Class 3: Parties

radical and extreme

Opening notes

Students’ favourite cities

Presentation groups

Remember: topic to me at least by Week 4

Presentations line-up
Date Presenters Method
15 May: Idil M., Zeynep P., Liesl W., Selin K., Chiara W. logistic regression
22 May: Gabriel W., Lina M., Florian S., Julian B. discourse analysis
29 May: NO CLASS MEETING
  • no more regression presentationssee syllabus for some of the other options
Presentations line-up
Date Presenters Method
5 June: Rasmus B., Andre D., Josefine E., Ioanna L., Santiago C. regression
12 June: Omar B., Lela E., Niclas W. TBD
19 June: NO CLASS MEETING
26 June: Colombe I., Konstantin S., Jakob W. TBD
26 June: Maksim K., Felix S., Jon L.D., Damir S., Korbinian M. case study
Presentations line-up
Date Presenters Method
3 July: Alexander V., Samuel B., Luis G., Oscar O. TBD
10 July: Lina S., Stephen W., Philomena B., Aarón Z. TBD
17 July: Corinna Z., Eva M., and Rostislav N. TBD
24 July: Sebastian K., Thomas R., Emilia Z., Florian P. TBD
24 July: Lorenz F., Daniel B., Fiona W., Medina H. TBD

Check-in: ideological components

  • nationalism
  • exclusionism
  • xenophobia
  • strong state
  • welfare chauvinism
  • traditional ethics

  • nativism
  • authoritarianism
  • populism
  • questions from the recorded lecture?

Party classification

  • applying the ideological components to classify parties
    • why do this?
    • how?
    • scoring cases

Discussion point

  • Why classify parties into party families? Is this worthwhile?

temporal, contextual comparisons; consequences for policy positions and other party behaviour (e.g., cooperation with other parties); map party system landscapes

  • How can we make classifications?

Mudde’s approach (focused on ideology)

  1. party-based:
    1. Party name;
    2. Membership in transnational confederations;
    3. self-identification
  • all duds…

Mudde’s approach (focused on ideology)

  1. researcher-based:
    1. electorates/constituencies
      • problems: electorates change; electorates are heterogeneous
    2. member ideology
      • problems: diverse membership; active members are most extreme (David May’s ‘special law of curvilinear disparity’ compared to leadership and voting base; your thoughts?)
    3. leader ideology
      • problems: who exactly? how (interviews, speeches?)?
    4. official party literature
      • conditions: ‘official’ only (no ‘aligned’ lit.), national only (no regional), and both external and internal lit. is optimal

Mudde’s approach (focused on ideology)

  1. researcher-based:
    1. electorates/constituencies
      • problems: electorates change; electorates are heterogeneous
    2. member ideology
      • problems: diverse membership; active members are most extreme (David May’s ‘special law of curvilinear disparity’ compared to leadership and voting base; your thoughts?)
    3. leader ideology
      • problems: who exactly? how (interviews, speeches?)?
    4. official party literature
      • conditions: ‘official’ only (no ‘aligned’ lit.), national only (no regional), and both external and internal lit. is optimal

Populist radical right parties (PRRPs)

populist non-populist
radical
non-radical

Mudde’s list … a bit outdated. What is the scene like today?

FPÖ (AT); Vlaams Belang (BE); Hrvatska stranka prava (HR); Dansk Folkeparti (DK); Front National (FR); Die Republikaner (DE); MIEP (HU); Liga Polskich Rodzin (PL); Partidul Romania Mare (RO); LDPR (Zhironovsky) (RU); Slovenska narodna strana (SI)

Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet (NO); Bulgarian Business Bloc (BG); Danish Fremskridtspartiet (DK); Lijst Pim Fortuyn (NL); Forza Italia (IT); Polish Unia Polityki Realnej (PL); Swedish Ny Demokrati (SE); Schweizer Autopartei (CH)

NPD (DE); National Political Union (GR); BNP (UK); Dutch Centrumpartij ’86 (NL); Prava Alternativa (CZ); Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski (PL); Movement for Romania (RO); Russian National Unity (RU); National Bolshevik Party (RU); non-extreme: Nationalist Action Party (TR)

Civic Democratic Party (CZ); Fidesz (HU) …

Party classification in practice

  • name: Bharatiya Janata Party
  • founded: 1980
  • in gov: yes, since 2014
  • leadership: Narendra Modi (Prime Minister), J.P. Nadda (Party President)
  • notable social organisation: Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (‘National Volunteer Corps’, RSS)

  • name: Republican Party
  • founded: 1854
  • in gov: yes, since 2025 (and repeatedly before)
  • leadership: Donald Trump
  • notable social organisation: (e.g.,) Turning Point USA

  • name: Alternative für Deutschland
  • founded: 2013
  • in gov: no, never at national or regional levels
  • leadership: Tino Chrupalla and Alice Weidel
  • notable social organisation: Desiderius-Erasmus-Stiftung

Party classification in practice

A QR code for the survey.

Take the survey at https://forms.gle/MPe6HyUSdEdkMpk6A

  • not based on evaluating party literature—just on your familiarity with these cases

Class poll - classification

BJP - nativist?

BJP - authoritarian?

BJP - populist?

Class poll - classification

Republican (US) - nativist?

Republican (US) - authoritarian?

Republican (US) - populist?

Class poll - classification

AfD - nativist?

AfD - authoritarian?

AfD - populist?

Class poll - classification: radical/extreme?

BJP

Republicans

AfD

BJP - debatable classification

pro

  • Promotes India rooted in Hindutva (cultural nationalism)
  • non-Hindus framed as threat
  • Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) discriminates against Muslims

contra

  • Presents itself as inclusive of all Indians, promoting unity
  • Merely defending (religious) majority, not attacking minorities
  • Party has broad, diverse demographic support base

pro

  • power has been centralised around PM Modi
  • some crackdown on dissent (e.g., civil society orgs.)
  • civil liberties restrictions (e.g., internet shutdowns)

contra

  • multi-party political system endures
  • plurality-winning party in functioning electoral democracy
  • judiciary and press (perhaps harassed, but) remains independent

pro

  • often frames politics as people vs. elites
  • charismatic leadership of Modi
  • emphasis on direct communication (e.g., Mann Ki Baat radio)

contra

  • party has deep institutional roots
  • often technocratic (economic) policy agenda

Republicans - debatable classification

pro

  • emphasis on restrictive immigration policies
  • rhetoric distinguishing between ‘real Americans’ and foreign-born other
  • asserting threat of ’globalism

contra

  • argue immigration policy is about upholding lawful procedures
  • sometimes significant immigrant-background electoral support

pro

  • increasing willingness to undermine democratic norms
  • (continued) expansion of executive power
  • hostility towards independent institutions

contra

  • U.S. politics remains democratically competitive
  • more complex intra-party dynamics—not only Trump loyalism
  • libertarian elements in party likely hostile to creeping authoritarianism

pro

  • lots of people vs. elite rhetoric
  • unique charisma of Trump
  • direct communication of social media and rallies

contra

  • heavily institutionalised and reliant on (certain) elites
  • ‘traditional conservatives’ in GOP (opposed to MAGA populism?)

AfD - debatable classification

pro

  • strongly anti-immigrant stance
  • promotion of German cultural identity
  • demanding assimilation or else exclusion

contra

  • manifesto documents are less strongly-worded than campaign rhetoric
  • ‘cultural identity’ is accessible (unlike ethnic nationalism)

pro

  • advocacy for enhanced state powers (esp. on migration-related issues)
  • attempts to undermine some institutions
  • some expressed admiration of authoritarian leaders

contra

  • competes in free and fair elections just like other parties, adhering to many informal conventions
  • does not advocate the elimination of political pluralism

pro

  • positions itself as voice of ‘true people’ against mainstream elites
  • skilled direct communication through social media and collaboration with movement orgs.

contra

  • policy proposals do not have the same sort of anti-elitism as members’ campaign rhetoric
  • some elite backing

Party classification in practice - utility

Does Mudde’s classification approach enable differentiation between far-right parties or merely classification whether a party belongs to the far-right party family?

A tricky case?

  • Schweizerische Volkspartei - Union démocratique du centre (SVP)
    • conservative? populist radical right? decentralised mess?

advert adapted by NPD, Lega Nord, VB, Democracia Nacional—among others

A (typical) tricky case?

  • Schweizerische Volkspartei - Union démocratique du centre (SVP)
    • conservative? populist radical right? decentralised mess?

advert adapted by NPD, Lega Nord, VB, Democracia Nacional—among others

  • regional variation
    • Berne (centrist); Zurich (populist, adversarial)

Radical right electoral performance

  • overview
  • Minkenberg (2013)
  • European elections 2024
  • German elections 2025

Overview electoral performance (ParlGov)

https://github.com/hdigital/parlgov-snippets/tree/main/party-family-share

Overview electoral performance (ParlGov)

https://github.com/hdigital/parlgov-snippets/tree/main/party-family-share

Overview cabinet share (ParlGov)

https://github.com/hdigital/parlgov-snippets/blob/main/country-year/cabinet-share.png

Resources to dive deeper

Minkenberg (2013) - far-right parties

  1. extremist/autocratic-fascist (usually including racism or xenophobia): NPD/DVU (DE), BNP (UK), Jobbik (HU)

  2. Ethnocentrist (but not fascist): FPÖ (AT), VB (BE), REP (DE), FN (FR), MIEP (HU), Lega (IT), SVP (CH)

  3. populist/populist-authoritarian (strong and charismatic leader and with a diffuse nationalist ideology): BZÖ (AT), FIDESZ (HU), PiS (PL)

  4. religious-fundamentalist: KDNP (HU), LPR (PL)

Visualising Minkenberg (2013) Table 2: RR-West (lineplot)

Relation of party strength to movement strength

How is Minkenberg evaluating party and movement strength? Is there a causal relationship? (if so, in what direction?)

low party strength high party strength
low movement strength Austria, France, Italy
medium movement strength Germany (West), Netherlands Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Belgium
high movement strength Germany (East), United Kingdom, Sweden

Relation of party strength to movement strength

Koopmans and Rucht (1995) have an (outdated?) answer:

mobilization of left-wing movements is concentrated during periods of right-wing government, whereas the Right tends to mobilize most strongly when the Left is in power. However, the highest levels of mobilization, of the Left and to some extent also of the Right, occur when mixed governments, in which power is shared by parties of the Left and of the Right, are in power.

relationship types of the right and the radical right

Minkenberg (2013): the efforts by a number of radical right parties to appear ‘respectable’ has changed their pariah status—although as will be shown, they have not become a conservative or moderate right-wing party

  • policy adoption (e.g., on immigration) from far-right to centre (even centre-left, e.g., Denmark 2019?)
  • Possible results:
    • taking issue away from FR party → marginalising it
    • legitimation and confirmation of issue ownership (e.g., Karácsony and Róna 2011)
    • alignment and opening opportunities for formal cooperation
    • others?

what was/is/will be going on in Central and Eastern Europe?

  • is Central and Eastern Europe special, different in degree or even in kind?

Hungary: shifting political sands - a closer look

left centre right
1990 MSZP FIDESZ SZDSZ, **MDF** FKGP, KDNP
1994 **MSZP**, FIDESZ SZDSZ, MDF KDNP, FKGP (MIEP)
1998 MSZP SZDSZ, **FIDESZ**, MDF FKGP MIEP
2002 **MSZP** SZDSZ, FIDESZ-MDF
2006 **MSZP** SZDSZ, MDF FIDESZ
2010 LMP MSZP **FIDESZ** Jobbik
2014 LMP MSZP (+ coalition) **FIDESZ** Jobbik
2018 LMP MSZP-Parbeszed, + **FIDESZ** Jobbik
2022 United (incl. Jobbik) **FIDESZ** Mi Hazánk
  • Minkenberg writes about MIÉP and István Csurka, and FIDESZ: the efforts by a number of radical right parties to appear ‘respectable’ has changed their pariah status—although as will be shown, they have not become a conservative or moderate right-wing party

Hungary - a closer look

  • Example of Jobbik and Gabor Vona (cf. ‘frontstage moderation,’ Brandmann 2022)

far-right parties in government

Minkenberg (2013, 19):

In the language of Giovanni Sartori: the radical right’s ‘blackmail potential’ may be more consequential than its ‘coalition potential’

coalition potential

ability to influence electoral competition by (potential) inclusion in a viable government

blackmail potential

represents another pole of political support and counters traditional centripetal party competition between the centrist parties

far-right parties in government - discussion questions

What are the barriers to far-right parties in government? Are they unique?

Is there anything distinctive about the effects of far-right parties in government (policy, political competition, internationally)?

What do you know about cases of far right in government (e.g., FPÖ/BZÖ, Lega [Nord], Dansk Folkepartiet, FdI)?

What has happened since Minkenberg’s article in 2013? Are we in a ‘new world’?

Any questions, concerns, feedback for this class?

Anonymous feedback here: https://forms.gle/pisUmtmWdE13zMD58

Alternatively, send me an email: m.zeller@lmu.de

References

Brandmann, Franziska. 2022. “Radical-Right Parties in Militant Democracies: How the Alternative for Germany’s Strategic Frontstage Moderation Undermines Militant Measures.” European Constitutional Law Review 18 (3): 412–39. https://doi.org/10.1017/S157401962200030X.
Karácsony, Gergely, and Dániel Róna. 2011. “The Secret of Jobbik - Reasons Behind the Rise of the Hungarian Radical Right.” Journal of East European and Asian Studies 2 (1): 61–92.
Koopmans, Ruud, and Dieter Rucht. 1995. “Social Movement Mobilization Under Right and Left Governments: A Look at Four West European Countries.” Berlin: Das Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung.
Minkenberg, Michael. 2013. “From Pariah to Policy-Maker? The Radical Right in Europe, West and East: Between Margin and Mainstream.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 21 (1): 5–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2013.766473.