Class 9: Politically Violent Activity

Escalation and restraint

Opening notes

Presentation groups

Presentations line-up
Date Presenters Method
4 Dec: Shahadaan, Kristine, Daichi ethnography
11 Dec: Bérénice, Zorka, Victoria, Katharina content analysis
18 Dec: Shoam, Aidan, Tara, Sebastian QCA

Antifa

  • opening discussion
  • debatable proposition and pressing policy issue
  • antifa in Germany
  • Copsey and Merrill (2020): antifa in the U.S.

Opening discussion

What should we, students of political violence, know about antifa? (causes? organisation/leadership? radical subcultures and mobilisation? strategies?)

is antifa a ‘gang’ (Pyrooz and Densley 2018)? is antifa a ‘group’ (LaFree 2018)?

Debatable proposition: antifa as terrorist org.?

Pyrooz and Densley (2018, 233): “the history of antifa reads like a history of violence”

vs.

Bray (2017, 169): “In truth, violence represents a small though vital sliver of anti-fascist activity.”

Should state security (in Germany, elsewhere) designate antifa as extremist/terrorist

antifa (recently) in Germany

ARD series (in German): https://www.ardaudiothek.de/sendung/die-fascho-jaegerin-der-fall-lina-e-und-seine-folgen/94838298/

  • 28-year-old antifa activist, Lina E., and three accomplices jailed for either membership of or support for a criminal organisation.
    • politicised/radicalised by revelations about NSU in 2011
  • attacks on (assumed) right-wing extremists in Thüringen and Sachsen between 2018 and 2020
  • judge…
    • acknowledged deficiency of criminal punishment of neo-Nazis
    • described right-wing extremism as a greater threat to Germany
    • but asserted ‘even Nazis have inalienable rights’
    • criticized the defense lawyers for describing the trial as “political justice.”

recent journal article: Jones and Schuhmacher (2024)

Copsey and Merrill (2020) - background

  • Since 2001, right-wing extremists in the U.S. responsible for 110 politically motivated deathsantifa: 0 (or maximum one, in case of 2020 death of Patriot Prayer supporter)

In putting their “bodies on the line,” militant anti-fascists aspire to defeat fascist organizing, to de-stabilize it, and ultimately de-mobilize it. At its root, anti-fascist militancy is the promise to effect intimidation, humiliation and de-moralization upon fascists. This involves a physical commitment to “no platforming” (p. 124)

  • lots of informative background information about U.S. antifa in the article

Copsey and Merrill (2020) - research design

  • semi-structured interviews with activists from RCA in Portland
    • conditions of anonymity
    • between October 2019 and February 2020.
  • sample of 3971 tweets (including 2484 retweets) shared by RCA’s Twitter account (@RoseCityAntifa)
    • between 13 March 2018 and 28 August 2019
    • collected using Tweepy in accordance with Twitter’s regulations
    • ‘more militant’ tweets—“648 tweets (including 279 retweets) from within this sample which featured variants of “violence,” “attack,” “assault,” “fight,” and “terror””
      • close reading; quantitatively and qualitatively analysed with critical discourse analysis approach

Copsey and Merrill (2020) - findings/points raised

  • violent disruption of “fascist” assembly is an axiom of antifa praxis
  • how far does the label ‘fascist’ extend?
    • legitimacy of anti-fascist action is thus drawn from the illegitimacy of its opponent
  • antifa’s “pre-emptive self-defence
    • premised on (a) deadliness of fascist movements of any size and (b) rapid growth potential of fascist movements
  • there are ‘internal tactical and rhetorical strategies that limit violence’ from antifa — BUT, consistent danger of antifa slipping into glorification of violence

Poll: escalation and restraint

A QR code for the survey.

Take the survey at https://forms.gle/12tV7fgjcAyC8iVG6

  • ideology secondary to pragmatic issues in choosing to use violence?
  • most important in allowing restraint?
  • most likely to provoke escalation?
  • should states remain open to negotiating with violent groups?
  • groups more likely to escalate violence if they feel they are losing support?

ideology secondary to pragmatic issues?

more likely to escalate if losing support?

Poll results: escalation and restraint

most important factor allowing restraint?

most likely to provoke escalation?

Poll results: negotiation

states should remain open to negotiating with politically violent groups?

relates to our Week 11-12 classes on state responses

Mechanisms of escalation and restraint

  • escalation and restraint concepts
  • catalogue of mechanisms
  • grouped/summarised mechanisms
    • restraint
    • escalation

escalation and restraint

  • escalation - a rise in the frequency and/or severity of violent actions
  • restraint - a deliberate restriction (either reducing or completely stopping) of violent actions

are there significant examples of escalation and/or restraint in cases you know of?

Mechanisms of escalation and restraint

summarising logics of restraint - (Busher et al. 2022; Bjørgo and Ravndal 2020)

(‘ascending the ladder of abstraction,’ Sartori 1970)

  1. A strategic logic (violence is counterproductive in the present circumstances)
  2. A moral logic (certain forms of violence are illegitimate)
  3. A logic of ego maintenance (we are not a violent organization)
  4. A logic of outgroup definition (softening views on putative outgroups)
  5. An organisational logic (the organisation evolves in ways that undermine the logics of violent escalation)

summarising logics of escalation - Busher et al. (2022)

(‘ascending the ladder of abstraction,’ Sartori 1970)

  1. framing logic (intensity of context/threat, revolutionary goals, glorification of violence, violence as viable/necessary, increasing vilification of ‘enemies’)
  2. strategic logic (cope with changing dynamics with opponents and/or state, deal with diminishing opportunity, loss of state control)
  3. organisational logic (declining moderate influence, logistical/practical preparation for violence)
  4. constituency/social logic (endorsement/legitimation from elites and/or public, politics/media focuses on radical flank)

A case of RWE restraint?

  • Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) at a glance
  • Tore Bjørgo on NRM
    • findings

NRM at a glance

  • Territory of action: Scandinavia [Blomberg and Stier (2019); ]
  • Organisational structure: hierarchical national branches
  • Membership: moderate (varies by country, e.g., Stiftelsen Expo 2025)
  • (main) Objective: white ethno-state
  • (common) Targets: political and ethnic opponents

Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) - Tore Bjørgo

Tore Bjørgo on Why the Nordic Resistance Movement Restrains its Use of Violence (Bjørgo and Ravndal 2020)

Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) - Tore Bjørgo

  1. When, why does NRM permit use of violence?
    • no moral restraints, rather violence perceived as counter-productive (to gaining support and freely propagating views)
    • try to expand boundaries of acceptable violence with acts against police and political enemies
  2. Why, how does NRM restrain use of violence?
    • to maintain strategic position
    • commit members to maintaining nonviolent discipline
  3. How does NRM leadership respond to cases where members overstep and act violently?
    • honouring rather than punishing activists who overstep
    • BUT ALSO distancing from any affiliation or connection

Any questions, concerns, feedback for this class?

Anonymous feedback here: https://forms.gle/NfF1pCfYMbkAT3WP6

Alternatively, please send me an email: m.zeller@lmu.de

References

Bjørgo, Tore, and Jacob Aasland Ravndal. 2020. “Why the Nordic Resistance Movement Restrains Its Use of Violence.” Perspectives on Terrorism 14 (6): 37–48.
Blomberg, Helena, and Jonas Stier. 2019. “Flashback as a Rhetorical Online Battleground: Debating the (Dis)guise of the Nordic Resistance Movement.” Social Media + Society 5 (1): 205630511882333. https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305118823336.
Bray, Mark. 2017. Antifa: The Anti-Fascist Handbook. New York: Melville House Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004.
Busher, Joel, Gareth Harris, Julia Ebner, Zsofia Hacsek, and Graham Macklin. 2022. “The Dynamics Of Violence Escalation And Inhibition DuringHot PeriodsOf Anti-Minority And Far-Right Activism: Towards An Assessment Framework.” Coventry: CREST.
Copsey, Nigel, and Samuel Merrill. 2020. “Violence and Restraint Within Antifa: A View from the United States.” Perspectives on Terrorism 14 (6): 122–38.
Jones, Ali, and Nils Schuhmacher. 2024. “Ghostly Militanz: The Loss of Discursive Infrastructures and German Antifascist Radical Counterpublics 17 (1): 46–63. https://doi.org/10.1285/I20356609V17I1P46.
Kotonen, Tommi. 2021. “Proscribing the Nordic Resistance Movement in Finland: Analyzing the Process and Its Outcome.” Journal for Deradicalization 29 (Winter): 177–204.
LaFree, Gary. 2018. “Is Antifa a Terrorist Group?” Society 55 (3): 248–52. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-018-0246-x.
Pyrooz, David C., and James A. Densley. 2018. “On Public Protest, Violence, and Street Gangs.” Society 55 (3): 229–36. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-018-0242-1.
Ravndal, Jacob Aasland. 2020. “The Emergence of Transnational Street Militancy: A Comparative Case Study of the Nordic Resistance Movement and Generation Identity.” Journal for Deradicalization 25: 1–34.
Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics.” The American Political Science Review 64 (4): 1033–53.
Stiftelsen Expo. 2025. “Svensk Rasideologisk Miljö 2024.” Stokholm: Stiftelsen Expo.
Zeller, Michael C, and Michael Vaughan. 2024. “Proscribing Right-Wing Extremist Organizations in Europe: Variations, Trends, and Prospects.” Terrorism and Political Violence 36 (8): 985–1007. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2023.2240446.