

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The Strategic Use of Emotions in Recruitment Strategies of Armed Groups: The Case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

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ABSTRACT

What role do emotions play in recruitment strategies employed by armed groups? I argue that armed groups use "emotion work" – the effort to evoke or shape emotions – to recruit new fighters, trying to appeal not only to peoplès self-interest or reason but to their values and normative judgements. I use data from 30 interviews with former members of the LTTE to show that emotions were a central element of their recruitment strategy. To analyze the role of emotions in recruitment, I build on social movement theory and the sociology of emotions and propose an analytical framework linking different types of collective action frames with different emotions they provoke and the mechanisms through which they facilitate recruitment.

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While emotions have been rediscovered as relevant to understand social movements and dynamics of mass protest, works examining the role of emotions in shaping mobilization during armed conflicts are still rare. We know little about how different emotions influence an individuals decision to join armed groups, to continue fighting or to leave violence behind.[1] This study addresses this gap in the literature by focusing on the role emotions play in recruitment strategies employed by armed groups. It argues that armed groups use "emotion work" – the effort to evoke or shape emotions[2] – as a part of their strategy to convince individuals to take up arms, trying to appeal not only to peoplès self-interest or reason but to their values and normative judgements.

The article proposes an analytical framework to examine the use of emotions in recruitment processes by linking different types of collective action frames with different emotions they provoke and the mechanisms through which they facilitate recruitment. More precisely, it suggests that armed groups use different types of frames to evoke specific emotions which have been identified as relevant to shape individual perceptions of conflicts and motivation to participate. By provoking specific emotional responses, armed groups thus intend to activate social mechanisms, such as polarization among groups, which then facilitate participation. This framework is drawn inductively from an analysis of the role emotions played in the recruitment strategies employed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Once confronted with falling numbers of

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youngsters who volunteered to join, the LTTE stepped up an extensive recruitment campaign targeting young Tamils living in the territory they controlled.[3] Emotions were a central element of this recruitment strategy. The LTTE used speeches, street performances, movies and poetry to deliberately provoke emotions to make youngsters more willing to join.

By examining the role of emotions in recruitment processes into armed groups, this article makes contributions to different strands of literature. First, it extends the emerging literature on recruitment strategies employed by armed groups and the way these strategies might influence individuals' motivation to engage in militancy.[4] In doing so, it helps to clarify how different types of recruitment strategies work. Case studies on mobilization into militancy, for example, point to the relevance of indoctrination and political education to understand peoples' decision to take up arms;[5] it, however, remains often unclear how these strategies translate into action. Including emotions could clarify how education and indoctrination work to "change peoplès mind".[6]

Moreover, by exploring the interactions between framing and emotions, this article builds on the emerging literature in civil war studies that uses framing processes to analyze mobilization during war.[7] By linking specific frames with specific types of emotions and mechanisms, it helps to clarify how frames translate into action, thus facilitate participation in armed conflicts. For example, polarization between social groups is a central component of most armed conflicts; focusing on how fear, threat and/or resentment activate mechanisms such as boundary activation, out-group negativity and in-group solidarity helps to clarify how polarization between different groups emerges and deepens.[8]

Thereby, the article might also contribute to the literature on emotions in social movements that has paid little attention to the link between frames and emotions, e.g. how frames create emotions and how emotions make frames resonate with an audience.[9]

Finally, the article addresses an empirical gap in the literature on mobilization into armed activism during the Sri Lankan civil war. Existing research has singled out many factors as relevant to explain why individuals decided to join armed groups, such as repression, collective identity, selective incentives, social and territorial entrapment and coercion.[10] There is, however, very limited research on the role of emotions in mobilization dynamics during the Sri Lankan war.

The empirical part of this article is mainly based on interview data collected in 2018 and 2019 in North-Eastern Sri Lanka, in the UK and Switzerland. In total, I conducted 30 in-depth interviews with former members of the LTTE, focusing on their pathways to militancy and their experience as members of the LTTE. The interviews lasted on average 90 minutes and were conducted either in English or with the assistance of a translator in Tamil. I conducted the interviews in the form of life histories in order to avoid "pushing" interviewees towards specific explanations but rather give them the opportunity to develop their own narratives and to focus on the events and motivations that they themselves consider as most relevant for their participation in militant activism. At the same time, life histories necessarily depend on interviewees' recollection of past experiences and thus tend to be selective and might provide the opportunity for retrospective self-justification. In order to address this concern, I conducted 15

additional interviews with civilians who had been living in the war zones as well as 15 expert interviews with journalists, religious leaders, social workers and local researchers who have been living in Sri Lanka during the conflict in order to triangulate data from the life histories as well as to gain additional information about recruitment practices.

Recruitment, Emotions and Armed Conflict

Recruitment into armed groups can be understood as the process through which individuals leave their civilian life behind and become members of an organization involved in violent activism. Recruitment thus always involves two sorts of agents: the individual who joins the group and the armed group that accepts him or her as a member.[11] The literature, however, rarely conceptualizes recruitment as a two-sided process and therefore focuses almost exclusively on the individual and their motivation to join. The other facet of recruitment – the agency of armed groups and the way this agency can influence an individual's motivation to mobilize – is often neglected. In order to fully capture mobilization into armed activism it is, however, equally relevant to focus on recruitment strategies armed groups employ and how these strategies influence individual mobilization trajectories.[12]

The literature dealing with participation in armed groups departs from a collective action problem. Since risk of participation is high and the success of a rebellion unlikely, incentives to participate in militant activism are minimal. The solution for armed groups then is to distribute selective incentives in order to motivate individuals to join. In particular, the literature focuses on material benefits (salaries/natural resources/protection) or social incentives (status rewards/sense of collective belonging/pleasure of agency) armed groups can use to facilitate recruitment.[13] Few studies, however, explore the role emotions might play in motivating individuals to join. Elizabeth Wood identifies moral and emotional benefits as the factors most relevant to understand why many *campesinos* decided to take up arms despite high risks. Similarly, Costelli and Ruggeri find that indignation played a crucial role in deepening polarization between social groups and thereby to explain the outbreak of the Italian civil war.[14] Moreover, in the literature on civil wars, fear is implicitly present in several studies applying the security dilemma to understand the onset of armed conflicts. In these theories, fear between social groups – either as a consequence of archaic situations, such as state collapse, and/or purposefully instigated by political elites – is considered as a necessary precondition of armed conflict. Out of fear, both sides have strong incentives to take preemptive military action to eliminate the threat.[15] Finally, Roger Petersen (2002) develops a theory of ethnic conflict which is primarily based on emotions. In his approach, structural changes activate fear, hatred, resentment, and rage which then trigger violence against specific ethnic groups. Moreover, in a more recent work, he explores how political entrepreneurs use emotions strategically to influence western intervention in the Balkans (2011).[16]

The role of emotions in shaping mobilization is thus still an under-studied aspect in the literature on political violence and civil wars. This is surprising as research on social movements and mass protests, in the last twenty years, has rediscovered emotions as relevant to understand different aspects of mobilization.[17] This emotional turn in the

social movement literature points to the relevance of emotions to explain the emergence, persistence and the decline of social movements and other forms of contentious politics.[18] Specifically relevant for this paper are studies exploring the strategic use of emotions by activists to achieve different objectives. For example, one way in which protesters can create emotions is through generating "moral shocks" as a reaction to perceived grievances.[19] Moreover, Juris shows that emotions are strategically deployed by protest organizers to build affective attachment to the cause among activists and create specific moods in order to strengthen commitment among participants.[20] Gould (2009) explores how movement activists use different emotions at different stages of the conflict as they have different impacts on mobilization and are thus relevant in different phases.[21] Finally, Cadena-Roa (2002) finds that the public's emotional response to the use of strategic dramaturgy was a crucial element in mobilizing and sustaining support for Superbarrio, a justice movement in Mexico City.[22] Research focusing on emotions during war can thus benefit from existing approaches and findings on the role of emotions in mobilization processes in the literature on social movements and contentious politics.

Analyzing the Strategic Use of Emotions in Recruitment – An Analytical Framework

This section proposes an analytical framework to analyze the use of emotions in recruitment strategies employed by armed group. It argues that armed groups use collective action frames in order to provoke different types of emotions which then foster mobilization. To derive the proposed framework, I went back and forth between the interview transcripts, the existing literature on emotions and the literature on social movements in order to inductively 'code' the transcripts and to understand how specific types of frames are connected to specific emotions and mechanisms facilitating recruitment.[23] The framework presented in the following thus focuses on the frames, emotions and mechanisms that emerged from my empirical data as the most relevant ones to explain recruitment dynamics. This doesn't mean that the identified combinations are the only ones that shape recruitment; they are, however, general enough to be of relevance in many conflicts.

According to frame theory we can broadly distinguish between two key tasks of framing: consensus mobilization and action mobilization. Frames aimed at consensus mobilization – which I call interpretative frames[24] – commonly identify a problem a group is facing, blame a perpetrator responsible for it and propose a way to resolve the problem. Motivational frames, by contrast, aim at fostering action and urge people to join a movement in order to affect change.[25] This distinction is relevant as it indicates that acceptance of a certain interpretative frame does not necessarily translate into active engagement, a particularly relevant distinction for armed groups interested in recruiting fighters rather than mobilizing support among the broader population. Especially with regard to armed conflicts, there is a difference between adopting grievances and actively fighting in the name of theses grievances.[26]

Building on these findings, it is argued that armed groups use interpretative and motivational frames to provoke specific emotions which then reinforce the cognitive

message transported by frames and push people towards concrete action. For the purpose of this paper, emotions are understood as "a socially prescribed set of responses to be followed by a person in a given situation".[27] Scholars have identified several ways through which emotions influence peoplès beliefs and behavior. For the following argument, however, two effects of emotions are particularly relevant. First, emotions influence how people define their interests. While individuals generally have several preferences such as security, wealth and justice, emotions can direct attention to one desire that is then considered as most valuable at this specific juncture. Under the influence of indignation, for example, someone might value justice overall and disregard any trade-offs with wealth or security.[28] And second, emotions are powerful motivators of action. The more intense the emotions, the more likely they are to make a direct impact on behavior.[29] Anger, for example, tends to decrease the sense of risks and might motivate people to join armed groups despite the dangers involved.[30] Emotions thus generally orient beliefs and behavior. However, not all emotions are equally apt to encourage participation.[31] Whereas emotions like hope, anger or outrage are emboldening and tend to encourage mobilization, others such as fear or depression have opposite effects.[32] As the objective of this article is to explain recruitment, the framework focuses on emboldening emotions which tend to encourage rather than inhibit action.

While intertwined in practice, I analytically distinguish between two different ways armed groups provoke emotions through framing in order to facilitate recruitment. They can first use interpretative frames to provoke resentment. Often armed groups spread narratives about how the group they claim to represent is dominated by another group and thereby focus attention to the subordinate and unjust position of "their community". As Petersen notes, resentment arises from the perception that onès own group is politically dominated by another group. The everyday experience of being in a subordinate position, of being "underneath", makes people aware of who is superior and who is oppressed. It focuses attention to the unjust position of onès own group.[33] If widespread enough, resentment thus tends to activate polarization – a mechanism which has been identified as crucial for mobilization into militancy.[34] More precisely, resentment triggers different dynamics that are commonly at work in group polarization. First, when resentment grows, group identities that distinguish the in-group from the out-group become more relevant. Moreover, resentment increases the need for in-group-solidarity, it thus strengthens the identification of individuals with their communities. Finally, resentment often leads to out-group negativity, thus tends to encourage beliefs that denigrate the out-group. By provoking resentment through interpretative frames armed groups might thus deepen polarization and convince people that violence is a necessary mean to change existing power relations.[35]

However, polarization rarely motivates people to take action and engage in violence. When experiencing resentment, individuals detach from the status quo and realize that the actual situation is unjust; support for a cause, however, does not necessarily imply active engagement. Armed groups therefore use motivational frames, such as stories about atrocities committed against onès own group, to provoke anger and shame which combined with resentment are meant to push people into concrete action. In contrast to resentment, anger is based on the cognition that an individual or a group has committed some perceived wrong against oneself. Hence, anger is an emotion about the self

(or about close relatives), where a person has suffered a wrongdoing and therefore reacts emotionally against the perpetrator. The (perceived) suffering of a wrongdoing heightens the desire for punishment.[36] Anger thus urges people to fight and turns them into "intuitive prosecutors".[37] Moreover, anger lowers someonès estimation of risk and might therefore make people take up arms despite high risk.[38] Similarly, shame is an emotion about onès own identity or action. When feeling shame, attention is focused on the unworthiness of onès action or identity. Shame makes a single unworthy action or characteristic to be the whole of a personˋs identity.[39] By provoking shame, armed groups thus try to shift the focus to dishonor and to make people believe that refusing to fight is dishonorable and makes them complicit in the continuous suffering of their communities.[40]

When evoking anger and shame, armed groups thus activate personalization – a mechanism that makes an action more relevant for a particular individual. People do not only agree that a situation is unjust, they feel personally affected by the injustice. Or they believe that, if they donˋt act, this would be dishonorable and make them partly responsible for the continuous suffering of their families and communities. More precisely, personalization may trigger action in several ways. First, when experiencing anger or shame, the goals and ideas, such as fighting back to take revenge, propagated by armed groups become much more essential to targets of mobilization.[41] Secondly, by provoking anger and shame armed groups personalize grievances; people feel affected personally and the idea of taking action against injustices becomes less abstract and distant but relevant to their everyday life. They experience the injustice themselves and through this personal affection feel the need to take action against it. And finally, as emotions like anger and shame are often generated when norms or moral principles are violated, the experience of these emotions might clarify or even activate these values and thereby increase peoplès readiness to take action against violations of values central to them.[42]

In addition to resentment, anger and shame, hope and pride do not directly contribute to mobilization but they can reinforce existing action tendencies. As Jasper stresses, the combination of positive and negative emotions, such as pride and shame or hope and anxiety, – what he calls moral batteries[43] – are particularly effective in energizing action.[44] Hope anticipates future improvement of onès status and/or situation and, similarly to pride, increases self-confidence and onès sense of self-worth even in "situations where we understand our own agency to be limited".[45] Armed groups might thus create hope and pride to reinforce the action tendency of anger and shame and motivate individuals to take up arms despite high risk and low prospects of success.[46] Figure 1 summarizes the framework, linking different frames with different emotions and the respective mechanisms facilitating mobilization.

Analyzing the LTTÈs Use of Emotions in Recruitment Strategies

The recruitment strategies employed by the LTTE during the Sri Lankan civil war serve to illustrate the use of emotions in recruitment campaigns employed by armed groups. In the following three subsections, some necessary information on the LTTÈs struggle for a separate state and on recruitment dynamics are provided, then LTTÈs recruitment



Figure 1. Strategic Use of Emotions in Recruitment Campaigns.

strategies are analyzed according to the two uses of emotions proposed in the analytical framework. First, the focus will be on how the LTTE used interpretative frames to create resentment and thereby deepened polarization between communities. Then, the motivational frames and how these frames aimed at generating anger and shame to push people towards militancy are analyzed.

The Historical Context: The LTTÈs Struggle for Tamil Eelam

The political conflict between the two main ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, the mainly Buddhist Sinhalese (74%) in the South of the country and the largest minority group, the primarily Hindu Tamils (18%) in the North, dates back to the time of Sri Lankàs independence from British colonial rule.[47] Parts of the Sinhalese elite suspected the Tamil minority to have benefited disproportionally during the colonial period, mainly as a result from the usual British divide and rule strategy. As the preferred minority, they had privileged access to English education programs provided by missionaries. This made them better prepared for jobs in the colonial civil service as well as other highly paid position in the medical, legal and banking sector.[48] In order to rectify these imbalances, Sinhalese political leaders adopted a series of policies and constitutional changes which increasingly reduced Tamil peoplès access to education, land and employment. Especially reforms in the educational system, which reduced the number of Tamil youths admitted to university, were judged as evidence of the general Sinhalisation of the country and led to the creation of small Tamil militant groups in the 1970s. One of them was the LTTE which was founded in 1972 by Vellupillai Prabhakaran.[49] It was, however, in the 1980s only, after massive anti-Tamil riots in July 1983[50], that recruitment to and support for militant activism exploded and small scale militancy turned into a large-scale armed conflict. In this first phase, militancy, as Thiranagama points out, was popular.[51] Young people voluntarily left their everyday lives behind to join militant groups. There was therefore no active LTTE recruitment; rather the LTTE was very selective in its recruitment policy and accepted only the most committed individuals.[52] It was only form the early 1990s, after the LTTE had turned against rival militant groups and killed hundreds of cadres and thereby established itself as the only representative of the Tamil speaking people, that it started to actively recruit fighters.[53] The following analysis thus focuses on this second period of recruitment when the LTTE had established control over areas claimed as the Tamil homeland

mainly in the Jaffna district and the Vanni and had turned itself into a quasi-state with its own administrative structures.[54]

After a number of failed peace negotiations, in 2001 the LTTE and the government signed a ceasefire agreement brokered by the Norwegian government. In the agreement the parties agreed to abstain from any 'offensive military operations'. Moreover, the armed forces were separated and buffer zones installed between government-controlled and rebel-held areas. Other Tamil paramilitary groups that had been working together with the Sri Lankan government, were to disarm.[55] Despite the strong emphasis put on creating the conditions conducive for peace negotiations in the peace agreement, the ceasefire period was marked by mutual violations. Moreover, in 2004 the LTTE Eastern commander Karuna split with the LTTE and formed an alliance with the government.[56] As a result of this shifting power balance, the government in 2007, was able to regain military control over the East and, shortly after that, formally abrogated the ceasefire agreement to pursue a military solution leading to the military defeat of the LTTE in May 2009.[57]

Mobilizing Support for the Armed Struggle – Resentment and Polarization

Coming of age in the 90s in LTTE controlled territory meant that young Tamils were continuously exposed to LTTE propaganda campaigns. They attended public meetings and street performances regularly organized by the LTTE and participated in LTTE affiliated students' organizations and recruitment sessions in school. During these events, the LTTE would spread its interpretative frames to depict the war as a conflict between "the violent oppressor", the Sinhalese majority government, against "the oppressed", the Tamil community. Moreover, the threat posed by state repression would be presented as gradually intensifying over time, thus leaving Tamils "with no alternative other than to confront the state violence with violence". Finally, the LTTE presented itself as the national liberation organization that "is fighting for the liberation of our people against racist tyranny, against military occupation, against state terror."[58] Moreover, violent resistance is presented as the only way to fight back and change existing power relations. By spreading this narrative, the LTTE provoked and reinforced resentment among Tamils. When talking about how they felt when attending these different propaganda events, many respondents described how they started "to boil inside" when they learned about the "discrimination against Tamils" and how they had this „urgent feeling "to „break the oppression of the Sinhala government and getting the rights for Tamil people":

> They explained, why we need to fight for Tamil Eelam. It was a political explanation, the changes in the university recruitment and the quota system and the Tamil students that they are ignored and the loss of work opportunities and the land grabbing all those things they explained. That is why, we felt that we are not free that we are the minority and that we are not free and that they are dominating us and not giving the equal rights to us.[59]

Apart from spreading their narrative through public gatherings, the LTTE used other techniques for propaganda purposes, such as street performances. They had been organized regularly to inform people on the conflict and create emotional responses.[60] When asked to describe what the street dramas were about, one of my respondents explains:

"They were telling the history of how we were oppressed, the Tamil community, how they [the Sinhalese] destroyed our culture and tradition, how our people are getting suppressed day by day."[61] The popularity of street dramas and the emotional response they elicit from the public partly comes from the cultural resonance of street performances which are deeply embedded in Tamil culture.[62] Moreover, during the performances, people were encouraged to express their indignation about the discrimination done to them. This expression would then often evoke emotional responses from the broader audience. Harrison, who observed one of the street performances, reports how, after the performance, "people who have lost their land are encouraged to express their anger and one woman breaks down in tears saying she wants to go back to her home to die but it is in a military high security zone."[63] Additionally, street plays stressed the moral responsibility of all Tamils to contribute to the fight. The following scene of a street drama illustrates this well:

> It was a very emotional drama about the struggle. […] The story of the drama was that of a family—a father, mother, and two children. One child gets shot and killed by the SLA. The remaining child—in the drama, he was of school age, still a child—then decides to join the movement. In the drama, the mother resists and begs her remaining child not to join the movement, saying she only has one child left. The mother is hysterical. Then the father speaks. He is calm and rational, although also very sad. He talks to the mother, saying that the correct thing for them to do is to give their remaining child to the LTTE.[64]

The story provokes outrage among the audience about the brutal killing of a young Tamil and connects it with the moral responsibility of every family to contribute to the fight. The plot makes it very clear that the right thing for every Tamil family to do, is to sacrifice one child to the struggle. The LTTE narrative thus fostered an increasing in and out-group thinking while, at the same time, uniting Tamils of different caste, class and religion against a common enemy.[65]

Finally, the LTTE supported the foundation of student associations in which students would talk about the discrimination against Tamils and how to react to it. The following quote of a former member of the Student Organization of Liberation Tigers (SOLT) summarizes well how many youngsters thought and felt when listening to and discussing the LTTE narrative:

> You know there was this Sinhala only act, we used to discuss about that, what is the impact of this policy on Tamils. And because of this, we also thought about having a separate homeland for us. Those days were completely disturbed. It was a restless life, we were so frustrated and angry. And we were in a crucial age 17, 18, 19 years. This period is very important, very energetic. We felt that we have to do something.[66]

As a result of the continuous exposure to the LTTE narrative, many young Tamils began to see Sinhalese as their enemies and to believe that Tamils could never live in peace in a state dominated by the Sinhalese majority.[67] Moreover, many respondents mentioned how they started to identify more with "their community":

> In the campaign they explained why the Sinhala state is destroying us. Why they are killing us. This motivated me, I had such a grudge, these people are killing us. And they said we have to support the fight. Then only we all will get freedom. This was another reason why I joined. I thought if all Tamils are united we doǹt have to suffer like that anymore.[68]

Spread through different channels, the LTTE narrative thus evoked resentment among Tamils and thereby activated and deepened polarization between the two communities, and, at the same time, strengthened in-group solidarity among Tamils.

Provoking Anger and Shame – Pushing Youngsters to Take up Arms

As already mentioned, the LTTE organized regular recruitment sessions in schools and tutorials. Normally, LTTE recruiters would then talk about how Tamils had been oppressed by the Sinhalese majority, about the importance to oppose this domination and about the need to join.[69] The LTTE thus used the interpretative frames to provoke resentment as has been analyzed in the last section. However, in order to push youngsters towards action, however, they shifted to motivational frames provoking anger and/or shame. These frames were mostly detailed descriptions of atrocities committed against Tamils by security forces. Moreover, in order to strengthen the impact of these frames, they would not only be told in the form of narratives but the LTTE used videos and movies to confront youngsters with visual material of atrocities.[70] The LTTE was very skilled in using modern technology for recruitment purposes. They had their own video documentary unit that recorded all sorts of LTTE activities; footage that was then used to produce movies and documentaries. Most of these films present the history of the Tamil struggle against an oppressive Sinhala state in the form of an action movie and were thus especially appealing to youth.[71] Many of my respondents described how they were hypnotized by these videos and anger and outrage they felt when watching them:

> R:It [the movie] was about the atrocities by the military. Sometimes, they bombed school and hospitals. These happened time and again.
>
> I:And what did they say about the movie?
>
> R:They said, this happened to Tamils and we cannot tolerate that, we have to fight against it. And they would say that unless we doǹt destroy the forces and we establish a separate state, our sisters and daughters or families cannot live peacefully. This are the points they will mention and then they make us convinced that this is the only way. It was very emotional you know. I had such a grudge. And I felt, I should go.[72]

LTTE recruiters thus provoked anger and outrage among students and channeled it into action – the fight for a separate homeland for Tamils. Moreover, by presenting the threat that the families of youngsters could be affected and that it is their responsibility to protect them, LTTE recruiters personalized narratives and thereby increased the emotional impact of the recruitment messages. The following description of a movie produced by the LTTE television station in 1993, called the dream of the motherland, provides another example of how the provocation of anger combined with personalized narratives aims to motivate youngsters to join the LTTE:

> It starts by showing a happy family consisting of parents, a daughter and a son, the tiyaki [martyr]-to-be. They are all happy sitting in the garden celebrating a birthday. They feed each other with hands as signs of intimacy. They also have good relations with their neighbours. The son takes the neighbour's young daughter to school on his motor-bike. One day the Lankan air force drops bombs on the school, and the boy can only take the

body of his young friend to her parents. In his inner vision, he anticipates that this could have happened to his own younger sister [tankacci]. He decides he will enter the squad of Black Tigers.[73]

Apart from anger, LTTE recruiters also provoked shame in order to convince youngsters that they had to go and fight. The following is an example of a popular poem the LTTE used during recruitment sessions for girls that illustrates the use of shame very well:

O sister

Where are you going?

Is it to the tutory?

Are you happy?

Study well and become a doctor

You will gain fame.

You must treat wounds on the body

Also the wounds of the earth.

Doǹt forget it.

Do you need education to carry a bier?

What is the use of having an education when you are a slave?

You must have self-respect my dear younger sister

Fight while studying

Study while fighting.[74]

By ridiculing the girl̀s ambition to become a doctor while she is living "like a slave", the poem evokes shame among young girls. While generally in Tamil culture youngsters who excel in school are highly regarded in society, the LTTE portrayed studying as selfish and shameful. By contrast, taking up arms and fighting is portrayed as necessary if youngsters want to maintain self-esteem. According to the messages conveyed by recruiters, studying is useless as long the war is ongoing and, day by day, Tamils are being killed by the Sri Lankan Army. Only once the war is over, can Tamils live peacefully and studying becomes worth the effort again.[75] The message the LTTE conveyed was thus again that fighting is the right thing for young people to do. Thereby, recruiters tried to create a sense of responsibility among youngsters. Only if they go and fight, they lead a respectful life. The following example of Mugil, a female LTTE ex-combatant, shows how shame and a feeling of responsibility are channeled into concrete action. Mugil remembered that she had decided to join during a recruitment session in school. LTTE recruiters asked her to perform to a song called *Just twelve, she*

holds the rifle over her shoulder and after she had finished, one of the recruiters would say "The song is about a twelve-year-old girl. You are thirteen." After this performance and the recruiter's comment, Mugil felt ashamed and guilty and she was convinced that she should contribute. The next day she went.[76]

Moreover, LTTE recruiters often shared their own stories in order to make students feel ashamed. In Jaffna, for example, the LTTE regularly organized so called "Students' Inspirational Weeks" where LTTE cadres talked about their personal decision to join the LTTE: "I too once thought studies are important and put my heart and soul into it. I later realized that liberation is far more important, so here I am."[77] LTTE cadres thus motivated youngsters to join by sharing their personal stories about how they themselves thought that studying is very important but then realized that, as long as they are oppressed and attacked by the military, it is more relevant to fight and achieve a separate state for Tamils:

> When they deliver the speech they share their own experience what they were before and what they are doing know. And then we thought they also sacrificed their parents, they also left their parents so I should do the same.[78]

The recruiters provoked shame by comparing their own willingness to fight with the "unworthy" life of students. At the same time, they make young people think that if they (LTTE cadres) can do it (fighting) they should and can do the same. The personal narratives thus evoked a sense of moral responsibility and thereby increased the salience of frames and motivated action.

The common recruitment sessions in school were, however, not the main recruitment arenas; rather, LTTE recruiters used these sessions to find out which students were potentially willing to join in order to focus on those in one-on-one talks after school was over. Many of my respondents remembered how LTTE recruiters waited outside after the propaganda sessions or they would approach them when they were hanging around in streets and junctures and engage them in discussions. In their talks, LTTE recruiters normally spoke about personal experiences or asked provocative questions in order to arouse anger and shame in young Tamils and make them more willing to join. Thesa remembered how, once, LTTE recruiters waited for her and some friends in a juncture and confronted them with stories of how girls had been raped by the military and other atrocities to provoke anger:

> Among the girls, they would stress rape cases, what would arouse emotions and make them join. In general they would focus on all the atrocities done by the military bombing, shelling, murder, torture those kind of things.[79]

Similarly, a University Teacher of Human Rights report describes how LTTE cadres tried to make youngsters feel ashamed of not going and fighting while they themselves sacrificed their lives and would still be willing to fight if they had not been injured:

> Koorai, is a village with a population of Indian origin near which there is also an LTTE unit known as the Young Leopards. Nearly every village has a recruitment centre. Several of those manning these centres are tragic victims of the war who had lost limbs in the course of fighting. There is now no possibility of a life for them outside the Movement. They make passionate speeches to the young of the village waving their truncated limbs challenging the others to sacrifice themselves as they had. They evoke a mixture of pity, horror and shame in others. "If you do not want to go and fight the Sri Lankan forces, give me your arm or your leg. I am itching to go back and fight", they would say.[80]

Finally, LTTE recruiters not only created anger and shame but were careful to complement the recruitment sessions with stories and/or movies about the affective ties between LTTE cadres and successful battles in order to evoke hope and pride among youngsters. For example, LTTE recruiters would screen a video of the LTTÈs victory at Elephant Pass[81] and then frame it as one of the worldś most remarkably military feats in order to create hope and a desire among students to be part of a glorious fight.[82] Finally, the mere presence of LTTE cadres with their uniforms, arms and motorbikes, as well as the team spirit among cadres would evoke pride in many youngsters as well as the desire to be part of the movement themselves:

> When I saw all these cadres, LTTE girls especially. who were in LTTE, we were only trained to cook. We only knew to light the cooker but when I saw these girls, they were able to carry heavy artilleries, they were able to handle them equally to boys. Women, they did the same things, they used the very heavy weapons also not only the small ones. When you use them, it will push you behind, so you had to be very strong. It was really impressive to see that.[83]

It was thus the combination of anger and shame with pride about the devotion and the skills of LTTE members and the hope to contribute to a better future for their community that proved most effective to motivate youngsters to join.

Discussion and Conclusion

The empirical analysis showed that the LTTE strategically used emotions in order to recruit fighters. Moreover, combining different types of frames with the emotions they are likely to provoke, and with the mechanisms through which they facilitate recruitment, helped to better capture how different emotions are created and how they impact mobilization. More precisely, two combinations of frames, emotions and mechanism proved to be relevant to help understand recruitment.

First, the LTTE used interpretative frames to depict the conflict as one between an oppressed minority and an oppressive majority and thereby provoked resentment among Tamils. Once provoked, resentment reinforced the message transmitted by the narrative and, at the same time, deepened polarization between the two communities. Tamils began to see the Sinhalese as their enemy and increasingly accepted violence as a necessary mean to change existing power relations. Second, motivational frames were used to evoke anger and/or shame among students and push them to concrete action. LTTE recruiters used videos and stories to expose youngsters to the atrocities committed against their communities in order to provoke anger. Or they evoked shame by portraying the lives of young people as comfortable and selfish and comparing their selfishness with the readiness of LTTE cadres to leave family and education behind and sacrifice themselves for their community. By provoking these emotional responses recruiters made youngsters believe that they and their immediate families could be affected and that it is their responsibility to protect them and join the fight. Moreover, pride about the LTTÈs fighting capacity and the commitment shown by LTTE cadres, as well as hope that victory is possible, reinforced the impact of anger and shame and thereby the motivational impact of action frames.

Apart from stressing the role of emotions in recruitment in general, my analysis points to the relevance of interactions of different emotions. LTTE recruiters succeeded in provoking emotions through the display of atrocities against Tamils, at least partly, because they could tap into resentment already felt by many Tamils. They identified with the people attacked in the videos because they interpreted the attack not as one against some unknown people but as an attack against their own community and it is through this association that they then felt anger about the atrocities. Provoking anger in combination with resentment might thus be particularly effective in mobilizing people into collective violence.

However, it is important to note that the effectiveness of the LTTÈs recruitment strategy did not depend on emotions only. Or to put it differently, the resonance of frames to provoke emotions and trigger action depended on other factors. Most importantly, the majority of my respondents had no experience with Sinhalese; the only contact they had was with the Sinhalese army, either through intense bombing campaigns and shelling, or through personal experiences of displacement, checkpoints and death.[84] It was therefore empirically verifiable that "the Sinhalese are attacking Tamils". This contributed to the credibility of frames and the likelihood of an emotional response. Moreover, the respondentś family situation and/or the experience of poverty were additional factors that – combined with the motivational effect of recruitment campaigns – affected respondentś decision to join. And finally, it is impossible to analyze recruitment during war without paying attention to the influence of power.[85] Due to the fact that the LTTE was controlling most aspects of civilian life in the territories it controlled, LTTE recruiters naturally exerted pressure on students to comply with their expectations. Moreover, many students admired LTTE cadres and their readiness to sacrifice their lives for their community; LTTE recruiters thus had a certain status among youngsters. This would definitely help to make recruitment frames more credible, especially those focused on provoking shame among students for not being ready to join.[86] It was thus not only the use of emotions that affected the effectiveness of the LTTÈs recruitment strategy. Other factors, such as power relations between LTTE recruiters and young Tamils, the resonance of frames with the everyday experience of the youth and especially their vulnerability due to socioeconomic and family backgrounds, were equally relevant to explain why some young Tamils eventually joined while others did not.

By highlighting the role of emotions in recruitment, this article doesǹt deny the relevance of other factors that the literature has identified as relevant to understand why people decide to join armed groups. Rather, it suggests that they are insufficient to fully explain participation processes and points to the need to analyze how emotions influence these other factors. For example, works focusing on how collective incentives, such as a common identity, shape participation processes would benefit from including emotions into their analysis, as emotions play a central role in building and maintaining affective ties between group members.

The insights gained through combining frames, emotions and mechanisms could inform future research on all forms of violent and non-violent collective action. First, combining different types of frames with specific emotions and mechanisms might help scholars to clarify the role different emotions play in dynamics of collective action. It

allows scholars to disentangle how the emotions are evoked, through what kind of frames, and how, through what kind of mechanism, they affect individuals̀ willingness to participate. Secondly, a similar analytical framework could be used to better understand the relevance of emotions in other dimensions of collective action. Scholars could, for example, analyze how different frames, emotions and mechanisms interact to create and sustain collective solidarity and/or maintain the discipline of existing members and thereby clarify the role emotions play in fulfilling these different movement tasks. Thirdly, frames are not the only means armed groups can use to evoke emotions. For example, scholars interested in tactics used by collective actors could focus on how different tactics, such as rituals, are used to provoke different sorts or emotions and activate different mechanisms which contribute to the recruitment, sustained participation and support for collective action.

Notes

1. Stefano Costelli and Andrea Ruggeri, "Indignation, Ideologies and Armed Mobilization: Civil War in Italy, 1943-45," *International Security* 40, no. 2 (2015): 119-157.
2. Arlie Russell Hochschild, "Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure," *American Journal of Sociology* 85, no. 3 (1979): 551-575.
3. Sharika Thiranagama, *In My Mother̀s House. Civil War in Sri Lanka* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 187.
4. Kristine Eck, "Coercion in Rebel Recruitment," *Security Studies* 32, no. 2 (2014): 364-398; Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, "The Dilemmas of Recruitment: The Colombian Case," in *Understanding Collective Political Violence. Conflict, Inequality and Ethnicity*, ed. Yvan Guichaoua (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2012): 175-195.
5. Kristine Eck, "Recruiting Rebels: Indoctrination and Political Education in Nepal," in *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal. Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup Kumar Pahari (London: Routledge, 2010): 33-51; Guobin Yang, "Achieving Emotions in Collective Action: Emotional Processes and Movement Mobilization in the 1989 Chinese Student Movement," *Sociological Quarterly* 41 (2005): 593-614.
6. Yu Liu, "Maoist Discourse and the Mobilization of Emotions in Revolutionary China," *Modern China* 36, no. 3 (2010): 329-362.
7. For an overview see issue 17 of the Civil Wars journal in 2015 focused on framing approach to understand micro-processes of mobilization during civil wars, *Civil Wars* 17, no. 2 (2015).
8. Omar Shahabudin McDoom, "The Psychology of Threat in Intergroup Conflict: Emotions, Rationality, and Opportunity in Rwandan Genocide," *International Security* 37, no. 2 (2012): 122.
9. Jorge Cadena-Roa, "Strategic Framing, Emotions, And Superbarrio—Mexico City's Masked Crusader," *Mobilization* 7, no. 2 (2002): 201-216; James Jasper, "The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and around Social Movements," *Sociological Forum* 13, no. 3 (1998): 397-424.
10. Sumatra Bose, *States, Nations, Sovereignty: Sri Lanka, India and the Tamil Eelam Movement* (London: Sage, 1994); Catherine Brun, "Birds of Freedom," *Critical Asian Studies* 40, no. 3 (2008): 399-422; Jannie Lilja, "Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds? Rebel Strategies to Attain Constituent Support in Sri Lanka," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21, no. 2 (2009): 306-326; Human Rights Watch, "Living in Fear. Child Soldiers and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka," 16, no. 3 (2004).
11. Yvan Guichaoua, "Rebel Recruitment," Working Paper, Centre for Research on Peace and Development, no. 6 (2011).
12. Kristine Eck, "Coercion in Rebel Recruitment."

13. Stathis Kalyvas and Michael Kocher, "How `Freè is Free Riding in Civil Wars?: Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem," *World Politics* 59, no 2 (2007): 177-216; Roger Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion, Lessons from Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: University Press, 2001); Timothy Wickham-Crowley, *Guerillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956* (Princeton: University Press, 1992); Elisabeth Jean Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* (Cambridge: University Press, 2003).
14. Stefano Costelli and Andrea Ruggeri, "Indignation, Ideologies and Armed Mobilization: Civil War in Italy, 1943-45."
15. Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University Press, 2000); Rui De Figueiredo and Barry Weingast, "The Rationality of Fear. Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict," In *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention*, eds. Barbara Walter and Timothy Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000): 261-302; Omar Shahabudin McDoom, "The Psychology of Threat in Intergroup Conflict: Emotions, Rationality, and Opportunity in Rwandan Genocide."; Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival. Global Politics and Strategy* 35, no. 1 (1993): 27-47.
16. Roger Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in the Twentieh-Century Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: University Press, 2002); Roger Petersen and Evangelos Liaras, "Countering Fear in War: The Strategic Use of Emotion," *Journal of Military Ethics* 5, no. 4 (2006): 317-333; Roger Petersen, *Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict* (Cambridge: University Press, 2011).
17. For a good overview over existing research see James Jasper, "Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research," *Annual Review of Sociology* 37, (2011): 287.
18. Fernando Bosco, "Emotions that build Networks: Geographies of Human Rights Movements in Argentina and Beyond," *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 98, no. 5 (2007): 545-563; Gavin Brown and Jenny Pickerill, "Space for Emotions in the Space of Activism," *Emotion Space and Society* 2 (2009): 24-35; Jorge Cadena-Roa, "Strategic Framing, Emotions, And Superbarrio—Mexico City's Masked Crusader."; Walter Pearlman, "Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings," *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 2 (2011): 387-409; Sieglinde Rosenberg and Jakob Winkler, "Compassionate Protests: Fighting the Deportation of Asylum Seekers," *Mobilization* 19, no. 2 (2014): 165-184.
19. James Jasper, "The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and around Social Movements," 409.
20. Jeffrey Juris, "Performing Politics: Image, Embodiment, and Affective Solidarity during Anti-Corporate Globalization Protests," *Ethnography* 9, no. 1 (2008): 61-97.
21. Deborah Gould, *Moving Politics: Emotion and ACT UP's Fight against AIDS* (Chicago: University Press, 2009).
22. Jorge Cadena-Roa, "Strategic Framing, Emotions, And Superbarrio—Mexico City's Masked Crusader."
23. Johnny Saldana, *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers* (London: Sage, 2009).
24. I combine here what Benford and Snow call diagnostic and prognostic frames. Robert Benford and David Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment."
25. Ibid., 615. As Bendford and Snow stress activists often use vocabulary of severity and urgency in order to address this agency. Ibid., 617.
26. Marie-Eve Desrosiers, "Tackling Puzzles of Identity-Based Conflict: The Promise of Framing Theory," *Civil Wars* 17, no. 2 (2015): 120-140.
27. Averill quoted in James Jasper, "The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and around Social Movements," 400.
28. Roger Petersen, *Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict*, 25-26.
29. Walter Pearlman, "Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings."

30. Nico Frijda and Batja Mesquita, "Beliefs through Emotions," In *Emotions and Beliefs: How Emotions influence Thought* (Cambridge: University Press, 2000): 68.
31. James Jasper, "Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research," 85.
32. Pearlman makes a difference between emboldening emotions that motivate action and dispiriting emotions that have opposite effects. Walter Pearlman, "Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings," 392; See also Jasper who distinguishes between activating and deactivating emotions, James Jasper, "Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research."
33. Roger Petersen, *Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict*, 40-42.
34. Omar Shahabudin McDoom, "The Psychology of Threat in Intergroup Conflict: Emotions, Rationality, and Opportunity in Rwandan Genocide."
35. Roger Petersen, *Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict*, 40.
36. Ibid., 35.
37. Nico Frija, *The Emotion* (Cambridge: University Press, 1986); Julie Goldberg, Jennifer Lerner and Philip Tetlock, "Rage and Reason: the Psychology of the Intuitive Prosecutor," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 29, (1999): 781-795.
38. Roger Petersen, *Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict*, 35.
39. Janice Lindsay-Hartz, Joseph de Rivera and Michael Mascolo, "Differentiating Guilt and Shame and their Effects on Motivation." In *Self-conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride*, eds. June Price Tangney and Kurt Fischer (New York: Guilford Press, 1995): 274-300.
40. Roger Petersen and Evangelos Liaras, "Countering Fear in War: The Strategic Use of Emotion," 322.
41. Robert Benford and David Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," 621.
42. William Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action," In *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, eds. Aldon Morris and Carol Mueller (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1992): 73.
43. According to Jasper an emotion can be strengthened when we explicitly or implicitly compare it to their opposite, just as a battery works through the tension between the positive and negative poles. Ibid., 291.
44. James Jasper, "Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research," 291.
45. Victoria McGeer, "The Art of Good Hope," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 592, no. 1 (2004): 103.
46. Roger Petersen and Evangelos Liaras, "Countering Fear in War: The Strategic Use of Emotion", 332.
47. Mohamed Imtiyaz Abdul Razak and Ben Stavis, "Ethno-Political Conflict in Sri Lanka," *Journal of Third World Studies* 25, no. 2 (2008): 139.
48. Mia Bloom, "Ethnic Conflict, State Terror and Suicide Bombing in Sri Lanka," *Civil Wars* 6, no. 1 (2003): 54-84.
49. Neil De Votta, "Form Ethnic Outbidding to Ethic Conflict: The Institutional Bases for Sri Lankàs Separatist War," *Nations and Nationalism* 11, no. 1 (2005): 141-159.
50. The violence against Tamils broke out after a landmine attack and an ambush by the LTTE killed thirteen government soldiers near Jaffna — the first time an attack on this scale had taken place. After the soldiers' bodies were flown to Colombo for a mass funeral, retaliatory attacks commenced against Tamils. Catherine Brun, "Birds of Freedom."
51. Sharika Thiranagama, *In My Mother̀s House. Civil War in Sri Lanka*, 187.
52. Narayan Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka. From Boys to Guerillas* (Delhi: Konark Publishers PVT, 1994).

53. The exact reasons why the LTTE turned against other militant groups remain unclear. The literature as well as my interview data suggest that it was primarily Prabhakaraǹs excessive concern with security (he distrusted some groups because of their close ties to the Indian military) and his thirst for power that led the LTTE turn its guns on rival groups. Interview local researcher, Jaffna, July 2018; Interview religious leader, Jaffna, June 2108; Swamy, Narayan, *Tigers of Lanka. From Boys to Guerillas.*
54. Kristine Höglund, "Violence and the Peace Process in Sri Lanka", *Civil Wars* 7, no. 2 (2005): 156-170.
55. Ibid., 160.
56. Karuna was a senior military commander who was known for his successful military operations. Moreover, the territory under his control in the East was the central recruitment base for the LTTE and therefore essential for the LTTÈs conventional fighting capacity. Karunàs increasing power within the LTTE, however, led to internal rivalries among senior commanders. While peace negotiations were ongoing, Pottu Amman, the LTTE intelligence chief, accused Karuna of corruption and summoned him to the North to face corruption charges. However, with a potential death sentence awaiting, Karuna chose to defect with a sizeable amount of Eastern cadres. Shortly after defection an internal war between the LTTE and the Karuna faction broke out, forcing the latter to seek shelter from the government. Paul Staniland, „Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 1 (2012): 16-40.
57. Kristian Stokke, "Building the Tamil Eelam State: Emerging State Institutions and Forms of Governance in LTTE-controlled Areas in Sri Lanka," *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 6 (2006): 1021-1040.
58. This vocabulary would be used repeatedly by Vellupilai Prabhakaran in his annual speeches at Heròs Day as well as by Anton Balasingham who was LTTÈs chief strategist, see for example Vellupilai Prabhakaran Heròs Day speeches 1996. 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 online on TamilNet https://www.tamilnet.com/ and Anton Balasingham, *War and Peace: Armed Struggle and Peace Efforts of Liberation Tigers* (Mitcham: Fairmex Publisher, 2004).
59. Interview Ex-combatant 11, Mullaitivu, June 2018.
60. Human Rights Watch, "Living in Fear. Child Soldiers and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka."
61. Interview Ex-combatant 13, Mullaitivu, June 2018.
62. The LTTE was very skilful in revitalizing practices common in Tamil cultural history and thereby present themselves as the protectors of Tamil culture. Niels Terpstra and Georg Frerks, "Rebel Governance and Legitimacy: Understanding the Impact of Rebel Legitimation on Civilian Compliance with the LTTE Rule", *Civil Wars* 19, no. 3 (2017): 279-307.
63. Frances Harrison, "Tamil Tigers seek Voterś Support", Story from BBC News, March 13, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3585143.stm.
64. Description of a street performance by a Tamil civilians in Human Rights Watch, "Living in Fear. Child Soldiers and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka," 23-24.
65. Sumatra Bose, *States, Nations, Sovereignty: Sri Lanka, India and the Tamil Eelam Movement.*
66. Interview Ex-combatant 30, Vavuniya, May 2018.
67. Sharika, Thiranagama, *In My Mother̀s House. Civil War in Sri Lanka.*
68. Interview Ex-combatant 1, Mullaitivu, June 2018.
69. Interview Ex-combatant 18, Mullaitivu, June 2018; Interview Ex-combatant 4, Jaffna, July 2018.
70. Catherine Brun, "Birds of Freedom"; Interview Ex-combatant 8, Batticaloa, June 2018.
71. Catherine Brun, "Birds of Freedom," 411; Michael Roberts, "Selfless Sacrifice and Living Gods Among The Tamil Tigers", Colombo Telegraph, June 12, 2014. https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/selfless-sacrifice-and-living-gods-among-the-tamil-tigers/.
72. Interview Ex-combatant 5, Jaffna, June 2018.
73. Schalk quoted in Stephen Hopgod, "Tamil Tigers 1987-2002", In *Making Sense of Suicide Missions*, ed. Diego Gambetta (Oxford: University Press, 2005): 71.

74. Quoted in Harendra De Silva, Chris Hobbs and Helga Hanks, "Conscription of Children in Armed Conflict—a Form of Child Abuse. A Study of 19 former Child Soldiers," *Child Abuse Review* 10, no. 2 (2001): 130.
75. University Teacher for Human Rights (Jaffna), "The Sun Goḍs Children & The Big Lie."; Interview Ex-combatant 8, Batticaloa, June 2018.
76. See the account of the life of Mugil a former LTTE member in Rohini Mohan, *The Seasons of Trouble. Life amid the Ruins of Sri Lankàs Civil War* (London, Brooklyn: Verso, 2014): 62.
77. LTTE member quoted in University Teacher for Human Rights (Jaffna), "The Sun Goḍs Children & The Big Lie," *Information Bulletin* no. 23 (2000).
78. Interview Ex-combatant 8, Batticaloa, June 2018.
79. Interview Ex-combatant 18, Mullaitivu, June 2018.
80. University Teacher for Human Rights (Jaffna), "Vanni: A People Crushed between Cycles of Violence," *Information Bulletin* no. 12 (1996).
81. In April 2002 the LTTE seized the vast military complex in the area around Elephant Pass. The victory was considered as decisive for the LTTÈs struggle for an independent state due to the strategic and symbolic importance of the Elephant Pass which links two important parts of the "Tamil homeland", the northern mainland known as the Vanni with the Jaffna Peninsula. Moreover, the victory changed the military balance very significantly in favour of the LTTE. Channa Wickremeserka, *The Tamil Separatist War in Sri Lanka* (New York: Routledge, 2016).
82. Nirupama Subramanian, *Voices from a War Zone* (New Dehli: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2005); 174; University Teacher for Human Rights (Jaffna), "The Sun Goḍs Children & The Big Lie."
83. Interview Ex-combatant 4, Jaffna, July 2018.
84. University Teacher for Human Rights (Jaffna), "Children in the North-East War: 1985 -1995," Briefing no. 2 (1995).
85. Yu Liu, "Maoist Discourse and the Mobilization of Emotions in Revolutionary China."
86. Especially those youngsters who were particularly vulnerable with regard to age, personality and family background were more likely to be affected by pressure. LTTÈs strategy seems to have been particularly successful in mobilizing Tamils of a very young age, who had difficulties in school and are from less privileged backgrounds. For more information, see University Teacher for Human Rights (Jaffna), "The Sun Goḍs Children & The Big Lie."; Human Rights Watch, "Living in Fear. Child Soldiers and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka."