# When Numbers Are Not Enough:

## The Strategic Use of Violence in Ukraine's 2014 Revolution

*Serhiy Kudelia*

Can violent tactics help protesters defeat a regime? While earlier studies suggested ways in which violence may empower protesters, recent works have argued that violent protest tends to be largely counterproductive for a campaign.[1] One widely cited cross-case analysis concludes that large-scale protest campaigns practicing primarily nonviolent tactics between 1900 and 2006 were "nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent counterparts."[2] It finds that violent repertoires of contention dampen protest participation, consolidate ruling elites, and allow the government to use repression indiscriminately. Since the state usually has a substantial advantage over the society when it comes to coercive resources, it should only welcome direct confrontation. By contrast, violent protesters lose crucial leverage over authorities and, ultimately, face defeat.

This article counters some of the conclusions of scholarly works on nonviolent resistance and builds on rationalist theories of protest to explain when and how a limited use of violent tactics may lead to the success of a largely non-violent movement.[3] In developing my argument I use the case study of the 2013–2014 Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine, which toppled the regime of Viktor Yanukovych.[4] While the total share of violent protests across Ukraine for the duration of the movement was just 12 percent, the total substantially increased in the final month (January 19-February 21, 2014), with most of violence concentrated in Kyiv.[5] The choice of violent tactics by protesters during Euromaidan signaled a major departure from the previous patterns of peaceful contentious politics in Ukraine.[6] Yet, only after the start of violent clashes with the police in mid-January did the authorities offer tangible concessions and ultimately yield power.

The success of violent protest tactics in Ukraine's case, puzzling from the standpoint of recent findings, has received no systematic, theoretically-driven scholarly treatment. Most academic writing focuses on government-sponsored violence and portrays protest violence as limited in scale, used only by fringe groups with no bearing on the campaign outcome.[7] Some even suggest that Euromaidan's success can be attributed solely to its non-violent tactics.[8] By contrast, this article argues that protest

violence during Euromaidan proved crucial to defeating the regime by raising the costs associated with stalling the movement and coercive crackdown of protesters. It points to the causal significance of the agency and its strategic choices in explaining the dynamics and the outcome of the revolution. As I will illustrate, further routinization of violent tactics becomes possible due to the preexistence of organized groups skilled in violence and ideologically predisposed to its use in pursuit of political goals. I point to three factors that explain the effectiveness of violent tactics during mass protests: a) the participatory character of protest violence; b) the embeddedness of violent groups and practices in a generally non-violent movement; and c) the capacity and willingness of violent activists to escalate beyond the cost-tolerance threshold of the regime.

Methodologically, this article is based on within-case qualitative analysis that aims to trace the reciprocal causation of actors' choices using a rationalist theoretical framework. Its focus is on the micro-level interactions among multiple agents (the regime, the coercive apparatus, opposition elites, group leaders, and protest participants) in the process of intense political contestation. The goal of the article is inductive theory development, specifying the set of mechanisms behind the hypothesized causal relationship. For data collection I rely mainly on primary sources, such as testimonies of protest participants, interviews with elite members, statements and writings of political leaders, and contemporaneous news reports and analyses. I also utilize video evidence available through online resources and presented in several documentaries about the revolution. Conceptually, I adopt Gamson's minimalist definition of violence as a "deliberate physical injury to property or persons," but focus primarily on actions meant to inflict physical harm on individuals.[9] Not all instances of the use of force by protesters represent violent tactics, but all violence is based on the use of force. This definition thus excludes tactics such as the occupation of public space, the blockade of buildings and streets, and verbal abuse, unless they are accompanied by intentional physical damage to the targets of protest. Intentionality, of course, may sometimes be hard to establish empirically, but consistency in the use of the same techniques to produce such damage is a strong indication that the action is purposeful.

## Sequences of Violence During Euromaidan

Protest violence during Euromaidan moved through four sequences: (1) antagonism (December 1, 2013); (2) mobilization (January 19–22, 2014); (3) diffusion (January 23-February 17, 2014); and (4) spiraling (February 18–21, 2014). The first outbreak of violent contention happened on December 1, 2013, the day of the first mass demonstration in Kyiv—following a brutal assault by riot police against the Maidan protest camp. Dozens of masked protesters attacked police cordons next to the Presidential Administration with iron chains, flares, stones, and petrol bombs. They also tried to use a bulldozer to break through the police lines. After several hours of clashes, "Berkut" (riot police) led a counteroffensive assault against protesters, beating them indiscriminately and arresting dozens. Opposition elites condemned the violent acts as

provocation organized by the authorities to discredit the movement. In response, Oleg Odnorozhenko, a prominent nationalist ideologue, argued that it was just a spontaneous action of the "patriotic youth" trying to seize the "symbol of power."[10] However, violent tactics proved to have a limited appeal among protesters beyond the nationalist core and antagonized the movement's rank and file.[11] Only 15 percent of protesters at the time were willing to support the creation of armed protest groups and even fewer said they would participate in capturing government buildings, which might involve fighting with the police.[12]

The second violent sequence was preceded by Parliament's vote for a law restricting freedom of assembly and criminalizing unsanctioned protest actions. It represented the regime's shift from coercion to a more channeled mode of repression meant to "limit the range of spaces, activities, and issues on which activism can safely occur."[13] The march to the parliament on January 19 with demands to revoke the law was blocked by rows of interior troops and police in full riot gear. As one witness described the scene, protesters "wore helmets and balaclavas and held sticks, some with nails in them. [...] They first threw something into the police, then smashed bus windows and started shaking it."[14] Protest violence escalated with the use of petards, petrol bombs, and stones, while police responded with rubber bullets and stun grenades. However, only a minority of protesters initially engaged in the violent skirmishes. As one observer recalled, "the most active fighters numbered around one hundred, while the rest were standing on the hills and watching."[15] When opposition leaders personally interfered to stop violence, they suddenly faced pushback from other protesters. This time, a violent backlash against the police spearheaded by small groups of radicals turned out to have a mobilizing effect on regular protesters. As one participant of the clashes recalls: "Thousands of people were standing behind our backs and chanting 'Well done!' when we were throwing Molotov cocktails."[16] As more protesters gradually got involved in aiding radicals, earlier proponents of violent tactics felt vindicated.[17] Violent protest was now reframed as an innovative tactic helping "to keep the flame of mobilization alive" versus just a subversive act carried out by government-hired provocateurs.[18]

The third sequence was characterized by the diffusion of violent repertoires from Kyiv to other regions. On January 23, several thousand protesters captured the building of Lviv Oblast State Administration and proclaimed the creation of People's Council. It was followed by the seizures of oblast administrations and councils in Western and Central Ukraine. Some of these captures involved minimal use of force since the police barely resisted the advance of protesters.[19] Others turned into intense physical skirmishes. In Vinnytsia, for example, protesters sprayed police with water cannons and hit them with wooden sticks and chairs.[20] There were particularly intense clashes with the police in Cherkasy where the protesters also ransacked oblast administration office and made a bonfire out of the furniture.[21]

The fourth and most lethal stage of violent protests started on February 18 when another march to the parliament got stalled by the cordons of riot police. In vain attempts to break through the police lines, protesters threw petrol bombs, pavement

stones, and firecrackers. They also stormed the headquarters of the ruling Party of Regions, setting several floors of the building on fire.[22] This violent altercation marked the first time protesters openly resorted to firearms.[23] After hours of intense street fighting, the police cleared most of the central streets and surrounded the central square preparing for the final assault. With Maidan under siege, protest violence spiraled in a desperate effort to stop the troops' advances. Ukraine's Interior Ministry confirmed the protesters' use of Makarov pistols, Kalashnikov rifles, and hunting rifles, which led to the killing of thirteen police officers and injuries to seventy-nine more between February 18 and 20.[24]

The killing of two policemen on the morning of February 20 triggered the withdrawal of riot police from Maidan and a counteroffensive by protesters.[25] The special Berkut unit armed with sniper and Kalashnikov rifles covered their retreat using deadly force to stop protesters' advance. In the ensuing massacre, forty-nine protesters were killed and ninety received firearm injuries.[26] The following morning the president and three opposition leaders signed an agreement to end the confrontation, but Maidan rejected the deal demanding Yanukovych's immediate resignation. By midnight of that day Maidan's self-defense units established control over the president's office and the government's building, which they found completely deserted. Meanwhile, the president was already fleeing for his life.

**The Pitfalls of Protest Violence**

Studies of social movements suggest that violent techniques may have a number of counterproductive effects for a protest campaign. They may (1) alienate current and potential supporters of the movement; (2) provoke a devastating coercive response from the authorities; and (3) dampen support for protests in the international community. The persistence and, ultimately, success of protest movements depend on their ability to attract new supporters and increase their size.[27] Higher levels of popular mobilization increase costs of repression and tip the balance in favor of reformers.[28] Nonviolent tactics may promote movement growth due to the lower "barriers to entry" and greater opportunities for "safe exit." Violence, by contrast, increases the risks associated with participation making them "prohibitively high for many potential members."[29]

Social movements are also more likely to succeed when they produce political realignments or gain influential allies within the ruling elite, especially among "guys with guns."[30] Nonviolent campaigns are more likely to encourage elite defection for three reasons. First, commitment to peaceful tactics signals the conciliatory nature of the opposition and a prevalence of moderates within its ranks. Hence, ruling elite members may expect to eventually be rewarded if they change sides. Second, the use of nonviolent tactics allows security chiefs to ignore or disobey orders to suppress a movement since it does not directly threaten the safety of individuals or property. In fact, the use of lethal force against peaceful protesters may threaten the coherence of security apparatus by undermining "morale and discipline within the corps."[31] Third,

nonviolent protest techniques make the use of coercion a suboptimal choice. It may produce moral backlash engendering expressions of solidarity with an unjustly victimized movement from various social actors.[32] For this reason, nonviolent activists may even encourage coercive responses against their movement and exploit this to broaden their appeal.[33] Overall, commitment to non-violent action gives movements leverage that helps to weaken the authorities by leaving them without crucial third-party support.[34]

By contrast, violent protest signals that extreme elements within the movement are gaining the upper hand. This raises uncertainty for potential defectors and enhances cohesion among the ruling elite. It also allows the authorities to portray mobilization as a "threat to order and security for both domestic and international constituencies."[35] The framing of protesters as rowdy mobsters deprives them of their most critical resource: broad public support.[36] As a result, repression becomes less likely to backfire against the regime.

Protests, particularly against authoritarian regimes, may also seek international backing to acquire legitimacy, resources, and leverage. The endorsement of protesters' demands from leaders of major foreign powers or international organizations adds credibility to a movement and lends legitimacy to its actions. International leaders may serve as mediators between a government and protesters, helping both sides come to a compromise agreement. Finally, they can increase the costs of government's crackdown on protests by threatening diplomatic isolation and personal sanctions against elite members. As McFaul shows, international assistance may prove crucial in the context of a relatively equal power balance.[37] In order to receive international backing, however, a movement usually needs to show civility in its methods and moderation in its demands. Hence, according to one finding, nonviolent campaigns are 70 percent more likely to gain diplomatic backing through sanctions than violent ones.[38]

## Why Protest Violence Still Happens?

Despite numerous potential disadvantages, violent techniques remain a staple in protesters' arsenal. For some groups, such as soccer ultras, anarchists, or skinheads, the opportunity for violent action may be the sole reason for their participation in the campaign. They adopt violent practices as a form of self-expression and an end in itself. These groups are usually viewed as fringe entities that operate independently from the movement and pursue their own agenda. A more intriguing phenomenon, from a scholarly standpoint, is the adoption of violent tactics by an otherwise relatively peaceful campaign. A set of process-based explanations view it as a result of a movement's internal transformation and interactions with the regime. Tarrow, for example, suggests that violence is the outcome of a movement's growing internal diversity. With the emergence of new actors, available space within the social movement shrinks, which triggers outbidding between groups competing for popular support. This leads to "increasing intensity of conflict" and "organized violence at the end of the

cycle."[39] Violence is thus an expression of polarization within a movement over the path forward. In his recent work, Tarrow also notes that "determined police and unified governments" encourage demobilization of a moderate majority, while the remaining militants are "more likely to choose violence than to maintain an uncertain relation with authorities."[40]

Gamson, by contrast, argues that violence reflects growing confidence and assertiveness, rather than insecurity, on the part of protesters.[41] It occurs, in his view, when general hostility toward the target of violence makes it "a relatively costless strategy."[42] Violent agents then sense that "they will be exonerated because they will be seen as more midwives than initiators of punishment."[43] By resorting to violence they are strategically capitalizing on implicit support for such tactics from among movement members. Another strategic approach views protest violence in relational terms as a response to growing regime repression or brutal policing strategies.[44] Della Porta combines several theories suggesting that violence emerges out of a gradual process of "repeated clashes with police and political adversary" and "interaction with supportive environment, in which they find logistical help as well as symbolic rewards."[45]

Finally, structural theorists analyze protest tactics in a broader institutional context, but disagree on whether fully authoritarian or hybrid political regimes are more likely to face violent opposition. Tilly suggests that violence is more prevalent in closed political systems where entrenched forces block the entry of new groups into the political process.[46] Chenoweth, by contrast, notes that hybrid authoritarian regimes experience higher level of anti-regime violence than other regime types.[47] It could be the result of their weaker repressive apparatus or the greater space available for political opposition, which still lacks the institutional channels to express its discontent or gain representation.

The empirical evidence from Ukraine contradicts the expectations of structural and process-based theories of violent protests. Violent tactics became a mainstay of the movement's arsenal embraced by opposition elites rather than an aberration practiced on the fringe. It was adopted at a moment of movement's weakness, but it did not result from a decision by moderates to adopt more conventional forms of contention. Yanukovych's regime was hybrid authoritarianism, but the coercive apparatus was strong, while the opposition had significant representation in the parliament and access to media. Although violence gained wider acceptance as the intensity of coercion on the part of the regime increased, there was nothing predetermined about the choice of violent tactics. Regime intransigence in the face of non-violent protests could have resulted just as easily in the movement's demise and demobilization as participation costs increased.

## Theorizing Violence as a Strategic Choice

This article builds on a rationalist approach to protest tactics, which explains violence as a strategic choice rather than a spontaneous reaction to external or internal developments.[48] It reflects a group's expectations about the costs of using violence and effectiveness of

alternative strategies. In this framework, the key criterion for effectiveness is regime responsiveness, which DeNardo defines as its "willingness to trade concessions for tranquility."[49] Peaceful demonstrations produce concessions primarily by increasing the number of protest participants, but regimes' responsiveness to the same size of protest may vary considerably. If demonstrations and other non-violent tactics are insufficiently disruptive for regime to concede, protesters could ultimately consider violent resistance. Violent protest is inherently distasteful to a regime because it exposes the government's weakening authority. As a result, it can decrease regime's utility (or satisfaction) levels quicker than non-violent mobilization. When combined with continued large-scale mobilization on the streets, violence can push unresponsive regime to major concessions.

Still, as DeNardo argues, violence also imposes costs on a movement. The first set of costs is associated with generating violence, which requires additional financial investment and special training on the part of protesters. Absent a sufficient number of protesters skilled in violent repertoires with access to instruments of violence, this tactic quickly becomes impracticable. The second set of costs is related to protest participation, which now carries greater risks of repression for regular protesters and may require serious moral compromises on their part. Violence is normally viewed as a morally repugnant tactic, which could alienate a moderate majority of protesters from a movement. Moreover, violent protests cross the boundary of legality making any participant in the movement potentially subject to serious criminal charges. As a result, participation in protests tarnished by violence is likely to drop precipitously. If these combined costs outweigh the potential gains from making the regime more responsive to protesters' demands, the movement will either seek a negotiated solution or demobilize. On the other hand, if protesters expect to keep these costs low, they will opt for violence.

The rationalist framework reveals the causal mechanisms that, in Ukraine's case, enabled an effective shift to violent tactics. As I demonstrate below, the costs of using violent tactics during Euromaidan remained low because of the presence of a cohesive group of radical revolutionaries and further involvement in the production of violence of rank-and-file protesters. At the same time, the regime's increasing repression in response to violent outbursts reinforced the sense of moral outrage among regular protest participants and helped to maintain protest mobilization on Maidan at high levels. Yanukovych showed his sensitivity to continued violence by offering a series of concessions, which were still suboptimal for the movement. When protesters' commitment to escalating violence made further repression too costly for ruling elites, they had to satisfy protesters' most extreme demand and withdraw from power.

## Why Violence During Euromaidan?

The decisive factor in the decision to add violence to Euromaidan's protest repertoire was the pre-existence of far-right networks with training in violent actions and recent experience with intense prosecution. The alliance of far-right organizations known as

Right Sector (RS) gained prominence only after taking official responsibility for the initiation of large-scale violence on January 19.[50] However, its members had already participated in violent clashes on December 1 and conducted self-defense exercises from the first days of Euromaidan.[51] RS was formed in late November through the informal merger of the nationalist conservative and social-nationalist wings of the far right movement. The former was represented by the two long-standing organizations: Tryzub (Trident), named after Stepan Bandera, and the Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian Nationalist Self-Defense (UNA-UNSO). Both have operated since the early 1990s as highly centralized and semi-clandestine "orders," espoused Dmytro Dontsov's ideology of integral nationalism, and drew their lineage from World War II organizations—Bandera's faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Tryzub's leader, Dmytro Yarosh, also became the head of RS. The second ideological wing within RS was represented by the Social-National Assembly (SNA) and its paramilitary formation Patriot of Ukraine (PU). The leader of both groups was former Tryzub activist from Kharkiv, Andriy Bilets'kyi, who has been promoting his own racist brand of far-right politics since 2006.[52]

Prior to 2013, the organizations that formed RS had a deeply confrontational relationship. Tryzub positioned itself as a more principled force than UNA-UNSO, eschewing tactical cooperation with any forces it viewed as serving foreign interests. When the two tried to form an alliance in 2008 along with a better known nationalist party Svoboda, they refused to invite any representatives from the social-nationalist wing viewed as too extreme. Yarosh even suggested that PU was manipulated by the Russian security services in order to form an image of Ukrainian nationalists as "narrow-minded plebeians with sadistic inclinations."[53] By then PU had already gained notoriety in Kharkiv for its anti-immigrant actions and openly racist rhetoric. Its program described Ukraine as an "avant-garde of the White civilization," which had to "become a sword of White Europe and save a White Human Being from extinction."[54] Bilets'kyi argued that the key difference between his organization and "national-liberals" lay in the interpretation of the "primordial roots" of the Ukrainian nation.[55] While traditional nationalists viewed ethno-cultural markers, namely the language, as the main building blocks of the nation, social-nationalists prioritized racial characteristics.

Despite prior ideological squabbles, by the end of 2013 these far-right groups found themselves closely aligned around the goal of overthrowing Yanukovych's regime. They shared several characteristics that became the basis for their new alliance. First, they preached a similar radical revolutionary ideology which suggested that regime change was possible only through a mass uprising and Yanukovych's capitulation. Any concessions to the authorities were dismissed as a form of collaboration with the "regime of internal occupation" and treason against the revolutionary cause.[56] In a millenarian fashion they argued that the new revolution was imminent and their task was to make it a genuine "national revolution," capable of "radical and qualitative changes."[57]

Second, these groups were prepared to use violent tactics to achieve the envisioned societal transformation. As Yarosh wrote in 2009, if pro-Russian forces, such as the Party of Regions or Communists, were to gain power, "we should start an armed struggle against the regime of internal occupation and Moscow's empire."[58] In its appeal to Ukrainian people in February 2013, Tryzub called for a shift from protest actions to street revolution aimed at Yanukovych's overthrow.[59] It also suggested that paramilitary "Ukrainian Cossack units," capable of resisting the police and preventing bloodshed among civilians, should become the revolution's "driving force." Preparing for insurrection, all three organizations organized regular camps across Ukraine to provide military training to their members. In addition to studying "hand-to-hand" combat, they also learned gun fighting and staged combat simulation exercises.[60] "Develop and improve your shooting skills," Yarosh preached to Tryzub members in his brochure.[61]

Finally, Tryzub and PU became targets for repression early in Yanukovych's presidency. Nine members of Tryzub received criminal sentences for trying to demolish Stalin's statue in Zaporizhzhia, while its leaders, including Yarosh, spent several months in jail.[62] Similarly, in late 2011, senior members of PU, including Bilets'kyi, were arrested on charges of attempted murder of a political opponent. They were never convicted, but remained behind bars in Kharkiv's preliminary detention facility until the end of the revolution. Three other PU members charged with trying to blow up Lenin's monument on Kyiv's outskirts were sentenced to six years in prison on January 10, 2014. Their sentencing was accompanied by the clashes of demonstrators with the riot police outside the courtroom.[63]

The activists of far-right groups thus harbored particularly intense anti-regime grievances well before police violence on Euromaidan began. They also recognized that they could not rely on conventional opposition parties to take the lead in violent actions. In his earlier writings, Yarosh compared his organization's future role to OUN in 1939 following the Soviet take-over of Western Ukraine.[64] As he explained, traditional political parties then immediately disappeared in the face of Soviet occupation, and only a militant group could lead the fight against the communist regime. When Yarosh became the leader of a new far-right alliance, he turned his prior ideological deliberations into a guideline for the revolutionary strategy.[65]

The failure to achieve any tangible concessions from the regime almost two months after the launch of Euromaidan protests generated a crisis of confidence in party leaders. As one activist remembers, after the parliament's vote to criminalize all unsanctioned mass rallies, "the intensity of rejection of opposition politicians by Maidan reached its maximum." He recalls that during the rally on January 19, "I stood next to the guys from the Right Sector and heard how they disapproved of what was said from the stage and heckled at opposition leaders."[66] This attitude was shared by other protesters since, according to another activist, "It became clear to the people that the politicians already capitulated, so it was up to the people to decide what to do next."[67]

The disruptive effect of non-violent actions was also quickly diminishing. As one protester observed, "people were already standing for two months and realized that they

could stand like that all their lives and nothing would change since the authorities just ignored them."[68] Still, politicians dismissed the possibility of adopting violent tactics. Rather, as one opposition member claimed, violence was initiated by "a radical group, which refused to subordinate to anyone."[69] According to one account, the Right Sector column marched to Hrushevskogo Street following the January 19 rally on Maidan and initiated clashes with police units subsequently blocking the street.[70] She described them as "wearing military camouflage, helmets with self-made shields out of steel or wood, carrying sticks and metal rods . . . looking like homemade warriors." By drawing on an available cadre of trained recruits, RS kept the initial costs of generating violence to a minimum.

**Why Euromaidan Violence Worked**

Despite its high intensity and visibility, protest violence during Euromaidan did not produce most of the negative effects that theorists ascribe to violent actions. It did not alienate nonviolent protest participants or lead to demobilization of the movement. It did not prevent the defection of the law enforcement from the authorities, but hastened it in some regions. Violence on the streets did not make the military more receptive to the idea of deploying troops to quell protests. The cohesiveness of the pro-presidential coalition began to weaken only after violence was fully introduced into the protest repertoire in January and crumbled right as the use of violence by protesters became endemic—exactly the opposite of what some theoretical arguments predict. It also did not lead to the withdrawal of movement support from the international community. While the United States condemned "the aggressive actions of members of extreme-right group Pravyi Sektor," it maintained pressure on Yanukovych and blamed the Ukrainian government for escalation.[71] Finally, while it did provoke a repressive backlash from the regime, it also exposed the regime's limited capacity to use coercion.

At the same time, violent tactics became an unexpected source of inspiration for many seeking a more radical struggle.[72] Moreover, on the crucial measure of the tactics' effectiveness—regime responsiveness—violence scored remarkably well. Nine days after protests turned violent, Yanukovych agreed to dismiss Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, his key loyalist and the Party of Regions chief. He also offered a power-sharing agreement to the opposition, proposing to nominate one of its leaders, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, as the new PM and make another one, Petro Poroshenko, the head of the National Bank. On the president's orders, the parliamentary majority voted to revoke the set of laws restricting freedom of assembly and grant amnesty to all participants of violent actions. By mid-February most of the detained activists were released from prison. However, Maidan's main demands—the change of the constitution and the removal of the president—were fulfilled only after protest violence reached its peak.

The effectiveness of violent techniques can be attributed to three factors: (1) the participatory character of violent practices; (2) the adaptation of violent tactics for the purposes of a generally non-violent movement and embeddedness of violent groups in

it; and (3) the escalation of protest violence beyond the cost-tolerance threshold of the regime. The first two factors helped to minimize the costs of participation and maintain non-violent mobilization at high levels. The third factor increased the costs of repression for the regime beyond acceptable levels.

Anti-police violence initiated by RS on January 19 quickly acquired a participatory character with the broader involvement of traditionally non-violent protesters.[73] In the words of one activist, the Right Sector "breathed new life into these protests" and more people realized that they had "to get hold of bricks and tires and fight for themselves."[74] As another protester explained of her involvement: "There was no fear, but you realized that you had to be there. You did not have to help by throwing a cocktail, but those who started fighting Berkut needed support of the people."[75] Even an activist who earlier stopped attending peaceful rallies said that he joined violent protests since he felt "it was time for Molotov cocktails."[76] This new belief in the utility of violence kept mobilization at a high level despite intensified clashes. The spike in casualties did not deter participation but added "emboldening emotions" that "increase an individual's likelihood of political resistance, even if it jeopardizes security."[77] It generated outrage at the use of excessive force and moral sympathy for its targets. The same opinion dynamic that Della Porta observed in other cases emerged in Maidan: "The more the repression was perceived as indiscriminate, the more solidarity with the militants increased."[78] One participant observed that "many people even without any specific political views radicalized" as violence unfolded.[79] Another recalled how police brutality led him to switch from non-violent to violent tactics: "When Right Sector created this barricade out of fire on Hrushevskogo street I called it a provocation, I was against it . . . but after Sergei [Nigoyan] was killed everything I said earlier, that I won't be throwing bricks and Molotov cocktails, I realized that I was already throwing them, standing and fighting there and was ready to fight to the end."[80] As a result, more protesters on Maidan now supported the militarization of resistance tactics. After two weeks of violence, half of them (50.4 percent) were in favor of creating armed groups independent from the government (a tripling in support since early December).[81] By early February, one study found that individuals who were personally willing to join an armed group were "43 times more likely to be living on Maidan than those who were not."[82] Even an activist who identified himself as a "committed pacifist" said he understood that "violence was unavoidable and without it nothing could succeed."[83]

Despite their earlier public condemnation of violent tactics, the opposition parties quickly recognized the outpouring of moral support for RS actions and the new leverage it gave them in dealing with the authorities. According to Oleksandr Turchynov, an opposition insider, protest violence persuaded military commanders to oppose the president's proposal to introduce martial law since they felt that "Maidan would now fight back . . . and deployment of troops to disperse it would lead to the killing of thousands of people."[84] Clearly, the new participatory character of protest violence that led to the fusion of violent and non-violent actors substantially raised the costs of military intervention. As a result, opposition elites quickly became receptive to violent tactics and even encouraged them. An opposition MP publicly argued that by practicing

violence protesters were exercising their constitutional rights: "Can anyone offer any other ways to defend oneself from this 'dark mass' standing next to the government building and shooting at people? There are no alternatives."[85] Furthermore, the opposition decided to integrate violent groups into the new phase of the campaign, which it called a "regional offensive."[86] It involved occupying buildings of local state administrations in Central and Western Ukraine and creating parallel executive committees insubordinate to the central government. The driving forces in all such seizures were dozens of young men wearing masks, carrying wooden clubs, and chanting nationalist slogans. These protest trailblazers belonged to different nationalist organizations or soccer fan clubs, most of which grouped under the umbrella of RS.[87] Young men in the balaclavas storming the local administrations paved the path for the opposition to take down the symbols of power in the regions. Once the buildings were seized and the police pushed out, non-violent activists and politicians were coming to the forefront to press their demands.

Violent and non-violent methods of protest thus became complementary and transformed Euromaidan into a two-tiered movement. It consisted of a militant vanguard acting in specific sites and a rank-and-file providing assistance to the militants, but also practicing non-violent protest on Maidan. The former diverted the focus of coercive forces from the main square and raised the overall costs of protest for the regime. The latter offered a safe space for strictly non-violent protesters to maintain the movement's high mobilization levels. As one protester recalls, anyone could choose the form of protest they preferred and neither side denounced the other.[88] "I was grateful to RS for being themselves. I could not throw stones, but I could pull them out of the pavement," he added. The interchangeability of the roles of protesters and the way RS based its choices on the needs of the movement indicated a high degree of embeddedness of a violent group in the overall campaign network.[89] Militants also produced a "radical flank effect" strengthening the opposition's leverage in their talks with Yanukovych.[90] According to Turchynov, Yanukovych expressed strong aversion to violent forms of protest, demanding that the opposition publicly disavowed the radicals.[91] Other sources indicate that the regime officials even tried to bribe RS to end their confrontation.[92] While disassociating themselves from the radicals, the opposition leaders could credibly threaten the president with further escalation, which forced him to make first concessions.

Although the opposition claimed to have no influence over the radical flank, some of its members had long established ties to nationalist groups. The commander of Maidan's self-defense units, Andriy Parubiy, entered politics as a founder of the Social-National Party in 1991 and has since maintained close contacts with the far-right activists.[93] Another opposition figure, former Security Service (SBU) chief Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, attended several summer training camps of Tryzub in the run up to the revolution. Once Nalyvaichenko gained the seat in the parliament, Yarosh became his aide.[94] In his introduction to Yarosh's collection of articles Nalyvaichenko called Tryzub a "brotherly organization" without which "we could get little done."[95] In August 2012, Yarosh specifically singled out Parubiy and Nalyvaichenko as the two opposition

politicians his organization was willing to work with.[96] Through brokerage with the group skilled in violence, the opposition managed their informal coordination without compromising its publicly non-violent stance.[97]

A prominent example of their coordinated actions was the demonstration on February 18, which launched the final showdown with authorities. The opposition called for a "peaceful march" to the parliament demanding constitutional changes, but mobilized its militarized self-defense units to lead it. As one march participant recalled: "I had a clear impression that we were not going for a 'peaceful march,' there were guys with shields, helmets, vests … as I was walking I smelled gasoline and realized that they had incendiary bottles. It looked as if we were provoking the other side."[98] Another protester described the decision to stage the march to the parliament as "colossal adventurism" since it included "everyone from well-equipped and armed self-defense members to women wearing embroidered shirts."[99]

Given that the authorities usually maintain a preponderance of coercive resources, violent protests often prove counterproductive in the end. Coercive advantage gives regimes an escalation dominance or capacity to apply a greater and more destructive force at every phase of a conflict. As Tarrow argues, once protesters resort to violence, they get "trapped in a spiral of military confrontation with authorities that, in the modern age, is virtually impossible for them to win."[100] This view, however, is premised on the implicit assumption that regime faces no constraints on its repressive actions and can commit its full force against opponents. In reality, any regime repression may carry both internal and external costs. Domestic costs depend on the resolve of their opponents, while external costs depend on the response of the international community to the regime's transgressions.

As Ukraine's case shows, expected costs of repressive escalation may sometimes exceed the regime's cost-tolerance threshold.[101] Armed resistance by demonstrators and their continued resolve in the face of fierce police assault meant that the successful crackdown of Maidan required an indiscriminate use of lethal force against the thousands remaining on the square. The ensuing bloodbath in the center of the capital could have been exceptionally costly for the regime. Domestic costs would involve a near certain loss of control over most of Western and Central Ukraine and the possibility of further armed insurrection against the regime in Kyiv.[102] International costs meant a real prospect of isolation in the West and personal sanctions against the president's family and his oligarchic allies. The regime wavering during this critical phase of the confrontation indicated that protesters' violent tactics had become a crucial constraint on its decision-making. The far-right groups, again, played a decisive role in the escalation of violence.

The RS issued initial threats to use firepower in early February.[103] Once the clashes near the parliament began on February 18, RS publicly called on "all gun owners to gather on the Maidan and form squads to protect people from the servants of the criminal authorities."[104] The first shootings of riot police that day indicated that RS and other self-defense groups were not just willing but capable of escalating the conflict to the level of direct gunfights with police. According to one police commander, after

seeing his men shot, he became terrified at the thought of having to face "an armed uprising."[105] By contrast, a protester recalled that he felt "happy seeing people with firearms on our side."[106] When riot police launched their final attack on Maidan on the evening of February 18, the Interior Ministry had already reported two policemen killed and around two dozen sustaining gunshot wounds.[107] According to ex-Interior Minister Vitaliy Zakharchenko, at that time he realized that it was "necessary to go to the very end" since the "armed radicals crossed the boundary" that prevented the police from full crackdown.[108] However, with just few thousand people left on Maidan on the night of February 18, RS fighters stopped the police advance by burning the armored personnel carrier that tried to break through the barricades.[109]

By the next morning, protesters and interior troops found themselves in an uneasy standoff on Maidan with no side having a clear advantage. "At 7am the police attack continued, but it became clear that they got tired, just as we did," one protester explains. "There were fewer explosions … they ran out of ammunition."[110] Similarly, Zakharchenko suggested that the two reasons for the stalled attack on Maidan were the "exhaustion of the troops who were fighting for over a day" and "the depleted supply of stun grenades."[111] The failure to disperse Maidan was puzzling. As witness testimonies indicate, there were no opposition leaders on Maidan that night and a relatively small number of protesters left. So it was not "power in numbers" but the armed resistance by remaining protesters that stopped the riot police. "We had a limited number of firearms and the huntsmen came with the carabines and rifles," a protester recalls. "Berkut started using Kalashnikovs and we could only use shotguns, which worked for a shorter distance. Rifles could not compare to machine guns, but they shot with good enough accuracy forcing Berkut to hide."[112] That morning a Berkut commander affirmed that police were slow in their advance because protesters used "forks and hunting rifles."[113] In order to succeed, the regime's coercive forces had to escalate their retaliatory violence, but they faced their own restraints. Several Berkut policemen later claimed that their commanders were giving inconsistent instructions, fearful of taking responsibility.[114] Even the former interior minister Zakharchenko conceded that his orders to resume the advance against Maidan were no longer followed by the interior troops commander or the head of Kyiv police since they "talked directly to the president," and he was "not always aware of the substance of their conversations."[115] Indicative of president's aversion to further escalation was his agreement that day to declare a truce and start talks with the opposition. As an opposition leader present at these talks recalls: "On February 19 Yanukovych was already a different man. He agreed to everything … to early presidential election and to the constitutional changes."[116]

The turning point in the standoff happened during wee hours of February 20, when the shooting of police on Maidan resumed. According to a GPO investigation, the first shots fired at police units occurred at around 5:30am wounding and, later, killing several officers.[117] Instead of giving an order to respond with overwhelming force, top Interior Ministry officials now privately contacted the opposition leaders asking them to restrain the shooters.[118] A protest participant who acknowledged killing two policemen that

morning explained his rationale: "I was aiming at those in charge . . . there was no need to kill the others, only shoot them in the legs. . . . And I then saw how the policemen on the right side began to flee."[119] A police commander present on the scene recalls a similar dynamic: "All law enforcers started running in different directions and since there was a continued shooting from the conservatory I ordered my unit to board the bus and leave."[120] According to former interior minister, "once the targeted shooting of policemen started they began to retreat on their own and nobody could any longer influence their decision."[121]

Crucially, the desertion of police on Maidan did not start because policemen refused to suppress protesters, as has happened in other successful revolutions, but rather because they could no longer defend themselves from protesters' attacks.[122] In the words of one activist, "the readiness of people on Maidan to die trumped the willingness of Berkut and interior troops to die God knows for what."[123] Chaotic retreat of interior troops from Maidan produced a broader shift in power balance in favor of protesters as police in neighboring areas began a simultaneous withdrawal.[124] As one witness characterized it, this outcome represented "a clean victory of one side and a defeat of the other in a military confrontation."[125]

## Conclusion

The dynamics of the Euromaidan revolution reveal a set of mechanisms that make violent protest tactics effective in authoritarian or hybrid regimes. First, a regime becomes particularly sensitive to protest costs when protesters add violence to their repertoires while maintaining the same mobilization levels. This becomes possible if a campaign has long engaged in non-violent resistance without producing tangible concessions from the regime. The presence within the campaign of a committed activist core trained in violent tactics lowers the initial costs of generating violence. At the same time, a regime's repressive escalation may decrease net participation costs by broadening support for militants among rank-and-file protesters and outside sympathizers. This could result in participatory violence based on a new partnership between militant and "civilian" protesters. A two-tiered organizational structure allows for the cohabitation of a violent vanguard and a non-violent base in the same protest space. It opens up new avenues of protest and strengthens the leverage of moderate opposition elites in bargaining with the regime. As Ukraine's case shows, violent tactics are unlikely to be effective at the initial stage of a protest campaign. However, when used in conjunction with non-violent actions in response to intensifying repression, it may deter the regime or even tip the balance of power against it.

The ultimate success of violent tactics depends on a regime's cost-tolerance threshold. If a regime is particularly sensitive to the human and material costs of suppressing violent protests, escalation on the part of protesters may lead to major concessions or complete surrender. Regimes that rely on narrow and geographically-concentrated support bases may be faced with particularly high costs of crackdown once

protests spread. By contrast, if a regime has a high tolerance for suppression costs, the escalation of violent protest may backfire against the movement resulting either in its demobilization or prolonged civil war. Ukraine's case also points to the importance of disentangling political decision-makers from the coercive apparatus and analyzing each of their cost-tolerance thresholds separately. While the interior minister and some riot police commanders on the square indicated their willingness and capacity to use overwhelming force against protesters, it was the ruler's hesitation that held them back. Absent clear and consistent political orders authorizing the use of deadly force, even a loyal coercive apparatus can crumble in the face of increasing protest violence.

The example of Euromaidan also shows that the common use of the violent/non-violent dichotomy when analyzing protests may lead to misleading conclusions about the effectiveness of a certain tactic. While non-violent tactics were critical in launching Euromaidan, it was the exercise of violence that decided when and how the protest would end. In that sense, violent practices are at least as important as non-violent ones in accounting for the movement's outcome. Therefore, in instances where both tactics are used, their causal significance should be established based on a detailed comparison of their effects rather than by estimating their relative frequency.

While illustrating how violence can help revolution succeed, Ukraine's case also serves as a cautionary tale about its detrimental long-term consequences. The tragic loss of life during Euromaidan is one stark reminder of the true price of violent tactics. Furthermore, when a protest movement does not represent the preferences of a significant part of the society, its reliance on violence undercuts the legitimacy of its success. This, in turn, makes it harder to find common ground in post-revolutionary conditions. Protracted anti-government violence also erodes critical institutions leaving the state particularly vulnerable to external challenges or internal splits. The resulting weakness and division attracts revisionist powers interested in capturing territory and intensifying discord. It also lifts the usual restrictions on the strategies of political contestation and broadens the range of future protest repertoires beyond nonviolent forms. Revolutionary violence thus breeds post-revolutionary disorder, turning an iron bar, a Molotov cocktail, or even AK-47 into a conventional tool of resistance. Even if revolutions tend to devour their own followers, violent revolutions never seem to run out of them.

## NOTES

1. William Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1974); James DeNardo, *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Non-Violent Conflict* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). For recent literature review see Fabrice Lehoucq, "Does Nonviolence Work?," *Comparative Politics*, 48 (January 2016), 269–87.

2. Chenoweth and Stephan, 7.

3. Following DeNardo, I define successful strategy as one that "establishes equilibrium at its most extreme demand." See DeNardo, 62.

4. Here I use Goodwin's definition of revolution as "any and all instances in which a state or political regime is overthrown and thereby transformed by a popular movement in an irregular, extra constitutional, and/or violent fashion." See Jeff Goodwin, *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 9.

5. Half of all protest events in Kyiv (49%) involved violence or confrontation, see "Spravzhne oblychia Maidanu [True face of Maidan]," Report of the Center for Social and Labor Studies, July 9, 2014, available at http://cslr.org.ua/spravzhnye-oblichchya-maydanu-statistika-protestiv-yaki-zminili-krayinu-2/.

6. See Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul, eds., *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough* (Washington: CEIP, 2006).

7. Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine: Democratization, Corruption, and the New Russian Imperialism* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2015); Lucan Way, *Pluralism by Default: Weak Autocrats and the Rise of Competitive Politic*s (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015); Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014); Olga Onuch and Gwendolyn Sasse, "The Maidan in Movement: Diversity and the Cycles of Protest," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 68 (June 2016), 556–87; Nadia Diuk, "Euromaidan: Ukraine's Self-Organizing Revolution," *World Affairs*, 176 (March/April 2014). Two notable exceptions are Ivan Katchanovski, "The 'Snipers' Massacre' on the Maidan in Ukraine," available at https://www.academia.edu/8776021/ and Maria Popova, "Why the Orange Revolution was Short and Peaceful and Euromaidan Long and Violent," *Problems of Postcommunism*, 61 (November/December 2014), 64–70.

8. Maciej Bartkowski and Maria Stephan, "How Ukraine Ousted an Autocrat: The Logic of Civil Resistance," *The Atlantic Council*, June 1, 2014, available at http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/articles/how-ukraine-ousted-an-autocrat-the-logic-of-civil-resistance.

9. Gamson, 74.

10. Severyn Nalyvaiko, "Opozytsia Vzhe Mohla Buty Vladou [Opposition Could Have Taken Power]," *Gazeta.ua*, Dec. 23, 2013.

11. Interview with Dmytro Korchyns'kyi, *Hromads'ke TV*, Feb. 24, 2014, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NVXtG3HRDEo#t=15.

12. "Vid Maidanu-Taboru do Maidanu-Sichi: Sho Zminylos? [From Maidan-Camp to Maidan-Sich: What Changed?]," Democratic Initiatives Foundation Poll, February 6, 2014, available at http://dif.org.ua/article/vid-maydanu-taboru-do-maydanu-sichi-shcho-zminilosya.

13. Jennifer Earl, "Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression," *Sociological Theory*, 21 (March 2003), 51.

14. Testimony of Andriy Ostrikov in Leonid Finberg and Uliana Holovach, eds., *Maidan. Svidchennia. Kyiv, 2013–2014 roku [Maidan. Testimonoies. Kyiv, 2013–2014]* (Kyiv: Dukh I Litera, 2016), 348.

15. Testimony of Oleksiy Demchenko, *Maidan. Svidchennia*, 329.

16. Testimony of Oleh Mahaletskyi, *Maidan. Svidchennia*, 335.

17. Interview with Dmytro Yarosh, *Ukrains'ka Pravda*, Feb.4, 2014, available at http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2014/02/4/7012683/.

18. Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics,* Third Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), ch. 10.

19. See, for example, storming of administration in Lviv, "Zahoplennia Lvivskoi ODA [Seizure of Lviv ODA]," *Zahid.net*, Jan. 23, 2013, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cr7-UWEgi6o.

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30. Michael McFaul, "Transitions from Postcommunism," *Journal of Democracy*, 16 (July 2005), 14; Tarrow, 2011.

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42. Ibid.

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49. DeNardo, 35.

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67. Testimony of Pavlo Kucher, *Maidan. Svidchennia*, 317.

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70. Testimony of Olena Kozachenko, *Maidan. Svidchennia*, 212.

71. "Statement by Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf on the Reported Deaths in Ukraine Street Clashes," U.S. Department of State, January 22, 2014, available at http://ukraine.usembassy.gov/statements/ukraine-deaths.html.

72. Volodymyr Kulyk, "Ukrainian Nationalism Since the Outbreak of Euromaidan," *Ab Imperio*, No. 3, 2014, 103. Piven also points out that protest violence may have an inspirational effect on observers, see Frances Fox Piven, "Protest Movements and Violence," in Seraphim Seferiades and Hank Johnston, eds., *Movements, Protest and Culture: Violent Protest, Contentious Politics, and the Neoliberal State* (New York: Ashgate, 2012), 24–25.

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74. Testimony of Taras Tymo, *Maidan. Svidchennia*, 17.

75. Interview with Olena Kozachenko, *Maidan. Svidchennia,* 212.

76. Testimony of Zhenia Chistikov, *Maidan. Svidchennia*, 337.

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80. Testimony of Boris Egiazarian, *Maidan. Svidchennia*, 320.

81. Democratic Initiatives Poll.

82. Bryn Rosenfeld, "A Case-Control Method for Studying Protest Participation and Other Rare Events: An Application to Ukraine's Euromaidan," Paper prepared for 2016 Convention of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies, November 17–20, 2016.

83. Testimony of Arseniy Finberg, *Maidan. Svidchennia*, 177.

84. Koshkina, 196.

85. Interview with Vitaliy Yarema, *Espresso TV*, Jan. 23, 2014, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iw3kD1858Yg&index=11&list=PLTaVZhjFFIIJKVBYBAJR7EhMqttyRb-2P.

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87. Interview with Dmytro Yarosh, *V Gostiah u Gordona*, Jun. 8, 2014, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7xjWYpyJcaY.

88. Testimony of Petro Didula, 382.

89. On the concept of embeddedness, see Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," *American Journal of Sociology*, 91 (November 1985), 481–510.

90. On the theory of "radical flank effect," see Herbert Haines, "Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957–1970," *Social Problems*, 32 (October 1984), 32.

91. Koshkina, 197.

92. Mustafa Naem, "Za Lashtunkamy Pravogo Sektoru [Behind the Curtains of Right Sector]," *Ukrains'ka Pravda*, Apr. 1, 2014, available at http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2014/04/1/7020952/.

93. Yarosh coordinated a shift to violent tactics with Parubiy on January 18, 2014, a day before the beginning of clashes with riot police on Hrushevskogo street, and received his backing. See Braty Kapranovy, *Maidan. Taemni Faily* (Kyiv: Nora-Druk, 2017), 107.

94. Naem.

95. Dmytro Yarosh, *Natsiya i Revoliutsiya [Nation and Revolution]* (Lviv: Spolom, 2014).

96. Dmytro Yarosh, "Ukrains'ka Politychna Organizatsiya "Tryzub [Ukrainian Political Organization Trident]," Aug. 10, 2012 in Dmytro Yarosh, *Natsiya i Revoliutsiya [Nation and Revolution]* (Lviv: Spolom, 2014).

97. For a detailed analysis of this mechanism see Tilly (2003).

98. Testimony of Rostyslav Pan'ko, *Maidan. Svidchennia*, 61–62.

99. Testimony of Taras Tymo, *Maidan. Svidchennia*, 20.

100. Tarrow, 2011, Ch. 5.

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103. Interview with Yarosh, *Ukrains'ka Pravda*, Feb. 4, 2014.

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109. Testimony of Taras Tymo, *Maidan. Svidchennia*, 22.

110. Testimony of Dmytro Ignatenko, *Maidan. Svidchennia*, 515.

111. Zakharchenko, 143.

112. Testimony of Kostiantyn Ivanov, *Maidan. Svidchennia,* 772.

113. Interview with Sevastopol Berkut Commander, Fakty, *ICTV Channel*, Feb. 19, 2014, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1E3YvnFFrws.

114. Interview with Roman Fedorenko and Konstantin Bryuhanov, *Oplot TV*, Feb. 24, 2016, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N0TuxDtKmXk&index=10&list=PLTaVZhjFFIIKLnE3iK25NiTO1-Q_dzSWo.

115. Zakharchenko, 141.

116. Koshkina, 270.

117. Interview with GPO investigator Oleksiy Yurchuk, "Zlam: Slidamy revolyutsii."

118. Interview with Andriy Shevchenko, Ibid.

119. Interview with Ivan Bubenchyk, Ibid.

120. Koshkina, 276.

121. Zakharchenko, 144.

122. On the significance of the will and capacity of coercive apparatus to repress, see Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics*, 36 (January 2004), 139–57.

123. Testimony of Evgeny, *Maidan. Svidchennia,* 549.

124. "Soldaty Vnutrennih Voisk Otstupaiut [The Retreat of Interior Troops]," *Accidents News*, Feb. 20, 2014, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZgPuSJ8KaH0.

125. Testimony of Kostiantyn Ivanov, *Maidan. Svidchennia,* 773.