with factor analysis. Moreover, multicollinearity was found in their models when both measurements of threat were included. Nevertheless, Sniderman and colleagues demonstrated that concerns over national identity are more of a driving force for prejudice than are concerns over economic interest. Lubbers (2008) found similar results in his research on Dutch Euro-skepticism; utilitarian explanations determined Euro-skepticism less well than national identity explanations. Even though they faced the same problem as Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) in that the measurements were factorially indistinguishable, Lubbers and Güveli (2007) showed in their research on voting the Dutch far-right-wing party LPF that threats to cultural identity are more likely to induce exclusionary reactions toward migrants, and, consequently, far-right voting, than are threats to economic well-being. Norris (2005) distinguished among negative attitudes toward immigrants, refugees, multiculturalism, and economic equality. Although the division is quite sophisticated, she also disregarded

making a clear distinction between economic and cultural ethnic threats. In her study she mixed economic and cultural threats, which she regarded as "negative attitudes towards immigrants and multiculturalism" (p. 177) In a study by Ivarsflaten (2005a), we believe the cultural and economic attitude measurements had unequal status because only the cultural one referred explicitly to minority members in its wording. Finally, Rydgren (2008) differentiated among various types of attitudes by using single indicators. He also provided evidence that some of the items are more strongly related to far-right-wing preference than others. We try to build measurement scales instead of using single items and study whether these attitudes are indeed affected by individual and contextual positions.

The question remains of why cultural threats would have a stronger impact than economic threats. Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, and Passy (2005) argued that globalization processes and the expansion of the European Union fuel feelings of loss of national identity, even though these processes might be economically beneficial for a country. Also, Norris (2005) claimed that the process of globalization is the relevant factor that induces, in particular, threats to the national identity, which consequently results in greater preference for the far right. Knigge (1998, p. 271) demonstrated that popular xenophobia increased as a result of a national identity crisis. Still, this describes why levels of cultural threat could have increased. It does not provide an argument for why perceived cultural ethnic threats would lead to a stronger far-right-wing vote than would perceived economic ethnic threats. Apart from the saliency of cultural issues, the party competition over economic and cultural issues may play a role (Norris, 2005). What researchers stress is that socioeconomic issues are secondary to far-right-wing parties' programs (Mudde, 2007). Far-right-wing parties adopted their programs to the general crisis of national identity to strengthen their electoral market position (Betz, 1993; Swank & Betz, 2003), though others might argue that these far-right-wing parties were the first to acknowledge these crises of perceptions among voters (Kitschelt, 1995; Norris, 2005). Far-right-wing parties have become the issue owners of the protection of national identity against foreign influences—primarily against threats from minorities. On the other hand, far-right-wing parties are not regarded as issue owners of fighting unemployment and other related economic issues—issues already owned by mainstream center parties (Norris, 2005). We therefore expect voters to favor a far-right-wing party more when they perceive threats from migrants on the cultural domain than when they perceive these threats on the economic domain. We expect,

Hypothesis 1a: Both perceived cultural and economic ethnic threats positively affect far-right-wing preference.

Hypothesis 1b: Perceived cultural ethnic threats have stronger positive effects than do perceived economic ethnic threats on far-right preference.

Social Class

From the demand-side perspective of far-right support, it has been argued that certain social classes are more likely to perceive that their interests are under pressure from immigrants than others. It is debated whether class still matters in explaining voting behavior (see, e.g., Brooks, 2006). Although we stress the importance of a new social class scheme, we try to replicate previous findings since numerous studies have shown that manual workers, in particular, are more likely to support the far right. Two main reasons are provided for their overrepresentation among the far-right-wing electorate: First, manual workers are susceptible in times of globalization and deindustrialization since they face job insecurity; and second, the skills of typical manual workers are often similar to those of immigrants in Western Europe, who mostly have little education (Kitschelt, 1995; Koopmans et al., 2005; Lubbers, 2001). These higher levels of competition between manual workers and immigrants induce perceptions of threat. Consequently, we expect,

Hypothesis 2a: Manual workers to be more likely to prefer the far right compared to other social classes since they have stronger perceptions of economic ethnic threat.

Moreover, the lower class strata are more likely to be affected by economic malaise than the higher classes since they have a more vulnerable economic position. This implies that when manual workers perceive ethnic threats, they will be more likely than other social classes to translate these perceptions into a preference for a party that particularly addresses this issue. This leads us to expect,

Hypothesis 2b: The effect of economic ethnic threat on far-right preference is stronger among manual workers than among other social classes.

The employment and social class structures of Western societies has changed; the proportion of the low and unskilled workers has decreased, whereas the

middle class has vastly grown (Betz, 1993; Güveli, 2006; Kriesi, 1989, 1998). The class has also lost the natural bond with the social democrats. Some researchers have concluded that social class is no longer important to explain voting behavior in contemporary Western societies (Clark & Lipset, 1991; Clark, Lipset, & Rempel, 1993). However, these researchers used the so-called Alford Index, which distinguishes manual workers only from other social classes. This distinction has been criticized for its simplistic account (Brooks & Manza, 1997; de Graaf & Nieuwbeerta, 1995; Evans, 2000; Güveli, Need, & de Graaf, 2006; Nieuwbeerta, 1995). The use of more sophisticated measurements such as the EGP class scheme developed by Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero (1979), which distinguishes seven social classes, did not resolve the debate on whether class-based voting is declining (see, e.g., Brooks & Manza, 1997; de Graaf & Nieuwbeerta, 1995; Nieuwbeerta, 1995).

Inglehart (1990, 1997) provided new insights into this debate. He argued that in the Western world, a shift took place from modern to postmodern societies. In these prosperous postmodern societies, personal self-fulfillment was more imperative than economic well-being. Consequently, the importance of social class diminished since this structure was created by income inequalities that were less urgent in those societies. Contrary to Inglehart, Güveli (2006) used the postmaterialists as a separate class within the service class, distinguishing sociocultural specialists from technocrats (also see Kriesi, 1989, 1998). This division is based on employment relations. Güveli (2006) claimed that sociocultural specialists have jobs that require specialized knowledge and use sociocultural knowledge to deliver social services. The technocrat class consists of people such as managers, accountants, engineers, and computer specialists. The class of sociocultural workers includes teachers, medical doctors, psychologists, and religious workers (Güveli, 2006, p. 19). Researchers have shown vast differences in voting behavior between sociocultural specialists and technocrats (Güveli et al., 2006; Kriesi, 1998; Lubbers & Güveli, 2007). Kitschelt (1995) expected the former group to be less likely to feel threatened by minorities because of their client-related work and interethnic training. In line with the new social class scheme, we expect,

> *Hypothesis 3a:* Sociocultural specialists to be less likely to prefer the far right than technocrats because of their weaker perceptions of cultural ethnic threats.

Furthermore, the salience of cultural ethnic threats is less for sociocultural specialists, and we expect that when they do experience threat, they will

be less willing to translate their perceptions of threat into far-right-wing preference because of group pressure in a culturally diverse environment (Lubbers & Güveli, 2007). Consequently, we hypothesize,

Hypothesis 3b: The effect of a perceived cultural ethnic threat on far-right preference will be less strong among sociocultural specialists than among technocrats.

Cultural Competition at the Contextual Level

Schneider (2008) found that economic competition between groups might play a less important role in the explanation of cross-national differences in anti-immigrant attitudes than previously thought. Although she used rather sophisticated contextual measures—distinguishing between the relative size of an economically threatening outgroup (low-educated immigrants) and that of a culturally unfamiliar outgroup (non-Western immigrants)—she did not include a special measure of Muslim migrants. Coffé and colleagues (2007) revealed that the higher percentage of votes for the Vlaams Blok is the result of the presence of Turkish and Maghrebean immigrants at the municipality level, whereas the presence of other immigrants has no effect. Also, van der Brug and Fennema (2007) saw a necessity for new research on the cultural elements of the competition thesis. Increasingly, the tension over migrants in Europe is directed toward cultural dissimilarities between European majorities and Muslims (see, e.g., Norris, 2005; Sniderman et al., 2004; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Accordingly, we expect,

Hypothesis 4a: In European countries with a larger Muslim community, people will be more likely to prefer the far right because of higher levels of perceived cultural ethnic threats.

Moreover, in countries with larger Muslim communities, we expect the cultural dimension to be more salient than the economic one. Therefore, we expect,

Hypothesis 4b: In European countries with a larger Muslim community, perceived cultural ethnic threats affect far-right preference more strongly than perceived economic ethnic threats.

In Figure 1, all expected relations are illustrated.



Figure 1. Conceptual model: Influence of individual and contextual level variables on far-right preference, and the mediating effect of perceived economic and cultural ethnic threat
The dotted arrows are the direct effects not hypothesized about.

Data and Measurements

Data Set

In this study we used data from the first round of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2002–2003). The ESS is an academically driven social survey with, in the first round, information on inhabitants of 21 countries. The ESS was created to register and clarify the attitudes, beliefs, and behavior patterns of Europeans. In the 2002–2003 survey (but unfortunately not in the later ESS rounds), a module on immigration and asylum was included, which gave us the opportunity to use several items to distinguish between cultural and economic ethnic threats.

The ESS team prioritizes evaluating the questions' reliability and validity and annotating translations and questionnaires. The response rate of the countries used in this study is between 43.1% and 73.2% (ESS, 2002–2003). For this article, we selected 11 European countries with adequate information on far-right-wing party preference and attitudes toward immigrants, namely, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Slovenia.[1] This resulted in 14,653 respondents.[2]

Far-Right Preference

A preference for far-right parties is often measured by questioning whom the respondents voted for during the last national election. The voting behavior measure is hence retrospective, whereas the attitudes are present measures.[3] However, our model assumes that voting behavior is influenced by attitudes.[4] Although many researchers using cross-national surveys disregarded this problem (see, e.g., Norris, 2005), we constructed an alternative measure that more closely gauges recent political preferences. Far-right preference is measured by combining scores on political party closeness and voting information. Although the first measure is mostly accurate, many people do not feel close to any party, and therefore the voting variable was also used. Since there is a strong correlation between the old and new measurement (Pearson correlation = .887, $p < .001$), the vote variable is regarded as a reasonable proxy for party preference. We constructed far-right preference in the following way: First, we used the respondents' party preference, indicating the closeness to a particular party. Respondents got a score of 1 if this was a far-right party and a score of 0 if it concerned another political party. Second, for those respondents who did not feel close to any party, we looked at the party they voted for in the last national election. If these respondents scored on the voting question, we used the party they voted for as a proxy of their current political preference. Only those people who answered neither the question on party closeness nor the question on voting got a missing score. Consequently, respondents who voted for a far-right party in the last national elections but who felt closer to another party family were not regarded as having a far-right preference.[5]

To decide whether parties are characterized as far right, we used the classification of Mudde (2007) and Norris (2005) based on both the Lubbers (2001) expert scale and the Benoit and Laver (2006) survey data, and extensive literature research. Table 1 shows the political parties in the 11 selected countries that we consider as far right wing, the placement on the left–right and immigration restriction scales of Lubbers (2001) and Benoit–Laver, the number and percentage of respondents who prefer these parties, and the actual election results in the last national elections. These percentages differ, possibly because of the time difference between the two measurements.[6] Although far-right parties differ from each other in their specific ideological outline, previous research has shown that they can be treated as constituent members of a larger, single group. Although the far-right party group may be more heterogeneous than other party families, they share features that permit them to be grouped together (see, e.g., Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Mudde, 2007).

Table 1. Selected Far-Right Parties

		Placement on right–left scale[a,b]		Placement on immigration restriction scale[a,b]		Party preference[b]		Election results[c]	
Country	Far-right party	Lubbers	Benoit–Laver	Lubbers	Benoit–Laver	*n*	%	%	Seats won
Austria	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs	8.50	17.4	9.1	18.5	85	6.1	10.1	18
Belgium	Front National Belge	9.50	18.9	9.8	19.2	5	0.4	1.5	0
	Vlaams Blok	9.30	18.9	9.8	19.8	96	7.4	9.4	4
Switzerland	Schweizer Demokraten	9.06	18.9	9.7	19.7	1	0.01	1.8	1
	Schweizerische Volkspartei	8.39	17.9	9.1	18.8	247	20.0	22.5	44
Germany	Republikaner	8.70	18.8	9.4	19.4	14	0.7	0.6	0
Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti	8.65	15.3	9.7	19.4	86	8.6	12.0	22
	Fremskridtspartiet	8.73	18.3	9.2	19.3	6	0.5	0.6	0
France[d]	Front National	9.50	—	9.6	19.3	58	5.9	11.1	0
	Mouvement National Républicaine	—	—	—	—	10	1.0	1.1	0
Italy[e]	Lega Nord	7.55	16.9	9.0	19.3	15	1.5	3.9	0
	Fiamma Tricolore	9.66	19.0	9.1	17.9	3	0.03	0.4	0
Netherlands	Lijst Pim Fortuyn	—	17.6	—	18.3	231	11.4	17.0	26
Norway	Fremskrittspartiet	8.14	15.8	9.2	19.1	331	19.0	14.6	26
Poland	Liga Polskich Rodzin	—	16.4	—	19.0	69	6.2	9.1	38
Slovenia	Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka	—	10.1	—	17.1	40	4.7	4.4	4
Total						1,299	8.9		

N = 14,653. Lubbers constructed his scale in 2001 in a study on Western European countries; consequently, not all parties in this data set—newer parties and parties in Eastern Europe—have a score on his scale. Benoit and Laver (2006) measured party positions on policy based on specialist country surveys.
a. On a scale from 0 to 10.
b. On a scale from 1 to 20.
c. For Poland, no measure on migration is included; the figure refers to position on the nationalist policy. Relative to the number of respondents from that specific country. Election results—valid votes—adapted from www.electionguide.org.
d. First round numbers.
e. Chamber of deputies, proportional ballot.

The selection of far-right parties led to the exclusion of countries without a far-right party in the parliament since the primary goal of this study is to analyze the difference in effects from economic and cultural ethnic threats and how these effects vary under different conditions. Consequently, this type of analysis needs countries with a far-right party to be able to investigate the moderating effects. Therefore, several countries were excluded from the analysis, namely, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.[7]

Sociodemographic Variables

Social class is a vital sociodemographic variable in this study. The social class measurement is constructed from the EGP classification (Erikson et al., 1979) using the ISCO88 values, which describe the respondents' last or current occupation. Following Güveli (2006), we divided the service class into technocrats and sociocultural specialists. Moreover, we added an unemployment category since this has proven to be an important social category in far-right-wing party support research. Consequently, the social class variable consists of seven categories, namely, technocrats, sociocultural specialists, routine nonmanual workers, self-employed, manual workers, unemployed, and others (housewives, students, etc.).

The other sociodemographic variables are the standard ones: gender (0 = *female* and 1 = *male*), age (in years), educational attainment (in years of schooling), religiosity (measured on an 11-point scale from *not at all religious* to *very religious*), and whether people have a migrant status (foreign-born respondents or with at least one foreign-born parent).

Economic and Cultural Ethnic Threats

In this study we distinguish between perceived economic and cultural ethnic threats. We measure levels of economic ethnic threat with three items that indicate whether respondents evaluate immigration as a positive factor for the country's economy, the tax balance, and the acquisition of jobs for natives. Cultural ethnic threat is measured by four items. These capture perceived threats that immigrants undermine the cultural life or increase tensions and the evaluation of multiple religions, customs, and traditions within one country.[8] All items were recoded on a 5-point scale; a higher score indicates stronger ethnic threat perceptions.

We performed three statistical tests to reach reliable ethnic threat scales. First, we carried out a reliability analysis for one total threat and an economic and a cultural ethnic threat separately (see Table 2). This showed that Switzerland

Table 2. Cronbach's Alpha of Different Perceived Ethnic Threats

	Total[a]	Economic[b]	Cultural[c]
Austria	.811	.754	.745
Belgium	.803	.753	.715
Switzerland	.778	.664	.704
Germany	.802	.723	.736
Denmark	.814	.742	.759
France	.840	.765	.759
Italy	.752	.592	.702
Netherlands	.759	.700	.661
Norway	.798	.701	.741
Poland	.773	.772	.629
Slovenia	.758	.741	.601

Source: European Social Survey (2002–2003).
The total threat is one scale with all the items loading on it.
a. Seven items.
b. Three items.
c. Four items.

and Italy did not reach a satisfactory alpha for the economic ethnic threat and the Netherlands, Poland, and Slovenia for the cultural ethnic threat; however, alpha is acceptable overall.

Second, we performed a principle factor analysis with oblimin rotation in SPSS. This revealed that we could extract only one factor for 3 out of 11 countries, namely, Austria, France, and the Netherlands.[9] In the remaining countries, the two ethnic threats could be distinguished; however, there are some remaining issues. The cultural threat item on whether cultural life is enriched or undermined by immigrants is statistically regarded as a cultural as well as economic ethnic threat item, which might be because this particular cultural threat item was asked in between the sets of items for economic threat. Since Cronbach's alpha would drop considerably by excluding this item—except for Italy, Poland, and Slovenia—this item remains in the analysis.

Third, we performed a latent variable analysis in AMOS in which we separated economic and cultural ethnic threats connected by a covariance, since AMOS offers the opportunity to do equivalence tests between groups.[10] First, we treated the item on whether cultural life was enriched or undermined by immigrants as a double loader since the factor analysis revealed this possibility. This model showed a good model fit (Cmin/df = 5.472, comparative fit index [CFI] = .978, root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] = .017). Second, we treated this particular threat item only as an indicator of cultural

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics: Range, Mean, and Standard Deviation

	Range	*M*	*SD*
Dependent variable			
Far-right preference	0–1	0.09	0.28
Perceived ethnic threat			
Cultural ethnic threat	1–5	2.97	0.77
Economic ethnic threat	1–5	3.10	0.68
Control variables			
Age	16–97	47.22	16.78
Gender (male)	0–1	0.51	0.50
Religiosity	0–10	4.88	2.87
Years of education	0–40	12.67	3.71
Migrant status	0–1	0.13	0.33
Contextual level variables			
GDP	9900–31700	24680.99	5405.75
% Muslims	0.10–7.50	3.67	1.90

Source: European Social Survey (2002–2003).
In the analyses, the ethnic threats and contextual level variables are centered and GDP is divided by 1,000.

ethnic threat; this also showed a good fit (Cmin/*df* = 8.108, CFI = .962, RMSEA = .022). For theoretical reasons we treat the cultural "life" item as an item for cultural threat only since the model fit remains relatively good.

Country Characteristics

The contextual level variables are presented in Table 2. The proportion of Muslims is derived from the Religious Freedom Reports issued by the U.S. Department of State (2004). Strabac and Listhaug (2008) used the same source on a country's Muslim population and demonstrated the robustness of the measure. We control for gross domestic product (GDP) levels from 2002–2003, which are derived from Eurostat (2008), the Statistical Office of the European Communities. We chose GDP instead of unemployment levels, following Schneider (2008), who showed an effect of GDP on attitudes toward Muslims. Table 3 gives the descriptive statistics.

Statistical Models

To test the hypotheses, we used binary logistic regression and multivariate analysis (MANOVA).[11] Logistic regression was used to deal with the

dichotomous outcome variable, namely, far-right preference, for which we constructed six models. First, the baseline model captures the effect of social class. Second, in Model 1 the economic and cultural ethnic threats were added. In Model 2 we included interaction effects between social class and the two ethnic threat variables, which reveal whether the effects of economic and/or cultural ethnic threats are stronger predictors of far-right preference for certain social classes than for others. Model 3 includes the baseline model with contextual level variables, and in Model 4 we added the ethnic threats again to reveal the mediating effect of ethnic threats on far-right preference. In Model 5 interaction effects between the contextual variables and the threats show the salience of threats in countries with certain characteristics. In addition, we tested a multinomial model to find out whether the effect of ethnic threat is unique in predicting voting for the far right as compared to all party options in a country and compared to nonvoting (see the appendix). MANOVA allows us to test the effect of social class and contextual variables on the two ethnic threats.

Results

Table 4 provides the direct effects of independent variables on far-right preference, whereas Table 5 presents the mediating effects. Although not presented here, models with technocrats as reference category were also estimated. The baseline model (Table 4) shows the differences among the social categories. In line with previous research, we find that males are more likely to prefer the far right than are females. Moreover, far-right preference is higher among younger people. The less religious and the less educated people are, the higher the likelihood they prefer the far right. Last, migrants prefer the far right significantly less than natives do.

In our hypotheses, we formulated expectations on differences between social classes and to what extent these differences are mediated by economic and cultural ethnic threats. The baseline model reveals that all social classes prefer the far right less than manual workers do, although the effect is significant only for technocrats and sociocultural specialists. The most notable class difference is reflected in the smaller likelihood of voting for far-right-wing parties among the sociocultural specialists. The difference between the sociocultural specialists and the technocrats is also significant ($B = -0.740$, $SE = 0.157$, $p < .001$, not shown).

In Model 1 we include ethnic threat measurements, by which we can evaluate the hypotheses: first by assessing to what extent economic and cultural threats differ in relevance, and second the extent to which these threats mediate social class effects. Starting with the former, our findings reveal that

Table 4. Parameter Estimates From Logistic Regression Models on Far-Right Preference

Models	Baseline: Control and class		1: + ethnic threats		2: + threats × class		3: Baseline + context		4: + threat		5: + threats × context	
Social class (manuals = ref.)												
Technocrats	−0.193*	(0.082)	0.028	(0.084)	−0.061	(0.096)	−0.302***	(0.083)	−0.071	(0.086)	−0.074	(0.086)
Sociocult. specialists	−0.934***	(0.160)	−0.523***	(0.163)	−0.696***	(0.180)	−1.090***	(0.161)	−0.690***	(0.164)	−0.707***	(0.164)
Routine nonmanuals	−0.133	(0.095)	0.026	(0.097)	−0.104	(0.113)	−0.284**	(0.096)	−0.123	(0.099)	−0.124	(0.099)
Self-employed	−0.019	(0.120)	0.006	(0.123)	0.134	(0.145)	0.143	(0.123)	0.245*	(0.126)	0.227*	(0.127)
Others	−0.118	(0.113)	−0.009	(0.115)	−0.204	(0.146)	−0.289*	(0.115)	−0.191	(0.119)	−0.186	(0.119)
Unemployed	−0.041	(0.149)	−0.103	(0.153)	−0.043	(0.183)	0.117	(0.152)	0.076	(0.157)	0.082	(0.158)
Perceived ethnic threats (centered)												
Cultural threat[a]			0.833***	(0.050)	0.764***	(0.088)			0.834***	(0.051)	0.922***	(0.060)
Economic threat[b]			0.116*	(0.051)	0.012	(0.083)			0.282***	(0.054)	0.254***	(0.057)
Contextual variables (centered)												
GDP							0.131***	(0.008)	0.151***	(0.008)	0.168***	(0.011)
% Muslims							−0.031	(0.018)	−0.004	(0.018)	0.027	(0.022)
Interaction class and cultural ethnic threat (centered)[c]												
Technocrats × cult. threat					0.134	(0.130)						
SC specialists × cult. threat					0.743*	(0.257)						
Routine × cult. threat					0.081	(0.148)						
Self-empl. × cult. threat					−0.478*	(0.196)						
Other × cult. threat					0.319*	(0.186)						
Unemployed × cult. threat					−0.288	(0.246)						
Interaction class and economic ethnic threat (centered)[d]												
Technocrats × econ. threat					0.074	(0.134)						
SC specialists × econ. threat					−0.025	(0.278)						
Routine × econ. threat					0.317*	(0.154)						
Self-empl. × econ. threat					0.359*	(0.199)						
Other × econ. threat					0.077	(0.186)						
Unemployed × econ. threat					0.184	(0.228)						

(continued)

Table 4. (continued)

Models	Baseline: Control and class		1: + ethnic threats		2: + threats × class		3: Baseline + context		4: + threat		5: + threats × context	
Interaction context(centered) and ethnic threats (centered)												
GDP × cultural threat											−0.035*	(0.014)
GDP × econ. threat											0.016	(0.013)
% Muslims × cultural threat											−0.081*	(0.029)
% Muslims × econ. threat											0.032	(0.030)
Control variables												
Gender (male)	0.346***	(0.064)	0.329***	(0.066)	0.331***	(0.066)	0.308***	(0.065)	0.307***	(0.068)	0.305***	(0.068)
Age	−0.008***	(0.002)	−0.012***	(0.002)	−0.013***	(0.002)	−0.010***	(0.002)	−0.015***	(0.002)	−0.015***	(0.002)
Religiosity	−0.046***	(0.011)	−0.050***	(0.011)	−0.049***	(0.011)	−0.026*	(0.011)	−0.017	(0.011)	−0.019	(0.011)
Years of education	−0.102***	(0.010)	−0.068***	(0.011)	−0.068***	(0.011)	−0.110***	(0.010)	−0.072***	(0.011)	−0.071***	(0.011)
Migrant	−0.223*	(0.096)	−0.014	(0.098)	−0.015	(0.098)	−0.243*	(0.097)	−0.008	(0.100)	−0.010	(0.100)
Constant	−0.538		−1.046		−0.956		−0.500		−1.125		−1.185	
χ^2 (*df*) model	307.289	(11)	760.030	(13)	793.589	(25)	668.290	(13)	1209.247	(15)	1220.917	(19)
−2 log likelihood	8467.076		8014.335		7980.776		8105.442		7565.118		7553.448	
Nagelkerke R^2	.046		.112		.117		.099		.176		.177	

Source: European Social Survey (2002–2003).
Unstandardized *B* coefficients of logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses.
a. Including this variable solely results in χ^2(model) = 754.734, df = 12, $p < .001$, −2 log likelihood = 8019.631, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .111$, $B = 0.892$, $SE = 0.044$, $p < .001$.
b. Including this variable solely results in χ^2(model) = 473.830, df = 12, $p < .001$, −2 log likelihood = 8300.535, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .071$, $B = 0.559$, $SE = 0.043$, $p < .001$.
c.Including this block exclusively results in χ^2(model) = 786.842, df = 19, $p < .001$, −2 log likelihood = 7987.523, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .116$.
d. Including this block exclusively results in χ^2(model) = 770.470, df = 19, $p < .001$, −2 log likelihood = 8003.895, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .114$.
*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Table 5. Parameter Estimates From Multivariate Models on Perceived Economic and Cultural Ethnic Threats in Europe

	Economic threat		Cultural threat	
Social class (manuals = ref.)				
Technocrats	−0.156***	(0.016)	−0.213***	(0.017)
Sociocult. specialists	−0.250***	(0.022)	−0.400***	(0.023)
Routine nonmanuals	−0.131***	(0.018)	−0.152***	(0.019)
Self-employed	−0.063**	(0.024)	−0.052*	(0.027)
Other	−0.127***	(0.022)	−0.118***	(0.024)
Unemployed	0.096***	(0.030)	0.000	(0.032)
Contextual variables (centered)				
GDP	−0.017***	(0.001)	−0.009***	(0.001)
% Muslims	0.014***	(0.003)	−0.042***	(0.003)
Control variables				
Gender (male)	−0.085***	(0.012)	0.050***	(0.012)
Age	0.002***	(0.000)	0.006***	(0.000)
Religiosity	−0.009***	(0.002)	0.004*	(0.002)
Years of education	−0.030***	(0.002)	−0.042***	(0.002)
Migrant	−0.186***	(0.016)	−0.206***	(0.018)
Intercept	0.523		0.371	
Wilks's lambda[a]	.973			
F	33.395 (12)			
$p <$	.001			
η^2	.014			

Source: European Social Survey (2002–2003).
Unstandardized *B* coefficients of multivariate analysis. Standard errors in parentheses.
a.Wilks's lambda is a test statistic used in MANOVA as a direct measure of the proportion of variance in the combination of dependent variables that is unaccounted for by the independent variable.
*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

we can confirm that both perceived cultural threats and perceived economic threats have a positive significant effect on far-right preference (Hypothesis 1a). Moreover, perceived cultural ethnic threat ($B = 0.833$, $SE = 0.050$, $p < .001$) is a stronger predictor of far-right preference than economic ethnic threat ($B = 0.166$, $SE = 0.051$, $p = .011$) (Hypothesis 1b). Including the threats separately (fit measures presented in the notes to Table 4) also shows that the model with cultural ethnic threats has a better model fit.[12]

Bringing this argument one step further, we also tested a multinomial model as to what extent the perceived cultural ethnic threats actually predict far-right-wing voting as compared to all other party options and to nonvoting. The appendix gives the results, showing that for no other party group cultural threats make this difference, and it should be the greens and the communists for which the reverse effect is generally found. The appendix also shows that the importance of ethnic threats in discriminating between parties is much larger in countries where large far-right-wing parties exist, such as Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. We found no relation between the presence of a far-right-wing party and the level of cultural ethnic threat among the voters who abstained.

We anticipated that ethnic threats would explain social class differences. As expected, manual workers perceive more economic threats compared to other social classes, except for the unemployed (Table 5). Including the threat variables in Model 1 (Table 4) showed that threats mediate the social class effects on far-right preference since the unstandardized coefficients reach nonsignificant values, except for the sociocultural specialists and unemployed (Hypothesis 2a). Moreover, as anticipated, sociocultural specialists perceive less cultural ethnic threats than do technocrats ($B = -0.202$, $SE = 0.021$, $p < .001$), but these threats only partially mediate the effect of social class on far-right preference ($B = -0.740$, $SE = 0.157$, $p < .001$ in the baseline model, and $B = -0.551$, $SE = 0.159$, $p < .001$ in Model 1; Hypothesis 3a). However, sociocultural specialists also perceive somewhat less economic threats than do technocrats ($B = -0.100$, $SE = 0.019$, $p < .001$).

Model 2 (Table 4) provides the moderating class effects. We anticipated that the effect of economic ethnic threat would be stronger among manual workers compared to other social classes (Hypothesis 2b), but the interaction effect between social class and economic ethnic threats shows that for none of the social class categories the effect of economic ethnic threat is significantly smaller. Instead, it is significantly stronger for the self-employed and routine nonmanuals. Moreover, we expected the effect of perceived cultural ethnic threats on far-right preference to be less strong among sociocultural specialists than among technocrats (Hypothesis 3b). It is surprising that we found the opposite: The effect of cultural ethnic threats on far-right preference is stronger for sociocultural specialists ($B = 0.609$, $SE = 0.260$, $p = .008$).

The second set of hypotheses was aimed at explaining country differences using contextual country-level predictors. Comparable to previous findings, the economic indicator of competition, as measured by GDP, results in significantly greater instead of lesser far-right preference (Table 4, Model 3). However, inhabitants of countries with lower GDP levels perceive significantly more economic, but also cultural, ethnic threats. Consequently, when

including perceived ethnic threats in Model 4, we find that the effect of the GDP was suppressed and is even larger in Model 4 compared to that in Model 3. Furthermore, we found that the proportion of Muslims in a country had no significant effect on the likelihood of far-right preference. It is interesting that higher levels of Muslims result in more perceived economic ethnic threats but less cultural ethnic threats. Consequently, Hypothesis 4a is not supported.

We tested as to what extent country differences exist in the effect of economic and cultural ethnic threats on far-right preference. We expected that the larger the Muslim community, the more strongly the perceived cultural ethnic threats would affect far-right-wing preference, as compared to economic ethnic threats (Hypothesis 4b). However, we found a significant negative interaction between the proportion of Muslims and cultural ethnic threat. Thus, cultural ethnic threats are a stronger predictor of far-right preference in countries with lower proportions of Muslims.

In line with the study of Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris (2007), we conducted a stability test to see whether the contextual level effects were stable given a selection of countries.[13] This revealed that the effect of the GDP level was reasonably stable across a random selection of countries but that the effect of proportion of Muslims was rather unstable, a point we reflect on in the discussion.

Conclusions and Discussion

The increasing support for the far right since the late 1980s has drawn much scientific interest; however, little research has been done on distinguishing perceived economic from cultural ethnic threats. Furthermore, there has been no thoroughly conducted cross-national studies on this distinction. In this study we set out to explain differences in far-right preference among social classes and 11 European countries by analyzing the mediating and moderating effects of perceived economic and cultural ethnic threats.

Differentiating these two ethnic threats was a major challenge since previous research has revealed that the distinction is often not supported by factor analysis. We showed that in 8 out of the 11 investigated countries, we could distinguish economic from cultural ethnic threats. This has wide implications for further research since the effects of these two threats have been shown to differ vastly in strength; cultural ethnic threats are a much stronger predictor of far-right preference than are economic ethnic threats. In the development of questionnaires, in particular, more attention should be paid to creating items that systematically depict and distinguish between economic and cultural ethnic threats to overcome differentiation problems.

The new social class division between technocrats and sociocultural specialists has been shown to contribute greatly to far-right research since the former group is much more likely to prefer the far right than the latter and because they have more perceived cultural ethnic threats. Another interesting finding is that the effect of perceived cultural ethnic threats on far-right preference is stronger among sociocultural specialists compared to technocrats and manual workers. Although we argued that this social group would be less willing to translate their threat perceptions into far-right-wing voting because of group pressure in a culturally diverse environment, the analysis showed the opposite. Contrary to our previous expectations, we now believe sociocultural specialists are more likely than other social categories to properly identify the party that best represents their interests. Because of their training in the social and cultural fields and their independent work environment, sociocultural specialists are able to articulate and argue their opinion well and are therefore possibly more equipped to translate ideas into a party preference (Güveli et al., 2006).

Our expectations about contextual level effects could not be confirmed. The proportion of Muslims in a country has no effect on far-right preference. A lower GDP results in stronger threat perceptions but lower levels of far-right-wing voting. This is comparable with previous cross-national research on far-right voting, which showed that inhabitants of more prosperous countries are more likely to vote far right for fear of losing what they have gained (Lubbers, 2001). It is possible that in poorer countries people do perceive threats from immigrants but that job security is a more salient social reality (see, e.g., Arzheimer & Carter, 2006).

In this research we checked for the possibility that individual countries may excessively affect the results. The stability check across the 11 countries indicated that more attention needs to be paid to the extent to which single countries and possible outliers influence the results. This research showed that the set of countries used in studies affects the findings of especially the contextual level variable proportion of Muslims.

We addressed in more detail than previously had been done that distinguishing between perceived economic and cultural ethnic threats contributes to the existing far right literature. Second, we provided support for the view that the new social class scheme is cross-nationally valuable in explaining far-right-wing preference, particularly that sociocultural specialists are less likely to vote far right. Last, we showed that more attention should be paid to the effect that single countries in cross-national research can have on the estimation, specifically of contextual level predictors. The study reveals that the concerns of the native population that stem from demographic changes are located in perceptions of threats to culture. It is too easy to label such

Appendix

Multinomial Models: The Effect of Cultural Ethnic Threat (CET) on Voting for a Specific Party Versus the Social Democratic Party (0)

	1. Far right	2. Christian democrats	3. Conservatives	4. Liberals	5. Greens	6. Communists	7. Other party 1	8. Other party 2	Nonvoting	CET's contribution to Nagelkerke *R*
Austria	1.07**	0.46**			−0.75**				0.21	0.046
Belgium	1.99**	0.57**		0.49**	−0.43*		0.22		0.23	0.054
Switzerland	1.17**	0.34		0.62**	−0.44				0.59**	0.028
Czech Republic		−0.24		0.07		−0.24			−0.18	0.004
Denmark	1.19**	−0.00				−0.71**	−0.11		−0.08	0.041
Germany		0.43**		0.23	−0.29	−0.07			0.34**	0.012
Spain		0.58**		0.06		−0.67*			0.10	0.022
Finland		0.52**		0.49**	−0.05	−0.16	0.63**		0.39**	0.010
France	0.82**	0.63**			0.01	−0.05			0.16	0.021
UK			0.55**	0.03			0.14		0.31**	0.013
Greece		0.24*				−0.30			−0.11	0.002
Hungary		0.15		−0.94**					0.10	0.015
Ireland		0.28		0.51**	0.02	0.47*	0.37		0.46*	0.004
Israel			0.36**	0.36		−0.42*	1.04**	0.20	0.41**	0.013
Italy	1.05*	0.15				−0.18	0.64**	0.73**	0.34*	0.024
Netherlands	1.24**	0.24	0.82**	0.25	−0.70**	−0.50**	−0.25		0.48**	0.046
Norway	1.05**	0.42*	0.20	−0.47*		−0.74**	0.39		0.32*	0.035
Poland	0.26	−0.06	0.22	−0.37			0.53*		−0.02	0.003
Portugal		−0.03				−0.30	−0.06		0.04	0.008
Slovenia	−0.08	0.75*		−0.22			0.49*	−0.52	−0.29	0.014
Sweden		0.16	0.35*	−0.02	−1.03**	−0.49*			0.28*	0.014

Only parties with more than 25 respondents; education, gender, age, occupation, and religiosity are controlled for. Austria: 0 = SPÖ, 1 = FPÖ, 2 = ÖVP, 5 = Grüne; Belgium: 0 = SP/PS, 1 = VB/FN, 2 = CVP/PSC, 4 = VLD/PRL-FDF, 5 = Agalev/Ecolo, 7 = VU-ID; Switzerland: 0 = SP, 1 = SVP/SD, 2 = CVP, 4 = FDP, 5 = Grüne; Czech Republic: 0 = CSSD, 2 = KDU-CSL, 4 = ODS, 7 = KSCM; Denmark: 0 = SD, 1 = DF/FP, 2 = KF, 4 = V, 6 = EL, 7 = RV; Germany: 0 = SPD, 2 = CSU/CDU, 4 = FDP, 5 = Grüne, 6 = PDS; Spain: 0 = PSOE, 2 = PP, 4 = CiU, 6 = IU; Finland: 0 = SDP, 2 = Kok/KD, 4 = Kesk, 5 = Vihr, 6 = Vas, 7 = RKP; France: 0 = PS, 1 = FN/MNR, 2 = UMP, 4 = UDF, 5 = Verts, 6 = PC; United Kingdom: 0 = Labour, 3 = Conservatives, 4 = LibDem, 7 = SNP; Greece: 0 = PASOK, 2 = ND, 6 = KKE/SYN; Hungary: 0 = MSZP, 2 = Fidesz-MPP-MDF, 4 = SZDSZ; Ireland: 0 = Labour, 2 = FG, 4 = FF, 5 = Greens, 6 = SF, 7 = PD; Israel: 0 = IA, 3 = Likud, 4 = Shinuy, 6 = Meretz, 7 = Orthodox, 8 = Hadash; Italy: 0 = DemSin, 1 = LN/FT, 2 = Margherita, 6 = RifCom, 7 = Forza, 8 = AN; Netherlands = 0 = PvdA, 1 = LPF, 2 = CDA, 3 = CU, 4 = VVD, 5 = GL, 6 = SP, 7 = D66; Norway: 0 = A, 1 = FrP, 2 = KrF, 3 = H, 4 = V, 6 = SV, 7 = Sp; Poland: 0 = SLD, 1 = PLR, 2 = PSL/PO, 3 = PiS, 4 = UW, 7 = AWSP; Portugal: 0 = PS, 2 = PSD, 6 = BE/PCP, 7 = CDS/PP; Slovenia: 0 = SDS/SLSD, 1 = SNS, 2 = NSi, 4 = LDS, 7 = SLS, 8 = SMS; Sweden: 0 = S, 2 = KD, 3 = M, 4 = FP, 5 = MP, 6 = V.

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

threats as racism. The threats and losses people perceive in societies that alter rapidly because of demographic changes should be addressed seriously and not only by far-right-wing parties.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

1. Although Luxembourg had adequate information on party preference, this country was highly problematic regarding missing values (more than 50%) and in distinguishing economic from cultural ethnic threats. A reliability test on the scales showed that Luxembourg was troublesome (economic ethnic threat Cronbach's $\alpha = .629$, cultural ethnic threat Cronbach's $\alpha = .442$). Moreover, the factor analysis results for Luxembourg differed extremely from the other countries.
2. Missing values on far-right preference were excluded from the analysis. The missing values on ethnic threat items and continuous control variables were imputed per country by means of Expectation Maximization (EM) imputation—only those that had fewer than three missing values on the threat items—and later merged into a total data set. The remaining missing values, on gender and migrant status, have been deleted.
3. The last national elections per country were as follows: November 2002 in Austria, June 1999 in Belgium, October 1999 in Switzerland, September 2002 in Germany, November 2001 in Denmark, June 2002 in France, May 2001 in Italy, May 2002 in the Netherlands, September 2001 in Poland, September 2001 in Norway, and January 2000 in Slovenia.
4. We were not able to study the reverse effect of voting on attitudes. However, the act of voting itself is not likely to affect one's attitude. Political entrepreneurship is, but the question would then shift to who is susceptible to these messages.
5. We also ran the analyses with the conventional far-right vote outcome, but apart from strength this did not yield different results.
6. Another reason might be underreporting. Systematic underreporting is problematic when one aims to explain levels of far-right-wing voting. In the current contribution, we aim to test relations and to what extent relations are dependent on the context. We therefore see underreporting as less problematic.

7. In the Czech Republic, only one person voted for the far right; consequently, this country was also left out of the analysis.
8. The economic ethnic threat items used were the following: "Would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in [the country] or generally help to create new jobs?" "Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?" and "Would you say it is generally bad or good for [the country's] economy that people come to live here from other countries?" The cultural ethnic threat items used were the following: "Would you say that [the country's] cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?" "It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions," "It is better for a country if there are a variety of different religions," and "If a country wants to reduce tensions it should stop immigration." See the codebook at www.europeansocialsurvey.org.
9. For the Netherlands this was not surprising since Lubbers and Güveli (2007) and Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004) found similar results. Nevertheless, these authors did reveal that threats to cultural identity are more likely to induce exclusionary reactions toward migrants than are perceived economic threats. Therefore, considering that in Austria, France, and the Netherlands the two threats are not distinguishable when tested with factor analysis, we proceed with the analysis.
10. Moreover, an AMOS measurement invariance test showed that when it was assumed that there was complete measurement invariance across the 11 selected countries, the model still had a reasonable fit (RMSEA = .041). However, the difference in fit between the unconstrained and the constrained model does show that there are country differences.
11. Ideally, multilevel analysis in MLwiN should be used; however, the relatively small number of countries made us decide to use contextual analyses in conventional logistic regression analyses. We are aware of the fact that the standard errors of the contextual level effects are underestimated and take this into account in interpreting the contextual level effects.
12. We also tested the model including the countries without a far-right-wing party, as has been suggested by one of the reviewers of *Comparative Political Studies*. The findings are largely replicated: The effect of perceived cultural ethnic threat is stronger than that of perceived economic ethnic threat.
13. The stability analyses reveal that the effect of perceived cultural ethnic threat is affected by dropping a country. It is smallest without Belgium (.76) and largest without Switzerland (.94). Likewise, the effect of the sociocultural specialists as compared to the manual workers is largest when Switzerland is excluded and smallest when Norway is excluded.

References

Arzheimer, K., & Carter, E. (2006). Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party success. *European Journal of Political Research*, *45*, 419-443.

Benoit, K., & Laver, M. (2006). *Party policy in modern democracies*. Retrieved from http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/ppmd/PPMD_11apr2006.pdf

Betz, H. G. (1993). The new politics of resentment: Radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. *Comparative Politics*, *25*, 413-427.

Blumer, H. (1958). Race prejudice as a sense of group position. *Pacific Sociological Review*, *1*, 3-7.

Brooks, C. (2006). Cleavage-based voting behavior in cross-national perspective: Evidence from six postwar democracies, *Social Science Research*, *35*, 88-128.

Brooks, C., & Manza, J. (1997). Social divisions and political alignments: U.S. presidential elections, 1960 to 1992. *American Journal of Sociology*, *90*, 30-71.

Clark, T. N., & Lipset, S. M. (1991). Are social classes dying? *International Sociology*, *6*, 397-410.

Clark, T. N., Lipset, S. M., & Rempel, M. (1993). The declining political significance of social class. *International Sociology*, *8*, 293-316.

Coenders, M., Gijsberts, M., Hagendoorn, L., & Scheepers, P. (2004). Introduction. In M. Gijsberts, L. Hagendoorn, & P. Scheepers (Eds.), *Nationalism and exclusion of migrants: Cross-national comparisons* (pp. 1-29). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.

Coffé, H., Heyndels, B., & Vermeir, J. (2007). Fertile grounds for extreme right-wing parties: Explaining the Vlaams Blok electoral success. *Electoral Studies*, *26*, 142-155.

Coser, L. (1956). *The functions of social conflict*. New York, NY: Free Press.

de Graaf, N. D., & Nieuwbeerta, P. (1995). Social klasse, mobiliteit, trouwpatronen en politieke voorkeuren [Social class, mobility, wedding patterns, and political preferences]. In J. Dronkers & W. C. Ultee (Eds.), *Verschuivende ongelijkheid in Nederland: Sociale Gelaagdheid en Mobiliteit* (pp. 182-201). Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum.

Erikson, R., Goldthorpe, J. H., & Portocarero, J. (1979). Intergenerational class mobility in three Western European societies: England, France and Sweden. *British Journal of Sociology*, *30*, 415-441.

European Social Survey. (2002–2003). *ESS round 1*, *2002* [Data file]. Retrieved from www.europeansocialsurvey.org

Eurostat. (2008). GDP per Capita [Data file]. Retrieved from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu

Evans, G. (2000). The continued significance of class voting. *Annual Review Political Science*, *3*, 401-417.

Goodwin, M. J. (2006). The rise and faults of the internalist perspective in extreme right studies. *Representations*, *42*, 347-364.

Güveli, A. (2006). *New social classes within the service class in the Netherlands and Britain: Adjusting the EGP class schema for the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, Netherlands.

Güveli, A., Need, A., & de Graaf, D. (2006). Socio-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviours of the social and cultural specialists and the technocrats: Social class or education? *Social Indicators Research*, *81*, 597-631.

Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture shifts in advanced industrial societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural*, *economical and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ivarsflaten, E. (2005a). Threatened by diversity: Why restrictive asylum and immigration policies appeal to Western Europeans. *Journal of Elections*, *Public Opinion & Parties*, *15*, 21-45.

Ivarsflaten, E. (2005b). The vulnerable populist right parties: No economic realignment fuelling their electoral success. *European Journal of Political Research*, *44*, 465-492.

Ivarsflaten, E. (2006). *Why so many right-wing populists in Western Europe? Re-examining grievance mobilization models in seven successful cases* (Working paper). Oxford, UK: Oxford University.

Ivarsflaten, E. (2008). What unites right-wing populists in Western Europe? Re-examining grievance mobilization models in seven successful cases. *Comparative Political Studies*, *41*, 3-23.

Kinder, D. R., & Sears, D. O. (1981). Prejudice and politics: Symbolic racism versus racial threats to the good life. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *10*, 336-353.

Kitschelt, H. (1995). *The radical right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Kitschelt, H. (2007). Review article: Growth and persistence of the radical right in postindustrial democracies: Advances and challenges in comparative research. *West European Politics*, *30*, 1176-1206.

Knigge, P. (1998). The ecological correlates of right-wing extremism in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, *34*, 249-279.

Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M., & Passy, F. (2005). *Contested citizenship: Immigration and cultural diversity in Europe*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Kriesi, H. (1989). New social movement and the new class in the Netherlands. *American Journal of Sociology*, *94*, 1078-1116.

Kriesi, H. (1998). The transformation of cleavage politics: The 1997 Stein Rokkan lecture. *European Journal of Political Research*, *33*, 165-185.

Lubbers, M. (2001). *Exclusionistic electorates: Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Nijmegen University, Nijmegen, Netherlands.

Lubbers, M. (2008). Regarding the Dutch "nee" to the European Constitution: A test of the identity, utilitarian and political approaches to voting "no". *European Union Politics*, *9*, 59-86.

Lubbers, M., Gijsberts, M., & Scheepers, P. (2002). Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, *41*, 345-378.

Lubbers, M., & Güveli, A. (2007). Voting LPF: Stratification and the varying importance of attitudes. *Journal of Elections*, *Public Opinion and Parties*, *17*, 21-48.

McConahay, J. B. (1982). Self-interest versus racial attitudes as correlates of anti-busing attitudes in Louisville: Is it the buses or the Blacks? *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *10*, 336-353.

McLaren, L. M. (2004). Opposition to European integration and fear of loss of national identity: Debunking a basic assumption regarding hostility to the integration project. *European Journal of Political Research*, *43*, 895-911.

Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist radical right parties in Europe*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Nieuwbeerta, P. (1995). *The democratic class struggle in twenty countries 1945/1990*. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Thesis.

Norris, P. (2005). *Radical right: Voters and parties in the electoral market*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Rydgren, J. (2007). The sociology of the radical right. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *33*, 241-262.

Rydgren, J. (2008). Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical right-wing voting in six West European countries. *European Journal of Political Research*, *47*, 737-765.

Scheepers, P., Gijsberts, M., & Coenders, M. (2002). Ethnic exclusionism in European countries: Public opposition to civil rights for legal migrants as a response to perceived ethnic threat. *European Sociological Review*, *18*, 17-34.

Schneider, S. L. (2008). Anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe: Outgroup size and perceived ethnic threat. *European Sociological Review*, *24*, 53-67.

Sniderman, P., & Hagendoorn, L. (2007). *When ways of life collide*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sniderman, P., Hagendoorn, L., & Prior, M. (2004). Predisposing factors and situational triggers: Exclusionary reactions to immigrant minorities. *American Political Science Review*, *98*, 35-49.

Stephan, W. G., Boniecki, K. A., Ybarra, O., Bettencourt, A., Ervin, K. S., Jackson, L., … Renfro, C. L. (2002). The role of threats in the racial attitudes of Blacks and Whites. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *28*, 1242-1253.

Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2000). An integrated threat theory of prejudice. In S. Oskamp (Ed.), *Reducing prejudice and discrimination* (pp. 23-46). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Strabac, Z., & Listhaug, O. (2008). Anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe: A multilevel analysis of survey data from 30 countries. *Social Science Research*, *37*, 268-286.

Swank, D., & Betz, H. G. (2003). Globalization, the welfare state and right-wing populism in Western Europe. *Socio-Economic Review*, *1*, 215-245.

U.S. Department of State. (2004). *Annual report on international religious freedom*. Retrieved from www.nationmaster.com

van der Brug, W., & Fennema, M. (2007). What causes people to vote for a radical-right party? A review of recent work. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *19*, 474-487.

van der Brug, W., Fennema, M., & Tillie, J. (2005). Why some anti-immigrant parties fail and others succeed. *Comparative Political Studies*, *38*, 537-573.

Wilkes, R., Guppy, N., & Farris, L. (2007). Right-wing parties and anti-foreigner sentiment in Europe. *American Sociological Review*, *72*, 831-840.

Bios

Geertje Lucassen graduated from the Utrecht University in the Netherlands and was affiliated with ERCOMER when writing this article in 2008. She is working as program manager at SodaProducties, an organization for societal development. They develop accessible projects aiming to establish contacts between people of different background and views.

Marcel Lubbers is associate professor in the section of sociology of the Radboud University Nijmegen in the Netherlands. He is affiliated with ERCOMER and studies national in-group and out-group relations by questioning far-right-wing voting behavior, interethnic attitudes, Euro-skepticism, and national cultural consumption.