Disengagement, deradicalisation (individual), demobilisation (organisational)
“How has political participation in Germany changed over the last four decades and what are the key explanatory factors for this?”
„Wie hat sich politische Partizipation in Deutschland in den letzten vier Jahrzehnten gewandelt und was sind zentrale Erklärungsfaktoren dessen?“
radicalisation (change in belief): process of connecting with and adopting radical or extremist ideology—does not necessarily result in violence or ‘engaging’ in extremist activity
engagement (change in behaviour): (in this context) process or act of performing radical or extremist activity, especially violence
deradicalisation (change in belief): “process by which an individual is diverted from an extremist ideology, eventually rejecting an extremist ideology and moderating their beliefs” (Gaudette, Scrivens, and Venkatesh 2022, 1)
disengagement (change in behaviour): “process by which an individual decides to leave their associated extremist group or movement in order to reintegrate into society” (Ibid.)
Why might individuals disengage from politically violent organisations? And deradicalise? Who might be susceptible to disengage and deradicalise, what types of persons?
we must first investigate the individuals and their life story and then question the manner in which their existence is partly determined by structural factors at the meso and macro levels. Which means adopting the framework of a comprehensive sociology, attentive to the justifications of the actors.
prior to conducting the interviews with formers, we consulted with key stakeholders, namely Canadian law enforcement officials and local community activists, and they developed a list of interview questions that they would ask formers and those questions were incorporated into the interview guide. The purpose of this approach was simple: rather than developing an interview guide that was derived from an academic perspective only, we included interview questions from key stakeholders for the purposes of developing a multidimensional, multi-perspective interview guide.
Reasons for leaving (note multiplicity of reasons)
| Freq. | |
|---|---|
| Birth of a child | 4 |
| Reunite with family | 1 |
| Emotional burnout | 3 |
| Physical burnout | 1 |
| Disillusionment | 6 |
(in German)
https://www.zeit.de/politik/2023-07/sterbehilfe-gesetz-bundestag-nachrichtenpodcast
should Beate Zschäpe be eligible for a deradicalisation programme? Including the incentives for participation (i.e., sentence reduction)?
On average, modern terrorist groups do not exist for long. According to David Rapoport, 90 percent of terrorist organisations have a life span of less than one year; and of those that make it to a year, more than half disappear within a decade.
On average, modern terrorist groups do not exist for long. According to David Rapoport, 90 percent of terrorist organisations have a life span of less than one year; and of those that make it to a year, more than half disappear within a decade.
Terrorist groups generally cannot survive without either active or passive support from a surrounding population.
Active support: hiding members, raising money, joining the organization
Passive support: ignoring obvious signs of terrorist group activity, declining to cooperate with police investigations, sending money to organizations that act as fronts for the group, expressing support for the group’s objectives
the need to overcome apathy
Apathy is a powerful force; all else being equal, most people naturally prefer to carry on their daily lives without the threat of being targeted by counterterrorism laws, regulations, sanctions, and raids.
| Key factors | Notable historical examples |
|---|---|
| Capture/Kill leader(s) | Shining Path; Kurdistan Workers’ Party; Real Irish Republican Army; Aum Shinrikyo |
| Unsuccessful generational transition | Red Brigades; Second of June Movement; Weather Underground; Baader-Meinhof group (Red Army Faction); The Order; Aryan Resistance Army |
| Achievement of the cause | Irgun/Stern Gang; African National Congress |
| Transition to a legitimate political process/negotiations | Provisional Irish Republican Army; Palestinian Liberation Organization; Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam; Moro Islamic Liberation Front |
| Loss of popular support | Real Irish Republican Army; Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA); Shining Path |
| Transition toward criminality | Abu Sayyaf; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia |
| Transition toward full insurgency | Khmer Rouge; Guatemalan Labor Party/Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit; Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists; Kashmiri separatist groups (e.g., Lashkare-Toiba and Hizbul Mujahideen); Armed Islamic Group (Algeria) |
“No previous terrorist organization has exhibited the complexity, agility, and global reach of al-Qaida, with its fluid operational style based increasingly on a common mission statement and objectives, rather than on standard operating procedures and an organizational structure.”
“…many terrorism experts agreed that al-Qaida could best be described as a franchise organization with a marketable ‘brand.’”
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