Class 8: Politically Violent Activity

Election-related violence

Dr. Michael C. Zeller

Agenda for the day

- Opening notes
- Election-related violence
- Back to Violence / Nonviolence
- Any questions, concerns, feedback for this class?

Opening notes

Presentation groups

Presentations line-up

Date	Presenters	Method
4 Dec:	Shahadaan, Kristine, Daichi	ethnography
11 Dec:	Bérénice, Zorka, Victoria, Katharina	content analysis
18 Dec:	Shoam, Aidan, Tara, Sebastian	TBD

Election-related violence

- Starter questions
- Harbers, Richetta, and van Wingerden (2022)
  - research design
  - analyses:
    - DV: turnout
    - DV: incumbent vote
  - conclusions

What actors might strategically use violence before or during an election? Why?

Can you think of any cases of election-related violence?

Harbers, Richetta, and van Wingerden (2022) - conc

electoral violence (p. 3): "coercion directed towards actors and/or objects during the electoral cycle … part of a menu of electoral manipulation, which includes threats and coercion targeting voters, candidates and officials involved in the process"

- **intra-systemic violence**

  - "try to win under the existing system"

  - "suppress or drown out the voices of political opponents"

- **anti-systemic violence**

  - "burn down the house and alter the status quo"

  - "depress participation as much as possible in order to undermine the legitimacy of the election"

- examples from cases? any difference in the *form* of violence? applicable beyond modern democracies? (e.g., KKK, Wilson, and *The Birth of a Nation*)

Harbers, Richetta, and van Wingerden (2022) - conc

- **intra-systemic violence**

- **anti-systemic violence**

- examples from cases? any difference in the *form* of violence?

  - intra-systemic: riots or group clashes between party supporters and violent attacks on candidates, politicians or voters. ... 'booth capture', where armed goons take over polling places

  - anti-systemic: coercion of or threats against candidates, voters, poll workers or security, as well as destruction of election infrastructure

intra-systemic violence (left) and anti-systemic vio (right) in India, 1985-2008

- research aim: looking at *sub-national election-related violence in India*: what effect on electoral outcomes (DVs: turnout, incumbent vote percentage) does violence before elections (IV) have?

- Method: series of fixed-effects and Poisson regression models

    - ↪ fixed-effects - intercept of model varies across units/cases to control for unvarying attributes of specific units/cases

    - ↪ Poisson - often used to model 'count' data

- Data (collection procedure detailed on p. 8):

    - Times of India (ToI) new reports, *sub-national* elections

    - Unit of analysis/case: constituency-year

    - coded: violence intra-systemic or part of armed group's tactic

what findings can you pick out?

Table 1. Results of the fixed-effects analysis, dependent variable: turnout (%)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intra-systemic violence			
Non-lethal	−2.834** (0.854)		−2.989*** (0.844)
Lethal	2.242 (1.243)		1.827 (1.225)
Anti-systemic violence			
Boycott call		−18.54*** (4.334)	−18.71*** (4.412)
Non-lethal		−22.96** (7.958)	−23.05** (7.939)
Lethal		−24.78*** (5.016)	−24.92*** (5.088)
Alignment	1.317*** (0.349)	1.158*** (0.313)	1.143*** (0.313)
Margin of victory	−0.0735*** (0.0123)	−0.0618*** (0.0105)	−0.0612*** (0.0105)
Literacy	0.200*** (0.0595)	0.165** (0.0527)	0.162** (0.0530)
Electrification	0.0414 (0.0342)	0.0571 (0.0313)	0.0597 (0.0313)
Urbanization	−0.0350 (0.0800)	−0.0495 (0.0744)	−0.0487 (0.0743)
Turnout ($t − 1$)	0.0586 (0.0381)	0.0966** (0.0342)	0.0974** (0.0342)
Intra-systemic violence (spatial lag)	4.442*** (1.045)		1.983 (1.030)
Intercept	48.68*** (2.368)	47.89*** (2.431)	47.89*** (2.415)
Log likelihood	−64744.4	−63936.7	−63918.4
N	18,982	18,982	18,982
n	3,486	3,486	3,486

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster: district); * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$: fixed effects at the constituency level.

Reg table, DV: turnout

Reg table, DV: incumbent vote

what findings can you pick out?

Table 3. Results of the fixed-effects analysis, dependent variable: incumbent vote share (%)

	Model 1	Model 2
Intra-systemic violence	−5.257*** (1.150)	−6.140*** (1.243)
Alignment	11.18*** (0.501)	11.00*** (0.490)
Intra-systemic violence x alignment		7.993** (2.521)
Margin of victory	−0.00174 (0.0229)	−0.00159 (0.0230)
Literacy	0.167*** (0.0499)	0.163** (0.0498)
Electrification	0.0235 (0.0444)	0.0255 (0.0443)
Urbanization	0.278** (0.0985)	0.277** (0.0983)
Turnout	0.127*** (0.0259)	0.128*** (0.0258)
Incumbent vote share ($t-1$)	0.167*** (0.0232)	0.167*** (0.0233)
Intercept	−1.195 (3.159)	−1.104 (3.165)
Log likelihood	−66881.1	−66872.0
N	16,851	16,851
n	3,485	3,485

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster: district); * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$; fixed effects at the constituency level.

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- violence is associated with fewer votes for the constituency-level incumbent party

- positive interaction term (β = 7.993***) indicates … the negative effect of violence is diminished if the incumbent is aligned with the state government

  - suggests that within non-aligned constituencies, intra-systemic violence is targeted at supporters of the state-level opposition

- violence decreases turnout but that the **effect is larger for anti-systemic violence**

- intra-systemic violence appears intended to **selectively depress turnout** among opposition supporters

- **anti-systemic violence** "extremely effective in terms of keeping voters away from the polls and thus discrediting the electoral results due to low participation rates"

  - ethics question: qualms about reporting this finding?

- open data on subnational violence: Zhukov, Davenport, and Kostyuk (2019)

how should states respond to electoral violence?

Back to Violence / Nonviolence

- background: Chenoweth and Stephan (2011)

- Kudelia (2018) and the case of Euromaidan in Ukraine

  - a puzzling case?

  - productive and counter-productive effects of violence

  - findings

- concluding question

UNSPEAKABLE VIOLENCE

Background: study of Chenoweth and Stephan (201...

- research aim: determine relative success of nonviolent ('civil resistance' - Gene Sharp) or violent resistance

- cases of violent and non-violent campaigns between 1900 and 2006: 323 cases

Pay attention to the mechanisms that Prof. Chenoweth specifies in her brief explanation

Background: study of Chenoweth and Stephan (201

Pay attention to the mechanisms that Prof. Chenoweth specifies in her brief explanation

- nonviolent campaigns are better at eliciting broad and diverse support

- nonviolent campaigns create more defections among the opposition

- nonviolent campaigns have a broader set of tactics at their disposal

- nonviolent campaigns often maintain discipline even in the face of escalating oppression

Kudelia (2018) - refining Chenoweth and Stephan (2

- Ukraine's Euromaidan

  - what's going on in this case?

    - Yanukovych's regime: semi-authoritarian

- violent protests occurred...

  - **but** accounted for just 12 percent of all protests

  - **yet** concentrated in final month (Jan.-Feb. 2014) and in Kyiv

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"The success of violent protest tactics in Ukraine's case, **puzzling** from the standpoint of recent findings, has received no systematic, theoretically-driven scholarly treatment."

(empirically, theoretically) puzzling or not...

- Kudelia (2018) - within-case qualitative process tracing of "actors' choices using a rationalist theoretical"

  - rationalist = strategic choice rather than spontaneous reaction

(counter-)productive effects of violence - Kudelia (2

- violence **counter-productive**

  1. alienate current and potential supporters

  2. provoke a coercive response

  3. dampen international support for protests

- violence **productive**

  1. participatory character of protest violence

  2. embeddedness of violent groups and practices in a generally non-violent movement (*radical flanks*)

  3. capacity and willingness of violent activists to escalate beyond the cost-tolerance threshold of the regime

     - i.e., how much will regime tolerate? will it offer concessions?

Kudelia (2018) - findings

- violence complementing **already** and **continuing** high mobilisation is effective in making regime more sensitive to protest costs

- "a regime's repressive escalation may decrease net participation costs by broadening support for militants among rank-and-file protesters and outside sympathizers"

- two-tiered orgs.: a violent vanguard and a non-violent base
  - strengthens the leverage of moderate opposition elites in bargaining with the regime
  - when used in conjunction with non-violent actions in response to intensifying repression, it **may deter** the regime **or even tip** the balance of power against it.

- your thoughts on these findings?

Relationship across a movement:

how do (or should) nonviolent actors deal with violent actors/groups within their movement ('radical flanks')? Infighting or solidarity?

Any questions, concerns, feedback for this class?

Anonymous feedback here:
https://forms.gle/NfF1pCfYMbkAT3WP6

Alternatively, please send me an email: m.zeller@lmu.de

References

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