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Kill a Leader, Murder a Movement?

Leadership and Assassination in Social Movements

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All too frequently, governments kill social movement leaders in an attempt to halt challenges to state power. Sometimes such repression yields its intended effect; other times it produces a powerful backlash, strengthening mass commitment and bolstering protest. In this article, the authors propose hypotheses accounting for these divergent outcomes. Comparing El Salvador's liberation movement with Nigeria's Ogoni autonomy movement, they hypothesize that in addition to a movement's political opportunity structure, four factors internal to the movement matter: the type of leader, the movement's ideology of martyrdom, the leader's embodiment of a shared group identity, and the movement's preexisting unity.

Keywords: *social movements; leadership; repression; assassination; martyrs*

Leaders of the world's most significant political movements often run a risk of assassination. Among the many targets are Lebanon's Rafik Hariri in 2005, the Ukraine's Viktor Yushchenko in 2004, the Philippines' Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino in 1983, Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968, and Mohandas K. Gandhi in 1949. Under what circumstances does the assassination of a leader weaken or destroy a social movement? Conversely, when do such murders invigorate and embolden a movement—to the shock of its would-be assassins? Assessing a movement's development before and after the killing—and particularly comparing movements that succeeded against those that failed in the wake of assassination—allows for systematic exploration of these questions. Moreover, this type of comparative analysis also enables researchers to examine other issues about leadership, such as, Does clear designation of a successor help or hurt a movement after the leader's killing? Do public and activist reactions to assassination vary based on the type of leader that is

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killed? How are some leaders transformed into martyrs having great symbolic and mobilizing power, whereas others are not? What factors shape the response of the international community (or the lack thereof) to the murder of a movement leader?

Not only do these questions have theoretical significance, they have practical relevance as well. Given the frequency of state-sponsored violence against movements challenging fundamental structures of the status quo, broader publics need to understand repression's likely effects (Burawoy, 2005). Such knowledge may influence the actions that leaders take to mitigate or avoid the worst effects of future repression. By the same token, third parties—such as the media and solidarity groups, who frequently are attracted to movements by the charisma or ideas of particular leaders—would benefit from better information about possible trajectories of movements deprived of their leaders by ruthless state action.

It is surprising, therefore, that scholars have not paid much attention to the impact that assassinations have on social movements. Thus, we begin this article by reviewing the social movements' literature on repression, focusing particularly on the relatively meager scholarship that examines state actors' use of deadly force against movement leaders. In the article's second section, we propose hypotheses regarding the effects of a leader's murder on movement development. Our hypotheses have two main foci: the external factor of the movement's political opportunity structure and, more important, internal factors dealing with key aspects of movement leadership. With regard to the latter factors, we offer hypotheses related to four sets of issues: the type of leader killed, the movement's ideological perspective on martyrdom, the leader's embodiment (or not) of a broadly shared identity, and the leader's ability to bridge divisions within the movement. In the third section of the article, we make "probability probes" about these hypotheses aimed at establishing their prima facie validity (Eckstein, 1975). To do so, we compare two important recent movements, El Salvador's liberation movement of the 1970s to 1980s and Nigeria's Ogoni autonomy movement of the 1990s and later. Finally, in the conclusion, we discuss limitations, implications, and extensions of our article.

Case Selection and Methodology

How did we choose our two focus cases from the vast universe of movements against which states have deployed repression? On the basis of prior research about these movements, we knew that both had leaders who played critical roles, Archbishop Oscar Romero and Ken Saro-Wiwa, respectively. We also knew that both movements suffered severe state repression punctuated by the leader's killing. This underlying causal homogeneity (Munck, 2004; Skocpol & Somers, 1980) convinced us of the validity and utility of comparing the movements. Selecting these movements also allowed us to deploy two comparative methodologies useful for hypothesis development, diachronic comparison within each case (Collier, Mahoney, & Seawright, 2004) and J. S. Mill's method of difference between the cases (Mill,

1843/1974; Ragin, 1997). The first method involves careful tracing of structural, organizational, and ideological variables affecting the movement's trajectory before and after its leader's assassination. Although such tracing does not allow us to "prove" hypotheses, it creates a fruitful basis for proposing new hypotheses in a relatively unstudied area of social analysis (Munck, 2004). To maximize the potential applicability of these hypotheses, we chose two movements that challenged fundamental aspects of their societies but that came from different continents and sought different aims.

A second methodological rationale for selecting our cases is the leverage they give us in making cross-case comparisons. Following Mill's method of difference, we sought movements in which the assassination of key leaders contributed to differing outcomes: in the Salvadoran case, eventual movement success in achieving some of its goals; and in the Ogoni case, decline and failure to reach its aims. Notwithstanding this methodologically crucial variation on the dependent variable, our movements are also marked by similarities justifying their comparison (and establishing preliminary scope conditions for our hypotheses): Both movements arose in poor and repressive countries, both sought major change in the economic and political foundations of their respective societies, both won the support of "conscience constituents" (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Tarrow, 2005) in the international community, and both benefited from the leadership of extraordinary individuals. Of course, no comparison in the social sciences is perfect. But the Salvadoran liberation and Ogoni autonomy movements offer a fertile and appropriate basis on which to develop hypotheses, especially in an underdeveloped research area such as movement leadership (Eckstein, 1975; McKeown, 2004). Given the dearth of scholarship on this topic, we emphasize that our article is exploratory. Our aim is to develop plausible hypotheses, not to "prove" these hypotheses through case analysis (Ragin, 1997). Rather, we hope our article serves as a basis on which other researchers can test these hypotheses using a variety of methods.

Some additional methodological notes: Although a leader's killing creates an obvious break point in any movement's development, it may sometimes be difficult to identify concrete causal linkages between such murders and later events. As a result, our analysis hinges in part on a counterfactual: What would the movement's development have looked like without the murder of its leader? Such an endeavor is inevitably speculative, but there are ways to reduce uncertainty (Fearon, 1991; King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). For one thing, sharp and sustained changes in a movement after a leader's murder provide strong evidence of the effects of this event. In addition to such behavioral evidence, testimonial evidence may also be indicative; for instance, a movement's rhetoric may state or suggest that mobilization has been spurred by anger about a leader's killing.

That said, the Ogoni section is based on more than 40 in-person and telephone interviews, mostly done from 1996 to 1998 and from 2000 to 2001. Interviewees included Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) leaders, both male

and female, who had gone into exile to escape state repression. Other interviewees included major international supporters of the Ogoni, chiefly principals at European and North American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In addition, the section relies on analysis of numerous MOSOP documents obtained during interviews or from publicly available sources, contemporaneous Nigerian and international media reports about the Ogoni movement, and secondary sources (Bob, 2005). Our analysis of the Salvadoran liberation movement draws mainly from secondary resources (Almeida, 2003; Berryman, 1984; Montgomery, 1982; Peterson, 1997; Wood, 2003) as well as published speeches of the movement's symbolic leader, Archbishop Romero. We also draw on interviews conducted in person from 1994 to 1995 with 35 activists and organizational leaders of the U.S. movement in solidarity with El Salvador (Nepstad, 2004).

Finally, we wish to clarify our use and definition of the term *leader* in these cases. Many studies oversimplify the division between leaders and followers, exclusively focusing on "formal leaders" (Etzioni, 1961) who hold titled positions in established movement organizations. Robnett (1996) persuasively reminds us that movements often have many informal leaders who may not hold any official office (and thus are less visible) but who nonetheless play a critical role in the mobilization process, particularly at the grassroots level. Moreover, numerous movements develop leadership structures that reflect their ideological values and commitment to egalitarianism. Thus, hierarchical relations and centralized power are rejected in favor of rotating leadership or direct democracy whereby all participants take part in decision making (Klandermans, 1989). In these situations, it may be difficult to identify leaders. Yet in many social movements, including our cases, a single person often comes to be acknowledged by the movement itself, third parties, the media, and opponents as its "leader." This may be because of the resources he or she wields, the numbers of followers he or she commands, his or her symbolic importance to the movement, or other reasons. Whatever the source of prominence, such individuals are considered leaders because they exercise significant authority within a movement (Ganz, 2000). Hence, this is the definition of leadership that we employ.

Although we acknowledge that there were numerous people who filled various leadership roles in our two cases, we limit our attention to the most highly visible and publicly recognized leaders of the Salvadoran liberation struggle and Ogoni autonomy movement. We do so because it seems likely that the assassination of someone who is widely considered to be the key visionary or primary strategist will have the most important impacts on the movement as a whole. Of course, repression against a leader's entourage, subleaders, or mass participants (Bailey, 1988) is tragic and undoubtedly affects movements. However, in this article, we do not directly consider these issues.

Repression and Leadership in Social Movements

Our focus on a leader's assassination places our study in the context of scholarship on repression against movements (Almeida, 2003; Davenport, Johnston, & Mueller,

2005; Francisco, 2004). We recognize that movements and their leaders may experience various forms of social control, including infiltration, entrapment, slander, ridicule, arrest, torture, and incarceration (Earl, 2003; Feree, 2004). And every form of repression is likely to have its own peculiar effects on a movement. Yet we limit our study to the "state-sponsored" killing of a movement's leader because this extreme sanction throws repression's effects into sharpest relief. Of course, a leader's death by natural causes or his or her murder by nonstate actors or deranged individuals is likely to have major effects on a movement too. Although our findings may be relevant to these situations, our concern here is a state's strategic use of deadly force to eliminate troublesome leaders, usually with the intent to undermine movements. The killers in these cases are either state actors or nominally independent individuals who receive resources, support, or encouragement from the state.

In most theoretical models, this type of state-sponsored violence is associated with movement decline (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 2001; Tilly, 1978). In broadest terms, repression reduces the political opportunities that facilitate movement development (McAdam, 1982). It makes organizing difficult and dangerous, as those who seek to activate indigenous organizations or form new ones become easy targets for sanctions. Repression can therefore cause ordinary movement participants to drop out, fearing the costs and risks involved (Marx, 1979; McAdam, 1988). Additionally, repression can inhibit the formation of new resistance groups that seek similar goals (Andrews, 2001). Less directly, it can create a sense of hopelessness and resignation, undermining the "cognitive liberation" often seen as crucial to mobilization. Finally, repression may also generate internal tensions and destroy unity, as activists suspect one another of being infiltrators or government collaborators (Churchill & Vander Wall, 1988; Marx, 1974).

At times, however, repression can backfire, leading to broader protest, augmenting movement resources, and ultimately tipping the balance of power against a state (Almeida, 2003; Francisco, 2004; Sharp, 1990). In the wake of harsh repression, such as a leader's killing, mobilization by two broad populations is possible. Most important are actual or potential movement constituents, people from the aggrieved group itself, who usually have the greatest chance of achieving real change within their societies. In addition, third parties sympathetic to but not part of the aggrieved population may also be activated by repression, providing resources, personnel, and moral support that can strengthen a movement (Bob, 2005; McAdam, 1982). Of course, third parties' ability to act, their interest in doing so, and the effects of their actions are quite different from those of movement constituents. But in many cases, third parties play an important role when movements face repression. Thus, throughout this article we examine the effects of a leader's murder on both audiences.

What causes a sustained and substantial upwelling of mobilization by members and third parties following the murder of a movement's leader? First, repression can draw domestic and worldwide notice to a conflict. Movements, particularly those fighting chronic, low-level oppression, often have difficulty publicizing their plight

(Bob, 2002b). But state despotism, such as the killing of a prominent leader, may attract journalistic coverage, much to the chagrin of the killers. Encapsulating a movement's broad grievances in a single dramatic event, such repression may inadvertently reveal the brutality of an unjust social system (McAdam, 1982; Sharp, 1990). In itself, increased awareness creates a basis for mobilization by potential but previously unpoliticized constituents. Second, severe repression can generate emotions and social-psychological mind-sets that fuel collective action. A leader's murder often creates a "moral shock" (Jasper, 1997) that may generate outrage among both the aggrieved population and third parties, intensifying resistance (McAdam, 1982; Nepstad & Smith, 2001). In this case, righteousness joins grievance to create a potent psychological basis for mobilization. Third, severe social control can strengthen members' militancy as they seek to vindicate their "sunk costs" in a movement and as they perceive fewer options for working within the existing system (Koopmans, 1993; Zwerman & Steinhoff, 2005). Finally, in some cases, protestors may experience an increased sense of efficacy and empowerment (e.g., "insurgent consciousness" or "cognitive liberation") if they interpret brutal sanctions as a sign that authorities feel their power slipping away or consider the challenging group a viable threat.

Hypotheses on Leadership and Assassination

If a leader's slaying sometimes leads to a movement's decline but other times does not, it becomes important to understand the factors affecting these contrary outcomes.

Table 1 presents an outline of our hypotheses. Two broad sets of circumstances seem critical: those external and those internal to a movement. With regard to the former, the national opportunity structure within which a movement operates conditions responses to its leader's murder. In a situation of extreme and widespread repression, there may be little possibility for a movement to bounce back after its leader's elimination. Thus, if assassination is matched by strenuous efforts to dismantle a movement's infrastructure—through the killing of subleaders, terrorizing of the mass base, destruction of indigenous and movement organizations, and disruption of communications networks—mobilization becomes unlikely. Our assertion is supported by Francisco's (2004) study of 31 massacres worldwide; he found that movements often are unable to remobilize if information networks have been demolished. In such cases, news about massacres cannot be widely disseminated and thus activists are unlikely to receive critical forms of support as they seek to sustain resistance. Moreover, the risks of domestic activism may become too great and its organizational basis too weak, except perhaps in isolated regions where state power has little reach (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Internationally, third-party mobilization may still be possible, but only if information about domestic repression leaks outside the home state. In sum, a leader's killing may wipe out a movement and foreclose international support if associated state violence is harsh and comprehensive—as ruthless

Table 1
Hypotheses on Leadership and Assassination

External factors	
Hypothesis 1	The harsher, more comprehensive, and more effective state repression is after the killing, the more likely that the movement will decline.
Hypothesis 2	The more fractured state elites are before the killing, the more likely that divisions will deepen and that opportunities for the movement will grow.
Internal factors	
Types of movement leader: Prophetic versus administrative	
Hypothesis 3	The killing of a prophetic leader will generate greater attention from movement members, the media, and third parties than the murder of an administrative leader, creating higher potential for the former movement's growth.
Hypothesis 4	The killing of a prophetic leader will generate greater moral outrage among movement members, the media, and third parties than the murder of an administrative leader, creating higher potential for the former movement's growth.
Hypothesis 5	The killing of a prophetic leader is more likely to provoke a succession crisis than the killing of an administrative leader, creating higher potential for the latter movement's growth.
Leadership of movement versus movement organization	
Hypothesis 6	The murder of a movement leader is more likely to have a deleterious effect if the movement is weakly institutionalized, with few formal social movement organizations (SMOs) comprising it.
Hypothesis 7	When a movement is composed of numerous SMOs and the leader acts primarily as a symbol for the movement overall, the leader's killing is less likely to undermine the movement's capacity to act.
Ideology of martyrdom	
Hypothesis 8	A leader who regularly uses religious imagery associated with martyrdom will more easily be converted into a martyr after death, enhancing the movement's likelihood of growth.
Hypothesis 9	Even if a movement has no overt religious component, if it operates in a society in which martyrdom is a familiar cultural motif, an assassinated leader will more easily be converted into a martyr, enhancing the movement's likelihood of growth.
Leader's embodiment of a shared group identity	
Hypothesis 10	If a leader has ties to overseas communities through a shared group identity, his or her death will attract greater third-party support to the movement.

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

Movement's unity and the leader's role in creating it	
Hypothesis 11	More unified movements are likely to be more resilient than fractious ones in the wake of a leader's killing.
Hypothesis 12	A movement in which a leader has played a crucial role in bridging internal divisions will be more likely to decline after his or her killing than will a movement whose unity hinges on indigenous factors.

governments from North Korea to Equatorial Guinea well know (Hypothesis 1). There is one caveat. Because assassinating an opposition leader is one of the most extreme measures a government may take against a movement, it has the potential to create tensions within elite circles. If the elite is unified, these may be of little consequence. However, where state rulers are divided, the killing of a movement leader may deepen elite fissures and weaken the authorities' power (Hypothesis 2).

Although far-reaching state repression can obviate a movement's recovery after its leader's murder, less severe conditions create a permissive environment for mobilization. Assuming there is some political or cultural space and organizational basis for further mobilization, we hypothesize that four internal movement factors shape responses to the state-sponsored killing of a leader: a) the type of leader in question; b) the movement's ideological perspective on martyrdom, if any; c) whether the leader embodies a broadly shared identity; and d) the movement's preexisting level of unity or division.

Regarding the first internal factor, social movement scholars have identified numerous types of movement leaders. But two, rooted in Weberian distinctions between charismatic and rational-legal forms of legitimation, provide the broadest categories: prophetic and administrative leaders (Weber, 1947). Often the founders of movements, prophetic leaders provide persuasive visions of social change and advancement. Their clarity of purpose, certainty of direction, and courage in challenging powerful opponents give them great moral and symbolic authority within movements. Using words and ideas as their primary tools, prophetic leaders galvanize aggrieved populations and inspire mass mobilization even in the face of profound adversity (Festinger, 1964). This makes the prophetic leader a more central figure than an administrative leader within a movement. Similarly, it makes the prophetic leader a more prominent personage among third parties. Yet the personalization of authority is not purely unidirectional or top down. Rather, prophetic leaders draw their power from the acclaim they receive from followers, creating a strongly felt bond even in the absence of face-to-face interactions (Madsen & Snow, 1991). Using these informal, reciprocal mechanisms, prophetic leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr. have exercised significant effects on movements extending well beyond the organizations they titularly head (Garrow, 1986).

Administrative leaders differ from prophetic leaders in a number of ways. First, they tend to gain their positions through aptitude at organizational tasks. Seldom the founders or visionaries of a movement, administrative leaders excel at the critical but quotidian tasks of institution building, internal communication, and alliance formation. Often, their work occurs behind the scenes, as they slowly forge movement organizations and make strategic decisions. As a result, their profile among third parties and even the movement itself is likely to be lower than that of a prophetic leader. Second, administrative leaders rely far more than prophetic leaders on bureaucracies and organizational structures to gain their power. As a result, the tight, personalistic bond between leader and follower, so common to the dynamic of prophetic leadership, is reduced in the case of an administrative leader. Moreover, the scope of the administrative leader's authority is likely to be narrower than that of the prophetic leader. Whereas the latter may influence an entire movement, the administrative leader's sway is more likely to be confined to the organization he or she heads. Third, administrative leaders are more likely to create structures and procedures aimed at developing new leaders (Ganz, 2000). By contrast, prophetic leaders are often less successful in extending their leadership temporally. Replacing a prophet is difficult, and typically such leaders have little interest in creating bureaucratic structures and mechanisms to designate a successor (Weber, 1947).

Clearly, these two categories of leaders are ideal types. Few leaders fit neatly into a single one, and movements will often include leaders of both types (Zurcher & Curtis, 1973). In addition, we recognize that these two leadership types by no means exhaust possible classifications. Nonetheless, as a first cut on the issues, we follow other scholars in distinguishing leaders in this way (Aminzade, Perry, & Goldstone, 2001; Roche & Sachs, 1969; Smelser, 1962; Turner & Killian, 1987; Weber, 1947; Wilson, 1973). What hypotheses about the effects of a leader's killing can we derive from these two leadership types and their accompanying dynamics? We hold that a prophetic leader's killing will generate greater attention than the murder of an administrative leader, particularly among potentially supportive third parties (Hypothesis 3). This rests in large part on the greater preexisting prominence of a prophetic leader compared to an administrative leader. For similar reasons, we hypothesize that there will be greater moral outrage after the murder of a prophetic rather than administrative leader (Hypothesis 4). In the former case, immediate shock and sorrow give way to widespread fury over the temerity of those willing to silence a "saint." The response may be massive, as the sense of popular affront may run very deep. Even sectors of the elite may be horrified and alienated by such a killing, weakening the state. Together, these considerations suggest that authorities run greater risks if they kill a prophetic rather than an administrative leader.

Some of the dynamics of prophetic leadership that create potential for movement growth after an assassination also entail possible pitfalls, however. For one thing, a lack of bureaucratic structures and clear lines of authority can limit movement coherence and weaken movement actions in the wake of a prophetic leader's killing. By contrast, movements led by administrators rather than prophets are likely to have

established procedures and lines of succession. Typically in such movements, leaders rise through rational-legal mechanisms (Ganz, 2000), and seconds-in-command are clearly denoted. This suggests another hypothesis: The killing of a prophetic leader is more likely to provoke a succession crisis than the killing of an administrator (Hypothesis 5). Although the loss of an administrative leader will be a serious blow, recognized succession processes and designated deputies can limit disruptions after the killing. By contrast, in the case of prophetic leaders, lines and processes of succession are usually cloudier. Conflict may quickly engulf a movement's top echelons as secondary figures scramble for the mantle of leadership. Because prophetic leaders are less likely to routinize their authority than administrative leaders, the movement may falter in factional infighting (Zald & Ash, 1966).

There is another important point involving these two types of leaders and the distinction between a social movement (SM) and a social movement organization (SMO). McCarthy and Zald (1977) define a social movement as "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population representing preferences for changing some elements of the social structure or reward distribution, or both, in a society," whereas a social movement organization is "a complex, or formal, organization that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement . . . and attempts to implement those goals (pp. 1217-1218). Given their different skills and functions, we posit that prophetic leaders are more likely to inspire and guide movements as a whole, whereas administrative leaders are more likely to direct social movement organizations. Moreover, we argue that if an SMO's leader is killed, that particular organization may be hurt, but the movement as a whole may still progress. However, if a leader who guides the larger movement is killed, the consequences are less certain. On one hand, if a movement is weakly institutionalized, with few formal SMOs comprising it, the murder of the SM's leader is likely to have deleterious effects on the movement (Hypothesis 6). On the other hand, if there are numerous SMOs within the movement and the leader acted primarily as a symbol of the overall SM, the effects of his death may be less grave (Hypothesis 7). In the latter case, SMOs may continue the struggle, their continuing viability allowing them to use the SM leader's killing as a catalyst for greater mobilization. By contrast, in the former case, the movement will have few organizational bases on which to maintain or expand itself.

A second internal factor, a movement's ideology of martyrdom, is also important in explaining reactions to a leader's assassination. The concept of martyrdom is probably present to some degree in all cultures and can therefore be appropriated by many movements. But some movements may be better prepared than others to incorporate a martyred leader into the movement's story line. Probably the most important factor is the leader's own publicly expressed views of martyrdom. When leaders openly anticipate the possibility of their own murders and frame this as a sacrifice that will strengthen the struggle, they may help the movement transform tragedy into opportunity. Doing so is probably easiest in movements with an overtly Christian religious identity, where Christ's death may act as a model for the sacrifices necessary to

achieve social change. The crucifixion may be a constant reference point in movement rhetoric, and as conflict with the state intensifies, leaders may note similar threats under which they all live (Peterson, 1997). In movements with Muslim roots, the concept of jihad may serve a similar function, with death seen as sometimes necessary in realizing important goals (Juergensmeyer, 2001). To hypothesize about this factor, a leader who regularly uses religious imagery associated with martyrdom will more easily be converted into a martyr after death, enhancing the movement's likelihood of growth (Hypothesis 8). Although this by no means guarantees that the movement will flourish, it gives meaning to the killing—as a tragic but predictable, even necessary, step in the realization of the leader's vision. This may fuel mass mobilization as moral outrage rises and the movement's "sunk costs" spike upward.

For movements without an overt religious component, such transformations may be more difficult. A leader's murder is more likely to appear pointless, and popular responses may tend toward despair. At a minimum, remaining movement leaders will need to work harder to portray their fallen comrade as a martyr. In this task, the broader cultural milieu may be important. Even if a movement has no religious component, if it operates in a society in which martyrdom is a familiar cultural motif, a leader's apotheosis will likely be easier than in a culture where the concept is less prominent (Hypothesis 9).

Another factor is particularly relevant to mobilization by third parties. If a leader has ties to overseas communities through a shared group identity, his or her death will usually attract greater third-party support to the movement (Hypothesis 10). Such identities create a basis for solidarity activism, particularly where a movement leader has actively cultivated it through extensive interactions with overseas communities (Bob, 2005; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). The most common example of this is diaspora support for a homeland religion or ethnic group. But similar forms of support can be based on strongly felt ideological identities reinforced by direct personal contacts with the leader. When such a shared identity is present, the death of a movement leader is quickly transmitted to the entire community through existing informational networks. Distant supporters may in turn be able to instigate broader media attention and third-party support (Bob, 2005). More important, such killings may appear as a direct affront to the overseas community. By contrast, for leaders with no such ties or interactions, the possibility of solidarity activism is smaller.

A final set of internal factors concerns the leader's role in creating movement cohesiveness. As a general matter, we claim that unified movements are likely to be more resilient than fractious ones in the face of a leader's killing (Hypothesis 11). Leaders often play a role in bridging differences within movements concerning multiple goals, competing personalities, and diverse strategies. In more unified movements, such unavoidable differences are negotiated and compromised on an ongoing basis, generating increased coherence even as new controversies inevitably arise. Although leaders may help forge these agreements, more unified movements maintain their equanimity through internal correction mechanisms that seem likely to persist even

after a leader's killing. By contrast, in more fractious movements, leaders often play a larger role in bridging deep personal, ideological, or strategic gulfs. In some cases, such leaders may initially have brought contending groups under the umbrella of a single movement. In other cases, leaders may be designated precisely because of their ability to traverse factional divides. Whatever their provenance, such leaders act as linchpins—and their killing can create a crisis for the movement. Although even the most fragmented movement may unite in the immediate aftermath of leaders' slaying, such cohesion is likely to be transitory. Preexisting divisions will quickly reerupt, vitiating any sense that the killing demonstrated the state's insecurity. Even if succession is not an issue, without the former leader, these divisions can degenerate into the movement's fissuring or collapse. In sum, a movement in which a leader has played a crucial role in bridging internal divisions will be more likely to decline after his or her killing (Hypothesis 12).

In the following two sections, we perform probability probes to demonstrate that these hypotheses have prima facie validity. We begin each section with a brief overview of the cases and then proceed to analysis.

El Salvador: State Murder and Movement Expansion

In the 1970s, El Salvador was spiraling into a brutal class conflict. After centuries of economic inequality and political marginalization, the poor had begun working for comprehensive social change. Numerous organizations were active, mobilizing different segments of the population, including labor, peasants, students, and church groups. Although each sector had some concerns and issues uniquely pertaining to its own constituents, they all shared the common goals of expanding political access, implementing land and labor reforms, and increasing democratic freedoms. Moreover, they all sought transformation of the oppressive neocolonial social system that had been in place in the country for centuries. Although there were significant differences in their tactical approaches, ranging from armed insurrection to nonviolent methods, the combined efforts of these various groups became known as the movement for liberation (Montgomery, 1982; Nepstad, 2004).

In response to this growing demand for change, the state escalated its level of repression. Paramilitary groups known as death squads began abducting suspected activists; torture and assassinations became commonplace. Human rights groups estimated that security forces killed an average of 1,000 civilians a month during 1980 and 1981 (Almeida, 2003). The victims of this violence were from all segments of the liberation movement. Almeida (2003) notes, "Human rights abuse records indicate that it was . . . unionized workers, students and affiliated teachers, and church organized peasants and religious workers that bore the brunt of state repression" (p. 376). Although the repression was designed to terrorize and immobilize those calling for change, it actually helped to further unify these groups by adding another joint interest: an end to the human rights abuses.

Notwithstanding this unity of purpose, each of the popular organizations in the liberation movement selected its own administrative leader. Yet as state-sponsored violence increased, these individuals were frequently abducted or killed. As it grew more difficult to publicly speak out against government policies and military abuses, the leader of the Salvadoran Catholic Church, Archbishop Oscar Romero, emerged as the inspirational leader of the movement. Romero quickly gained prominence as spokesperson for all those who were repressed, not simply the church. He was often referred to as the "voice of the voiceless" (Berryman, 1984) because of his willingness to confront those responsible for the suffering. Romero criticized government policies that benefited the rich at the expense of the poor. He denounced military abuses and demanded human rights and fair economic practices. At first, Romero's status as archbishop granted him a degree of protection from the repression, but he too eventually received death threats. On March 24, 1980, the archbishop was shot and killed while celebrating Mass. Although the assassination was designed to stop the surging movement for liberation, his murder had the opposite effect. It outraged the masses, deepening their commitment to the struggle, mobilizing larger numbers, and spurring development of a powerful international solidarity network with the people of El Salvador (Nepstad, 2001, 2004). After more than a decade of conflict, the state ultimately agreed to negotiations that ended the repression and democratized the country (Smith, 1996; Wood, 2003).

The archbishop held a distinct leadership role in this struggle. As Romero increasingly became the public voice of the liberation movement, he intentionally remained autonomous from movement organizations. He was a prophetic leader, inspiring resistance and articulating the vision of the movement, but he was unwilling to be an administrative or strategic organizer for any SMO. Romero (1988) stated,

> I am not a politician or sociologist or economist. I am not the one responsible for solving the country's political and economic problems. There are others, lay people, who have that tremendous responsibility. From my post as pastor, I only call upon them to use those talents that God has given them. . . . The church is not an opposition party . . . [but] the church defends the right of association, and it promotes a vigorous activity of raising consciousness and of organizing among the poor in order to bring about peace and justice. The church, from its commitment to the gospel, supports the just objectives that the organizations likewise seek. (pp. 74, 127, 135-136)

Romero's commitment to maintaining the church's independence from popular organizations may have contributed to the liberation movement's internal unity. Although some groups criticized the archbishop for not being radical enough (Montgomery, 1982), most popular organizations shared the belief that he played an invaluable role in the movement. Romero also highlighted the SMOs' common, universalistic goals—that is, economic, political, and military restructuring—rather than advocating a particular solution, which could have accentuated differences between

the groups' policies and strategies. This sense of unity led many popular organizations to view Romero as their spokesperson, and thus his murder in March 1980 outraged and radicalized the entire domestic movement, not simply those affiliated with the Catholic Church (Hypothesis 11). A few days after the murder, 5,000 people participated in Romero's funeral procession, which also served as a protest event. This was one of the largest acts of resistance during that time, and the army responded with sniping and bombing that killed dozens (Wood, 2003). Additionally, although reformist efforts began to decline after Romero's death, revolutionary groups expanded in this period (Almeida, 2003). Many activists left popular organizations to join the various guerrilla groups, which united in November 1980 to form the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). Nine months after the assassination of the archbishop, the FMLN launched a major attack that posed the first serious challenge to the military regime, shifting the nation toward civil war. Although this offensive failed, the guerrilla organizations continued to organize in the countryside (Wood, 2003). Romero's death also increased international resistance to the Salvadoran regime. Within months, thousands of U.S. citizens, including many progressive Catholics, began asking why their government was sponsoring a regime that killed church leaders. Many expressed their support for the Salvadoran liberation movement by working to change American foreign policy toward the country. Although only a few Central America solidarity organizations existed before 1980, nearly 1,500 groups were operating within a few short years of Romero's murder, organizing civil disobedience, lobbying efforts, material aid, and assistance for refugees fleeing the violence (Coutin, 1993; Nepstad, 2004; Smith, 1996).

How can we make sense of this increased resistance after Romero's murder? Government officials expected that the assassination would send a message to the Salvadoran population that anyone who dared criticize the regime would face a similar fate. Why, then, did the murder not have its intended effect? There are several answers to this question. First, for members of the liberation movement and its sympathizers, both in El Salvador and overseas, the killing of the movement's symbolic leader while he conducted a religious service violated the most sacred spheres of life. This egregious abuse provoked tremendous moral outrage among Catholics and non-Catholics alike. Even the ruling coalition, itself already divided (Wood, 2003), suffered further dissent because of the killing (Hypothesis 2). Thus, the killing sapped the authorities and reciprocally strengthened the movement, despite the devastating loss of Romero. Second, because Romero was not an administrative leader, the strategic capacity of the individual organizations comprising the liberation movement was not disrupted when he was killed. Individuals in the various popular organizations continued to plan campaigns and implement acts of resistance, even though the risks were great (Hypothesis 7). Third, there were no internal struggles for leadership succession. In part, this stems from the fact that Romero was a formal leader only in the Catholic Church, which has long-standing, highly rationalistic rules for replacing an archbishop (Hypothesis 5). Within the liberation movement,

Romero's leadership was prophetic, acquired not through appointment or election but through popular acclamation based on his courageous and outspoken support for popular resistance. But Romero was also a special kind of prophetic leader, one who held no position in any formal organization but the Church. Thus, no leader of the disparate organizations comprising the liberation movement sought Romero's mantle. Instead, their resolve to achieve victory hardened, leading quickly to unification around the FMLN and to the January 1981 offensive.

Contributing to this resolve and to a desire to validate Romero's sacrifice was his rapid transformation from prophetic leader to Jesus-like martyr for the liberation struggle. As some in the movement noted, the archbishop's life paralleled the story of Christ. For example, both Jesus and Romero devoted themselves to spiritual pursuits, foregoing family, wealth, and security. Each urged radical social transformation, although Romero came to this view only late in his life (Nepstad, 2004, p. 98; Wood, 2003, p. 105). Jesus interacted with the Samaritans, who were ostracized by society; told the rich to sell their possessions; and overturned the tables of moneylenders in the temple market when their exorbitant interest rates oppressed the poor. Similarly, Romero took the "preferential option for the poor," denouncing the economic system that benefited a few while impoverishing the masses. Such actions created enemies for both men, and each had an impending sense of his death but was willing to sacrifice his life for a greater cause (Nepstad, 2001). The similarities between the two were so important that it has been said that "the secret of Monseñor Romero is simply that he resembled Jesus" (as cited in Dennis, Golden, & Wright, 2000, p. 107).

Of course, the power of this resemblance is premised in part on El Salvador's status as a heavily Catholic country (Hypothesis 9). Moreover, Romero, aware of the risks he ran, facilitated a meaningful martyrdom. In public speeches, he often talked about threats against him; he also insisted that his assassination would not end a liberation struggle supported by so many of the faithful. For instance, several weeks before his assassination he stated,

> I have frequently been threatened with death. I must say that, as a Christian, I do not believe in death but in the resurrection. If they kill me, I shall rise again in the Salvadoran people. . . . If they manage to carry out their threats, I shall be offering my blood for the redemption and resurrection of El Salvador. Martyrdom is a grace from God that I do not believe I have earned. But if God accepts the sacrifice of my life, then may my blood be the seed of liberty, and a sign of the hope that will soon become a reality. May my death . . . be for the liberation of my people. . . . You can tell them, if they succeed in killing me, that I pardon them, and I bless those who carry out the killing. But I wish they could realize that they are wasting their time. A bishop will die, but the church of God—the people—will never die (as cited in Sobrino, 1990, pp. 99-100).

By discussing his own impending death as an act that would give new life to the Salvadoran struggle, Romero offered a politicized notion of redemption. Just as the

crucifixion and resurrection of Christ offered new life to humanity, this act of martyrdom—as well as future acts—would give new life to the movement for justice (Nepstad, 2004). This provided moral and theological incentive for ongoing resistance, reassuring the Salvadoran people that if they continued to fight, they would not die in vain but would instead contribute to the country's eventual liberation (Hypothesis 8).

Overseas, many of the foregoing factors played a role in galvanizing a transnational Salvadoran solidarity network. In addition, several other factors merit discussion. First, as a major global institution, the Catholic Church included an informational infrastructure that permitted rapid overseas dissemination of Romero's story (Nepstad, 2004). In particular, religious orders and U.S. missionaries who had served in Central America reported on Romero's murder, significantly raising awareness within North American faith communities about El Salvador's suffering. Therefore, although the Salvadoran military regime did in fact try to destroy much of the liberation movement's infrastructure, it could not eliminate the church networks that were so vital in spreading word of the archbishop's assassination (Hypothesis 1). Moreover, as suggested above, progressives within these religious communities also constituted a receptive audience. This was in large part because Romero personified a collective Christian identity spanning national boundaries. Reverend J. Bryan Hehir, the international director of the U.S. Catholic Conference, stated, "[American Catholics] may not know where El Salvador is, but they know killing a bishop while he's saying Mass is not something they ought to be passive about" (Keller, 1982, p. 898). Romero's murder, especially with its connotations of Jesus's martyrdom, animated progressive American Christians because he embodied their attitudes, beliefs, and commitments (Hypothesis 10).

Romero's brutal assassination backfired on the highly repressive Salvadoran state. Incensed by the killing and eager to avenge it through the country's liberation, the domestic movement gained unity and strength, even while the state suffered defections. Similarly outraged, transnational supporters provided new resources for the domestic movement and exerted significant pressure on the Salvadoran government's primary overseas supporter, the United States. Of course, the movement's strength still paled by comparison to the Salvadoran state's, and the conflict therefore lasted many more years. But, contrary to the state's expectations, Romero's killing played an important role in sustaining resistance.

Nigeria: State Murder and Movement Decline

Ten years after Romero's death, a very different movement arose in the Niger River delta of southern Nigeria. Led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, a former Nigerian government official, political writer, and nationally known television producer, the Ogoni minority formed MOSOP in 1990. Its key demands, which had roots in long-standing Ogoni grievances regarding their marginalization in a country dominated by three far

larger ethnic groups, included political autonomy for the group within Nigeria and control of the huge oil revenues derived from drilling on Ogoni territory. As such, these claims posed severe threats to the political and economic dominance of Nigeria's largest ethnic groups. MOSOP also called for reduction in and compensation for pollution caused by the oil drilling by multinational corporations (Ogoni Bill of Rights, 1990). Using these demands as a basis for activism, MOSOP mobilized much of the Ogoni people, 250,000 to 500,000 strong in a country of more than 100 million, by 1993.[1] Inspired by Saro-Wiwa's rhetoric and vision, previously rivalrous Ogoni elites joined MOSOP, and thousands of ordinary Ogoni protested. Of particular importance, Saro-Wiwa convinced leaders of most of the subethnic "kingdoms" comprising the Ogoni group to join together within MOSOP. Moreover, he acted as a crucial generational bridge between his contemporaries, Ogoni elders who had long worked within Nigerian political institutions, and insurgent "youth" who believed that the existing governmental structure exploited the Ogoni (Osaghae, 1995; Saro-Wiwa, 1995). His fame within Nigeria and his connections to the political establishment appealed to the former group, whereas his fiery rhetoric appealed to the latter. By 1993, MOSOP had also won significant backing from foreign NGOs, particularly moved by MOSOP's environmental claims (Welch & Sills, 1996).

As domestic and international protest rose in the early 1990s, however, the Nigerian military regime cracked down. In April 1994, the government arrested Saro-Wiwa and nine top MOSOP leaders on trumped-up charges of complicity in the murders of four Ogoni chiefs who had recently broken from the movement. During ensuing months, harsh repression terrorized MOSOP's mass base and drove elites into exile, culminating in the 1995 execution of Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders after a blatantly unfair military trial (Birnbaum, 1995). In the aftermath of these state killings, severe army repression muted any response within Nigeria. Meanwhile, MOSOP was riven by factionalism. Even after Nigerian democracy revived in 1999, the movement remained fragmented. Today, although MOSOP is a small political force in the Niger delta, the movement has never regained its early 1990s strength, and Ogoni demands remain largely unmet (Bob, 2002a, 2005).

Although the Salvadoran liberation movement vindicated Romero's death by escalating resistance, Nigeria's Ogoni movement floundered in the wake of Ken Saro-Wiwa's execution. What explains the different outcomes? One important reason for MOSOP's difficulties was the highly repressive political context facing this small, isolated, and nonviolent movement. This is not to say that the violence was worse than that facing the Salvadoran liberation movement; in fact, the death toll in El Salvador dwarfs that in Ogoniland. But in the Ogoni case, the difficulties stemming from state repression were exacerbated, at least within Nigeria, by the specific characteristics of the movement. Unlike the Salvadoran liberation movement, MOSOP sought autonomy for a tiny minority group rather than liberation for the numerical majority of El Salvador's poor and repressed. This had several implications. First, the movement's locus was geographically circumscribed—a 400-square-mile

region of mostly flat terrain. The small number of Ogoni and the group's high degree of geographic concentration made state repression easy. By sending troops into all parts of Ogoniland, by destroying towns in the region, and by terrorizing the population, state repression could be highly effective (Hypothesis 1). By contrast, in the Salvadoran case, the geographic scope of the movement was countrywide, making it possible for the rebels to maintain many redoubts and making it difficult even for brutal government repression to crush the movement (cf. Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Second, Saro-Wiwa's killing did not lead to defections among the country's military leaders. This probably results in part from the fact that the military junta was quite unified in 1995 (Osaghae, 1998) (Hypothesis 2). Just as important, however, was the fact that Saro-Wiwa led a small ethnic minority whose demands threatened the political and economic dominance of the majority ethnic groups; by contrast, Romero led not only the liberation movement but also a church whose members included both the Salvadoran masses and elites. Thus, even if there had been major preexisting divisions in the Nigerian state leadership, Saro-Wiwa's killings would probably not have precipitated elite defections.

In addition, factors internal to the movement and related to Saro-Wiwa's leadership reduced MOSOP's ability to remobilize after his killing. Unlike Romero, Saro-Wiwa took both prophetic and administrative roles within the movement. In founding MOSOP and popularizing the movement, he wrote prodigiously, often in visionary terms, promoting Ogoni identity and vehemently criticizing the Nigerian state, the majority ethnic groups, and multinational oil companies (Saro-Wiwa, 1992, 1995). He traveled extensively in Ogoniland, drumming up popular and elite support for MOSOP's mobilizations. In particular, he was instrumental in establishing MOSOP's ties to indigenous organizations (McAdam, 1982) within the Ogoni community, such as churches, dance groups, and women's organizations. He also helped integrate a variety of Ogoni rights organizations under the MOSOP umbrella. In addition, he was central to most of MOSOP's key mobilizations, not only planning and orchestrating them but also providing their inspirational core, through his speeches and courage in the face of military detentions and abuse. Thus, his killing, like that of other prophetic leaders such as Romero, attracted substantial media attention and generated great moral outrage both at home and abroad (Hypothesis 3, Hypothesis 4).

For several reasons, however, these immediate responses did not lead to major mobilizations within Ogoniland. In addition to Nigeria's highly repressive opportunity structure, a major reason was the peculiar dynamics of Saro-Wiwa's leadership. Unlike Romero, who was the prophetic leader of an SM but did not lead any SMOs, Saro-Wiwa did both. He served not only as prophetic leader of the movement but also as founder and key administrator of MOSOP. Indeed, it is difficult to separate the Ogoni movement from MOSOP (Osaghae, 1995). Under the MOSOP umbrella were numerous indigenous organizations and a few, much smaller movement organizations. But none of the latter organizations had a base of support independent

from MOSOP's. As a result, Saro-Wiwa's killing crippled both the SM and the SMO, particularly because eight other top MOSOP leaders were executed and most others had been driven into exile by state repression (Hypothesis 6, Hypothesis 7). By contrast, in El Salvador, numerous SMOs could continue to mobilize even after Romero's killing.

As a related matter, Saro-Wiwa's killing led to a succession crisis, despite the fact that Saro-Wiwa, in his role as administrative leader, had clearly designated a successor for MOSOP, Ledum Mitee (Hypothesis 5). In part, the failure of succession stemmed from unique circumstances. Mitee was tried with Saro-Wiwa but was the sole defendant to escape execution after the 1995 trial, making him suspect among some Ogoni. More important, Saro-Wiwa's key role in bridging personal, generational, subethnic, and political rivalries among Ogoni elites made his replacement difficult (Hypothesis 12). MOSOP's previous accord had always been tenuous, and harsh state repression broke important threads of unity (Bob, 2005; Saro-Wiwa, 1995) (Hypothesis 11). In 1994 and 1995, most MOSOP leaders who had not been killed or jailed were forced overseas, where they dispersed across two hemispheres in whichever countries offered them asylum. Geographic distances exacerbated preexisting generational and subethnic rivalries. Eventually, a rift opened between those who supported Mitee and others who supported Saro-Wiwa's brother, Owens Wiwa. Based in London and making occasional visits to Nigeria, Mitee remained most connected to the movement in Nigeria and to European NGOs. In North America, however, Owens Wiwa was the primary contact between the Ogoni and their American NGO supporters. As a result, relations between Wiwa and Mitee were tense. One of the most public disputes surrounded plans for the exhumation and reinterment of the "Ogoni Nine," permitted by the new Nigerian government in 2000: the two factions could not agree on whether the dead should be given private burials or joint rights that might serve as a new rallying point for the movement (Burke, 2000, Onishi, 2000).

This succession crisis cut into support for MOSOP among overseas audiences (T. Concannon, personal communication, December 9, 1999). In addition, although international support for the Ogoni flared in the period of outrage following his killing, it was brief and shallow compared to the support that arose for the Salvadoran liberation movement in the wake of Romero's murder. A major reason for this is that Saro-Wiwa did not embody a strong group identity shared by third parties, as Romero did among progressive Catholics and Christians (Hypothesis 10). Although there was a small Ogoni diaspora that provided sustained solidarity support, most overseas allies were advocacy NGOs with no blood, ethnic, or religious bonds to the dead leader or his ethnic group, and therefore with little long-term stake in the struggle. As a result, although there was immediate anger regarding Saro-Wiwa's killing, an enduring solidarity network did not form around the Ogoni. Notably, for international audiences, Saro-Wiwa had sought to portray the Ogoni cause more broadly as a fight for environmental justice and human rights rather than complex, regional ethnic minority rights (Bob, 2005). But even the latter framing failed to galvanize

sustained and widespread overseas support. Compared to Romero's Catholicism, which many around the world shared as a core identity, Saro-Wiwa's framing of the Ogoni struggle around environmentalism and human rights was a far weaker basis for solidarity activism.

For similar reasons, Saro-Wiwa's killing did not resonate as martyrdom, as Romero's murder did both at home and abroad. Nigeria is not a predominantly Catholic country but is split between Christian, Muslim, and animist religions. Although many Ogoni are Christians, the Catholic Church's role in the region pales by comparison to that in El Salvador. It is not surprising, therefore, that Saro-Wiwa refrained from portraying himself as a martyr even as his trial and execution loomed. Although he called for and predicted continuation of the Ogoni struggle after his death, he in no way suggested that he would be resurrected in the Ogoni struggle. Of course, because the martyr concept today has broad resonance, Saro-Wiwa was frequently hailed as one (Saro-Wiwa, 1995; Welch & Sills, 1996). Indeed, as Saro-Wiwa's son caustically stated, in the wake of the killings, international NGOs were "falling over themselves to write proposals and get funding for projects to ensure that 'Ken Saro-Wiwa's death was not in vain'" (Wiwa, 2000, p. 161). But, as this quotation suggests, the different cultural context for Saro-Wiwa's death created a shallow basis on which overseas advocates opportunistically sought to build support (Hypothesis 8, Hypothesis 9). In the Niger delta, Saro-Wiwa continues to be seen as a hero by many Ogoni and members of other marginalized minority groups. But there, too, his death, although seen as a symbol of state despotism, has not had the mobilizing power that Romero's had in heavily Catholic El Salvador.

Conclusion

In this article, we have proposed hypotheses concerning movement development in the wake of a leader's killing. Before reviewing our findings, we acknowledge limitations in our study. First, this article has analyzed only two movements of the many whose leaders have been victims of state violence. Although this comparison has been useful for hypothesis generation, we encourage other scholars to test its findings by studying other cases. Second, we recognize that the Salvadoran liberation and Ogoni autonomy movements are quite different from one another. As discussed above, however, there are good methodological reasons for comparing the movements, particularly given this article's goals of generating hypotheses and demonstrating their prima facie validity. If anything, differences between these two movements make our hypotheses potentially applicable to a wide variety of movements. Again, we urge future researchers to test our claims by examining additional movements.

Notwithstanding these caveats, our article suggests several important conclusions about how state-sponsored decapitation of a movement will affect future mobilization. First, the political opportunity structure matters. Harsh and comprehensive state

repression in the wake of a leader's murder can stifle future activism, as the Ogoni found when their tiny movement was overwhelmed by the Nigerian military regime. Yet where even small opportunities remain, as in the Salvadoran case, movements stand a chance of rebirth. This chance grows when authorities are already divided and the shock of the state's killing so dismays certain factions that they come to oppose the state, as in the Salvadoran case. Furthermore, the possibility for remobilization is greater when alternative information networks remain intact and convey the news of the murder to supportive third parties who can provide various resources to the movement.

Second, the type of leader killed matters. Although not directly tested in this article, it seems likely that the killing of prophetic leaders will excite greater outside attention and moral outrage than that of administrative leaders. If that fury is routinized and channeled, it can maintain and even augment movement pressure on a state. On the other hand, in a movement without clear lines of succession, future mobilization may be harmed, as in the Ogoni case. This situation seems most likely to affect movements with prophetic leaders, although our two cases indicate that it can affect movements with both types of leaders. In future research, scholars might consider examining how movements headed by other types of leaders respond to their assassinations.

Third, if a leader upholds an ideology of martyrdom or a movement operates in a society where martyrdom has deep cultural roots, the dead leader will more easily be converted into a martyr with mobilizing potential for the movement. The Salvadoran movement benefited significantly from this fact after Romero's assassination, whereas the Ogoni movement did less so after Saro-Wiwa's killing.

Fourth, movements whose goals are broader and whose leaders embody a shared group identity are also more likely to inspire third-party support. Again, the Salvadoran movement benefited from these factors, both at home and among third parties abroad. The Ogoni movement, with much narrower, ethnically based claims, was hurt among potential sympathizers at home. Moreover, whereas some of MOSOP's claims had significant resonance overseas, Saro-Wiwa did not personify a collective identity, as Romero did because of his leadership in the Catholic Church.

Finally, although our cases only hinted at it, we hypothesize that a movement's preexisting divisiveness affects its hardiness after its leader's slaying. We did find that movements such as MOSOP, whose leader acted as a critical bridge among opposing camps, are likely to suffer significant factionalism after his death. The death of leaders like Romero who serve primarily symbolic roles is less likely to spur fragmentation.

In sum, the state-sponsored killing of a leader need not murder a movement. Indeed in some cases, it will energize and mobilize those who remain. Of course, movements inevitably suffer when states deploy deadly force against their heads, and in some cases they may never recover. However, our findings suggest factors that may increase a movement's chances of survival even after a state-sponsored assassination. Although some of these factors are beyond a movement's power to influence, others

are not. Thus, movements facing despotic foes should take steps to increase the likelihood that if states lash out, their leaders will not die in vain.

Note

1. Precise population figures are uncertain. The Ogoni figure is based on estimates made by Ogoni leader Ken Saro-Wiwa (1995) and should be used with caution (Wiwa, 2000).

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