Class 2: Far-right ideology

From transnational traits to local idiosyncracies

Opening notes

Presentation groups

Remember: topic to me at least by Week 4

Presentations line-up
Date Presenters Method
15 May: Idil M., Zeynep P., Liesl W., Selin K., Chiara W. TBD
22 May: Gabriel W., Lina M., Florian S., Julian B. TBD
29 May: NO CLASS MEETING
Presentations line-up
Date Presenters Method
5 June: Rasmus B., Andre D., Josefine E., Ioanna L., Santiago C. TBD
12 June: Omar B., Lela E., Niclas W. TBD
19 June: NO CLASS MEETING
26 June: Colombe I., Konstantin S., Jakob W. TBD
Presentations line-up
Date Presenters Method
3 July: Alexander V., Samuel B., Luis G., Oscar O. TBD
10 July: Lina S., Stephen W., Philomena B. TBD
17 July: Corinna Z., Eva M., and Rostislav N. TBD
24 July: Sebastian K., Thomas R., Emilia Z., Florian P. TBD
24 July: Lorenz F., Daniel B., Fiona W., Medina H. TBD

Ideological components

  • nationalism
  • exclusionism
  • xenophobia
  • strong state
  • welfare chauvinism
  • traditional ethics

  • nativism
  • authoritarianism
  • populism

Recall…

Far Right encompasses both

Radical right Extreme right
illiberal but democratic anti-democratic, anti-system

Nationalism (a whole area of study on its own)

  • basic definition: political doctrine that strives for the congruence of the cultural and the political unit, i.e., the nation and the state

  • Variations:

    • ethnic nationalism
    • civic nationalism (e.g., Will Kymlicka)
      • assimilative
      • integrative

Exclusionism

  • basic definition: ideological practice of deliberately excluding certain individuals, groups, or communities based on (usually inherited/innate) characteristics such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or other factors
  • Particularly common examples:
    • antisemitism
    • ethnopluralism (all ethnicities are equal, but should be kept separate)

Xenophobia

  • basic definition: antipathy towards people from other countries (typically) or perceived as ‘other’ (‘out-group’)
    • overlaps with nationalism and exclusionism

Strong state

  • basic definition: preference for a powerful, centralised government (often with an autocratic leader) capable of maintaining control over various aspects of society

  • Here, the state becomes a tool for…

    • representing and preserving national identity
    • maintaining social order
    • securing dominance of a particular group
    • building/maintaining strong military

Welfare chauvinism

  • basic definition: belief in restricting access to welfare benefits based on exclusionary precepts
    • e.g., healthcare, unemployment benefits, housing assistance — only for certain categories of people
    • assumption of (undeserving) ‘outsiders’ that are ‘scamming’ the system, i.e., taking from welfare system without having first contributed

Traditional ethics

  • basic definition: belief in preservation and promotion of “traditional” patterns of social life, for example: . . .
  • traditional gender and sexuality: two sexes/genders with typical traits . . .
  • traditional gender family roles: male ‘breadwinner’ and stay-at-home female . . .
  • social hierarchies (e.g., of gender, class)

Mudde (2007) - 3 core features

  • nativism (combination of nationalism and xenophobia): states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”); non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening
  • authoritarianism: belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely
  • populism: ‘thin’ ideology where society consists of “the (pure) people” versus “the (corrupt) elite” and which argues for politics of the volonté générale (general will) of the people
    • not as inherently anti-democratic as the other two features
    • not unique feature of far-right politics (e.g., left-wing populism, as in Latin America)

Missing features and special considerations?

So… nativism, authoritarianism, and populism

  • does this make sense? are any important components missing?
  • issues to consider on ideology and classification:
    • individuals’ and groups’ ideology can change, even dramatically
    • where does ‘ideology’ happen or manifest?
      • for Mudde (2007), it is assessable through party manifestos
      • ↪ then how to assess movements?
      • difference of what parties write in official material and say elsewhere? (e.g., ‘frontstage moderation,’ Brandmann 2022)
    • is ‘far right’ classification only/mainly about ideology—or might it also be about behaviours/actions?

Idiosyncratic far-right features

A miscellaneous smattering of features

  • accelerationism: accelerate society’s system collapse to hasten new order
  • anti-globalist: opposed to globalisation, advocating preservation of national sovereignty, local cultures, economies
  • civilizationist: world is a battle of competing civilisations (e.g., ‘Western, Christian’)
  • great replacement: conspiracy belief that white or European or autochthonous populations are being systematically replaced by immigrants
  • irredentism: restoration of former territory (e.g., HU, AT, SRB)
  • male supremacism: belief that men are inherently superior to women and should dominate in society
  • neo-völkisch: revival blend of ethnonationalist (racial or ethnic purity), spiritual, and esoteric beliefs (mythic or pagan themes)

A (disturbing) digression: fascism

  • what is it?
  • historical phenomenon or living ideology?

Fascism

  • thin, consensus definition: revolutionary ultra-nationalism
    • a totalitarian movement
  • locked into a specific era?
    • yes!: today’s right-wing extremism is ‘essentially different’ to interwar predecessors
    • no!: ideological features, modes of organising, aspirations — all live on in contemporary organisations

Fascism

  • Stanley Payne (1995):
    1. negations (anti-Marxism, anti-liberalism, anti-conservatism);
    2. ideology and programme, such as nationalism, a positive evaluation of war, imperialism, and corporatism;
    3. style, such as the organised party-mass movement, and extensive use of symbolism
  • Roger Eatwell (2007): ideology that strives to forge social rebirth based on a holistic-national radical Third Way, though in practice fascism has tended to stress style, especially action and the charismatic leader, more than detailed programme, and to engage in a Manichaean demonisation of its enemies

Fascism - contemporary examples?

Some scholarship applies the ‘fascist’ label to…

  • British National Party (BNP)
  • Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD)
  • Golden Dawn
  • Jobbik
  • Mi Hazánk
  • CasaPound
  • Fratelli d’Italia
  • Kotleba - People’s Party Our Slovakia

Ideology and emotions

Ideology and emotions

Pilkington, Omelchenko, and Perasović (2018, 124): “… activists attached both rational and emotional meanings to their activism… the rational and the emotional may be entwined in social movement participation rather than constituting alternative explanations of motivation to engage”

for more on emotions in social movements, see Jasper (2018)

Ideology and emotions

Virchow (2007, 156): “…an integrative approach that considers ideology production, dissemination, and learning on the one hand and the way that protagonists of movements perform and act on the other hand”

  • in other words… examining ‘theory and practice’ of FR

Rational actors with ideological convictions, or…

Ideology and emotions

Virchow (2007, 160, emphasis added): “why people join and stay in political movements cannot be explained by cognitive processes alone. Rather, emotional and practical dimensions also are relevant to political recruitment and socialization”

  • key concept: emotional collective

  • Hints at the various modes of radicalisation (Class 11): true believers, material gain, network/peer-to-peer socialisation, etc.

  • Ideology is important—but not to the exclusion of other considerations

Ideology and emotions

  • Demonstrations as sites of instilling ideology and of creating emotion

  • create ‘emotional collective’ and stabilise collective identity (cf. Polletta and Jasper 2001)

    • racial pride, rage/grievance about immigrants, distrust of state, amusement or aggression towards counter-protesters
  • recruit new followers

  • promote new leaders

  • ‘shape an ideological worldview and attitudes’

  • asserting FR’s right to participate in public sphere

  • occupy a public space, as show of power

Emotional collectives in action

Pilkington, Omelchenko, and Perasović (2018) - looking at youth radical right activists in Croatia (football fans), England (EDL), Russia (jogging club)

Emotional collectives in action

Pilkington, Omelchenko, and Perasović (2018, 128): bonds through the ‘buzz’ of participation (at demonstrations, mass jogging events, or football matches) — also through the warmth, affection and sense of belonging to a ‘family’ generated by participation and persistent relationships between actions

When we arrived at the stadium, just that feeling that you are at Giuseppe Meazza and that you silenced the home fans in the first 5 minutes, their flags down, 4000 of us shouting hard […] money can’t buy that feeling. I would have walked [to Milan] for that. (Crni, TOR, HR)

Far-right organisational forms

Organisations (macro-, meso-, micro-levels)

  • Parties
    • Party family
    • individual parties (and within-party studies)
    • voters/supporters
  • Mobilisation
    • Whole movements or movement sectors/fields
    • SMOs
    • leaders, activists, members, participants
  • Terrorism / violent extremism
    • surrounding structures (e.g., NSU)
    • groups, cells
    • individuals

Triadic competition and contention

StateInstitutions state institutions FRParties FR parties (esp. RR) StateInstitutions->FRParties CompetingParties competing parties StateInstitutions->CompetingParties FRParties->CompetingParties CompetingParties->FRParties

Triadic competition and contention

State state FRMovements FR movements State->FRMovements CounterMovements countermovements State->CounterMovements FRMovements->CounterMovements CounterMovements->FRMovements

Germany’s far-right scene

  • Overview
  • Party membership
  • Demonstrations (movement activity)
  • Crime
  • Terrorism, political violence
  • 2024 counter-mobilisation

Germany’s far-right scene

Parties: AfD, DVU, NPD*, REP

Media, civil society: Institut für Staatspolitik (Sezession), Compact, Desiderius Erasmus Stiftung (AfD)

SMOs: NPD*, Dritte (III.) Weg, Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland, Pro-Bewegung

Terrorism: NSU, Gruppe Freital, Oldschool Society

German FR party membership

German FR demo mobilisation (2005-2020)

Kleine Anfrage data

Events Participants Grouping
1 30 (ohne)
2 100 ARMINIUS-Bund
240 22,521 DIE RECHTE
124 9,988 Der III. Weg
1 50 NPD-JN
1,002 157,054 NPD/JN
1 200 NPD/JN – „Freie Kräfte“
2 160 NPD/JN/DIE RECHTE
11 1,325 NPD/JN/Neonazis / Rechtsextremisten
1,253 211,740 Neonazis / Rechtsextremisten
2 90 Neonazis / Rechtsextremisten/DIE RECHTE
4 1,470 Neonazis / Rechtsextremisten/Der III. Weg
2 380 n. b.
64 3,101 pro NRW

German FR crime

German FR terrorism/violent extremism

Visualisation of DE data 1990-2020 from Ravndal et al. (2021)

far-right motivated homicides in Germany

Recognised by BRD vs. identified by Amadeu Antonio Stiftung

far-right motivated homicides in Germany

o: officially recognised by BRD

o: identified by Amadeu Antonio Stiftung

2024 counter-mobilisation against AfD

https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000209911/die-logik-hinter-den-anti-afd-protesten

Any questions, concerns, feedback for this class?

Anonymous feedback here: https://forms.gle/pisUmtmWdE13zMD58

Alternatively, send me an email: m.zeller@lmu.de

References

Brandmann, Franziska. 2022. “Radical-Right Parties in Militant Democracies: How the Alternative for Germany’s Strategic Frontstage Moderation Undermines Militant Measures.” European Constitutional Law Review 18 (3): 412–39. https://doi.org/10.1017/S157401962200030X.
Heinze, Anna Sophie, and Manès Weisskircher. 2022. “How Political Parties Respond to Pariah Street Protest: The Case of Anti-Corona Mobilisation in Germany.” German Politics 0 (0): 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2022.2042518.
Jasper, James M. 2018. The Emotions of Protest. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094306119880196q.
Mudde, Cas. 2007. “Constructing a Conceptual Framework.” In Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 11–31. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.48-1788.
Pilkington, Hilary, Elena Omelchenko, and Benjamin Perasović. 2018. One Big Family: Emotion, Affect and Solidarity in Young People’s Activism in Radical Right and Patriotic Movements.” In Understanding Youth Participation Across Europe, edited by Hilary Pilkington, Gary Pollock, and Renata Franc, 123–52. London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59007-7_6.
Plümper, Thomas, Eric Neumayer, and Katharina Gabriela Pfaff. 2021. “The Strategy of Protest Against Covid-19 Containment Policies in Germany.” Social Science Quarterly 102 (5): 2236–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13066.
Polletta, Francesca, and James M Jasper. 2001. “Collective Identity and Social Movements.” Annual Review of Sociology 27 (1): 283–305.
Ravndal, Jacob Aasland, Madeleine Thorstensen, Anders Ravik Jupskås, and Graham Macklin. 2021. RTV Trend Report 2021. Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe, 1990-2020.” 1. Oslo: University of Oslo.
Virchow, Fabian. 2007. “Performance, Emotion, and Ideology: On the Creation of "Collectives of Emotion" and Worldview in the Contemporary German Far Right.” Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 36 (2): 147–64. https://doi.org/10.1177/0891241606298822.