Mobilisation, State Crisis and Counter-Mobilisation: Ulster Unionist Politics and the Outbreak of the Troubles

Christopher Farrington

Mobilisation, State Crisis and Counter-Mobilisation: Ulster Unionist Politics and the Outbreak of the Troubles

CHRISTOPHER FARRINGTON

University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

ABSTRACT   *This article examines the role of Unionist politics in the outbreak of the Troubles. It seeks to advance the current debate on how and why the Troubles broke out by examining the interactions between the role of the state, the internal politics of Unionism, and the role of Unionist political elites in the developing crisis. It argues that these interactions should be understood from a comparative perspective, which allows for a greater appreciation of how communal divisions and social change led to a process of violent conflict.*

Introduction

In retrospect the outbreak of the Troubles in Northern Ireland seems highly predictable. We can point to the various events which were important staging posts on the road to the crisis of 1968 and 1969, such as the Divis Street riots, the 1966 commemoration of the 1916 Rising, the O'Neill–Lemass meetings, the civil rights march of 5 October 1968 and so on. However, it is only in hindsight that we can see these events as staging posts on the road to crisis. For example, in 1964 Unionist MP Robert Nixon remarked of the Divis Street riots (frequently seen as an epigraph to the main crises of the 1960s):

> I have pointed out certain dangers which may well exist unless we show ourselves to be citizens of 1964 and never permit the image of Northern Ireland to be carried in the newspapers of the world as it has been carried this summer … May what has now ended never begin again.[1]

Significantly, there is not much evidence that many people thought it would begin again. Even the *Protestant Telegraph* did not see the crisis extending far into the future: 'Someday the full story of the Ulster Crisis '68 will be fully recorded' (*Protestant Telegraph*, 30 November 1968). Unionist MP for Belfast Cromac,

---

Correspondence Address: Christopher Farrington, Institute for British Irish Studies, School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland. Email: Christopher. Farrington@ucd.ie

William Kennedy, in proposing the Queen's speech in Stormont, proclaimed: 'I believe that this Parliament in the year 1969 will go down in history as the birth of a new Ulster, an Ulster where confidence, tolerance and goodwill replace old bitterness, mistrust and ill-feeling.'[2]

However, in the knowledge that the crisis of the 1960s resulted in a prolonged period of organised violence, over 3,000 deaths and incalculable suffering and destruction, it is frequently forgotten that the development of that crisis was far from inevitable and was littered with contingencies which might have changed the course of events; leaders made, or did not make, decisions which had a bearing on the crisis. How did structural factors, issues, events and ideas interact to produce the crisis? These questions have been at the core of explanations of other forms of political change and should be at the core of any explanation of the outbreak of the troubles. This article seeks to introduce a discussion of agency into the explanation, while looking for key aspects of politics of the time which enable us to see the decisions, and the reasons behind them, more clearly. This article examines the role of Unionists in the crisis and considers these dynamics using findings from comparative social research on similar types of crisis. I focus on the crisis of 1968 because it is such a significant turning point. The article is divided into four parts. The first develops some theoretical approaches which are used to inform the following discussion examining the developing dynamics of the crisis. The second examines the role of the state and the decisions of the government in the crisis. The third uses debates from the Northern Ireland House of Commons to examine how Unionists made sense of the developing crisis. The final section analyses the role of political actors, and Paisley in particular, in order to rethink their role in the crisis.

The Outbreak of the Troubles as Contentious Politics

The story of how and why the Civil Rights Movement emerged in Northern Ireland is well told and well known (Bew *et al.*, 1996; Hennessey, 2005; Mullholland, 2000a, 2000b; O Dochartaigh, 1997; O'Leary & McGarry, 1996; Prince, 2006, 2007; Purdie, 1990). This article attempts to build on this literature by using insights and research findings from comparative work on political and social change because none of the current explanations in the literature on the outbreak of the Troubles adequately explains how social change was translated into political change, or political divisions were transformed into political crises, or how communal divisions were transformed into violent conflict.

Many have argued that the outbreak of the Troubles was a result of political changes in Northern Ireland which led to Catholics challenging the state in order to achieve equal political and social rights (Purdie, 1990). The traditional explanation for this changing boundary is the change in the socioeconomic structure of Northern Ireland Catholics (O'Leary & McGarry, 1996). In most accounts, the inability of the Northern Ireland government to reform itself led to increased frustration among Northern Ireland Catholics, which spilled over into violence. These implicitly use second generation theories of revolutions, such as Davies' J-curve, to explain the

development of the civil rights movement. Davies (1962) explains the occurrence of revolution as a product of the interaction between economic conditions and social and economic expectations of citizens. He illustrates this by plotting the relationship on a graph and argues that revolutions do not occur when there is rising prosperity and rising expectations but when there is an economic downturn and there is therefore a gap between the expectations of groups and the 'reality' of their social, economic or political position. By this analysis, Catholics mobilised when O'Neill raised their expectations of change but failed to deliver on his initial promise. Hennessey argues: 'no politician in the history of the state had aroused hopes and expectations to the same extent as O'Neill' (Hennessey, 2005, 131; see also Bloomfield, 2007: 168). However, as Almond pointed out about similar social mobilisation schools of political development, most of these explanations treat politics as a dependent variable (Almond, 1973: 12) and downplay the role of the mobilisation process.

   In an amendment to this explanation, Bew, Gibbon and Patterson (1996) argued that it was the nature of Ulster Unionism which prevented the Northern Ireland state from reforming itself. However, *why* these two factors should combine to create such a crisis is theoretically under-explained; the causal arguments about how and why the crisis descended into 30 years of violence are distinctly hazy. It may be the case that popular grievances and divisions within the regime are common features of society undergoing political change. However, there is no reason to suggest that this will lead to a prolonged ethnic conflict. The current literature suggests that the underlying ethnic division was responsible for this transformation. For example, Dixon (2001: 71) remarks: 'With the benefit of hindsight, the surge of antagonism and violence which followed the civil rights march of October 1968 might suggest that the optimistic view of community relations in the 1960s was rather superficial.' Dixon implies, without actually making a causal argument, that a latent polarisation between the two communities in the 1960s explains the violence. A slightly more sophisticated version of this argument comes from A.T.Q. Stewart. Stewart (1977: 183) argued that what happened in 1968 was about contemporary pressures but, 'once these contemporary pressures have operated, the form and course of the conflict are determined by patterns concealed in the past, rather than those visible in the present. There is nothing unusual about such atavism as an aspect of human history'. We are not trying to explain how Northern Ireland's communities became organised and mobilised on an ethnic basis. This, as we know, occurred long before the 1960s (Ruane & Todd, 1996, 2004). Instead we are attempting to explain a change in the salience of the ethno-national boundary. This is important because, while people are generally socialised into communal structures and identity formations, those practising politics in the 1960s were not socialised into violent conflict. As Brubaker and Laitin (1998: 426) argue:

   Even where violence is clearly rooted in preexisting conflict, it should not be treated as a 'natural,' self-explanatory outgrowth of such conflict, something that occurs automatically when the conflict reaches a certain intensity, a certain

'temperature.' Violence is not a quantitative *degree* of conflict, but a qualitative *form* of conflict, with its own dynamics.

We therefore need to be able to make stronger causal arguments about how and why social and political change occurred and why it resulted in the form that it did. I argue, fairly uncontroversially, that the period resulting in the outbreak of the Troubles can be seen as an example of contentious politics. This has been defined as follows:

> Contentious politics involves interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else's interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties. Contentious politics thus brings together three familiar features of social life: contention, collective action and politics. (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 4)

This body of literature attempts to explain large scale political and social change, such as revolutions or democratisation. This is not to say that what occurred in Northern Ireland in the 1960s and 1970s was a process of revolution or democratisation, it is merely to say that it resembles these phenomena in some of the ways in which change happened. In Northern Ireland in the 1960s there was a collective action movement, the Civil Rights Movement, making claims on the government, with a subsequent bearing on the interests of Unionists. These claims concerned the nature and practice of politics in Northern Ireland. There were processes of mobilisation and counter-mobilisation, which resulted in a process of political change. The literature on contentious politics offers a way of understanding and analysing this social and political change.

The methods used to study such social and political phenomena usually involve small-N case studies 'with the goal of identifying causal relationships … in order to test (and potentially shake) strong prior beliefs' (Goldstone, 2003: 46). One way of doing this is by process tracing, which involves: 'analyzing a case into a sequence (or several concatenating sequences) of events and showing how those events are plausibly linked given the interests and situations faced by groups or individual actions' (Goldstone, 2003: 47). The narrative of events in Northern Ireland in the 1960s is very well established, therefore the aim here is to identify key factors in explaining the dynamics of the crisis. We are looking for the social and political processes and mechanisms which changed the pre-existing patterns of communal organisation and communal relations. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001: 24) define mechanisms, processes and episodes:

> Mechanisms are a delimited class of events that alter relationships among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations. Processes are regular sequences of such mechanisms that produce similar (generally more complex and contingent) transformations of those

elements. Episodes are continuous streams of contention including collective claims making that bears on other parties' interests.

The process tracing method offers a way of explaining how grievance turns to challenge and how that challenge turns to violence. As Goldstone (2001: 152) observes, 'The varied, competitive, and contingent nature of revolutionary mobilisation has led scholars to place far more emphasis on the processes by which revolutions develop'. Moreover, we know from quantitative analyses that the existence of grievances is not a sufficient cause of conflict: 'ethnic grievances are commonly felt and latent; the factors that make these grievances vital and manifest differentiate the violent from the non-violent cases' (Laitin, 2007: 25).

   Therefore, we need to understand how the crisis developed. Theories explaining the occurrence of revolution have gone through four phases: first generation theories of revolution were comparative histories; second generation theories were based on modernisation and structural functionalist theories; and third generation theories were structural models (Foran, 1993: 1). I am using the fourth generation theories of revolution, which see social change and grievance as merely a part of the process, insofar as the state, its policies, weakness and division is part of the political process which causes revolutions in conjunction with leadership, ideology, identification and a range of structural factors (Goldstone, 2001). In particular, the mobilisation process is seen as a key causal factor in explaining political change. We therefore have two questions: what was the relationship between the mobilisation of the Civil Rights Movement and Unionist politics? And how do we explain the existence of Unionist counter-mobilisation and its subsequent effects on the crisis? The link between the nature of the state, the policies pursued by the government, and the pressures on the government from external forces (UK government and Civil Rights Movement) and internal forces (other Unionists) all partly explain these dynamics.

The Crisis of the State in Northern Ireland

The nature of the Northern Ireland state has always been at the forefront of explanations of the Northern Ireland Troubles; the traditional nationalist interpretation of the conflict argued that Northern Ireland was an artificial creation (McGarry & O'Leary, 1995: 13–35), which was 'a failed political entity' because of the practice of government (English, 2003: 339). Moreover, Provisional Republicans believed that the Northern Ireland state was irreformable (English, 2003: 342). As a devolved region of an otherwise centralised state, there is a question as to the extent to which Northern Ireland could be called a state. However, the axis of contention was between the Civil Rights Movement and the Northern Ireland government, not the British government. As such, we need to understand better the brittleness of the state in Northern Ireland. It is very difficult to argue that Northern Ireland was a weak state in 1963. It had control of internal security, its institutions had been in existence for just over 40 years and it was experiencing a period of economic prosperity. However, as Tarrow (1998: 82) points out, '"strength" and "weakness" are relational

values that vary for different sectors and levels of the state'. This is perhaps why the Civil Rights Movement made claims initially about local government rather than the devolved administration and why the devolved administration was the general target rather than the UK state.

There is a strong strain within the comparative literature which looks for state centred explanations for civil violence; for example Laitin (2007: 22) argues: 'Immunity from civil violence comes with building states with the power and incentive to enforce the rule of law. Weak, incompetent states unable to enforce the rule of law are dangerous.' While Northern Ireland was not a weak state, it was in an insecure position regarding its regime type. Research examining the connection between democracy and conflict has found that the type of regime is significant for the possibility of the outbreak of violence. When plotting likelihood of violence against regime type, the relationship is best described as an 'inverted U'; authoritarian and democratic regimes are unlikely to experience conflict but semi-democratic regimes are much more likely to experience conflict, particularly, but not exclusively, if this is combined with regime change (Hegre *et al.*, 2001). It is more realistic to argue that Northern Ireland was not a fully consolidated democratic regime rather than a weak state and that this set an unpromising baseline on which mobilisation was set. The state in Northern Ireland in the 1960s was economically robust, it had control of internal security and was able to govern effectively. However, the key weakness in Northern Ireland's democratic infrastructure was the de facto permanent exclusion of the nationalist minority from government. This seems an obvious problem and, comparatively speaking, exclusion from the governmental process is associated with democratic instability and more violent forms of claim-making by the excluded ethnic group (Birnir, 2007). The exclusion of nationalists from government is not a sign of a weak state but it is a sign of the incomplete democratisation of Northern Ireland.

While weak states may be more susceptible to civil war than strong ones, Tarrow (1998: 82) argues, 'If taken alone as a guide to action, the concept of state strength is somewhat wooden and lacks agency'. The response of the state to the claims of social movements is also an explanatory factor in the dynamics and the outcome of mobilisation (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001). Tarrow (1998) argues, building on the work of others, that state strength intersects with the prevailing strategy of the state in dealing with contentious claims. Broadly speaking, these can be inclusive or exclusive. Northern Ireland did not have a prevailing strategy for dealing with the type of claims originating from the Civil Rights Movement simply because they had not been made before. When it had been confronted with labour claims, the Unionist government had tended to co-opt labour figures and agendas, through, for example, the Ulster Unionist Labour Association (UULA) and the appointment of John Andrews as Minister of Labour (Patterson & Kaufmann, 2007: 17–28). However, the origins of these new claims made it react very differently. In the absence of a prevailing strategy, Goldstone and Tilly (2001) offer a useful starting point for tracing how the Northern Ireland state influenced the developing crisis. They agree with Tarrow that the policies of the state have a significant effect on the mobilisation

cycle. However, they develop a reform/repression choice for the state and argue that the choice of strategy will affect the political opportunity structure of potential challengers, in this case the Civil Rights Movement. On one hand, a course of repression by the state can increase the costs of political action and create threats; on the other hand, granting concessions can increase the opportunities for social movements (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001).

The experience of Northern Ireland indicates that this model is too simple and the actual process is much more complex. The initial response of the Northern Ireland government was to do nothing to address the civil rights demands but O'Neill instead took political risks on North–South relations and on community relations. In many respects this was the easier political course because he could take them without having to confront the many vested interests which controlled Unionist associations and local government in the most problematic local government areas (see Patterson & Kaufmann, 2007: 77–79). The government then took a more repressive course of action when it banned the civil rights march of 5 October 1968 and then imposed subsequent bans on marches in Londonderry. However, any notion that the Northern Ireland government had that further repressive action would be the solution to the law and order crisis was firmly closed by police advice to the cabinet at the end of November. Senior police officers informed the cabinet that they could not secure enforcement of the ban, that any statement from the government indicating that they would enforce the ban would be unhelpful, and that further firm police action would lead to 'further and prolonged disorder in Londonderry and elsewhere'. Moreover, the cabinet conclusions report: 'In response to a question from the Prime Minister, the police view was that unless the heat could be taken out of events by political means, the law and order situation could get completely out of control.'[3] This is a remarkable statement to make and enables us to point to a definite date when the capacity of the Northern Ireland state to effectively govern had changed. Why had this capacity changed so quickly? Ó Dochartaigh (1997: 70) argues: 'The civil rights campaign destabilised Northern Ireland by the simple fact of politically mobilising the state's Catholic minority which had previously been quiescent.' This would seem to give credence to the view that it was the nature of the state rather than the capacity of the state which is an explanatory factor in the crisis of 1968.

After the repression policy had failed, the government then embarked on a series of reforms to address the grievances of the Civil Rights Movement. This decision was taken with two audiences in mind. One was the audience predicted by Goldstone and Tilly (2001), the Civil Rights Movement. Indeed, a memorandum by O'Neill outlining the reasons for substantial reforms stated: 'We must never set at risk the basic constitutional integrity of Northern Ireland. But the greatest threat to this is any tinkering with the 1920 Act – and to avert this, concessions in other directions could well be the wisest course.'[4] However, it is clear from this memorandum that the primary audience for these reforms was the British government. After outlining some of the pressure which Wilson had put on him previously, and stating that Wilson had resisted pressure from his left wing to do something about Northern Ireland, O'Neill gave this analysis:

> I would be failing in my duty if I did not make it clear to you that, in my view, Londonderry has dramatically altered this situation to our great disadvantage. Whether the Press and T.V. coverage was fair is immaterial. We have now become a focus of world opinion; indeed we know through official channels that the Embassy and B.I.S. [British Information Service] in America have been under intense pressure from the American press.[5]

At a cabinet meeting on 14 November 1968, the Chief Whip argued that the government should offer 'maximum concessions compatible with their vital political interests'; he further argued that the government 'should seek for policies which would isolate the extremists and rally moderates on both sides'.[6] We know from other research that O'Neill was continually worried about British opinion and pressure from the British government, as O'Donnell (2007: 265) states, 'maintaining a good image of Northern Ireland in Britain and abroad appeared more important to O'Neill at this stage [1966] than did domestic opinion'. However, what this shows is that the Unionist government had a political opportunity structure of its own and saw threats from the fall-out from the civil rights march.

Therefore, the cycle was actually one of mobilisation–repression–more mobilisation–reform–more mobilisation–more repression. It is in analysing this cycle that the role of the reforms announced in November 1968 becomes crucial. The reforms clearly change the political opportunity structure of the Civil Rights Movement, even if they did not satisfy all of the demands of the movement. They showed that the Northern Ireland government was more susceptible to their challenge that it had previously been seen to be, thereby reducing the threat of repressive state action. On the other hand, it is still necessary to ask: how did mobilisation continue and why did the situation escalate into further violence? One school of thought sees the reforms as 'too little, too late'. For example, Buckland (1981: 129) argues, 'By April 1969 … matters were moving out of control … In these circumstances political initiatives were almost irrelevant'. This school of thought might endorse Della Porta and Tarrow's (1986) findings that violence, even organised violence by terrorist organisations, is part of the mobilisation cycle and signals de-mobilisation as the various components of the social movement compete for supremacy.

Another possible interpretation uses the issues as the starting point for analysis. Thomas Hennessey argues that there were two distinct crises in the early phases of the Northern Ireland Troubles. First, there was the crisis caused by the Civil Rights Movement but this crisis, he argues, was over by 1969 when the Northern Ireland government conceded all of the demands of the civil rights leaders. It was the second crisis which caused the 30 years of violence in Northern Ireland and this was a crisis caused by the IRA's decision to start a war against the British. Hennessey is able to argue this because the issues begin to change after 1968; civil rights demands begin to change into 'national demands'. Overall, these issue-driven explanations assume that it was issues that drove the escalating crisis and that if those issues been resolved then the civil rights campaign would not have escalated its mobilisation and the events which followed would not have happened. It is one

of the great counterfactuals of Northern Irish history. However, this interpretation is unconvincing because it does not take into consideration the extent to which the reforms failed to satisfy the Civil Rights Movement. As Ó Dochartaigh (1997: 30) argues: 'Few in the Civil Rights Movement in Derry saw them [the November 1968 reforms] as adequate.' Moreover, by November 1968 the demands of the Civil Rights Movement had begun to escalate and now included grievances about the police as a result of their experience of police action while they were making claims over the previous number of years (Ó Dochartaigh, 1997: 48–49). The reform package did nothing to address these new complaints. The discussion above allows us to understand more fully the interaction between the issues which drove the civil rights mobilisation and the role of the state in that mobilisation.

Unionist Politics and the Crisis

However, we want to know a little more than simply what policies the state implemented in response to the claims of the Civil Rights Movement. We need to know why the state responded in such a way. Laitin (2007: 24–25) warns against reading too much into the claims of activists: 'people caught in the throws of a civil war fought in their name are trying to make sense of the war; they are not, as too many journalists imply, making causal claims'. Nevertheless, it is *because* Unionists are trying to make sense of the crisis that their statements and speeches are interesting. We need to understand how the key political actors controlling the state understand the unfolding situation and how these understandings influence their policies. Moreover, the Goldstone and Tilly (2001) model makes some assumptions about the interests of the state which we may want to question in our specific case (and perhaps even more generally). The main assumption is that the state is primarily interested in stopping mobilisation and preventing the challenge posed by social movements from escalating into all-out revolution. Undoubtedly the Northern Ireland government also wanted these things but these were not the only pressures on it. Looking closely at these pressures allows us to describe the state's role more accurately.

Mulholland (2000a: 141) describes Unionist attitudes towards discrimination as 'defensive rather than aggressive' and remarks on their 'striking … inadequacy'. The initial response by Unionists to the claims made by Nationalists was twofold. Firstly, they contested the claims of discrimination. Secondly, the claims of discrimination were played off against the need for improved community relations. It was only later, when the Civil Rights Movement had escalated its campaign and taken to the streets, that Unionists began to frame the debate in terms of a crisis of law and order. As the stability of the state was undermined and it slowly lost control of law and order and was unable to guarantee the safety of its citizens, then the Unionist government came under pressure not only from the Civil Rights Movement but also from its own supporters and a growing number of Unionist challengers. Desmond Boal provides an interesting example of the tensions within much of Unionist thinking on the Civil Rights Movement. In a speech in the House of Commons, he framed

his contribution by outlining two 'personal principles of philosophy'. The first was that he abhorred 'the use of force or the threat of the use of force for the accomplishment or attainment of political ends'.[7] The second was: 'in a country, in a community or a society which is ruled over by a democratically elected legislature, and by an executive which is responsible to it, it is the duty of everyone in that community, without reference to who he is or what he is, to obey the law of that community'.[8] Following the logic of his argument through, he went on to argue:

> if a so-called civil rights movement demonstration is peaceful and does not either threaten the use of force or use force, then is it right for me in any way to object to the manifestation of such a feeling? … I hold firmly to the belief that the civil rights movement, misguided though it may be, has got a perfect right to move through the streets of this community and express itself politically in whatever way it chooses as long as it observes the particular principles I have mentioned and have delineated to this House.[9]

When the civil rights campaign turned into a law and order crisis, this enabled Unionists to interpret the challenge in terms of a challenge to the state. In many ways this reflects the changes in interpretation which were occurring within the Civil Rights Movement itself; Bosi (2006) shows how the escalation of the campaign changed the 'master frame' from the new frame of the early civil rights rhetoric to the 'old' frame of communal conflict. It was the crisis prompted by the events of October 1968 and its aftermath that allowed this shift to occur. As Terence O'Neill remarked in 1972: 'There we were in November 1968, the activities of the Civil Rights movement appeared to the Party to be nearly treasonable' (O'Neill, 1972: 106).

   A crucial aspect of this discussion is the role of Unionist divisions. The question is this: did the Civil Rights Movement exploit divisions within the Unionist establishment or did they create divisions within the Unionist establishment? The answer is probably a combination of the two factors; there were pre-existing Unionist divisions not necessarily apparent to contemporary observers but it took the political crisis caused by the Civil Rights Movement to make these divisions salient. On the one hand, the comparative literature would suggest the first explanation; as Goldstone (2001: 146) points out:

> It is now a truism, but worth restating, that fiscally and militarily sound states that enjoy the support of united elites are largely invulnerable to revolution from below. Popular misery and widespread grievances tend to produce pessimism, passive resistance, and depression, unless the circumstances of states and elites encourage actors to envision a realistic possibility of change.

Moreover, as the timing of the split within the regime is coterminous with the challenge of the Civil Rights Movement, it seems therefore unlikely that the Civil Rights Movement created those divisions.

On the other hand, the divisions within the regime existed prior to the crisis of the 1960s but were not necessarily obvious to outside observers. However, since then we have been able to appreciate the different types of divisions within the Unionist elite. There are two approaches to the study of Unionist divisions. One sees division as a result of ideological structures (see, for example, Todd, 1987) while the other sees divisions as a result of structural factors (see, for example, Bew *et al.*, 1996). The evidence from debates and discussions at the time, while not ruling out structural divisions, does give more credence to the view that ideological divisions were more salient at this time. Mulholland (2000b) and Wright (1973), for example, argue that Unionists were divided between those who were looking to accommodate Catholics in Northern Ireland through the resolution of some of the civil rights issues and inclusion in party structures, for example, and those who saw the civil rights demands as a threat to Northern Ireland. The debate over the Cameron Report is interesting in how it allows these divisions to become clear. The Cameron Commission was established in March 1969 by the Unionist government to investigate the causes of the disturbances of 1968. It reported in September 1969 and its Report represents a useful summary of events and issues that formed the backdrop to the crisis. Robin Bailie, who would be an 'assimilationist' Unionist, argued:

> As the Prime Minister [Chichester-Clarke] said, it was never the intention of the founders of this State to have a sectional country … In addition to the reforms that are necessary, one must recognise that one of the great problems in this community has been the fact that the minority has not been represented in government.[10]

O'Neill's (1969: 141) public interpretation of the events of October and November 1968 is interesting: 'In Londonderry and other places recently, a minority of agitators determined to subvert lawful authority played a part in setting light to highly flammable material. But the tinder for that fire, in the form of grievances real or imaginary, had been piling up for years.' There is also evidence that senior members of the Unionist Party thought that the Catholic grievances were justified. In a letter which O'Neill circulated to the cabinet, Edmund Warnock wrote:

> If ever a community had a right to demonstrate against a denial of civil rights, Derry is the finest example. A Roman Catholic and Nationalist city has for three or four decades been administered (and none too fairly administered) by a Protestant and Unionist majority secured by a manipulation of the Ward boundaries for the sole purpose of retaining Unionist control.[11]

On the other hand, Norman Laird placed the general causes in terms of a long term challenge to the state: 'Surely the reasons for this situation are fundamental and if properly explored would show very clearly the destructive forces with which this country has always been faced.'[12] Harry West also gave a similar argument:

> He [Nationalist MP Thomas Gormley] posed a very important question – what does the world think of Northern Ireland today? When he considers this question he must consider it against the background of the cause of the unrest during the past 50 years and particularly during the past few months. It has all been aimed at undermining and destroying the Constitution of this country.[13]

This discussion implies that we need something more than a model which merely describes the government–challenger interaction. Instead we need a model which accounts for the way in which decisions were taken in response to pressure both from the Civil Rights Movement and from the Unionist grassroots.[14] How then did the divisions within the Unionist elites impact on the crisis? One of the more influential explanations for the outbreak of the Troubles placed Unionist divisions at the heart of the account (Bew *et al.*, 1996). It took O'Neill until November 1968 to announce reforms designed to satisfy the demands of the Civil Rights Movement. The reason why these reforms were so slow in coming was largely because of opposition to the reforms from within the Unionist Party (see Patterson & Kaufmann, 2007: 63–88). Robin Bailie argued: 'The reforms should have come earlier and those who opposed the reforms at an earlier stage have a fair measure of blame to take for the events that have caused the present trouble in Northern Ireland.'[15] Moreover, the evidence from the cabinet discussions is that reforms, when they did come, were pushed through reluctantly because of anticipated opposition (see also Bloomfield, 2007: 170–171).

The Role of Paisley

How did these ideological divisions become salient in the general mobilisation processes which characterised the crisis? I wish to argue that political elites have a significant role. One of the more commonsensical explanations for the outbreak of civil wars is Michael Brown's taxonomy. Brown argued that there were four main proximate causes for the outbreak of internal conflicts, elite or mass triggered conflicts and internally or externally driven conflicts, and that therefore there are four main types of causes: bad leaders, bad neighbours, bad domestic problems, or bad regional problems (Brown, 1996: 579). He argued that 'most major, active internal conflicts were triggered by internal, elite-level forces' (Brown, 1996: 583). Brown's arguments have been supported by research by others; for example, Gagnon (1994/95: 164) argued:

> The current major conflicts taking place along ethnic lines throughout the world have as their main causes not ancient hatreds, but rather the purposeful actions of political actors who actively create violent conflict, selectively drawing on history in order to portray it as historically inevitable.

Interestingly, Brown (1996: 582) placed Northern Ireland in the 'bad domestic problems' box, meaning that the conflict was mass triggered and internally driven.

Again, this fits with the standard narrative of the crisis as emerging from the challenge to the Northern Irish state and its inability to reform itself. However, there is something to be said for an analysis which looks for the role of political leaders. What did political leaders in Northern Ireland do to influence the situation?

We could argue that the Civil Rights Movement created a security dilemma which triggered a spiral of mobilisation which led to violence. As Brubaker and Laitin (1998: 437–438) point out, the problem with this, as is the problem with most international relations inspired approaches to ethnic conflict, is that it treats ethnic groups as unitary actors. Nevertheless, this 'security dilemma' interpretation can be seen in an extract from the speech of James Chichester-Clarke (Prime Minister at the time):

> may I, through you [the Speaker], Sir, address a few words to those hon. Members opposite, whose presence in this House to play their proper, and indeed, indispensable part I so heartily welcome? 'You must accept that fear and suspicion in this community of ours has never been one-sided. A fear which one does not share and may not understand can often seen absurd, but that does not make it less real…' [*sic*].[16]

The Cameron Commission (1969: Chapter 16, paragraph 7) also proposed this interpretation:

> Fears and apprehensions among Protestants of a threat to Unionist domination and control of Government by increase of Catholic population and powers, inflamed in particular by the activities of the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee and the Ulster Protestant Volunteers, provoked strong hostile reaction to civil rights claims as asserted by the Civil Rights Association and later by the People's Democracy which was readily translated into physical violence against Civil Rights demonstrators.

However, we noted earlier that the Civil Rights Movement created alternative responses within the Unionist elite. In this way, a security dilemma was not created within Unionism as a whole. Moreover, in pre-1969 Northern Ireland there was not a security dilemma in the way in which Posen (1993) initially developed the concept in relation to ethnic conflict. Neither Unionists nor Nationalists feared for their physical security on a daily basis. Instead, the security dilemma, such as it did exist, was framed and promoted by political actors. If this was the case, then the emphasis shifts to the counter-mobilisation which took place: why did this occur and what role did it have in the escalating crisis?

Paisley's role in the crisis is crucial because it was he, more so than challengers to O'Neill within the Unionist Party, who mobilised people against the Civil Rights Movement. He did this through many of the features of McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's (2001: 38–49) dynamic mobilisation model. The story of how Nationalists were mobilised through the Civil Rights Movement is quite well established. However, it was the counter-mobilisation of Unionists which was to turn the challenge of the

Civil Rights Movement into a crisis. It is clear that Paisley is the political leader who fulfilled this role. The difference between the role of Paisley and the role of the Unionist Party is striking. Although there is plenty of evidence to show grassroots Unionist dissatisfaction with the general trend of policy and political events, this dissatisfaction was being mediated through the established institutions of the Unionist Party and the Orange Order (see Patterson & Kaufmann, 2007, for these internal party dynamics). During the 1960s both of these institutions had liberal and reformist political leaders, Terence O'Neill and Sir George Clarke respectively. This meant that there was an obvious opening for someone like Paisley to mobilise people outside these institutions. It is noteworthy that none of the other leading contenders seemed prepared to try and mobilise support outside the party until much later in the crisis (see Mulholland, 2000a: 115–128). Both the West Ulster Unionist Council and Vanguard started as factions within the Unionist Party and were formed late on in the crisis, in 1970 and 1972 respectively. Indeed, both Harry West (leader of WUUC) and William Craig (leader of Vanguard) were critics and challengers of O'Neill, Chichester-Clark, and Faulkner, but were critics from within the party. As O'Neill (1972: 106) remarked caustically in his memoirs: 'Craig [was] playing the role of the only – or nearly the only – man in the Cabinet who could "save Ulster".'

If Paisley was the political leader who organised the Unionist counter-mobilisation, is he an ethnic entrepreneur in the same category as, for example, Milosevic? Oddly, Paisley has rarely been analysed as an ethnic entrepreneur. This is perhaps because his motivations have seemed relatively straightforward and, most importantly, not driven by a personal interest in power, wealth or prestige. He has been seen as an ideologically motivated politician, whose ideology was informed by his religion. Indeed, the charge that a politician was simply interested in wealth or power was one of the more serious charges which Paisley could bring. He has not been seen as an office or power seeking politician and many authors place him firmly in the independent Unionist tradition (Bruce, 2007: 71–72; Walker, 2004: 157). His career has been defined by the twin concerns of religion and politics and the crisis of the 1960s was crucial for his career in both. Because Paisley's politics has been defined by his religion, it has made analysing his positions in the 1960s very straightforward. As Bruce (2007: 174) argues:

> It is certainly the case that the founding principles of church and party are similar and reinforcing: religious elites are not to be trusted with the preservation of the true gospel, and political elites are not to be trusted with the defence either of the character of Northern Ireland or of its place in the United Kingdom.

However, the question becomes: what was the relationship between Paisley's political aspirations and his political activities? Was Paisley seeking merely to influence policy or was he seeking power in order to make policy?

Paisley's role in violence has been one which has been a contested issue for some time. Bruce (2007: 209–245) defends Paisley against accusations that he directly or indirectly caused violence. However, in many ways Bruce phrases the question

wrongly. Paisley's methods for obtaining political power were polarising. Moreover, he was responsible, more than O'Neill's critics within the Unionist Party, for framing the issues in a polarising manner. He made the reform of the Northern Irish state a struggle between Unionism and Nationalism. There are two aspects of Paisley's politics that are relevant here. The first is his modus operandi, in other words, how he attempted to influence policy. The second is his rhetoric, or how he tried to persuade people to follow him.

Paisley's method of political protest is as important as his message. Like most challengers to established political orders who do not invent new repertoires of contention (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 16), Paisley drew on long-established methods of street and religious protest in Ulster and Northern Ireland, or as Graham Walker (2004: 159) has described it, 'a form of evangelical vaudeville'. While there is no evidence or suggestion that he organised riots or consciously organised protests with the intention that there would be subsequent violence (Bruce, 2007), his methods of making contentious claims were confrontational and risked public disorder. As the Cameron Commission (1969: chapter 16, paragraph 13) argued, 'the deliberate and organised interventions by followers of Major Bunting and the Rev. Dr. Paisley, especially in Armagh, Burntollet and Londonderry, substantially increased the risk of violent disorder on occasions when Civil Rights demonstrations or marches were to take place, [and] were a material contributory cause of the outbreaks'. Paisley organised counter-demonstrations, thereby consciously bringing people onto the streets in opposition to each other. An *Irish Times* (4 October 1968) editorial commenting on the decision by Craig to ban the march remarked: 'A formula has now been patented. Whenever the Northern Government wishes to ban a demonstration it can rely on its Unionist lunatic fringe to come to its rescue. Mr. Paisley might offer his services as a permanent foot in the door of Nationalist demonstration.' Paisley stopped the first civil rights march from going into Dungannon town centre in August 1968 but the events surrounding the march by QUB students to Belfast City Hall on 9 October 1968 are a good illustration of the lengths to which he had to go to prevent civil rights marches from occurring. The students organised a march and Paisley countered with a demonstration. The People's Democracy were prevented by the police from marching via Shaftesbury Square by a Paisley protest. In this instance Paisley argued that the march did not reflect the wishes of the residents of Sandy Row and, according to the *Newsletter* reporter 'intimated their intention of carrying out the motto "They Shall Not Pass"' (*Newsletter*, 10 October 1968). The students changed their route but were prevented from reaching the City Hall, where Paisley's protest had re-assembled. They staged a sit-down protest which ended peacefully when the government agreed to send representatives to the Queen's University Belfast Students' Union to receive their demands. It was at this protest that the People's Democracy was formed (see Arthur, 1974).

Paisley replicated these tactics when a civil rights march was proposed through Armagh on 30 November 1968. The Ulster Constitutional Defence Committee (UCDC) organised a counter-protest and issued a series of threatening posters and

leaflets. The Cameron Commission (1969: chapter 8) reported: 'This series of proposed counter measures leaves no room for doubt that Dr. Paisley was threatening violent opposition to the proposed Civil Rights march.' Paisley arrived in Armagh at 1am before RUC measures to prevent him and his supporters getting into the city were in place. The city spent the day in a state of unease and tension as police struggled to keep the two factions apart. When the civil rights protestors dispersed Paisley held a 'victory march'. These two events, a month and a half apart, demonstrate how Paisley sought to confront various groups of civil rights protestors. It should also be noted that these confrontations occurred in the context of the widespread violence and rioting resulting from the 5 October 1968 civil rights march in Derry.

Combined with the method of protest, Paisley's rhetoric also played a role in the escalating crisis. A key part of the mobilisation process is the attribution of threats and opportunities. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly do not see threats and opportunities as objective structural factors but instead have to be attributed by agents. This attribution is 'an activating mechanism responsible in part for the mobilisation of previously inert populations' (McAdam *et al.*, 2001: 43). Paisley's rhetoric throughout the 1960s was to interpret political and religious developments as threats to Protestant ethnic interests. Timing is crucial here. Paisley had been involved in or organised various anti-ecumenical protests since the 1950s but remained a minor religious player until 1966. Walker (2004: 159) argues: 'In 1966 Paisley was transformed from an irritant in the wings to a centre-stage scene-stealer, largely through the rise in inter-communal tensions surrounding the Republican commemorations of the 50th anniversary of the Easter Rising.' What is significant is his inability to mobilise large numbers of people over his religious concerns. It took a political issue as a trigger to launch Paisley as a more significant figure. In other words, people did not respond when he attributed threats to the ecumenical movement but they did respond when he attributed a threat to the political commemorations of the Easter Rising. However, the question is whether people turned to Paisley because of the inter-communal tensions, or whether Paisley's position changed because he was able to use the inter-communal tensions? That question is almost unanswerable.

It is Paisley's rhetoric which has attracted most attention over the years. Hennessey (2005: 380) argues: 'His [Paisley's] power came from his oratory. It is only when one hears the power and emotion in that voice that one can comprehend how he stirred emotions in some.' In many ways Paisley is the paradigm of the ethnic outbidder. Ethnic outbidding is a widely recognised mechanism whereby each intra-group faction seeks to demonstrate that it is more hardline than other factions, thereby gaining electoral and popular support. It is usually discussed in relation to ethnic electoral politics (Chandra, 2002, 2005; Horowitz, 1985; Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972). We saw above how parliamentary Unionists interpreted the crisis as a law and order one. Paisley was much more explicit in how he framed the issues. One article in the *Protestant Telegraph* (19 October 1968) in the aftermath of the 5 October 1968 march carried the headline 'C.R.A = I.R.A.'. Two other events occurred in the 1960s which allowed Paisley to place the Civil Rights Movement into an ethnic interpretative frame which

threatened the existence of the Union. The first was the 1966 commemorations of the 1916 Easter Rising and the second was the O'Neill–Lemass meetings.

   What is unusual about Paisley's challenge to the established political elite is that he made his challenge from outside established political structures. It is significant that he started off in both of the main Unionist institutions – the Unionist Party and the Orange Order – but found the avenues to political influence closed to him. As he stated: 'I do not happen to be a member of the Orange Institution. I resigned from that honourable Institution because the Unionist Party had got its bosses into office and were using the Orange Institution for its own political ends. That is something to which I object.'[17] Indeed, Paisley established a bewildering number of organisations and institutions throughout the 1960s. There are a number of significant points about these various organisations. The first is their political nature. Bruce (2007: 90) argues:

> Chronology is important for understanding the religious core of Paisleyism: the movement pre-dated the Civil Rights movement. The FPCU [Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster] did not grow as a result of Protestants reacting to evidence of increased Catholic nationalist assertiveness. The political crisis that created fertile conditions for the growth of the Church was the earlier struggle between O'Neill's secular and reformist Unionism and Paisley's traditionalist stand.

However, despite the close connection between the growth of Paisley's church and political events, Paisley had to establish *political* institutions in order to channel his mobilisation. The religious institutions of the Free Presbyterian Church were not enough for Paisley to achieve political power.

   The second point is the sheer number of organisations, their structure and their lack of longevity. The 'Paisleyite Movement' consisted, according to RUC sources, of the Ulster Constitutional Defence Committee, the Ulster Protestant Volunteer Division, the Ulster Volunteer Force, the Ulster Defence Corps, and Ulster Protestant Action (O'Callaghan & O'Donnell, 2006: 211). Given that all these organisations were political or quasi-paramilitary in nature and not religious, quite why five organisations were needed is not clear. Perhaps more importantly, these groups were short-lived. Ulster Protestant Action (UPA) was merged into the Protestant Unionist Party, which in turn was transformed into the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in 1971. However, the remaining quasi-paramilitary or paramilitary organisations faded relatively quickly. Indeed, Paisley had to form new ones such as Ulster Resistance at a later stage.

   The third significant point about Paisley's new organisations is that they were not brokerage institutions. In other words, they were not bringing about linkages between people of different backgrounds or ideas. Almost all of Paisley's organisations were built upon conservative evangelical networks and involved members of the Free Presbyterian church. Even the establishment of the DUP in 1971, which supposedly institutionalised the rural religious base of Paisley with the urban working class base of Boal, was dominated by Free Presbyterians until relatively recently. Indeed, if we see the DUP as an example of Paisley attempting to establish a brokerage institution, it is a relative failure.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to move the debate on the origins of the Troubles away from narrative historical accounts which fail to specify how change occurs. I have argued for a dynamic understanding of the interactions between political actors and have looked at the role of political leaders in the developing crisis. This raises serious questions about Hennessey's (2005: 394) argument when he suggests that 'Perhaps the violence of 1969 was inevitable: tribal warfare in a tribal society'. The violence of 1969 was a product of the interaction between the claims of the Civil Rights Movement and the state's inability to respond. The state's inaction, coupled with political changes at the North–South level, increased the perceived opportunities for the Civil Rights Movement, which took its campaign onto the streets. The attempted repression of the Northern Ireland government was ineffective at increasing the Civil Rights Movement's perceived costs of mobilisation and it was forced to grant concessions in order to change the political opportunity structure. That this was ineffective was in large part due to the changing dynamics of the contention. The dynamics of violence in 1969 was between Protestant and Catholic, as the previous axis of contention (between the state and the civil rights protestors) became subsumed in this broader dynamic. Why had it changed into this axis of contention? That was due to the counter-mobilisation of Paisley, which framed the contention in this way. Moreover, this counter-mobilisation was also important at an earlier stage of the process insofar as it constrained the ability of the government to make concessions at an earlier stage in the emerging crisis, although the evidence to suggest that it would have made these concessions is not at all clear.

Acknowledgements

Notes

1. Stormont debates, 28 October 1964, Vol. 58, col. 104.
2. Stormont debates, 4 March 1969, Vol. 72, col. 20.
3. Public Records Office Northern Ireland (PRONI) Conclusions of a meeting of the cabinet held at Stormont Castle on Thursday 20 November 1968, CAB4/1418.
4. PRONI: Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 14 October 1968, CAB 4/1406.
5. Ibid.
6. PRONI: Conclusions of a meeting of the cabinet held at Stormont Castle on Thursday 14 November 1968, Cab4/1414.
7. Stormont Hansard, 4 December 1968, Vol. 70, col. 2190.
8. Ibid., col. 2191.
9. Ibid., col. 2193.
10. Stormont debates, 30 September 1969, Vol. 74, col. 29.

11. PRONI Letter from Edmond Warnock to Terence O'Neill, 13 November 1968, CAB/4/1414, 14 November 1968. See also Mulholland (2000a: 142).
12. Stormont debates, 30 September 1969, Vol. 74, col. 35.
13. Ibid., col. 55.
14. This is similar to Putnam's (1988) 'two level game' model. However, his model is applied to negotiations and includes specifications of 'win-sets' and includes mechanisms for ratification. While the process may be similar, we are more interested here in the pressures on policy.
15. Stormont debates, 30 September 1969, Vol. 74, col. 26.
16. Stormont debates, 30 September 1969, Vol. 74, col. 12 (punctuation as in original).
17. Stormont Hansard, 29 April 1970, Vol. 70, col. 2006.

References

Almond, G. A. (1973) Approaches to developmental causation, in: G. A. Almond, S. C. Flanagan & R. J. Mundt (Eds) *Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development,* pp. 1–42 (Boston: Little, Brown & Company).

Arthur, P. (1974) *The People's Democracy 1968–1973* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press).

Bew, P., Gibbon, P. & Patterson, H. (1996) *Northern Ireland 1921–1996: Political Forces and Social Classes* (London: Serif).

Birnir, J. K. (2007) *Ethnicity and Electoral Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Bloomfield, K. (2007) *A Tragedy of Errors: The Government and Misgovernment of Northern Ireland* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press).

Bosi, L. (2006) The dynamics of social movement development: Northern Ireland's civil rights movement in the 1960s, *Mobilisation,* 11(1), pp. 81–100.

Brown, M. (1996) The causes and regional dimensions of internal conflict, in: M. Brown (Ed.) *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict,* pp. 571–601 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press).

Brubaker, R. & Laitin, D. (1998) Ethnic and nationalist violence, *Annual Review of Sociology,* 24, pp. 423–452.

Bruce, S. (2007) *Paisley: Religion and Politics in Northern Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Buckland, P. (1981) *A History of Northern Ireland* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan).

Cameron Commission (1969) *Disturbances in Northern Ireland: Report of the Commission appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland,* Northern Ireland Cmd 532 (Belfast: HMSO).

Chandra, K. (2002) *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Chandra, K. (2005) Ethnic parties and democratic stability, *Perspectives on Politics,* 3(2), pp. 235–252.

Davies, J. C. (1962) Towards a theory of revolution, *American Sociological Review,* 27(1), pp. 5–19.

Della Porta, D. & Tarrow, S. (1986) Unwanted children: political violence and the cycle of protest in Italy, 1966–1973, *European Journal of Political Research,* 14(5–6), pp. 607–632.

Dixon, P. (2001) *Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace* (Basingstoke: Palgrave).

English, R. (2003) *Armed Struggle: A History of the IRA* (London: Macmillan).

Foran, J. (1993) Theories of revolution revisited: toward a fourth generation?, *Sociological Theory,* 11(1), pp. 1–20.

Gagnon, V.P. Jr. (1994/95) Ethnic nationalism and international conflict: the case of Serbia, *International Security,* 19(3), pp. 130–166.

Goldstone, J. A. (2001) Toward a fourth generation of revolutionary theory, *Annual Review of Political Science,* 4, pp. 139–187.

Goldstone, J. A. (2003) Comparative historical analysis and knowledge accumulation in the study of revolutions, in: J. Mahoney & D. Rueschemeyer (Eds) *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences,* pp. 41–90 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Goldstone, J. A. & Tilly, C. (2001) Threat (and opportunity): popular action and state repression in the dynamics of contentious action, in: R. R. Aminzade, J. A. Goldstone, D. McAdam, E. J. Perry,

W. H. Sewell Jr, S. Tarrow & C. Tilly (Eds) *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics,* pp. 179–194 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Hegre, H., Ellingsen, T., Gates, S. & Gleditsch, N. J. (2001) Toward a democratic civil peace? Democracy, political change and civil war, 1816–1992, *American Political Science Review,* 95(1), pp. 33–48.

Hennessey, T. (2005) *Northern Ireland: The Origins of the Troubles* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan).

Horowitz, D. (1985) *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press).

Laitin, D. D. (2007) *Nations, States and Violence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. & Tilly, C. (2001) *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

McGarry, J. & O'Leary, B. (1995) *Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images* (Oxford: Blackwell).

Mulholland, M. (2000a) *Northern Ireland at the Crossroads: Ulster Unionism in the O'Neill years 1960–9* (Basingstoke: Macmillan).

Mulholland, M. (2000b) Assimilation versus segregation: Unionist strategy in the 1960s, *Twentieth Century British History,* 1(3), pp. 284–307.

O Dochartaigh, N. (1997) *From Civil Rights to Armalites: Derry and the Birth of the Irish Troubles* (Cork: Cork University Press).

O'Callaghan, M. & O'Donnell, C. (2006) The Northern Ireland Government, the 'Paisleyite Movement' and Ulster Unionism in 1966, *Irish Political Studies,* 21(2), pp. 203–222.

O'Donnell, C. (2007) Pragmatism versus unity: the Stormont government and the 1966 Easter Commemoration, in: M. Daly & M. O'Callaghan (Eds) *Commorating 1916 in 1966,* pp. 239–271 (Dublin: RIA Press).

O'Leary, B. & McGarry, J. (1996) *The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland* (2nd ed.) (London: Athlone Press).

O'Neill, T. (1969) *Ulster at the Crossroads* (London: Faber & Faber).

O'Neill, T. (1972) *The Autobiography of Terence O'Neill* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis).

Patterson, H. & Kaufmann, E. (2007) *Unionism and Orangeism in Northern Ireland since 1945: The Decline of the Loyal Family* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

Posen, B. (1993) The security dilemma and ethnic conflict, *Survival,* 35(1), pp. 27–47.

Prince, S. (2006) The global revolt of 1968 and Northern Ireland, *The Historical Journal,* 49(3), pp. 851–875.

Prince, S. (2007) *Northern Ireland's '68: Civil Rights, Global Revolt and the Origins of the Troubles* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press).

Purdie, B. (1990) *Politics in the Streets: The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press).

Putnam, R. D. (1988) Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, *International Organization,* 42(3), pp. 427–460.

Rabushka, A. & Shepsle, K. A. (1972) *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability* (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill).

Ruane, J. & Todd, J. (1996) *The Dynamics of the Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict and Emancipation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Ruane, J. & Todd, J. (2004) The roots of intense ethnic conflict may not in fact be ethnic: categories, communities and path dependence, *European Journal of Sociology,* 45(2), pp. 209–232.

Stewart, A. T. Q. (1977) *The Narrow Ground: Aspects of Ulster 1609–1969* (London: Faber & Faber).

Tarrow, S. (1998) *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (2nd ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Tilly, C. & Tarrow, S. (2007) *Contentious Politics* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm).

Todd, J. (1987) Two traditions in Unionist political culture, *Irish Political Studies,* 2(1), pp. 1–26.

Walker, G. (2004) *A History of the Ulster Unionist Party: Protest, Pragmatism and Pessimism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

Wright, F. (1973) Protestant ideology and politics in Ulster, *European Journal of Sociology,* 14, pp. 213–280.