Strategies of mainstream parties towards their right-wing populist challengers: Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland in comparison

Anna-Sophie Heinze

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Check for updates

Strategies of mainstream parties towards their right-wing populist challengers: Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland in comparison

Anna-Sophie Heinze

Department of Political Science, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Jena, Germany

ABSTRACT
Although right-wing populist parties (RPPs) have established themselves in most European countries, the academic discourse on political strategies towards them has been slow to start. This article compares the strategic reactions of the mainstream parties in the Nordic countries. The main findings are threefold: (1) in Denmark, Norway and Finland there has been a gradual change from various *disengage* to *engage* strategies over time, while in Sweden there has always been a strong *cordon sanitaire*; (2) one key difference has been in the speed and extent of the strategy changes; and (3) the choice of strategies, which is a very complex process, can be traced back to a combination of factors at the individual, party and systemic levels. There is a need for more research into the impacts and effectiveness of the strategies, the timing of the choice of strategies and the potential learning effects of political parties.

Since the 1980s, there has been a lot of research into 'why' questions (Why have RPPs emerged, and why have they done so in a particular context?), though the academic discourse is only slowly starting to ask 'how' questions (How do mainstream parties react to the RPPs and how effective are these strategies?) (Downs 2001: 25). In the new millennium, there have been different attempts to classify specific strategies and assess their potentials and risks. On the basis of two dichotomous strategies, *disengagement* and *engagement*, mainstream parties can select from reactions such as *ignore*, *legal restrictions*, *cordon sanitaire*, *demonise*, *adopt*, *defuse*, *hold* and *collaborate* (Bale *et al.* 2010; Downs 2001; Goodwin 2011; Grabow and Hartleb 2013; Saveljeff 2011). As there are still relatively few systematic comparative studies in the field, this article examines the strategies of mainstream parties towards their right-wing populist parties (RPPs) in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. Although those countries are very similar in their political, historical, social and economic contexts,

CONTACT Anna-Sophie Heinze ✉ anna-sophie.heinze@uni-jena.de

their mainstream parties have chosen different strategies. Whereas the Sweden Democrats (SD) have always been excluded from government participation by a broad *cordon sanitaire*, the mainstream parties in Denmark accepted the Danish People's Party (DF) as a 'normal' party from the beginning. The first of the RPPs, the Norwegian Progress Party (FrP), was included in a minority government in 2013 and was thus tolerated by the centre-right parties. The Finns Party (PS) has also been part of a centre-right government since 2015 although it was excluded for years following its emergence. As this strategic variance is surprising as well as unexplored, this article asks: *How did the mainstream parties in those countries react to the parliamentary representation of their RPPs and why did they choose these strategies?* The article will first give an overview of the main theoretical strategies which are discussed by scholars. It will then focus on the electoral and ideological developments of the RPPs and the strategies of the mainstream parties. Finally, the similarities of the strategies and the reasons for the choices made will be emphasised.

Theoretical strategies

Many scholars distinguish between *engage* and *disengage* (Downs 2001: 26) or *inclusion* and *exclusion* strategies (Goodwin 2011: 23). Besides this simple categorisation, there have already been attempts to classify more specific strategies and assess their potential. The most detailed thoughts may come from William M. Downs (2001: 26–8), who distinguishes between *ignore*, *legal restrictions* and *blocking coalitions* as *disengage* strategies and *co-opt policies* and *collaborate* as *engage* strategies. Downs' ideas were picked up and developed by others, such as Minkenberg (2001: 5, 10), who distinguishes between *demarcation* and *confrontation* on the one side and *co-optation* and *incorporation* on the other. In contrast, Bale (2003: 68; Bale *et al.* 2010: 412–14) deals with the question of how mainstream parties can react to the RPPs' issues and positions and makes a distinction between *hold*, *defuse* and *adopt* strategies. This was earlier considered by Meguid (2005: 349), who distinguished between *dismissive*, *adversarial* and *accommodative* strategies. Later, other strategies such as *demonise* (Saveljeff 2011: 36) or the local options of *engagement* and *interaction* (Goodwin 2011: 26–7) were introduced. In order to meet the various conceptual approaches, this analysis will be based on the following potential responses (see also Table 1).

Table 1. Strategies of mainstream parties towards RPPs.

Disengage strategies	Engage strategies
(1) ignore	(7) adopt (co-opt policies)
(2) legal restrictions	(8) collaborate (executive, legislative, electoral)
(3) cordon sanitaire (blocking coalitions)	
(4) demonise	
(5) defuse	
(6) hold	

Source: Own presentation based on Bale *et al.* (2010); Downs (2001); Saveljeff (2011).

(1) A mainstream party, finding an issue which has been taken up by a RPP unimportant or too difficult to address, can decide to *ignore* it (Meguid 2005: 349). Most of the time, it wants to 'keep clean hands' (Downs 2001: 26). The mainstream party denies the RPP's legitimacy and importance, and hopes that, due to the lack of power and publicity, it will become less attractive to the voters. Nevertheless, this strategy is not without risk. For instance, it does not address the sources of the RPP's electoral success (Downs 2001: 26). If the mainstream parties fail to adopt a coordinated strategy in parliament, the RPP can also become a kingmaker. Finally, the *ignore* strategy runs the risk of having the members of an established party system appearing to the voters and the media as neglecting their 'democratic duties' (Downs 2001: 26).

(2) Mainstream parties can also try actively to isolate the RPP using legal or political measures (Downs 2001: 27). On the one hand, they can establish *legal restrictions* against the RPP (e.g. raise the election thresholds, limit their right to speak or refuse public funding of their campaigns). Though this will probably not enable them to regain the trust of RPP voters.

(3) On the other hand, they can establish a political *cordon sanitaire*, a blocking coalition between most or all the mainstream parties (Downs 2001: 27). In this way, they try to prevent the RPP from gaining political office or influencing policy-making, thus presenting the party as 'extremist' and their supporters as 'wasting' their vote (Art 2007: 335; Goodwin 2011: 23). However, this strategy can increase the RPP's outsider status among its supporters, leading to a stronger sense of solidarity as well as to the party's radicalisation (van Spanje and van der Brug 2007: 1023). Often, there is little to unite the mainstream parties except their opposition to the RPP (Downs 2001: 27). Finally, this strategy is difficult if, due to the need to gain a majority, the RPP can no longer be ignored (Schellenberg 2011: 327).

(4) Another option is to publicly *demonise* the RPP, its political positions and its members, for instance as extreme or unacceptable, and prohibit any collaboration with it (Saveljeff 2011: 36, 39). However, this offensive strategy can increase the RPP's electorate support and its position as the owner of a specific issue (Meguid 2008: 31). Geden (2007: 24) advises against holding RPPs up to ridicule and excluding them as 'not politically viable' as this fails to delegitimise their arguments.

(5) A mainstream party can also try to change the perceived importance of a specific issue by, for instance, placing greater emphasis on socio-economic topics (Goodwin 2011: 23–4). However, such a *defusing* strategy can strengthen the RPP's voters in their opinion that politicians do not listen to the worries of 'the people', which can have a negative impact on public trust in political institutions. It is also difficult for

the mainstream parties to influence an agenda which is mainly set by the RPP (Bale *et al.* 2010: 413).

(6) A mainstream party can also try actively to win debates against the RPP by reinforcing its own policy positions, communicating these more clearly and concentrating on the mobilisation of its core electorate (Bale *et al.* 2010: 412–13; Goodwin 2011: 24–5). Such a *holding* strategy requires a high level of long-term thinking as it might cause short-term electoral losses. Although it is often the first strategy to be attempted, its success is unlikely if the other mainstream parties adopt the RPP's position (Grabow and Hartleb 2013: 39). Moreover, the salience of the issue that was picked up by the RPP can thereby increase (Bale *et al.* 2010: 349–50).

(7) When *adopting* positions from the RPP, mainstream parties try to decrease the RPP's political space and win back voters (Downs 1957; Goodwin 2011: 24). Such a U-turn can cause voters to further lose trust in the political parties and can alienate the mainstream party's core support. It is often followed by intra-party discussions which can further decrease the party's credibility, at which point the legitimacy of the RPP's position might increase (Bale *et al.* 2010: 413–14; Goodwin 2011: 28). Also, the RPP can radicalise its position and present itself as the 'original' (Decker 2004: 268).

(8) A mainstream party can also *collaborate* with the RPP, namely *legislatively*, when voting together for or against a bill (Downs 2001: 27–8) or *executively*, in the form of a government coalition or a minority government which is supported by the RPP (Grabow and Hartleb 2013: 36). Executive collaborations mostly arise for tactical reasons, for instance to avoid being the junior partner in a grand coalition, though they are justified in the hope that the RPP will lose credibility ('demystification') and will be forced to de-radicalise its positions and rhetoric ('taming effect') (Grabow and Hartleb 2013: 39; Heinisch 2003: 101–2; Rydgren 2006: 177). However, they can help RPPs to become legitimised, to emerge from their marginalised position, and gain influence in politics without being held responsible (Grabow and Hartleb 2013: 40; Rydgren 2006: 177). Finally, the *collaborative* strategy can also take place at the *electoral* level, when the mainstream party aligns with the RPP before the elections (Downs 2001: 28).

All these strategies have to be understood as ideal types which, in reality, combine and change over time, and are therefore difficult to distinguish (theoretically as well as empirically). Depending on the chosen theoretical assumptions and operationalisation, scientists assign party strategies to different categories. That is why the existing case studies on party responses are characterised by a wide variety (Bale 2007; De Lange 2012; Fallend and Heinisch

2015; Harmel and Svåsand 1997; Heinisch 2003; Minkenberg 2001; Saveljeff 2011; van Spanje and van der Brug 2007). This seems self-evident when looking at the constructed nature of the strategies themselves: As each strategy is a conceptual calculation of actors, based on their perceived goals and resources, it cannot be directly observed but can only be interpreted through their political actions (Raschke and Tils 2013: 127–8, 133–4). Furthermore, the interpretation will also depend on the data that is used (e.g. statements of individual party members, publicly communicated goals, direct information).

Deciding factors for the mainstream parties' choice of strategies

Political parties choose their strategies within their organisational and institutional contexts (Downs 2012: 78; Saveljeff 2011: 26–7). Their reactions can be influenced by different factors at the individual level (motivations of politicians, e.g. office maximisation), the party level (fragmentation of the party system, e.g. strategies of other parties) and the system level (electoral rules, e.g. timing and proportionality of elections) (Downs 2001: 28–9). Due to its limited scope, this article will focus on the strategies' correlation with the following four variables.

The first variable to be analysed will be *(V1) election results*, as it is assumed that the strategic behaviour of the mainstream parties is connected to their electoral risk evaluation as well as the fact that parties pursue specific goals and make rational decisions (Downs 1957; 2001: 29). To verify the hypothesis 'If the RPP can increase its electoral result at the expense of the mainstream party, the latter is more inclined to take risks and there is a higher probability of engage strategies', election results and analyses of the shift of voters will be used. The second variable, *(V2) strategies of the other parties*, is connected to the assumption that political parties seek governmental power and therefore behave strategically (Bale *et al.* 2010: 414, 422; Downs 2001: 30–31; Saveljeff 2011: 36). The hypothesis 'If a mainstream party has chosen an engage strategy, the other mainstream parties will probably also choose such a strategy' will be tested by examining the time at which parties adopted a strategy as well as the level of strategic fragmentation between the political factions. The third variable, *(V3) the public salience of the immigration issue*, is connected to the assumption that parties are anxious to react to voter preferences and the fact that RPPs often 'own' the immigration issue and contribute to politicising it (Downs 1957; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008: 613; Rydgren 2004: 492). The hypothesis 'If the public salience of the immigration issue is high, the mainstream parties tend to choose engage strategies' will be verified with regard to expert assessments of the main election issues, statements from party members and opinion polls on immigration. The last variable, *(V4) the ideology and rhetoric of the RPP*, is connected to Downs' (2001: 29) assumption that there are two potential sources of motivation for a politician's choice of strategy: electoral ambition and 'democratic responsibility'. It therefore appears necessary to also test the

hypothesis 'If a RPP openly holds xenophobic views and its members argue this way, the mainstream parties will probably choose disengage strategies' on the basis of the RPP's programmes, statements from its representatives and with regard to the party's ideological development.

Case selection

This article applies a most similar systems design and focuses on the mainstream parties in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland, whose political, historical, social and economic contexts are very similar. The countries have a high degree of pragmatism in policy-making ('consensus democracies'), proportional representation electoral systems with low, or no, thresholds (4% in Norway and Sweden; 2% in Denmark; none in Finland) and a strong tradition of minority coalitions (within the left or right bloc) or grand coalitions (Finland) (Jochem 2012: 49–51; Lane and Ersson 1996: 255, 269). Moreover, they are strong welfare states with high economic performances. In each country, the RPPs have gained their best electoral results in recent years. This article will analyse the strategies of those mainstream parties which have been particularly involved in forming governments since the electoral breakthrough of the RPPs.

In *Denmark*, the focus will be on events after 1998, when the Danish People's Party first participated in elections (after its separation from the Progress Party) and immediately won 7.4% of the vote. From 1998 to 2001, the Social Democrats (A) and the Social Liberal Party were in government; from 2001 to 2011 it was the liberal Venstre (V) and the Conservative People's Party; from 2011 to 2015, a coalition of the Social Democrats, the Social Liberal Party and the Socialist People's Party governed. In 2015, this coalition was replaced by a minority government of Venstre, which is supported by the DF, the Conservatives and the Liberal Alliance.

In *Norway*, all key election events since 1989 will be analysed as this is when the Progress Party achieved double-digit representation for the first time. Since 2013, it has been included in government under the conservative Høyre (H), which is supported by the Christian Democratic Party (KrF) and the social liberal Venstre. The Christian Democrats also led the government from 1997 to 2000 and from 2001 to 2005 (with Høyre) when the latter was supported by the FrP. In between, the Labour Party (Ap) governed alone (1997–1999) or in coalition (2000–2001, 2005–2013).

In *Sweden*, the focus will be on events after 2010, when the Sweden Democrats first entered parliament. From 2006 to 2014, the 'Alliance for Sweden' was in power, including the conservative Moderate Party (M), the Liberals, the Centre Party and the Christian Democrats. Since 2014, the Social Democratic Party (SAP) and the Green Party have run a minority government, which is supported by the 'Alliance parties' and by the Left Party.

In *Finland*, the focus will be on events after 2011, when the Finns Party achieved its electoral breakthrough. This had already been foreshadowed in 2009, when it won its first seat in the European Parliament. After the 2011 elections, a grand coalition between the conservative National Coalition Party (KOK) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) was formed, together with the Greens, the Swedish People's Party, the Christian Democrats and the Left Alliance. Since 2015, a coalition of the Centre Party (KESK), KOK and PS has been in government.

Denmark

Ideological and electoral development of the Danish People's Party

The DF developed from an anti-tax movement in 1972 (as FP) and became the second largest party after the Social Democrats in their first election (Klein 2013: 106–8; Meret 2011: 260–62). After its founder, Mogens Glistrup, was sent to prison for tax evasion, Pia Kjærsgaard became the new party leader in 1984 and the party increasingly developed a stronger anti-immigration profile. An intra-party discussion between hardliners and moderates was followed by the establishment of the DF in 1995. In 2001, the DF became the third largest party and supported a minority government (Klein 2013: 114–15; Rydgren 2004: 496). Until 2011, it exerted great influence on immigration policy without having to take responsibility for governmental decisions or to moderate its positions or rhetoric. As a result, it was able to gain legitimacy and consolidate its election results. However, the DF initially lost votes in 2011 and the minority coalition was replaced by a centre-left government (Widfeldt 2015: 3). One year later, Kristian Thulesen Dahl became the new party leader (Klein 2013: 115). For the first time, the DF became the strongest party in the 'blue' (centre-right) bloc and has supported a minority government of Venstre since then (Table 2).

Strategies of the social democrats and Venstre

The mainstream parties in Denmark did not establish a *cordon sanitaire* against the DF, or its predecessor, but accepted them as 'normal' parties from the beginning by, for example, supporting some of their bills in the 1980s (Downs 2002: 43; Klein 2013: 113). The immigration issue has dominated Danish politics and the media since the mid-1990s, after the mainstream parties joined the DF's

Table 2. Election results for Danish parties in this study in percentage and seats.

	1998	2001	2005	2007	2011	2015
DF	7.4 (13)	12.0 (22)	13.3 (24)	13.9 (25)	12.3 (22)	21.1 (37)
V	24.0 (42)	31.3 (56)	29.0 (52)	26.2 (46)	26.7 (47)	19.5 (34)
A	36.0 (63)	29.1 (52)	25.8 (47)	25.5 (45)	24.9 (44)	26.3 (47)

Source: Own presentation based on Nordsieck (2015).

anti-immigration discourse (Rydgren 2004: 493–4). Venstre was the first party to criticise the centre-left government's immigration policy (Bale *et al.* 2010: 415, 421). After that, the Social Democrats were divided on the issue too, and the government tightened its immigration policy at the end of the 1990s despite having taken a *defuse* strategy for a long time (Klein 2013: 114; Rydgren 2004: 494). At that time, all the mainstream parties became more sceptical towards multiculturalism and more pro-welfare state (Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2014: 7). During the 2001 election campaign, the Social Democrats and Venstre seemed to compete for the most radical positions on immigration and the DF was able to radicalise its stand, aided by the 9/11 incident (Decker 2004: 102–3; Hellström and Hervik 2011: 4; Rydgren 2004: 494). The DF increased its anti-Islam rhetoric, became the third largest party and was invited to support the centre-right minority government. During the next decade, it supported many bills and influenced Danish immigration policy (Downs 2012: 142). The Social Democrats, too, became more sceptical towards immigration and supported some of the government's bills (Bale *et al.* 2010: 415). During the 2011 election campaign, the economy became the most important issue for the first time since 2001 (Stubager 2012: 861–2). With a combination of pro-welfare state claims and a stricter immigration policy, the Social Democrats managed to form a government and to roll back many previously introduced measures (Stubager 2012: 863). After the elections in 2015, in which immigration became the main issue again, a minority government of Venstre took office and was supported by the DF, the Conservatives and the Liberal Alliance. Although the coalition talks between the centre-right parties failed, a future coalition with the DF can no longer be ruled out (Stubager 2012: 863; Widfeldt 2015: 138).

Variables

A correlation between the *(V1) election results* and the choice of *engage* strategies can be verified for the Social Democrats, especially since 2001. Since the mid-1990s, they have lost many blue-collar votes to the DF (Meret 2011: 273) and the DF's election successes between 2001 and 2011 were mainly at their expense (Klein 2013: 109). Between 2001 and 2007, the DF became the most clearly defined working-class party (Goodwin 2011: 8; Rydgren 2010: 60). For Venstre, the correlation cannot be directly verified as the party did not lose as much support. Instead, it was able to increase its votes between 1987 and 2001 and initially became the largest party in 2001. However, its strategic possibilities remain limited due to the coalition traditions and the fact that its potential coalition partners cannot compensate for the DF's high support. Furthermore, a correlation between the choice of strategy and the *(V2) strategies of the other parties* can be verified. As shown, the strategies of the Social Democrats and Venstre never differed much from each other. They have never adopted a *cordon sanitaire* and have become more open towards *engage* strategies over time.

After Venstre had changed its *defuse* strategy into an *adopt* strategy in the mid-1990s, the Social Democrats followed suit. When Venstre accepted the DF as an indirect coalition partner, the Social Democrats opened up to a legislative collaboration. The strategies of both mainstream parties converged during the 1990s, whereas the Social Democrats followed Venstre's strategies somewhat later. A correlation between the *(V3) public salience of the immigration issue* and the choice of strategy can also be verified. With the adoption of *engage* strategies in the mid-1990s, the mainstream parties reacted to the increased importance of the issue, though the voters were already more interested in socio-cultural issues from the mid-1980s (Rydgren 2004: 488). The immigration issue was also immediately picked up by the media, mostly in a negative way (Hussain 2000: 96; Klein 2013: 110). Nevertheless, the issue only dominated the political and public debate from the 1990s, after the mainstream parties acknowledged it and included it more explicitly in their election programmes (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008: 622; Hellström and Hervik 2011: 3; Klein 2013: 110). At the beginning of the new millennium, the Danes were the most immigration-critical population among the Nordic states (Widfeldt 2015: 39). Since then, the issue has remained central in all election campaigns, though the mainstream parties could not stop the DF's ownership of it (Etzold and Keck 2015; Klein 2013: 105; Stubager 2012: 862). Finally, the correlation between the choice of strategy and *(V4) the ideology and rhetoric of the DF* can be verified until the mid-1990s. The missing *cordon sanitaire* against the DF can be explained with its neoliberal background and relatively moderate stance until the early 1980s (Rydgren 2004: 497). However, the DF has radicalised its claims and rhetoric from the mid-1980s until today (Decker 2004: 102–3; Downs 2012: 137–8; Rydgren 2004: 480–81). From 2001 to 2011, only its anti-establishment rhetoric became less aggressive. The party succeeded in building up a 'radical but not extremist' image by, for example, excluding openly racist members (Rydgren 2004: 486–7; 2006: 183). Therefore, this variable does not explain the mainstream parties' move to *engage* strategies after the mid-1990s.

Norway

Electoral and ideological development of the Norwegian Progress Party

The FrP developed from an anti-tax movement in 1973 and was very similar to the DF regarding its content and voters (Bjørklund 2011: 301; Decker 2004: 103–5). In 1989, it gained its electoral breakthrough and became the third largest party in parliament. As in Denmark, that success was favoured by the economic developments as well as by the FrP's combination of pro-welfare and anti-immigration issues since the mid-1980s. In particular, the FrP campaigned to spend the money made by the oil industry on the welfare state (Bjørklund 2011: 304–5). After it became the second largest party in parliament in 1997, the

FrP went on to support the minority government of the Christian Democrats, Høyre and Venstre from 2001 to 2005, which contributed to a stricter immigration policy (Bale 2003: 83). That collaboration was not extended in 2005 or in 2009 as the FrP refused to support it (Jupskås 2013: 225). In 2006, Siv Jensen became the FrP's new party leader. She is known for being less confrontational than her predecessor Carl I. Hagen (Etzold 2013; Jupskås 2013: 208–9). In 2009, the FrP gained its best election result so far, though its share of the vote decreased after several intra-party scandals and the attack by right-wing extremist Anders Behring Breivik in July 2011. Breivik had been a member of the FrP's youth organisation. After the attack, all parties distanced themselves from his ideas and anti-immigration and anti-Islam statements were made less frequently, even by the FrP (Etzold 2013). In 2013, the FrP was included in the minority government of Høyre, which was supported by the Christian Democrats and Venstre (Table 3).

Strategies of the Labour Party, Høyre and the Christian People's Party

Instead of establishing a *cordon sanitaire* against the FrP, the mainstream parties accepted its supportive role in various national budgets in the 1980s and early 2000s (Jupskås 2013: 212). In contrast to Denmark, the political debate took place without the immigration issue for a long time as the Labour Party had successfully defused the topic and Høyre and the Christian Democrats tried to marginalise the FrP (Bale *et al.* 2010: 417). It was the Social Democratic government which introduced stricter immigration measures in 1975. After that, the other parties tightened their positions on the topic too, changing to an *adopt* strategy (Bale *et al.* 2010: 417; Harmel and Svåsand 1997: 324). This development was reinforced in the 1990s when all parties moved to the right. Slowly, the FrP became more accepted as a cooperation partner (Bjørklund 2011: 314–15). In particular, Høyre was open to the possibility of a coalition after many of its representatives had had good experiences working with the FrP in local councils (Bjørklund 2011: 314–315; Jupskås 2013: 213).

In 2001, a centre-right coalition government was supported by the FrP for the first time, though its influence on the government's agenda remained relatively marginal (Bale 2003: 83; Widfeldt 2015: 91). When the FrP refused to support any other coalition in 2005, the centre-left parties presented the

Table 3. Election results for Norwegian parties in this study in percentage and seats.

	1989	1993	1997	2001	2005	2009	2013
FrP	13.0 (22)	6.3 (10)	15.3 (25)	14.6 (25)	22.1 (38)	22.9 (41)	16.3 (29)
H	22.1 (37)	17.0 (28)	14.3 (23)	21.2 (38)	14.1 (23)	17.2 (30)	26.8 (48)
KrF	8.5 (14)	7.9 (13)	13.7 (25)	12.4 (22)	6.8 (11)	5.5 (10)	5.6 (10)
Ap	34.4 (63)	36.9 (67)	35.1 (65)	24.3 (43)	32.7 (61)	35.4 (64)	30.8 (55)

Source: Own presentation based on Nordsieck (2015).

centre-right bloc as being in political chaos and succeeded in forming a government (Allern 2010: 905; Jupskås 2013: 225; Widfeldt 2015: 91). Nevertheless, the Labour Party cooperated with the FrP in various municipalities from 2007 onwards (Jupskås 2013: 213). The centre-left government was re-elected in 2007 after it had successfully mobilised against a possible FrP-led coalition. The centre-right parties were still very fragmented in their positions towards the FrP, with Høyre being the only one open to a coalition (Allern 2010: 906; Jupskås 2013: 109; Sitter 2006: 578). Between 1985 and 2009, all the mainstream parties adopted the FrP's immigration policy positions (Jupskås 2013: 226). In 2013, Høyre and the FrP formed a minority government which is supported by the Christian Democrats and Venstre.

Variables

A correlation between the *(V1) election results* and the increasing choice of *engage* strategies can be verified at least partly for Høyre. Its *adopt* strategy cannot be explained by the election results until the mid-1980s since it was not losing voters to the FrP (Harmel and Svåsand 1997: 336). In the 1990s, it lost about half of its support, mainly to the FrP. To date, the FrP is Høyre's major electoral challenger (Jupskås 2013: 225). A similar correlation can also be verified partly for the Christian Democratic Party, as it is only marginally losing voters to the FrP (Jupskås 2013: 225). Moreover, its electoral results were fairly constant, to the extent that it was able to form the government in 1997 and 2001. Therefore, the indirect collaboration since 2001 cannot be explained. For the Labour Party, the correlation can also be verified only partly. Until the mid-1980s, it never had to fear for its position as the largest parliamentary party. Only at the end of the 1990s did the FrP become a greater electoral threat to it (Lorenz 2003: 202). In 2001, the Social Democrats' share of the vote fell to a historic low and in 2009 the FrP was the most frequently mentioned party among workers and the unemployed (Jakobsen 2015: 157; Jupskås 2013: 211). Therefore, this variable can explain only why the Labour Party has chosen *engage* strategies since the 1990s. The correlation between the choice of strategy and the *(V2) strategies of the other parties* can also be verified in part. As shown, all the mainstream parties chose *disengage* strategies in the early days of the FrP. After the Labour Party had tightened its immigration policy in 1975, Høyre and the Christian Democrats followed in the 1980s. However, to date, Høyre is the only party that supports a direct collaboration with the FrP. The strategies of the parties also indirectly influenced each other, especially with regard to the fragmentation of the centre-right parties' strategies in the 2000s. Furthermore, the correlation between the choice of strategy and *(V3) public salience of the immigration issue* can also be verified at least partly. As in Denmark, the issue was not important or politicised until the mid-1980s, even for the FrP (Bjørklund 2011: 305). After it had become more important in the 1980s, the issue lost salience in the

1990s and 2000s (Allern 2010: 906; Bale 2003: 79; Decker 2004: 106; Widfeldt 2015: 100). All in all, it has never been as important as in Denmark. In opinion polls between 1997 and 2009, immigration was almost never listed as one of the deciding factors that affected voters' choice of party (Bjørklund 2011: 310–11). During the 2013 campaign, the issue was less important than health and finance (Etzold 2013). Therefore, this variable cannot explain the choice of *engage* strategies since the 1990s. The correlation between the choice of strategy and the *(V4) ideology and rhetoric of the FrP* can also be verified to some extent. Compared with Denmark, the mainstream parties first chose a soft *cordon sanitaire* and a *defuse* strategy despite the fact that the FrP had the same anti-tax background as the DF (Jupskås 2013: 212). Because of its less vocal anti-system, authoritarian performance, the FrP has rarely been classified as a RPP or as a 'milder version' (Ignazi 1992: 15; Kitschelt and McGann 1997: 121; Mudde 2007: 55; 2012: 3). The FrP has tried to improve its image and distance itself from racism, nationalism and right-wing extremism, more than the DF ever has (Bjørklund 2011: 300; Jakobsen 2015: 148). However, since its establishment, it has changed its profile from being an anti-tax movement to being an anti-immigration party, with a stronger anti-Islam focus from the 2000s until 2011 (Juspskås 2013: 215). A double standard can be found between its anti-immigration and anti-Islam critique and its attempts not to engage in an openly racist attitude, which does not explain the choice of *engage* strategies (Jakobsen 2015: 152).

Sweden

Electoral and ideological development of the Sweden Democrats

The SD developed from the fascist Sweden Party in 1988 (Rydgren 2006: 183). Only in 1995 did the party start to distance itself from the right-wing extremist scene and began presenting itself as a progressive-nationalist, Eurosceptic movement, comparable with the DF, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) or the French Front National (FN), by changing some controversial elements of its programme (Klein 2013: 117; Rydgren 2006: 184). After this image change, which continued into the 2000s, the SD continued to gain votes. In 2010, it won parliamentary seats for the first time. Four years later, it doubled its representation and became the third largest party in parliament. In both elections, no political bloc was able to gain a majority, which gave the SD a strong leverage (Table 4).

Strategies of the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party

In comparison to the other Nordic states, the mainstream parties in Sweden managed to build up a strong *cordon sanitaire* against the RPP (Rydgren

Table 4. Election results the Swedish parties in this study in percentages and seats.

	2010	2014
SD	5.7 (20)	12.9 (49)
M	30.1 (107)	23.3 (84)
SAP	30.7 (112)	31.0 (113)

Source: Own presentation based on Nordsieck (2015).

2006: 179). They also explicitly tried to reject the SD's positions or rhetoric (Rydgren 2006: 179). During the campaigns in 2006 and 2010, they defused the immigration issue and focused on socio-economic issues (Engström 2010: 9; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008: 626). Their leading candidates ruled out any form of collaboration with the SD (Deloy 2010: 7; Engström 2010: 12) and the media also supported the *cordon sanitaire*, by, in the case of the state broadcaster TV4, refusing to transmit its election campaign spot 'Pensions or Immigration' (Klein 2013: 123). Although no political bloc gained a majority, the mainstream parties refused to collaborate with the SD and a centre-right minority government was formed (Downs 2012: 49–50). Two years after the elections, the mainstream parties still refused to cooperate with the SD (Klein 2013: 123) though there were some legislative collaborations with it at the local level (Downs 2012: 50; Pehle 2010: 295). During the 2014 campaign, socio-economic issues became central and overshadowed the immigration issue (Röver 2014: 2). Moreover, the Moderate Party's leading candidate, Fredrik Reinfeldt, publicly supported Sweden's liberal refugee policy. After the elections, a centre-left minority government was created but almost collapsed when it came to passing the state budget (Jungar 2015: 197). New elections were averted by the 'December Agreement', in which all democratic parties agreed to grant executive power and the authority to pass the state budget to the largest bloc until 2022 (Jungar 2015: 197–8; Röver 2015: 2). With this new parliamentary procedure, the parties have been able to maintain their *cordon sanitaire* and retain policy-making within the political blocs. The agreement was much criticised since it weakens the parliamentary rights of the opposition. Since 2014, some centre-right politicians have looked more favourably at cooperating with the SD (Jungar 2015: 189).

Variables

A correlation between the choice of strategy and the *(V1) election results* can be verified for both mainstream parties. Until 2010, the SD posed no electoral threat to either of them as it gained no parliamentary seats. Moreover, class-specific voting was high for a long time (Rydgren 2006: 170). Although the Social Democratic Party slowly lost support from the late 1990s and recorded its worst election result in 2010, it did not significantly lose voters to the SD, which mainly mobilised non-voters and young voters (Deloy 2010: 2; Klein 2013:

119). Instead, its major challenger is the Moderate Party, which has increasingly addressed left-wing topics since 2003 (Jochem 2012: 108). Likewise, the Moderate Party lost little support to the SD and even achieved its best election results yet in 2006 and 2010. However, it lost votes to the SD in 2014, which could explain the call for the termination of the *cordon sanitaire* (Röver 2014: 1). A correlation between the choice of strategy and the *(V2) strategies of the other mainstream parties* can also be verified. The *cordon sanitaire* could only survive because of the collective support of all democratic parties, which have rejected any form of collaboration at the national level and even used legal restrictions. However, the persistence of the strategy will depend on the reactions of the mainstream parties towards the scattered calls to accept the SD as a legitimate political rival. The correlation between the strategies and the *(V3) public salience of the immigration issue* can only be verified in part. The political agenda in Sweden has been dominated by socio-economic issues for a long time and the immigration issue has never been as politicised as in Denmark (Rydgren 2006: 187). Although it gained importance in the early 1990s and 2000s, the mainstream parties did not choose *engage* strategies (Rydgren 2006: 174). In recent years, the immigration issue has become more important to the political agenda and in public debate, though the mainstream parties defused it during the election campaigns (Klein 2013: 126). The correlation between the choice of strategy and the *(V4) ideology and rhetoric of the SD* can also be verified. Although the party has tried to improve its image, both ideologically and rhetorically, since the mid-1990s, it cannot deny its fascist roots (Rydgren 2006: 186–7). While the SD's programme in 2002 was still based on ethno-nationalism and xenophobia (Rydgren 2006: 184), ethnicity was significantly played down in the 2011 Principles manifesto (Widfeldt 2015: 195). There, the SD describes itself as a 'socially conservative party based on a nationalist outlook' (Widfeldt 2015: 194). As part of this moderation, it expelled more than 100 racist party members between 2012 and 2015 (Jungar 2015: 199–200). However, the SD is still arguing against multiculturalism with a highly anti-immigration and anti-Islam rhetoric, stances which go some way towards explaining the *disengage* strategies (Widfeldt 2015: 197).

Finland

Electoral and ideological development of the Finns Party

The PS was established in 1995 and considers itself the successor to the populist Finnish Rural Party, which had been involved in different governments between 1983 and 1990 after its establishment in 1959 (Arter 2010: 500; Breimaier 2011: 1–2; Jungar 2015: 193; Raunio 2013: 133). Although it continually increased its electoral support, the PS remained marginal until its electoral breakthrough in 2011. This had already been foreshadowed during the European elections

in 2009, when it gained 9.8% of the vote and one parliamentary seat. The 2011 election campaign focused on the differences between the PS and the mainstream parties, in particular party financial scandals. The PS, with its strong anti-establishment profile, was best able to exploit these differences (Raunio 2013: 137). Another central issue was the Finnish EU rescue measures, which were heavily criticised by the PS. Although the PS became the third largest party in parliament, it preferred to stay in opposition (Raunio 2013: 150). The 2015 elections were strongly dominated by the economy and public sector cuts, with other issues, including the EU, firmly in the background (Nurmi and Nurmi 2015: 434–5). The PS became the second largest party and entered the centre-right government, where it exerted influence on immigration policy by, for example, insisting on the establishment of a committee of enquiry to analyse the costs of immigration and its effects on society (Jungar 2015: 197) (Table 5).

Strategies of the National Coalition Party, the Centre Party and the Social Democratic Party

Until the 2009 EP elections, the PS had, at best, had marginal impact on politics and had not been taken seriously by the other parties (Raunio 2013: 152). The mainstream parties adopted a strategy of collective defence, depicting the PS as an irresponsible and dangerous political force that is all talk and no action (Raunio 2013: 152). However, the election outcome showed that such a collective isolation was not sufficient to contain the rise of the PS. Unsurprisingly, the 'old' parties opted for another strategy and most of them changed their approach, especially concerning the more critical discourse about the EU and immigration (Raunio 2013: 152). In a repeat of the 2009 EP elections, the 2011 campaign was characterised as a clash between the PS and the mainstream parties (Raunio 2013: 137). The governing parties in particular, often backed by the Social Democrats, did their best to discredit the PS, with the consequence that their own policy agendas were often ignored or downplayed. After the elections, the PS refused an invitation to participate in a coalition government with the National Coalition Party and the Social Democrats, and a six-party coalition was formed (Arter 2011: 1285; Raunio 2013: 152–4). In 2015, all parties pursued more cautious campaigns as unemployment was high and the EU sanctions against Russia weakened Finnish exports (Nurmi and Nurmi 2015: 434).

Table 5. Election results for Finnish parties in this study in percentage and seats.

	2011	2015
PS	19.1 (39)	17.7 (38)
KESK	15.8 (35)	21.1 (49)
KOK	20.4 (44)	18.2 (37)
SDP	19.1 (42)	16.5 (34)

Source: Own presentation based on Nordsieck (2015).

Therefore, they all agreed that public sector cuts would be necessary. The main beneficiary of the elections was the Centre Party but the PS could consolidate its results, too, while the National Coalition Party and the Social Democrats lost support. The Centre Party favoured a coalition with the National Coalition Party, the Social Democrats and the PS but the last two pulled out. In particular, the Social Democrats were reluctant to face another beating as a result of the inevitable public spending cuts (Nurmi and Nurmi 2015: 437; Ridder-Strolis and Rasche 2015a: 2). Eventually, the two centre-right parties and the PS formed a government. In the coalition agreement, a stricter EU policy was indicated and the rhetoric on immigration became tougher (e.g. an independent inquiry would be set up to analyse the costs of immigration and its impact on society) (Jungar 2015: 197; Ridder-Strolis and Rasche 2015b: 2).

Variables

A correlation between the choice of strategy and the *(V1) election results* can be verified. In 2011, the PS mobilised voters from all the mainstream parties and many former non-voters; about one-fifth of its voters in 2011 had not voted in previous elections (Raunio 2013: 137, 154–5). In 2015, the PS was able to retain its share of the vote (Jungar 2015: 190). The Social Democratic Party suffered its worst election result, losing voters not only to the PS but also to the National Coalition Party, which had used more labour-friendly rhetoric (Nurmi and Nurmi 2015: 435). As all the mainstream parties lost votes to the PS, the variable can explain the collective choice of *engage* strategies. The correlation between the choice of strategies and the *(V2) strategies of the other parties* can also be verified. Although all the mainstream parties had excluded the PS at the beginning, they tightened some of their positions concerning the EU and immigration after 2009 and no longer ruled out an executive collaboration two years later. Moreover, the correlation between the choice of strategy and the *(V3) public salience of the immigration issue* can partly be verified. Until 2009, immigration was a depoliticised issue, with hardly any public discussion or party competition (Raunio 2013: 154). Although this had changed with the presence of the PS, the party itself did not adopt immigration as a main issue in 2009 or 2011 (Raunio 2013: 154). During the 2015 campaign, it was less important than socio-economic issues (Jungar 2015: 190). Although the salience of the issue grew with the presence of the PS, it has never been as important as in Denmark. Therefore, the variable only partly explains the choice of *engage* strategies after 2009. The correlation between the choice of strategy and the *(V4) ideology and rhetoric of the PS* can partly be verified, too. Although the PS holds more moderate views than the DF or SD, it has become more critical of immigration (and later also of the EU) since the late 2000s, which does not explain the move towards *engage* strategies (Jungar 2015: 193). On the one hand, its manifesto has always been based on the defence of the 'forgotten people',

Euroscepticism and ethno-nationalism (Raunio 2013: 138) and its anti-immigration rhetoric is still less extreme and xenophobic than that of the DF or SD (Arter 2010: 497, 503; Breimaier 2011: 2; Jochem 2016: 115–16). On the other hand, the PS has increased its critique of immigration and multiculturalism, in particular since 2007, when activists with roots in nationalist organisations such as Suomen Sisu joined the party (Jungar 2015: 198, 200–201; Kuisma 2013: 100). In 2011, one-third of the party's delegates had such a background. The PS has never required its members to quit such organisations and has hardly ever expelled or distanced itself from radical representatives who espouse racism and extremism (Jungar 2015: 188, 193, 198). Instead, these members have had a strong influence on the PS's immigration policy: For example, Jussi Halla-aho, a radical critic of immigration and multiculturalism, became chairman of the parliamentary committee for immigration legislation and significantly contributed to an economically and culturally highly critical article on immigration in the 2011 electoral manifesto (Jungar 2015: 201; Raunio 2013: 149). Despite all that, the PS has always been perceived as a legitimate party due to its historical legacy and its relatively moderate appearance (Arter 2010: 501; Jungar 2015: 188).

Conclusion and research perspectives

As has been shown, there is no 'silver bullet' when dealing with RPPs. Instead, there are different ways of conceptualising, measuring and assigning political actions to different strategies. At the same time, the specific political and social context has to be taken into consideration. The analysis confirmed that the strategies of the mainstream parties are in a state of constant flux and can mostly be found in mixed forms. In all four countries, the mainstream parties reacted with *disengage* strategies at the beginning. However, the consistent exclusion of the RPP has survived only in Sweden, while in the other countries there has been an increasing trend towards *engage* strategies. This process always started before the electoral breakthrough of the RPPs and on the initiative of different parties. In all three countries, the adoption of the RPP's positions was followed by collaborations after some time. In Norway, Høyre accepted such an option at the end of the 1980s and first collaborated indirectly with the FrP from 2001 to 2005. However, the Social Democrats collaborated legislatively with the RPP at the local level, too. In Denmark, the government of Venstre was supported by the DF between 2001 and 2011, while the Social Democrats also supported some of the DF's bills. In Finland, no mainstream party rejected the possibility of a coalition with the PS after 2011 and the Centre Party and the National Coalition Party formed such a government in 2015. There was no evidence in any of the four countries of a change from an *engage* to a *disengage* strategy, which is why it can be assumed that once an *engage* strategy has been adopted it cannot easily be reversed. Rather, it can only be combined with other *engage*

strategies. Moreover, the findings have given the impression that the radicalisation of a RPP does not influence the willingness to cooperate once an *engage* strategy has been adopted.

There were also differences between the strategies, especially with regard to the speed and extent of strategy change. In Norway, the mainstream parties only slowly converged on the FrP from the 1970s and 1980s and it was several decades before the first indirect and direct collaborations. In Denmark, all the mainstream parties approached the DF in the 1990s and Venstre indirectly collaborated with it between 2001 and 2011. However, there has never yet been a direct collaboration. In Finland, the change of strategy was the fastest and the most extreme. After the 2009 EP elections, all the mainstream parties slowly changed their *disengage* into *engage* strategies, and in 2011 they invited the PS into coalition talks. Although the PS achieved its electoral breakthrough last among all Nordic RPPs, the Finnish mainstream parties are using *engage* strategies the most today.

Furthermore, as expected, the choice of strategy could not be traced back to a single variable but rather to a combination of different factors. A correlation with the *(V1) election results* can be verified for Sweden and Finland but only partly for Denmark and Norway. In Sweden, the mainstream parties barely lost support to the SD until 2010; only the Moderate Party lost out in 2014. In Finland, all the mainstream parties lost votes to the PS in 2011 and 2015, which could explain their collective choice of *engage* strategies. In Denmark, the variable can explain the *adopt* strategy of the Social Democrats since the mid-1990s, as they lost many voters to the DF, but this does not explain Venstre's adoption of the strategy, since their share of the vote increased. In Norway, the Labour Party tightened its policies before it too lost voters to the FrP, and Høyre only lost voters to the FrP from the end of the 1980s, which may explain its call for the opening of the *cordon sanitaire* but not the *adopt* strategy.

The correlation with the *(V2) strategies of the other parties* can be verified in Sweden, Denmark and Finland but only partly in Norway. In Sweden, the strategic unity of the mainstream parties was necessary to maintain the *cordon sanitaire*. In Denmark, Venstre chose an *adopt* strategy first, which was then picked up by the Social Democrats. Even now, their strategies are very similar. In Finland, the mainstream parties initially excluded the PS before choosing an *adopt* strategy after 2009. In Norway, the centre-right parties followed the Labour Party's *adopt* strategy in the 1980s but, to date, Høyre is the only party which has been open to a direct collaboration with the FrP.

The correlation with the *(V3) public salience of the immigration issue* can be verified for Denmark and to some extent for Norway, Finland and Sweden. In Denmark, the mainstream parties reacted to the increasing importance of the issue since the 1980s with an *adopt* strategy, but this also contributed to its politicisation. In Norway, the issue was politicised at the same time, though it has never been as important as in Denmark, having lost salience in the 1990s

and 2000s. In Finland, the issue was politicised by the PS's presence, although it has never been used as a main issue by itself. Furthermore, it continues to be less important than socio-economic issues in election campaigns. In Sweden, immigration was mostly subordinated to socio-economic issues and the mainstream parties have never chosen *engage* strategies, even when the issue gained salience.

The correlation with the *(V4) ideology and rhetoric of the RPP* can be verified in Sweden but only partly in Denmark, Norway and Finland. In Sweden, the fascist background and the ethno-nationalist ideology and rhetoric of the SD could explain the *disengage* strategies. In Denmark, the DF's neoliberal background and initially moderate claims could explain why there was no *cordon sanitaire*. However, the mainstream parties were open to *engage* strategies after the DF ideologically and rhetorically radicalised from the 1980s. In Norway, the FrP was also initially moderate but the mainstream parties were open to *collaborate* strategies after it had become more critical of immigration and Islam, and the Finnish parties, similarly, changed their *disengage* strategies for *engage* strategies after the PS had become more critical of immigration. Nevertheless, the PS and the FrP are more moderate than the DF and SD today, which partly explains the choice of direct collaborations.

All in all, this article illustrates the complexity of this field of research, in which more work is needed, be it operating with different theoretical strategies, cases, methodological approaches or variables. Investigation of strategies adopted at the local level or the different reactions of left- and right-leaning parties would be interesting. There are also more hypotheses that could be worthy of further research. First, the timing of the choice of strategy has to be explored. On the one hand, the analysis indicated that the choice of *adopt* strategies often leads to collaborations after some time, while, on the other hand, it suggested that *engage* strategies are unlikely to be rolled back, regardless of the RPP's ideological and rhetorical appearance. More research is also needed on the impacts and effectiveness of the various strategies, in particular how they impact on the legitimacy and political influence of the RPPs. In the analysis, *disengage* strategies (*cordon sanitaire*, *hold*) seemed to be more effective at limiting the RPP's influence in the long term than *engage* strategies (*adopt*). In that regard, it would be interesting to see how the direct collaborations in Norway and Finland will affect the RPPs' positions and support, the government performances and the mainstream parties' strategies. Finally, further research is needed into how the RPPs deal with the mainstream parties' reactions and the extent to which the mainstream parties improve their strategies in light of their previous experiences. If there are learning effects on the choice of strategy, maybe even cross-party or cross-national ones, theoretical models should become more dynamic.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Anna-Sophie Heinze is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Friedrich Schiller University Jena. Her dissertation involves a comparative analysis of the strategies of the German mainstream parties towards their new right-wing populist challenger, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). She is also a Research Fellow in the Department of Political Systems and Comparative Politics at the TU Dresden. [anna-sophie.heinze@uni-jena.de]

References

Allern, Elin Haugsgjerd (2010). 'Survival of a Majority Coalition: The Norwegian Parliamentary Election of 14 September 2009', *West European Politics*, 33:4, 904–912.

Art, David (2007). 'Reacting to the Radical Right: Lessons from Germany and Austria', *Party Politics*, 13:3, 331–349.

Arter, David (2010). 'The Breakthrough of Another West European Populist Radical Right Wing Party? The Case of the True Finns', *Government and Opposition*, 45:4, 484–504.

Arter, David (2011). 'Taking the Gilt off the Conservatives' Gingerbread: The April 2011 Finnish General Election', *West European Politics*, 34:6, 1284–1295.

Bale, Tim (2003). 'Cinderella and Her Ugly Sisters: The Mainstream and Extreme Right in Europe's Bipolarising Party Systems', *West European Politics*, 26:3, 67–90.

Bale, Tim (2007). 'Are Bans on Political Parties Bound to Turn out Badly? A Comparative Investigation of Three 'Intolerant' Democracies: Turkey, Spain, and Belgium', *Comparative European Politics*, 5:2, 141–157.

Bale, Tim, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, André Krouwel, Kurt Richard Luther, and Nick Sitter (2010). 'If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe', *Political Studies*, 58:3, 410–426.

Bjørklund, Tor (2011). 'Die radikale Rechte in Norwegen: Die Entwicklung der Fortschrittspartei', in Nora Langenbacher and Britta Schellenberg (eds.), *Europa auf dem 'rechten' Weg? Rechtsextremismus und Rechtspopulismus in Europa*. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 299–321.

Breimaier, Silke (2011). *Eine weitere rechtspopulistische Kraft in Europa. Der Erfolg der Basisfinnen bei den finnischen Wahlen 2011*. Stockholm: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Decker, Frank (2004). *Der neue Rechtspopulismus*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

Deloy, Corinne (2010). *General Elections in Sweden 19th September 2010*. Paris: Fondation Robert Schuman.

De Lange, Sarah L. (2012). 'New Alliances: Why Mainstream Parties Govern with Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties', *Political Studies*, 60:4, 899–918.

Downs, Anthony (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York, NY: Harper Collins.

Downs, William M. (2001). 'Pariahs in Their midst: Belgian and Norwegian Parties React to Extremist Threats', *West European Politics*, 24:3, 23–42.

Downs, William M. (2002). 'How Effective is the Cordon Sanitaire? Lessons from Efforts to Contain the Far Right in Belgium, France, Denmark and Norway', *Journal für Konflikt- Und Gewaltforschung*, 4:1, 32–51.

Downs, William M. (2012). *Political Extremism in Democracies. Combating Intolerance*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Engström, Mats (2010). *Länderanalyse Schweden. Lagerwahlkampf in Zeiten hoher Arbeitslosigkeit*. Stockholm: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Etzold, Tobias (2013). *Rechtspopulisten übernehmen Regierungsverantwortung in Norwegen*, available at http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/publikationen/kurz-gesagt/rechtspopulisten-uebernehmen-regierungsverantwortung-in-norwegen.html (accessed 12 March 2016).

Etzold, Tobias, and Janus Keck (2015). *Wahlen in Dänemark: EU-Skepsis statt schrittweiser Annäherung*, available at http://www.swp-berlin.org/publikationen/kurz-gesagt/wahlen-in-daenemark-eu-skepsis-statt-schrittweiser-annaeherung.html (accessed 12 March 2016).

Fallend, Franz, and Reinhard Heinisch (2015). 'Collaboration as Successful Strategy against Right-Wing Populism? The Case of the Centre-Right Coalition in Austria, 2000-2007', *Democratization*, 23:2, 324–344.

Geden, Oliver (2007). *Rechtspopulismus: Funktionslogiken - Gelegenheitsstrukturen - Gegenstrategien*. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.

Goodwin, Matthew (2011). *Right Response. Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe*. London: Chatham House.

Grabow, Karsten, and Florian Hartleb (2013). *Europa - Nein Danke? Studie zum Aufstieg rechts- und nationalpopulistischer Parteien in Europa*. Sankt Augustin/Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Jesper Krogstrup (2008). 'Immigration as a Political Issue in Denmark and Sweden', *European Journal of Political Research*, 47:5, 610–634.

Harmel, Robert, and Lars Svåsand (1997). 'The Influence of New Parties on Old Parties' Platforms. the Cases of the Progress Parties and Conservative Parties of Denmark and Norway', *Party Politics*, 3:3, 315–340.

Heinisch, Reinhard (2003). 'Success in Opposition - Failure in Government. Explaining the Performance of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Public Office', *West European Politics*, 26:3, 91–130.

Hellström, Anders, and Peter Hervik (2011). *Feeding 'The Beast': Nourishing Nativist Appeals in Sweden and Denmark*. Aalborg: Aalborg University.

Hussain, Mustafa (2000). 'Islam, Media and Minorities in Denmark', *Current Sociology*, 48:4, 95–116.

Ignazi, Piero (1992). 'The Silent Counter Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme-Right Wing Parties in Europe', *European Journal of Political Research*, 22:1, 3–34.

Jakobsen, Kjetil A. (2015). 'Aufstand der Bildungsverlierer? Die Fortschrittspartei auf dem norwegischen Sonderweg', in Bernd Henningsen and Kjetil Jakobsen (eds.), *Rechtspopulismus und Rechtsextremismus in Europa. Die Herausforderung der Zivilgesellschaft durch alte Ideologien und neue Medien*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 147–164.

Jochem, Sven (2012). *Die politischen Systeme Skandinaviens*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Jochem, Sven (2016). 'Die Parlamentswahl 2015 in Finnland - Herausforderungen für die Verhandlungsdemokratie', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 47:1, 102–117.

Jungar, Ann-Cathrine (2015). 'Convergence by Different Means: The Finns Party and the Sweden Democrats', in Frank Decker, Bernd Henningsen and Kjetil Jakobsen (eds.), *Rechtspopulismus und Rechtsextremismus in Europa: die Herausforderung*

der Zivilgesellschaft durch alte Ideologien und neue Medien. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 187–204.

Jupskås, Anders Ravik (2013). 'The Progress Party: A Fairly Integrated Part of the Norwegian Party System?', in Grabow, Karsten, and Florian Hartleb (eds.), *Exposing the Demagogues. Right-Wing and National Populist Parties in Europe*. Brussels: Centre for European Studies, 205-236.

Kitschelt, Herbert, and Anthony J. McGann (1997). *The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Klein, Andreas M. (2013). 'The End of Solidarity? On the Development of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Denmark and Sweden', in Grabow, Karsten, and Florian Hartleb (eds.), *Exposing the Demagogues. Right-Wing and National Populist Parties in Europe*. Brussels: Centre for European Studies, 105-131.

Kuisma, Mikko (2013). "Good' and 'Bad' Immigrants: The Economic Nationalism of the True Finns' Immigration Discourse', in Umut Korkut, Gregg Bucken-Knapp, Aidan McGarry, Jonas Hinnfors and Helen Drake (eds.), *The Discourse and Politics of Migration in Europe*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 93–108.

Lane, Jan-Erik, and Svante Ersson (1996). 'The Nordic Countries. Contention, Compromise and Corporatism', in Colomer, Josep. M. (eds.), *Political Institutions in Europe*. London: Routledge, 254-281.

Lorenz, Einhart (2003). 'Rechtspopulismus in Norwegen. Carl Ivar Hagen und die Fortschrittspartei', in Nikolaus Werz (ed.), *Populismus: Populisten in Übersee und Europa*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 195–207.

Meguid, Bonnie M. (2005). 'Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success', *American Political Science Review*, 99:3, 347–359.

Meguid, Bonnie M. (2008). *Party Competition between Unequals. Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Meret, Susi (2011). 'Vom Rand zur Mitte? Die Entwicklung der radikalen Rechten in Dänemark', in Nora Langenbacher and Britta Schellenberg (eds.), *Europa auf dem 'rechten' Weg? Rechtsextremismus und Rechtspopulismus in Europa*. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 257–279.

Minkenberg, Michael (2001). 'The Radical Right in Public Office: Agenda-Setting and Policy Effects', *West European Politics*, 24:4, 1–21.

Mudde, Cas (2007). *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mudde, Cas (2012). 'Three Decades of Populist Radical Right Parties in Western Europe: So What?', *European Journal of Political Research*, 52:1, 1–19.

Nordsieck, Wolfram (2015). *Parties and Elections in Europe*, available at www.parties-and-elections.eu (accessed 12 March 2016).

Nurmi, Hannu, and Lasse Nurmi (2015). 'The Parliamentary Election in Finland April 19 2015', *Electoral Studies*, 40:1, 433–438.

Pehle, Heinrich (2010). 'Nordeuropa: Schweden, Finnland, Dänemark', in Jürgen Dieringer and Roland Sturm (eds.), *Regional Governance in EU-Staaten*. Opladen/ Farmington Hills: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 286–302.

Raschke, Joachim, and Ralf Tils (2013). *Politische Strategie. Eine Grundlegung*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Raunio, Tapio (2013). 'The Finns: Filling a Gap in the Party System', in Grabow, Karsten, and Florian Hartleb (eds.), *Exposing the Demagogues. Right-Wing and National Populist Parties in Europe*. Brussels: Centre for European Studies, 133-160.

Ridder-Strolis, Katrin, and Stephan Rasche (2015a). *Nationale Zentrumspartei gewinnt finnische Parlamentswahlen*. Riga: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

Ridder-Strolis, Katrin, and Stephan Rasche (2015b). *Regierungsbildung in Finnland*. Riga: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

Röver, Corinna (2014). *Parlamentswahl in Schweden - Schwedendemokraten werden drittstärkste Kraft*. Riga: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

Rydgren, Jens (2004). 'Explaining the Emergence of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties: The Case of Denmark', *West European Politics*, 27:3, 474–502.

Rydgren, Jens (2006). 'Vom Wohlfahrtschauvinismus zur ideologisch begründeten Fremdenfeindlichkeit. Rechtspopulismus in Schweden und Dänemark', in Decker, Frank (eds.), *Populismus in Europa. Gefahr für die Demokratie oder nützliches Korrektiv?* Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 165-190.

Rydgren, Jens (2010). 'Radical Right-Wing Populism in Denmark and Sweden: Explaining Party System Change and Stability', *SAIS Review*, 30:1, 57–71.

Saveljeff, Sigrid (2011). *New Questions and New Answers. Strategies towards Parties with Radical Right-Wing Populist Profile*. Malmö: Malmö University.

Schellenberg, Britta (2011). 'Strategien gegen die radikale Rechte und für ein plurales und zukunftsfähiges Europa', in Nora Langenbacher and Britta Schellenberg (eds.), *Europa auf dem 'rechten' Weg? Rechtsextremismus und Rechtspopulismus in Europa*. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 323–333.

Schumacher, Gijs, and Kees van Kersbergen (2014). 'Do Mainstream Parties Adapt to the Welfare Chauvinism of Populist Parties?', *Party Politics*, Online First, 1–13.

Sitter, Nick (2006). 'Norway's Storting Election on September 2005: Back to the Left?', *West European Politics*, 29:3, 573–580.

Stubager, Rune (2012). 'The Parliamentary Election in Denmark, September 2011', *Electoral Studies*, 31:4, 861–864.

Van Spanje, Joost, and Wouter Van Der Brug (2007). 'The Party as Pariah: The Exclusion of Anti-Immigration Parties and Its Effect on Their Ideological Positions', *West European Politics*, 30:5, 1022–1040.

Widfeldt, Anders (2015). *Extreme Right Parties in Scandinavia*. London/New York: Routledge.