Presentation groups

Demobilisation and disengagement defined

Demobilisation (Zeller under contract; cf. Davenport 2015)

the process whereby collective action, whether in the form of campaigns, organisations, or even whole movements, decreases and ultimately ends

Demobilisation causes (Zeller under contract)

Demobilisation causes (Zeller under contract)

causes overlap and interact in different demobilisation processes

Individual disengagement - core concepts

• radicalisation (change in belief): process of connecting with and adopting radical or extremist ideology—does not necessarily result in violence or ‘engaging’ in extremist activity

• engagement (change in behaviour): (in this context) process or act of performing radical or extremist activity, especially violence

• deradicalisation (change in belief): (p1) “process by which an individual is diverted from an extremist ideology, eventually rejecting an extremist ideology and moderating their beliefs”

• disengagement (change in behaviour): (p1) “process by which an individual decides to leave their associated extremist group or movement in order to reintegrate into society”

(Gaudette, Scrivens, and Venkatesh 2022)

Individual disengagement - a few reasons

Burnout/exhaustion or Lost commitment might de driven by … among several possibilities:

Individual disengagement - a few reasons

Burnout/exhaustion or Lost commitment might de driven by … among several possibilities:

• intervention programmes

Individual disengagement - a few reasons

Burnout/exhaustion or Lost commitment might de driven by … among several possibilities:

• criminal justice responses (high variability: from ‘read Jane Austen’ (Taylor and Suliman 2021); to counter-terrorism responses (Koehler 2019))
• intervention programmes

Individual disengagement - a few reasons

Burnout/exhaustion or Lost commitment might de driven by … among several possibilities:

• changes to biographical availability
• criminal justice responses (high variability: from ‘read Jane Austen’ (Taylor and Suliman 2021); to counter-terrorism responses (Koehler 2019))
• intervention programmes

Individual disengagement - Gaudette et al. (2022)

• interviews with Canadian former right-wing extremists (RWEs):
• ethical implications? (more on related issues in our last class)

prior to conducting the interviews with formers, we consulted with key stakeholders, namely Canadian law enforcement officials and local community activists, and they developed a list of interview questions that they would ask formers and those questions were incorporated into the interview guide. The purpose of this approach was simple: rather than developing an interview guide that was derived from an academic perspective only, we included interview questions from key stakeholders for the purposes of developing a multidimensional, multi-perspective interview guide.

Individual disengagement - Gaudette et al. (2022)

• data: 10 former RWEs, recruited using snowball sampling

Disengagement reasons - Gaudette et al. (2022)

Disengagement reasons - Gaudette et al. (2022)

Disengagement reasons - Gaudette et al. (2022)

Disengagement reasons - Gaudette et al. (2022)

Individual disengagement intervention programmes

• non-criminal justice responses increasingly common in many European states
• social work programmes to steer individuals away from radical/extreme milieu
• For example: Exit Norway, UK’s Prevent strategy and Channel programme, EXIT Deutschland

Disengagement intervention programmes - EXIT

Social movement campaigns

• Campaigns consist of four elements (della Porta and Rucht 2002; Staggenborg and Lecomte 2009)
  1. a consistent organising actor (an activist[s], an organisation[s]),
  2. temporal boundedness,
  3. strategically linked actions, and
  4. the intention to advance goals

Far-right demonstration campaigns (AT, DE, UK)

Far-right demonstration campaigns (Zeller under contract)

Far-right demonstration campaigns (Zeller under contract)

• concentrated state channelling (SCH)

Far-right demonstration campaigns (Zeller under contract)

• concentrated state coercion (SCO)
• concentrated state channelling (SCH)

Far-right demonstration campaigns (Zeller under contract)

• concentrated private channelling (PCH)
• concentrated state coercion (SCO)
• concentrated state channelling (SCH)

Far-right demonstration campaigns (Zeller under contract)

• concentrated private coercion (PCO)
• concentrated private channelling (PCH)
• concentrated state coercion (SCO)
• concentrated state channelling (SCH)

Far-right demonstration campaigns (Zeller under contract)

• long duration (LD) (on temporality, see Grzymala-Busse 2011)
• concentrated private coercion (PCO)
• concentrated private channelling (PCH)
• concentrated state coercion (SCO)
• concentrated state channelling (SCH)

Far-right demobilisation patterns (Zeller under contract)

Example of the EDL (Morrow and Meadowcroft 2018)

English Defence League (EDL)

• important case: return to street politics, lots of successors (FLA, DFLA, Free Tommy Robinson, Justice for Women and Children)

Example of the EDL (Morrow and Meadowcroft 2018)

rejection of pluralism and minority rights means [EDL] can properly be considered ‘far right’ (p545) (cf. Mudde 2019)

EDL (Morrow and Meadowcroft 2018; cf. Busher et al. 2018)

EDL (Morrow and Meadowcroft 2018)

EDL (Morrow and Meadowcroft 2018)

%%flowchart LR
%%  A["`EDL 
%%  campaign
%%  kjaasdafjkjagk`"]:::greenBox --> B[reactive<br/>policing]:::yellowBox
%%  A --> C[counter-<br/>protest]:::yellowBox 
%%  B --> D[public<br/>disorder,<br/>arrests]
%%  C --> D
%%  D --> E[preventative<br/>policing]:::yellowBox
%%  E --> F[EDL<br/>benefits<br/>reduced]

flowchart LR
  A[EDL<br/>campaign:<br/>violence,<br/>increased<br/>self-worth,<br/>solidarity]:::greenBox --> B[heavy,<br/>reactive<br/>policing]:::yellowBox
  A --> C[counter-<br/>demonstration<br/>activity]:::yellowBox 
  B --> D[public disorder<br/>and numerous<br/>arrests]
  C --> D
  D --> E[policing<br/>adaptation:<br/>preventative]:::yellowBox
  E --> F[benefits to<br/>members esp.<br/>violence and<br/>group solidarity<br/>reduced]


  %% Style definitions - classDef blueBox fill:#d0e6ff,stroke:#003366,stroke-width:2px;
  %% classDef greenBox fill:#d4edda,height:150,width:160;
  %% classDef yellowBox fill:#fff3cd,height:100,width:70;
  classDef blueBox fill:#d0e6ff;
  classDef greenBox fill:#d4edda;
  classDef greyBox fill:#e2e3e5;
  classDef redBox fill:#f8d7da;
  classDef yellowBox fill:#fff3cd;

From 2012, the police more effectively kept EDL and counter-demonstrations apart, and routed protests away from potential flashpoints such as Islamic centres

EDL (Morrow and Meadowcroft 2018)

At interview, Robinson explained that the numbers at EDL demonstrations declined from 2011 because: The police were successful in what they were doing, the days become quite boring, intentionallywise [sic] … Tower Hamlets they held everyone in the road for six hours – it’s boring as fuck. Do you think I’ve just travelled down from Newcastle to stand in the road for six hours without having beer?

on protest policing, see (e.g.,) della Porta and Reiter (1998)

Banned & monitored (nationally) FR orgs in Germany

Banned & monitored (nationally) FR orgs in Germany

Banned & monitored (nationally) FR orgs in Germany

Banning FR orgs in Germany - necessity

• high far-right visibility is necessary for banning decisions

German governments banned far-right organisations only in years when far-right activity, in the form of violence or agitation, was highly visible. Conspicuous incidents of violence in particular were often a prod to proscriptive action. Organisational unlawfulness alone is not enough to explain banning decisions. Without public or political awareness, authorities appear unlikely to act, even if a group is technically illegal.

Banning FR orgs in Germany - sufficient patterns

1. Neo-Nazi movement groups – organisations promote National Socialist ideology—legally sufficient for banning in Germany and several other countries—as well as racial hatred and violence.

Case 1: Nationale Offensive (NO)

• typical of neo-Nazi sham parties pattern

• founded 1990 (by split from FAP) → linked to previously banned group

• not serious electoral contestation:

  • 0.2 per cent at local elections in Singen-Konstanz
  • 1992 BW Landtag elections: 183 votes out of five million cast

• BAN: by Rudolf Seiters (CDU): the NO ‘created and fuelled a xenophobic mood.’

• NO appealed… → Federal Administrative Court quashed appeal

mechanism: social and political pressure on minister ← indignation about high levels of far-right violence (HVIO) situation

Case 2: Collegium Humanum (CH)

• typical of longstanding hubs pattern
• founded 1963 by Haverbeck (d. 1999) and Haverbeck-Wetzel
  • had charitable status (Gemeinnützigkeit)
  • meeting point (Vlotho, NRW) for far-right activists from all over
    • are there any banned orgs. to which the CH was not linked?!
  • publication: Stimme des Gewissens
• BAN: by Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU): the CH was directed against Germany’s constitutional order and repeatedly violated laws against Holocaust denial

Case 2: Collegium Humanum (CH)

• typical of longstanding hubs pattern

• CH appealed… – Federal Administrative Court denied appeal

  1. CH publications repeatedly denied the Holocaust
  2. CH publications showed an affinity to and attempt to promote National Socialism
  • ideology of CH publication was sufficient legal basis (cf. Bundesverfassungsgericht 2009) – many fit this qualification…

• Mendel-Grundmann-Gesellschaft (MGG) active in Vlotho (research, then outreach)

• Vlothoer Bündnis gegen das CH (by local Greens)

• mechanism: high specific visibility, driven by local counter-mobilisation

informative epilogue to these cases

Response to parliamentary inquiry (Deutscher Bundestag 1994). Asked about effects of banning, government asserted

the bans had achieved ‘widespread uncertainty and a lack of prospects in the right-wing extremist scene, far-reaching suppression of group activity by breaking up organisational structures and confiscating organisations’ assets, and the seizure of weapons’

Moreover: government claimed a sort of chilling effect, that other groups ‘have at least restricted their agitation activities in order to prevent bans’.

informative epilogue to these cases

Conversely, gov. acknowledged that …

• BfV intelligence-gathering perhaps disrupted by banning action,
• activists might use banning as an opportunity to propagandise,
• bans could radicalise members (i.e., conspiratorial, aggressive),
• members might acquire more solidarity by enduring banning

Conclusions

• inconsistency in German governments’ banning practices:
  • org. characteristics alone are not enough to explain bans
  • situational factors are causally significant and cannot be ignored
• the use of banning is sometimes a tool of politics rather than a targeted response to systemic threats
• high far-right visibility (HVIO+HPRO) necessary situation for ban
  • but that visibility is specific rather than generalised
    • builds social/political pressure to ban