Class 3: Causes, Radicalisation, Mobilisation

Radicalisation

Opening notes

Presentation groups

Remember: topic to me at least by Week 4

Presentations line-up
Date Presenters Method
4 Dec: TBD
11 Dec: TBD
18 Dec: TBD
Presentations line-up
Date Presenters Method
8 Jan: TBD
15 Jan: TBD
22 Jan: TBD
29 Jan: TBD

Radicalisation - core concepts

  • (de)radicalisation
  • (dis)engagement
  • models of radicalisation (esp. in government work)
  • pathways of radicalisation (Jensen, Seate, and James 2018)

Radicalisation - core concepts

  • radicalisation (change in belief): process of connecting with and adopting radical or extremist ideology—does not necessarily result in violence or ‘engaging’ in extremist activity

  • engagement (change in behaviour): (in this context) process or act of performing radical or extremist activity, especially violence

  • deradicalisation (change in belief): “process by which an individual is diverted from an extremist ideology, eventually rejecting an extremist ideology and moderating their beliefs” (Gaudette, Scrivens, and Venkatesh 2022, 1)

  • disengagement (change in behaviour): “process by which an individual decides to leave their associated extremist group or movement in order to reintegrate into society” (Ibid.)

Dr. Erin Saltman talk (until 8.00 mark)

Opening questions

How have individuals radicalised into political violence?

  • what are their motivations?

  • what/who are they influenced by?

  • what are the differences/similarities of radicalisation processes in different eras and contexts?

  • Examples from cases you know of?

Models of radicalisation (esp. in government work)

Commonalities in radicalisation models

  • recognition of the processual nature of radicalisation
    • vulnerabilities and background factors
    • cognitive opening
      • recognition of some conditions as wrong
      • framing those conditions as unjust and justifying violent remedies
      • singling out specific responsibilities; demonisation of other
    • action
  • implicitly: most in society can become vulnerable to radicalisation
  • prevent and counter (P/CVE)

Commonalities in radicalisation models

  • Bjørgo (2005) identifies…

ideological activists, motivated by ideas; drifters and fellow travelers, seeking friendship; and frustrated youth with criminal records

  • Bosi and Porta (2012) similarly identifies ideological, instrumental, and solidaristic paths of radicalisation

key finding: radicals tend to have normal personalities (pathologising is futile)

Push/pull radicalisation factors

Push/pull radicalisation factors

external

Push/pull radicalisation factors

relational

external

Push/pull radicalisation factors

identity

relational

external

Push/pull radicalisation factors

personal

identity

relational

external

Push/pull radicalisation factors

psychological

personal

identity

relational

external

Push/pull radicalisation factors - psychological

psychological

  • cognitive, emotional frailties that threaten senses of self, identity, and belonging
    • cognitive, emotional benefits (perceived to be) received by adopting radical beliefs/actions
  • crises/breakdowns – moments of acute vulnerability

Push/pull radicalisation factors

psychological

personal

identity

relational

external

Push/pull radicalisation factors - personal

personal

  • factors or events that undermine the pillars of stability people depend on
  • personal background factors: e.g., issues in adolescence, lack of stable social relations development
    • sense of adventure/excitement
  • challenging event: e.g., loss of close interpersonal relationship(s), job loss, inability to provide for basic needs
    • possibility to gain material rewards

Push/pull radicalisation factors

psychological

personal

identity

relational

external

Push/pull radicalisation factors - identity

identity

  • social isolation (either self-imposed or imposed by external conditions)
    • possibility to join community
    • possibility of ‘acquired identity’
  • senses of exclusion, discrimination, relative deprivation due to characteristics or beliefs
    • gaining senses of belonging and solidarity

Push/pull radicalisation factors

psychological

personal

identity

relational

external

Push/pull radicalisation factors - relational

relational

  • alienation from family, friends (close interpersonal network)
    • contacts, possibility of building relations in radical milieu
  • history of conflict, radical activism
    • recruitment by leaders/members of radical milieu
    • radicalising messages about group norms (beliefs, values, actions that are prototypical)
  • community crisis: collective feelings of trouble, danger

Push/pull radicalisation factors

psychological

personal

identity

relational

external

Push/pull radicalisation factors - external

external

  • polarisation in societies
  • loss of trust in political institutions
  • provocative action from state or social actors
  • prevalent extremist discourse(s)
  • accessibility of radical/extremist activism
  • many other possiblities

Push/pull radicalisation factors

psychological

personal

identity

relational

external

Push/pull radicalisation factors

See further in (e.g.) Campelo et al. (2018), della Porta (2018), Fahey and Simi (2019), Jensen, Seate, and James (2018), Vergani et al. (2018)

psychological

personal

identity

relational

external

Radicalisation pathways (Fahey and Simi 2019)

  • RQ: What are the pathways to ideologically motivated violence among a sample of North American-based right-wing extremists, largely white supremacists and neo-Nazis?
  • data: 35 life history interviews (corrobated with open-source information)
  • method: (crisp-set) qualitative comparative analysis (QCA)
    • Outcome (dependent variable): use of (planned/spontaneous) extremist violence

Radicalisation pathways - factors (Fahey and Simi 2019)

  • prior property offences (part of cognitive opening)
  • truancy (weakening social stability)
  • delinquent peers (relational influences)
  • family involvement in extremism (relational influences)
  • lower/working class childhood (possible manifestations in psychological, personal, identity factors)
  • academic failure (personal crises)

But…

Radicalisation pathways - factors (Fahey and Simi 2019)

  • prior property offences (part of cognitive opening)
  • truancy (weakening social stability)
  • delinquent peers (relational influences)
  • family involvement in extremism (relational influences)
  • lower/working class childhood (possible manifestations in psychological, personal, identity factors)
  • academic failure (personal crises)

But…

No support was garnered for the identification of distinct pathways of homogeneous risk factors among either sample of violent offenders.

Examples from the IRA: radicalisation, recruitment, restraint

  • radicalisation (Joe Clark)
    • Note of caution: the interviewee briefly describes some cruel interrogation that he underwent
  • recruitment and training (Des Long)

Examples from the IRA (1/4): Joe Clark

Examples from the IRA (1/4): Joe Clark transcript

Narrator: A secret interrogation centre had been built months before at an old airfield on the north coast. 14 internees were singled out and flown there by helicopter. They would spend the next seven days wearing hoods, deprived of sleep, undergoing what was called ‘deep interrogation.’ Joe Clark, then 19, was one of those men.

Clark: We were taken out and put into this room, spread-eagled, fingertips up on the wall, feet out, and you would stand there for awhile. And if you tried to move your hands or your feet — if you moved your hands, your hand was beat; if you moved your feet, the inside of your legs, your feet were kicked, until eventually my feet were twice the size they normally were and the inside of them were totally bruised, black and blue. I just couldn’t comprehend why this was happening to me or how people could do this to other people. I just couldn’t fathom this at all.

Narrator: You were an active republican?

Clark: I was 19 at the time and I hadn’t been in the republican movement a long time. I wasn’t — I would say I was an innocent person.

Narrator: Nine days after his initial arrest, Joe Clark was taken back to an ordinary prison.

Clark: I couldn’t believe it. A week had passed when I left there. I see a prison officer come in, and I know only, his name was Dicky Ellen, used to be called Dicky Elder, and he says to me, ‘where were you?’ I said, ‘I don’t know.’ He says, ‘what do you mean you don’t know?’ I said, ‘I had a hood over my head.’ He says, ‘you had a hood over your head?’ and he’s patting me on the head and he says, ‘you’re alright now, nothing will happen to you; you’re among men now.’ And I got very emotional at this. I can actually feel myself getting emotion now, thinking about it. But it was guy in which genuine words of compassion or whatever were said to me in nine days.

Narrator: The interrogation methods were later found to be illegal under British law. The European Court found that they didn’t constitute torture,but were cruel and inhumane. Britain’s reputation had been damaged and for very little return.

Overreacting state (della Porta 2018, 464)

Radicalization spreads especially when the state is perceived as overreacting to the challengers—as in Italy, when the student movement and then the labor movement protest of the late 1960s and early 1970s signaled a growing hostility. This was even more the case in Franco’s Spain, when labor protest met ethnic revival, and in the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, which reacted strongly to the so-called religious awakening (della Porta 2013).

Examples from the IRA (2/4): Des Long

Examples from the IRA (2/4): Des Long transcript

Narrator: At that point, Des Long was already one of the IRA’s veterans. … Unionists would say the civil rights movement was by and large a front for the IRA…

Long: It wasn’t. It wasn’t a front for the IRA. You had people in it who were never in the IRA. Hume and a few of his cronies, they were never in the IRA. But then you had people in it who were in the IRA. I saw it as a wing helping people to oppose British rule. Every fellow that gets his head cracked open by a Peeler’s baton is a potential recruit.

Examples from the IRA (3/4): Des Long

Examples from the IRA (3/4): Des Long transcript

Narrator: 1970 comes around. What is the IRA about at this point?

Long: Recruiting and arming.

Narrator: It’s not about actually carrying out attacks?

Long: Well, of course you want to carry out attacks, if you could. Great tool of recruiting is attacks, if they’re successful. … We began training people, preparing people, because we were getting people in who didn’t understand weapons or didn’t know about them and would have to be trained, in training camps and that kind of thing.

Examples from the IRA (4/4): Des Long

Examples from the IRA (4/4): Des Long transcript

Video clip: it is very important that the volunteers of the Irish Republican Army is of good character

Narrator: The IRA leadership was dominated by men who had fought in the so-called ‘border campaign’ in the 1950s.

Video clip: He’d want to have a very sincere and genuine reason fro joining. It’s for the love of his country.

Narrator: It was southern based and often southern accented.

Video clip: Classes consist largely of arms-handling, bomb-making, and urban guerilla tactics. The instructors are IRA veterans who have come out of retirement…

Long: I wasn’t retired. …

Narrator: Limerick man, Desmond Long, sat very close to the top of the IRA, on the Army Executive, for 17 years. … [to Long] That’s yourself isn’t it?

Long: It is. …

Narrator: What was the average recruit like?

Long: Enthusiastic. Some of them were in it for there own reason. I remember a fellow saying once to me, handling an M1 rifle, ‘oh Jesus, that’d be great for shooting blue noses.’ I said to him, ‘what are blue noses?’ ‘Prots,’ he says, so I ripped the weapon off him and I said, ‘we’re training nobody here to shoot Protestants. You’re here to take on the British forces.’

Poll: tendencies of radicalisation

A QR code for the survey.

Take the survey at https://forms.gle/XjqgU7Xwnwaoio638

  • Is there a difference between how individuals radicalise depending on ideology?
  • Are younger people more open/vulnerable to radicalisation?
  • Has social media changed radicalisation processes?
  • Can government programmes effectively deradicalise individuals?
  • Should there be incentives for radical/extreme individuals to participate in deradicalisation programmes?

Is there a difference between how individuals radicalise depending on ideology?

Poll: youth and social media

Younger more vulnerable to radicalisation?

Social media changing radicalisation?

Study snapshot: youth radicalisation

  • Schils and Verhage (2017)
  • 12 Belgian extremists interviewed:
    • 7 from left-wing scene
    • 4 from right-wing scene
    • 1 religious extremist
  • futility of bans? (p14): one can strive to ban… groups, as long as the demand for these groups remains, this will lead to the constant development of new groups. The same goes for the websites run by these groups.
  • despite rise of digital communication and mobilisation, sub-culture-based recruitment remains (arguably chiefly) important for far-right movements
  • policy remedies (p14):
    1. address breeding ground
    2. alternatives for the demand: movements accessible and responsive to youth grievances

Poll: intervention, incentives, emphasis

Gov. programmes effective intervention?

Incentivise participation in programmes?

Emphasise criminal or treatment responses?

Why radicalisation fails

Barriers to terrorism (Simi and Windisch 2020)

RQs (p834):

What limits the larger pool of extremists who embrace an ideology but do not translate these beliefs into action? What types of conditions serve as barriers in the action pathway process? And, finally, how can the identification of these barriers help inform counterterrorism measures?

  • concepts:
    • action pathways: process of engaging in terrorism or violent extremist actions
    • barriers: maybe but not necessarily segues to disengagement and/or deradicalisation
    • MCV: mass casualty violence

Barriers to terrorism (Simi and Windisch 2020)

RQs (p834):

What limits the larger pool of extremists who embrace an ideology but do not translate these beliefs into action? What types of conditions serve as barriers in the action pathway process? And, finally, how can the identification of these barriers help inform counterterrorism measures?

  • 34 former U.S. white supremacist extremists; life history interviews, conducted between 2012-2016
    • exemplary data description - take note for paper- and thesis-writing!

Methodological issue: ‘negative cases’

Simi and Windisch (2020, 833–34):

our sample represents an important step forward in terms of focusing on “negative cases.”

(for methods nerds, further on ‘negative cases’: Emigh 1997; Varshney 2001; Mahoney and Goertz 2004)

Barriers to terrorism - findings (Simi and Windisch 2020)

  1. mass casualty violence as counterproductive;
  2. preference toward interpersonal violence;
  3. changes in focus/availability;
  4. internal organizational conflict; and
  5. moral apprehension

expanding on the findings (Simi and Windisch 2020)

p.839 (preference toward interpersonal violence):

They described interpersonal violence as a masculine endeavor, whereas, shooting or bombing people from a distance was considered dishonorable and unfair. As the following participants explained, compared to street fighting, using a gun expresses a lack of masculinity and physical prowess.

p.841 (changes in focus/availability):

The presence of personal obligations can be thought of as changes in “biographical availability” such as employment, marriage, and children. In all, thirteen participants (37 per cent) were identified as experiencing a change in focus and availability, which constrained the likelihood of MCV and shifted their attention toward personal obligations (e.g., children, work).

p.842 (internal organizational conflict):

A common reason for entering extremism is the appeal of joining a higher moral cause predicated on virtues such as loyalty, kinship, and purity.

Radicalisation prevention

Rune Ellefsen & Sveinung Sandberg (2022): Everyday Prevention of Radicalization: The Impacts of Family, Peer, and Police Intervention, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism.

  • (de)radicalisation actors in the example of Norway:
    • family
    • peers
    • police/security

Radicalisation prevention

Rune Ellefsen & Sveinung Sandberg (2022): Everyday Prevention of Radicalization: The Impacts of Family, Peer, and Police Intervention, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism.

  • (de)radicalisation actors in the example of Norway:
    • family
    • peers
    • police/security
    • what about other actors?

Radicalisation prevention

Rune Ellefsen & Sveinung Sandberg (2022): Everyday Prevention of Radicalization: The Impacts of Family, Peer, and Police Intervention, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism.

  • (de)radicalisation actors in the example of Norway:
    • family
    • peers
    • police/security
    • what about other actors?
      • social workers
      • faith leaders
      • NGOs and community organisations

Resilience building, e.g., Demokratie Leben!

Any questions, concerns, feedback for this class?

Anonymous feedback here: https://forms.gle/NfF1pCfYMbkAT3WP6

Alternatively, please send me an email: m.zeller@lmu.de

References

Bosi, Lorenzo, and Donatella Della Porta. 2012. “Micro-Mobilization into Armed Groups: Ideological, Instrumental and Solidaristic Paths.” Qualitative Sociology 35 (4): 361–83. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11133-012-9237-1.
Campelo, Nicolas, Alice Oppetit, Françoise Neau, David Cohen, and Guillaume Bronsard. 2018. “Who Are the European Youths Willing to Engage in Radicalisation? A Multidisciplinary Review of Their Psychological and Social Profiles.” European Psychiatry 52: 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2018.03.001.
della Porta, Donatella. 2018. “Radicalization: A Relational Perspective.” Annual Review of Sociology 21: 461–74. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-042716.
Emigh, Rebecca Jean. 1997. “The Power of Negative Thinking: The Use of Negative Case Methodology in the Development of Sociological Theory.” Theory and Society 26 (5): 649–84.
Fahey, Susan, and Pete Simi. 2019. “Pathways to Violent Extremism: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of the US Far-Right.” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 12 (1): 42–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2018.1551558.
Gaudette, Tiana, Ryan Scrivens, and Vivek Venkatesh. 2022. “Disengaged but Still Radical? Pathways Out of Violent Right-Wing Extremism.” Terrorism and Political Violence 00 (00): 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2022.2082288.
Jensen, Michael A, Anita Atwell Seate, and Patrick A James. 2018. “Radicalization to Violence: A Pathway Approach to Studying Extremism Radicalization to Violence.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1442330.
Mahoney, James, and Gary Goertz. 2004. “The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research.” American Political Science Review 98 (4): 653–69. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055404041401.
Schils, Nele, and Antoinette Verhage. 2017. “Understanding How and Why Young People Enter Radical or Violent Extremist Groups.” International Journal of Conflict and Violence 11: 1–17. https://doi.org/10.4119/UNIBI/ijcv.473.
Simi, Pete, and Steven Windisch. 2020. “Why Radicalization Fails: Barriers to Mass Casualty Terrorism.” Terrorism and Political Violence 32 (4): 831–50. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1409212.
Varshney, Ashutosh. 2001. “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond.” World Politics 53 (3): 362–98.
Vergani, Matteo, Muhammad Iqbal, Ekin Ilbahar, and Greg Barton. 2018. “The Three Ps of Radicalization: Push , Pull and Personal. A Systematic Scoping Review of the Scientific Evidence about Radicalization Into Violent Extremism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 0 (0): 1–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1505686.