THE SURVIVAL OF LEADERS AND ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DIGITAL AGE: LESSONS FROM THE CHILEAN STUDENT MOVEMENT[*]

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This article analyzes the impacts of the process of appropriation of social media on social movement organizations and leaders. It focuses on the case of the Chilean student movement and the cycle of protests that began in 2011. The analysis is based on a multimethods approach, bringing together content analysis of qualitative interviews and focus groups, and three years of network data on Twitter users. It shows that the appropriation of Twitter not only reproduced but actually reinforced preexisting asymmetries among actors. However, during the period studied, organizations put in motion control strategies to try to overcome these asymmetries and to use them to their advantage. Paradoxically, some of these led to greater asymmetries instead of greater equalization. Social movement theories on organizational forms and internal democracy demonstrate the continuous relevance of the "paradoxes of participation," as social movements include new digital technologies in their traditional repertoires.

In 2011, a wave of protests shook the Chilean political landscape. Led by university students and triggered by a delay in the payment of public grants, protests became massive, surprising even the organizers (Urra Rossi 2012: 27). In spite of important mobilizations in the country's recent past, especially those led by Mapuche groups (Bidegain 2017), the overall view of Chile, publicized by scholars and by national authorities, was that this was a country that had remained oblivious to the rise of contentious politics among its neighbors and in other regions of the world (Silva 2009: 258; von Bülow and Donoso 2017). The student movement changed that view. As this article was written, in early 2017, mobilizations were still ongoing amidst highly divisive debates about educational reforms in the national congress.

Between 2011 and 2016, students called dozens of nationwide street protests and occupied schools and university buildings for lengthy periods. In parallel with this traditional repertoire of action, and aided by new digital technologies, actors adopted other protest tactics, such as flash mobs. In July of 2011, a student with no clear ties to any political or movement organization posted a call on Facebook to organize a "Genki Dama for Education" flash mob. A few days later, thousands of students participated in choreographies in various cities across the country, including the square in front of the presidential palace, in the capital city of Santiago[1]. Inspired by the Japanese televised series Dragon Ball, this flash mob featured the main fictional characters "fighting" in their costumes for better education in Chile.

Examples of this type of "do-it-yourself" protest organization could lead us to think that we are facing yet another example of the rise of the "personalization of political action" (Bennett and Segerberg 2013). In fact, a prominent argument from the recent literature on the

Internet and activism has been that the greater empowerment of individuals to act autonomously has diminished the relevance of formal organizations and leaders in mobilization processes (for example, see Clark 2016; Earl and Kimport 2011; González-Bailón, Borge-Holthoefer, and Moreno 2013; Shirky 2008).

However, other authors have questioned these assumptions. According to them, social movement organizations (SMOs) can transform their roles rather than disappear or become irrelevant. In doing so, some of them may become stronger instead of weaker (Bimber, Flanagin, and Stohl 2012). By the same token, leaders may change their roles but remain relevant in mobilization efforts (Gerbaudo 2012), and new forms of leadership may emerge around the organizational needs of social media management (Gerbaudo 2016; Hensby 2016).

The debate about the possibilities for survival of organizations and leaders in the digital age is an important and complicated one: important because of the potential impacts of the widespread use of new technologies on social movements and on their ability to mobilize, and complicated because of the fast changing characteristics and affordances of the digital tools available. So far, the empirical evidence supports both sides of the argument: the empowerment of individuals and self-organizing communities, as well as the transformation and survival of formal organizations and leadership roles.

Scholars need to overcome these opposing views by assuming that both processes do happen. They may occur simultaneously, sometimes in tension and sometimes complementing each other. I propose that, instead of debating whether organizations and leaders are still relevant or not, it is more fruitful to analyze the impacts of digital practices on the internal governance of SMOs. This article contributes to these key debates by focusing on the dilemmas faced by bureaucratic social movement organizations and their leaders, as well as the strategies they develop when facing these dilemmas.

The Chilean student organizations analyzed are bureaucratic in the sense proposed by Gamson (1990: 91), who characterizes an organization in this way if it has at least three elements: some type of written document that describes its purpose and operating procedures, a list of members, and three or more levels of internal division, such as officers, committees, and rank and file members (see also Staggenborg, 2013: 74). I add a fourth characteristic in this article: rotating leadership structures, with specific functions and predefined temporary mandates. While the bureaucratic form of organization has not been altered in fundamental ways in the past decades, access to digital technologies has changed the opportunities and settings for student activism. University students are native digitals, for whom the use of web-based platforms is a natural part of their daily lives. Such a duality between (old) traditional bureaucratic structures and (new) tech-savvy constituencies presents elected leaders with a dilemma: they need to maintain organizational control over framing and decision making, while at the same time taking full benefit of the potentials of digital technologies.

I argue that how actors face this dilemma is based on continuous experiments and innovations in digital practices. I understand the process of appropriation of digital technologies as a dynamic one of adaptation and innovation, whereby organizations integrate digital practices into their traditional repertoire of action and adapt their internal governance structures to the new demands of digital participation. The fast pace of changes in the digital tools available to them means that actors learn as they go. Furthermore, I argue that the appropriation of social media (such as Twitter and Facebook) presents movement leaders with new challenges, not all of which are perceived as positive, and to which they do not necessarily respond in the same way. The social movement literature on the "paradoxes of participation" (Philips 1991) and on the roles of organizations help shed light on the strategies implemented by SMOs as they include new digital technologies in their traditional repertoires. My findings show that asymmetries of power within a social movement can not only be reproduced but actually reinforced through the use of social media.

The empirical analysis draws from a multimethods approach that brings together social network data and the content analysis of qualitative interviews and focus groups. I analyze the uses of Twitter during specific periods to map the centrality of a key set of actors in retweet networks. I focus on this social media platform because of its specific affordances: the possibility of

comparing data on the centrality of individual (leaders) and organizational accounts in networks, as well as how their positions change through time. To better understand the heterogeneity of digital practices and their changes through time, I rely on qualitative data-gathering techniques. Between 2012 and 2016 I undertook fifty-four semistructured interviews with key informants. During this period, I also organized two focus groups, participated in dozens of open meetings and protest events, and undertook document analysis of meeting minutes.

PARADOXES OF PARTICIPATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE

As SMOs begin to appropriate social media, actors have to decide how to deal with the individualized nature of new digital tools in a collective action context. The various ways in which they do so are, in part, a matter of differences in the availability of resources. Maintaining an updated set of online platforms can be costly and time consuming (Treré and Cargnelutti 2014: 187-188). Most importantly, however, decisions on how to use social media relate to a key political dilemma. On the one hand, actors can maintain previous rules that allowed for control over the framing of demands and the decisions taken, and on the other hand, they can make the most of the flexibility, the speed of communication, and the reachability of these platforms, which potentially undermines that control.

This dilemma is not specific to SMOs. As the literature on online electoral campaigning has argued, there are "inherent tensions between a desire to maintain control over messages and resources and the generally decentralizing dynamic of web-based communication . . . while campaigns want to involve a large number of supporters, they also want to establish the terms of that involvement" (Foot and Schneider 2006: 6). However, for social movement organizations, such a dilemma can have greater salience and be harder to overcome, because of the historical relevance of internal democracy issues and the negotiated nature of hierarchical arrangements. Indeed, these have long been important and highly contentious matters of debate for social movement actors.

In cases such as the student movement and the women's movement, to mention only two examples, heated discussions about how to organize participation and ensure equal representation have shaped the history of these movements in the twentieth century. As Philips remarks in her assessment of these issues within the women's liberation movement in the US and the UK, "that each woman should be equally respected was almost a founding principle, and equal respect is hard to sustain where there are clearly leaders and led" (1991: 122). Thus, women's groups devised several strategies to ensure equalized participation. This effort, however, led to what Philips calls "the paradoxes of participation" (p. 126-146). By refusing to formalize decision-making rules, women's groups were also refusing to develop procedures for the accountability of de facto leaders and elites (p. 126-127). Similar arguments about the dangers of the invisibility of leaders had been previously presented in the famous article by Freeman (1970) on the "tyranny of structurelessness," and later by Melucci in his analysis of a broader set of cases (1996, esp. chapter 17). Regardless of how effective attempts at building horizontal relations have been, the fact remains that SMOs have historically attempted to reconcile centralized decision making and the moral imperative of internal democracy.

The new possibilities for participation opened by social media platforms have given a renewed impetus to these debates, because of the expectation that technological affordances would finally enable more horizontal, autonomous, and democratic forms of participation. Often, however, such arguments conflate the potential for horizontality with leaderless and organizationless collective action. To avoid this conflation, it is important to transform assumptions about the impacts of digital technologies on SMOs and leaders into empirical questions, and, at the same time, to situate this discussion in the larger theoretical debates about the definition of organizations, and their roles.

I follow della Porta in assuming a broad understanding of the roles of organizations, "both as mobilization agents and as spaces of deliberation and value construction" (2009: 3). SMOs

not only provide incentives and diminish collective action costs, needs that have arguably become less relevant with the availability of digital tools, but they also play key roles in collective identity formation (Gamson 1996), roles that might become more—not less—important in the fragmented and short-term environment of online participation[2].

Leaders' roles are also defined in broad terms in this article, as brokers that operate on various levels: between social movement organizations and the grassroots, among social movement actors of various types, and between these and external actors. Brokerage is a political role, in the sense that leaders are not mechanically acting as transmission belts on behalf of their constituents or organizations, but, as Mische argues, they are also, "like most mediators, reaping some personal benefits for themselves, even if these come in the non-material form of status, recognition, and/or a sense of personal efficacy" (2001: 139).

The digital activism literature has mostly focused on mobilization processes that showcase uses of digital technologies outside of formal social movement organizations, such as the uprisings in various Arab countries, the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States, and *Indignados* in Spain. However, even in these cases lies evidence of the continuing relevance of the "paradoxes of participation." Based on ethnographic research of the Egyptian revolution, *Indignados,* and Occupy Wall Street, Gerbaudo (2012) argues that, in spite of all the talk (by scholars and activists alike) about the creation of horizontal relations, these mobilizations remain embedded in asymmetries. Rather than networks without center, what Gerbaudo finds in his research are "core organizers" who are "for the most part invisible on the stage itself" (2012: 13).

More recently, the literature has pointed to the creation of hierarchies as a result of processes of appropriation of social media. For instance, in his analysis of the U.K. student protests of 2010/2011, Alexander Hensby argues that the creation of secret Facebook groups introduced new hierarchies within the movement, both because these excluded a great deal of participants and because of the asymmetrical participation in the groups themselves (2016: 9-11). Gerbaudo's (2016) analysis of the roles of "digital vanguards,", or the groups in charge of maintaining social media platforms in social movements, presents a different approach to the same problem.

Based on the case of the Chilean student movement, in this article I discuss the impacts of the appropriation of social media in internal power relations at two levels: between leaders within their own organizations, and among leaders from various organizations. More concretely, I identify organizational control strategies that seek to address new demands and tensions arising from the uses of Twitter. These control strategies seek to predetermine (formally or informally) who can speak ("post"), when, and how. Through them, organizations attempt to set rules and practices to control the visibility of specific individuals, as well as the contents and framing of the message.

At the same time, I show that the use of social media and the visibility they offer can present leaders with new opportunities and challenges that are not necessarily perceived as positive. When confronted with the possibility of 24/7 direct communication with a broad audience (for instance, with Twitter), leaders can further advance their own personal agenda and gain greater political clout. At the same time, they face increased pressure to account for their everyday actions and positions, both within their organizations and in their relation with social media users in general.

The tensions, dilemmas, and resulting strategies addressed in this article are not necessarily new. They are part of the daily power struggles of social movement organizations, and are related to the paradoxes of participation mentioned above. However, I focus here on how these strategies are put in motion when collective action incorporates new digital tools.

THE CHILEAN STUDENT MOVEMENT

In Chile, every university—public or private—charges tuition. The current educational system was established in the 1980s, during the military dictatorship (1973-1990). Following an economically liberal credo, the military regime made deep changes to the traditional educational system, one of the main goals of which was to promote a greater participation of the

private sector in the provision of educational services. After the democratic transition, successive governments led by the center-left coalition Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia invested more state resources in the educational system, aiming to improve the quality of the education and to extend its coverage (von Bülow and Bidegain 2015). However, these efforts maintained the basic structure set by the dictatorship, which privileged market provision and private funding (Cox 2003: 16). Furthermore, greater access to tertiary education in a context of weak regulation by the Chilean state led to important disparities in terms of the quality of education (Guzmán-Concha 2012: 4).

It is this educational system that the student movement has been denouncing and trying to change. In 2011, demands centered on criticisms of the student credit systems, and protestors denounced the (illegal, according to Chilean law) practices of profitmaking by low-quality universities. Progressively, the movement radicalized and broadened its demands, calling for the establishment of a new, public, and free system of education (Donoso 2017).

Between 2011 and 2016, over forty national-level street protests (and many more local rallies) were called by the Confederation of Chilean Students (Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile, or Confech), the national student body, which is comprised of around fifty university-level federations of students spread throughout the country.[3] In spite of the existence of this national-level organization, the most resourceful and politically relevant formal organizational actors are the university-level federations. Confech exists as an assembly of federation leaders that meets more or less regularly, but it does not have its own budget, national offices, or dedicated staff. The spokespeople for Confech are chosen for one-year mandates from among the presidents of federations. These, in turn, are elected by direct vote in their universities, in what are often contentious events. A myriad of collectives, informal groups, and political tendencies that range from anarchists, autonomists, communists, and socialists to various conservative strands fight fiercely among themselves for the direction of these federations (Mella Polanco, Ríos Jara, and Rivera Gallardo 2016).

Historically, street protests have been the most visible face of the student movement, but these are only part of a broad repertoire of contention. Since 2011, universities and schools have been paralyzed by students, who occupied dozens of buildings for long periods of time around the country. Students also held hunger strikes and created flash mobs. At the same time, they took the debate and the mobilizing efforts online, progressively blurring the online/offline divide. Through the use of a wide variety of web-based platforms (see table 1), student organizations, student leaders, and rank-and-file activists alike sought to achieve their goals, which ranged from supporting offline actions to denouncing police brutality (see table 2).

The continuous relevance of formal organizations and leadership, and the overlapping of online and offline actions, make it hard to fit the student movement in the available ideal types proposed by the literature on the Internet and activism. I build on the typology of collective action networks that Bennett and Segerberg (2013: 47-49) propose to show that the Chilean student movement is a good example of how these types can overlap and be put in motion simultaneously in a process of appropriation of digital technologies.

The collective action efforts around flash mobs, such as the one mentioned in the introduction to this article, are examples of "crowd enabled networks," which Bennett and Segerberg define as "organized by the crowd largely without central or 'lead' organizational actors" (2014: 46). Chilean students have used flash mobs intensively since 2011. Typically, individuals on the Internet or at student meetings launch the idea, and they then gather support from others in their online and offline networks (Ponce Lara and Miranda 2016). Students use social media platforms to popularize the event, build support, and organize its implementation. "Organizationally enabled networks" are, according to Bennett and Segerberg, those in which formal organizations are key actors, but that "offer greater choice over how people may engage" (2013: 48) in collective action. We can see these types of networks in action in the student movement in a variety of settings. For example, some Facebook groups are launched but not controlled by student organizations, and individuals interact freely and organize joint actions. Some of the networks created around flash mobs can also be characterized as "organizationally enabled," in

cases when student organizations play a relevant role. A good example is the "Thriller for Education" flash mob, the most popular flash mob to date, in which officials in charge of communications at the Federation of Students of the University of Chile (FECh) played an important coordinating role. They created a Facebook event, made contacts with other federations, and launched a call to find someone who could double for Michael Jackson. They also influenced the political framing of the event, with an emphasis on the symbolic relevance of the "zombies" as individuals in capitalist society that are dying alive because of the system[4].

The third type, "organizationally brokered networks," is defined by Bennett and Segerberg (2013) as those in which there is strong organizational coordination of action, and social technologies are used by organizations to manage participation and coordinate goals. This type is also commonly observed in the period studied. University federations called for street protests, with control over the date, the place, and the framing of calls for mobilization. However, this control has historically been based on specific rules. The roles and duties of federations are defined in statutory documents[5]. The student movement is based on a rotating leadership, which may or may not be reelected after mandates expire. This gives leadership a short timeframe, which is further limited because the time spent at the university (or at the high school) is restricted to a few years. The rotation of leaders has important implications for the debates about the impacts of the process of appropriation of social media on internal power relations, as we will see below.

METHODS AND DATA

The empirical analysis presented in the next sections draws from a multimethods approach. It brings together the analysis of the presence and ties among actors on Twitter through social network-analysis methods and visualization tools, the content analysis of qualitative interviews, focus groups, and documents, and notes from participant observation in student meetings and protests. Between 2012 and 2013, we gathered and analyzed Twitter data, and did a first round of interviews and participant observation activities. At the same time, we gathered data on how organizations used other platforms and Internet-based tools. At the end of 2013, we did two focus groups with leaders and those in charge of social media in university federations. In 2015 and 2016 we did a second round of semistructured interviews with a new cohort of elected leaders[6].

The strategy for data collection on the uses of Twitter focused on gathering information that would enable the analysis of the ability of different types of actors to broadcast their messages through retweets. First, we made a list of Twitter accounts of elected leaders (presidents, vice presidents and secretary generals of federations of students, as well as spokespeople of the high school associations), of organizations that formally represent students (university federations, the Confech, the national-level high school students' organizations), and of other political organizations created by students (party youths, political student organizations, and organizations dedicated to supporting the student movement) in 2011, 2012, and 2013. The number of accounts changed as more actors became Twitter users: the dataset includes twenty-nine leaders' accounts in 2011, thirty in 2012, and 51 in 2013. With respect to the number of organizations' accounts, the dataset includes forty-six Twitter accounts in 2011, 55 in 2012, and 59 in 2013 (of which thirty-seven are formal university and high school student organizations and twenty-two are "collectives" and other student organizations). Because of the rotation of student leaders, the list of personal accounts followed changed accordingly across time. The organizations' official accounts remained the same throughout the period studied.

We then generated a timeline of events and focused on the use of Twitter in weeks during which the Confech called national street protests. Thus, we identified thirteen events in 2011, five in 2012, and eight in 2013 (see the exact dates in the appendix)[7]. We tracked all mentions of the selected accounts during twenty-six weeks (three days before the demonstration, the day of the protest, and three days afterwards). We used a script generated with the programming language Ruby to produce the database of retweets, and then used Gephi, a social-network analysis and graph visualization software (Bastian, Heymann, and Jacomy 2009), to generate sociograms and to analyze the structure of the networks.

As Meraz and Papacharissi (2013: 140) explain, forwarding messages—retweets—may function as a form of endorsement, often raising the visibility of content and of the sender of the original message. Thus, we do not analyze all the messages related to the mobilization or to the student movement. We focused only on the messages retweeted from a selected list of accounts, which amounted to a total of 255,910 retweets in the period analyzed. Both our data collection method and network analysis differ from other research that is based on Twitter, which gathers data on broader communication networks to understand diffusion of information (e.g., González-Bailón et al. 2013) or focuses on the mentioning of specific hashtags to understand the impacts of these virtual communities on public policy (e.g., Jeffares 2014) or on protest (e.g., Clark 2016).

We conducted a total of fifty-four semistructured interviews with key leaders (presidents and vice presidents of federations), those in charge of social media within student movement organizations, and flash mob organizers in the capital city of Santiago and three other cities. The first round of interviews occurred in parallel with the collection and analysis of Twitter data. The second round of interviews, undertaken in 2015 and 2016, aimed at complementing the information and questioning key informants about the preliminary results of the field research. This sequencing of data gathering strategies allowed us to make better sense of the dynamic character of the process of appropriation of social media and of the control strategies that are an important part of this process. The contents of interviews and of documents produced between 2011 and 2016 (especially meeting minutes) were analyzed through a content analysis software. Excerpts were manually coded according to specific issues, such as "perceptions of the impacts of social media," "digital strategies," and "power relations within the student movement."

VARIETIES OF DIGITAL PRACTICES AND THE STUDENT MOVEMENT

During the previous wave of massive student protests in Chile, in 2006, the predominant social media platforms used to diffuse information and coordinate action were blogs and fotologs. According to surveys with Chilean youth, between 2009 and 2011 the percentage of users of fotologs diminished from 48% to 16% of respondents (Valenzuela 2012: 24). Fotologs and blogs were substituted in 2011 by official organizations' webpages and groups in Facebook, YouTube channels, and Twitter accounts, accessed through smartphones as well as computers. However, this process of incorporation of new digital platforms did not occur in the same way in every university student organization. Table 1 provides an overview of the asymmetrical way in which federations have incorporated some of the main web-based platforms, three years after the beginning of protests (September of 2014).

Table 1. University Federations and Internet Uses (main public platforms), 2014

Platforms	Usage
Websites	54% (n = 25) of the federations have either a website or a blog. However, 28% (n = 7) of these are inactive, either cancelled or without new content in the previous two years.
Twitter	74% (n = 34) of the federations have Twitter accounts. Of these, 35% (n = 12) existed before 2011. However, almost 15% (n = 5) were currently inactive in 2014 (no tweets) and 41% (n = 14) had tweeted an average of fewer than 10 tweets per month since their creation.
YouTube	Almost 37% (n = 17) of the federations have YouTube channels. 23% (n = 4) of these had been created before 2011. However, 65% (n = 11) were inactive in 2014.
Facebook Profiles	6% (n = 3) of the federations have Facebook profiles.
Fan Pages	70% (n = 32) of the federations have fan pages. Of these, only 15% (n = 5) existed before 2011. 25% (n = 8) have < 1,000 followers, and 10% (n = 3) have < than 300 followers.
–Total	76% (n = 35) of the federations have either a Facebook profile or a fan page.

Source: Own elaboration, based on searches in Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and federations' pages. Data gathered between September 1 and 8, 2014.

This is an incomplete map of Internet use because it only considers publicly available information. Missing are data on closed or secret Facebook groups. It is also limited to the most used platforms (according to the interviews). However, these data do offer important insights on the different uses of the Internet across student federations in the period considered.

The data in table 1 confirm the declining relevance of webpages and blogs through time. Although most federations maintain a website address (or a blog), many of these pages have become inactive, and some, interviewees said, only functioned as an online archive of meeting minutes and statutory documents. On the other hand, a large proportion of federations had Facebook pages (mostly fan pages), few of which existed before the 2011 mobilizations. The same can be said with respect to Twitter accounts. Most interesting, however, is that the data in table 1 show how asymmetric the incorporation of these digital tools have been among student federations. It is striking to note that this is true across all four platforms: while some federations had been extremely active, others had not. This is especially true in the cases of Twitter accounts and of YouTube channels. Although organizations felt compelled to create these tools, many did not use them or had difficulties keeping them updated through time. They became empty digital shells.

The data presented in table 2 gives us further insights on the variety of digital practices, with respect to some of the key goals of the student movement. This information is based on the answers given by twenty-three 2011-2013 leaders to the question of how they perceived the relevance of different platforms, on a scale that ranged from zero (not important), to ten (very important).

The answers provided by leaders when they were interviewed (mostly in 2014) confirm the diminished relevance of websites and blogs, in comparison with social media platforms. As one leader of the Catholic University Student Federation (FEUC) explained, this was not a natural process of decay. It was part of the strategic decision that Facebook should become the most relevant communication platform. The specific affordances of this social networking platform, especially the possibility of reaching out quickly and easily to the students of the university (as well as to students of other universities), helps to understand this change:

> This was a decision we made as soon as we were elected […], that the FEUC [Federation of Students of the Catholic University] website would only be important as a link to the Facebook page. [...] For example, when we approved a statement of support for what was going on at Universidad Central [Central University, the first university to mobilize, in April of 2011], we searched for all the students of that university on Facebook and we published our statement [on Facebook].[8]

For the leaders interviewed, at that moment in time Twitter and Facebook were most relevant regarding the diffusion of information about offline events. On the other hand, they also confirmed that these were not perceived as being so relevant for decision making on the movement´s strategies. When questioned about this, interviewees noted the security issues involved. In Chile, social media were neither banned nor demonized by the government (as in other countries), but interviewees denounced the hacking of their email accounts and assumed that their digital activities were closely scrutinized. Debates about sensitive and contentious issues within the movement were either limited to closed online groups, personal email exchanges, or offline meetings.

Personal email was perceived as important in the dialogue with actors outside the movement, for example as a channel to receive messages sent by the students´ families and other actors in solidarity with students. Also scoring high was the use of Twitter accounts and Facebook pages for denouncing profitmaking in universities and police repression.

When asked to compare their use of Twitter and Facebook, interviewees emphasized the differences between these two platforms. They argued that the social networks created and cultivated in them were different, because Twitter's ties were more diverse and potentially spread more rapidly to other actors. Furthermore, Twitter allowed for a more direct and quick communication with the mainstream media, which often used tweets as a source of information.

Table 2. Leaders' Average Perception on the Relevance of Selected Web Platforms according to Key Goals, on a scale of 0 (not important) to 10 (very important).

	Key Goals				
Web Platform	*Diffusion of event information (e.g., demonstrations)*	*Debate and opinion exchange among students*	*Denouncing (made/received by movement)*	*Decisions on movement's strategies*	*Dialogue with actors outside movement*
Personal email	5	4.5	5.8	6.8	8.4
Institutional email	7.1	4.5	6.8	5.6	7.7
Personal Twitter	8.2	5.6	7.4	3.0	6.7
Institutional Twitter	8.5	5.1	6.9	2.5	6.0
Personal Facebook	9.2	7.4	8.4	5.2	7.0
Institutional Facebook	9.3	7.7	8.3	3.2	6.7
Personal Blog	2.6	2.8	2.9	1.8	2.1
Institutional website	6.3	4.0	5.0	2.2	3.6
YouTube	7.1	3.0	6.5	2.0	2.5
Others	1.2	0.7	0.6	1.1	0.9

Source: Author's elaboration based on interviews with 23 presidents, vice presidents, and secretary generals of university federations, carried out between May and September of 2013.

Finally, Twitter was more "open," in the sense that you do not have to send a friendship request to be able to know what someone else is writing.

On the other hand, Facebook (both fan pages and groups) was the preferred medium for internal communication with the students, especially with members of each federation. Facebook was also the preferred medium to share photos and other visual information in 2011-2013. In other words, Twitter was perceived as a site for weak ties (Granovetter 1973), which allowed participants to communicate across boundaries and, thus, to reach out to new constituencies, by interacting with the mainstream media as well as confronting government officials and politicians. Facebook, in turn, was perceived as the best medium for coordinating and cultivating stronger ties among those already involved in the movement.

In sum, for student leaders Facebook and Twitter allowed them to reach different target audiences as well as to pursue different goals. As will be explained in further detailed below, Twitter affordances led to specific impacts in power relations within the movement.

THE CENTRALITY OF LEADERS IN RETWEET NETWORKS

The focus on the behavior of actors on Twitter provides us with unique insights into the relations we seek to analyze. Because accounts can be individual as well as organizational, we can compare the visibility of different types of actors as they use the same tools of the same social media platform, at the same time. Furthermore, as mentioned above, Twitter was a social networking site mostly used by actors to broadcast their message to the outside world, reverberating in the mainstream media, political circles, and across thematic networks. Therefore, it became a space to fight for outside visibility, and to gather support and political clout that went beyond the student membership. As one leader explained, "Twitter has become a political tool, and not simply a communication tool . . . it is a medium for political strategy."[9] Another key leader argued, "Twitter allowed us to set the agenda in the mainstream media in ways that would not have been possible otherwise."[10] As a "political tool," it became an arena of power struggles and of attempts at manipulation and domination, as well as of propaganda and mobilization (García, von Bülow, Ledezma, and Chauveau 2014: 323).

In this section, I analyze how leaders and organizations used their Twitter accounts during weeks when Confech called for street protests between May of 2011 and October of 2013 (see the appendix for the exact dates). The analysis of retweets provides insights about the visibility and potential influence of the different actors, and how these have changed through time. Figures 1 and 2 exemplify the networks of retweets in two protest events. These sociograms represent the two network structures that dominated our database in the period studied. Nodes are Twitter accounts and lines are the ties that represent who retweeted whom. This is a directed network, meaning that ties were not necessarily reciprocated. The size of nodes is set according to outdegree centrality; that is, the larger the node, the larger the number of retweets by other accounts. The network graphs do not present all the actors, but only the most central ones (the ones whose messages were retweeted over one hundred times in each period). Finally, nodes have different shades according to the type of actor. In black are individual leaders' accounts, in grey are formal organizations accounts, and in white are other organizations´ accounts (youth parties and other political student groups).

During 2011, the most central positions in retweet networks were held by a very small number of accounts, most notably the personal accounts of Camila Vallejo and Giorgio Jackson (the largest nodes in figure 1). In that year, they were the presidents of the student bodies of two important universities in Chile, the Universidad de Chile and the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, respectively. Both are ranked as the best universities in the country, and are among the ten best universities in Latin America.[11] In this period, Camila Vallejo's individual account had approximately ten times more followers than the account of the federation of students she led.[12]

The federations of students of these universities are two of the country's most resourceful ones, in terms of financial resources as well as their political clout (Cabalin 2014; Lobos Roco 2014). Both have historically been cradles of new political movements, as well as key spaces for the recruitment for the country's political elites (Bidegain 2015: 214). In 2011, the presidents of both federations were also the spokespeople of Confech for the central region of the country.

This network structure, in which the personal accounts of a few individual leaders were much more central than others, was reproduced over the different protest weeks analyzed in both 2011 and the first months of 2012. However, by mid-2012 we observe a change: personal accounts became less dominant, and organizational accounts became more central. As can be seen in figure 2, which presents the network of retweets during the protest held on August 8, 2012, although Camila Vallejo (by then no longer the president, but now the vice president of the federation of students of the University of Chile) remained a very central actor, the official account of the federation she represented (@la_Fech) had become the most central one. In fact, from mid-2012 onward, retweets originating from organizations' accounts amounted to between 70 and 80% of the total. This remained a highly asymmetrical network structure, however, because of the dominance of the FECh in the network. Other organizations' accounts, such as @Difusion_ACES, one of two national organizations of high school students, also became more central in this period.[13] Giorgio Jackson remained an influential actor on Twitter, but his account is not represented in figure 2 because in 2012 he was no longer an elected leader.

In 2013 the network structure changed again, with other types of organizations (party youths, "collectives," and other political groups) playing a more important role as they mobilized to influence the results of the legislative and presidential elections that happened in November of that year. Of the twenty most retweeted messages in the week of the July 11 protest, seven originated from organizations' accounts. Figure 3 on page 34 shows the dynamics of centrality in retweet networks in a different way, by presenting the percentage of retweets of the three types of actors' accounts for the whole period.

These findings seem to confirm the so-called "power-law network," that is, the tendency of large online networks to create hierarchies.[14] This analysis is not, however, limited to confirming that power is concentrated, but also seeks to show which actors were the most central in retweet networks, whether this network structure changed through time, and why.

Figure 1. Retweet Network of Selected Actors, 21-27 August 2011

Source: Retweets based on selected list of Twitter accounts. Author's own elaboration. Black nodes: leaders´ accounts; grey: formal organizations; white: other organizations.

Figure 2. Retweet Network of Selected Actors, 24-30 September 2012 (most central actors, size of nodes according to outdegree centrality)

Source: Retweets based on selected list of Twitter accounts. Author's own elaboration. Black nodes: leaders´ accounts; grey: formal organizations; white: other organizations.

Figure 3. Retweets from Three Types of Actors' Accounts during Weeks of Protest (% of Retweets, 2011-2013)

Source: Retweets based on selected list of Twitter accounts. Author's own elaboration.

In fact, more interesting than confirming the presence of hierarchy is understanding that this was not a mirror image of asymmetries within the student movement, and, furthermore, that it changed through time. In the first months of appropriation of Twitter by the student movement, this social media not only reproduced the historical asymmetries of power among federations, but also evidenced another source of asymmetry: among leaders within as well as between organizations. In a second moment (from mid-2011 and throughout 2012), the institutional accounts of these same federations (specially the FECh) became more central nodes, a process that was characterized elsewhere as one of "institutionalization of Twitter" by the student movement (García et al. 2014: 319). Finally, in 2013, in the context of general elections in which several former student leaders ran for office, political organizations' accounts gained greater centrality (idem: 330). To understand these network dynamics, we need to go beyond the Twitter data gathered.

CONTROL STRATEGIES AND THE PARADOXES OF PARTICIPATION

On the morning of August 4, 2011, at the height of that year's mobilizations, students gathered in a public plaza in downtown Santiago for yet another street protest. However, city authorities denied the legal permission required. The result was as expected: students tried to march anyway and were then severely repressed by the police. Hundreds were imprisoned.[15] Pictures and videos of that repression quickly reached the Internet, and, in the context of the commotion they arose, Camila Vallejo, then president of the FECh, sent this tweet:

> "Today at 9p.m. pot-banging in all of Chile, to repudiate the repression against students. . . . RETWEET!"[16]

This message was retweeted 1,844 times, the most any one tweet has been resent in our database, and the mobilizations that evening were a high point of the student movement. It helps us understand why, on that date (which corresponds to protest period 8 on the x-axis of figure 3), leaders' accounts concentrated over 80% of all retweets. *Cacerolazo*, the Spanish word for "pot-banging protest," achieved world's trending topic status on Twitter that night (Guzmán-

Concha 2012: 3). However, the data are misleading: Camila Vallejo did not decide by herself to send the call for protest. The decision was the result of a collective process within the FECh. As one of the FECh leaders recounts:

> Their tweets [the ones written by Camila Vallejo and Giorgio Jackson] were particularly effective, much more than those of the federations. We did speak of this within the FECh. For example, on August 4, when we called the pot-banging protest, we [the leadership of the FECh as a whole] discussed whether to send the call through Camila's account, because if we posted it on the FECh account nobody would take notice. On the other hand, if we sent it through Camila's, people would react. And that's what happened. This was a reality that we had to assume and manage[17].

This comment is an example of what I call "control strategies," devised collectively within organizations to "manage," as the interviewee stated, the highly personalized and centralized network of the student movement on Twitter. This does not mean that the student movement as a whole had a clear strategy on how to use this platform. As Giorgio Jackson explained, "The social movement network [on Twitter] is huge. We have the capacity to define trending topics every day.… But we did not have a clear strategy then [in 2011], and I do not see one now either [in 2016]."[18]

In the process of appropriation of Twitter, however, organizations did devise strategies that were collectively discussed and that allowed them to maintain control of framing and decision making in key moments. Formal organizations established informal rules that limited the ability of their own leaders to say whatever they wanted whenever they wanted. I mapped three mechanisms: the taking over of leaders' accounts (illustrated above), the muting of leaders' accounts, and the bonding of federations and leaders' accounts.

Interviews with leaders of another key organization, the Federation of Students of the Catholic University (FEUC), confirm the relevance of these mechanisms. They also illuminate the muting mechanism, which is almost the opposite of taking over leaders' accounts to use them to broadcast messages. Muting refers to the collective decision to refrain from using key leaders' personal accounts to discuss potentially sensitive issues. As one member of the FEUC explained:

> We used other [personal] accounts to test the waters, to present new framings or positions. This was not done through Giorgio´s [Giorgio Jackson, president of the FEUC] account, because then we could step back. No drama[19].

"No drama" meant that the key leaders (the presidents of federations) would be shielded from the possible backlash of a contentious proposal or agenda, such as calls for a new constitution or a fiscal reform. These went beyond the specific demands of the movement, but became increasingly important to the student movement over time.

The third mechanism mapped aimed at enhancing the visibility of the institutional accounts on Twitter and making sure that all leaders were coherently sending the same message. Various leaders explained, for example, that they agreed to permanently promote the federations' accounts by mentioning it in their tweets and by constantly retweeting their federations' messages.[20] One of the arguments for doing so was related to the rotating leadership in the student movement: "I think we need to change it [the personalized structure of networks] because the institutions are the ones that will stay, while we go on to other tasks."[21] Such bonding allowed federations to tap into the networks of leaders and communicate with a wider Twitter audience.

However, none of the federations included in this research went as far as prohibiting leaders from having Twitter accounts (or controlling them permanently). On the contrary, those leaders who were not accustomed to using this platform complained that they had to become active users, even if they did not want to, and that they were pressured to do so from within their own organizations. As one of them argued,

People from the federation tell me that leaders have to use Twitter. I also know that a leader should use Twitter, but it annoys me to have to say idiotic things such as 'in a meeting with…', or 'planning the strategy…' but I have to admit that it is a tool that grants legitimacy, because for sure there are people who think that I am lying in bed at home because I do not say on Twitter what I am doing.… But this is not something that I share, so I don't do it.… The others insist, so I write something every two weeks, you know?[22].

For the small group of leaders that became Twitter celebrities, success entailed not only glory and the possibility of pursuing a political career after their mandates, but also a new set of challenges. As various interviewees noted, they had to be "very careful" with what they posted, because "you have to represent the federation."[23] Others complained that this visibility also entailed having to deal with harsh criticism that often spilled into online bullying. For the leaders that became central nodes in retweet networks, their representation roles changed in important ways. From being rather distant leaders that one saw delivering speeches in assemblies or on the television, they became part of the daily lives of a much broader audience, thirsty for a constant stream of instantaneous information.

The internal management of leaders' accounts did not, however, neutralize the tensions these asymmetries generated in the student movement. The dominance of Twitter by a few leaders and the difficulty of changing that led to pragmatic choices that, at least in the short term, further enhanced this dominance and presented leaders with new challenges. It is a good example of the continuous relevance of the "paradoxes of participation" discussed above, whereby rules intended to diminish asymmetries of power within social movements can have the opposite effect.

In order to better understand why the dominance of a few leaders on Twitter represented a source of tension, it is necessary to situate the use of social media in the Chilean political context; as Bennett and Segerberg have argued, "one of the important analytical fallacies in the debate about social media and contentious politics is that new social media can be abstracted from complex contexts" (2013: 93). In the case of the Chilean student movement, tensions arose because the asymmetries in Twitter related to longstanding power struggles, which, according to many, have historically privileged the voices of those located in the capital city of Santiago and in key universities, to the detriment of those located in other regions of the country. As can be seen in figure 2, those federations that were able to become central nodes in retweet networks in 2012 were all located in the metropolitan area of Santiago: the Federation of Students of the University of Chile (@la_Fech), the Federation of Students of the University of Santiago of Chile (@feusach), and the Federation of Students of the Catholic University (@feuc). The accounts @CONESCHILE and @difusion_ACES are those of the national organizations of high school students, which are also located in Santiago (see figure 2).

One interviewee described these tensions in terms of debates about who can speak for whom, and which issues get to be discussed:

During the Confederation of Students of Chile [Confech] meetings, it was very common to hear these questionings, someone would stand up and say: 'you, Giorgio [Giorgio Jackson, then President of the Federation of Students of the Catholic University – FEUC], you, who have access to the media, you have not talked [on Twitter] about the repression suffered by students in the provinces.... Why don't you share your contacts so that we can speak for the movement as well?'[24]

These questionings were not only related to the access Santiago leaders had to the mainstream press, but also the privileged access they had to political authorities in a unitary state. As one interviewee from Antofagasta, in northern Chile, argued, this difference in access extended to Twitter:

The ones from the center [Santiago] engage in debates with central political authorities too. You will not see someone from here, from the provinces, questioning the minister of education, you will not see that happening.[25]

Less visible leaders and organizations continuously sought to gain more influence on Twitter. To do this, some would post sensitive information about the movement. As one interviewee put it, "In Twitter and in Facebook all you want is to come ahead of others: 'I said it first.'"[26]

Again, formal organizations tried to control these initiatives. Various interviewees recalled that participants were prohibited from tweeting during Confech meetings. As one of them explained, this entailed a process of organizational learning of what to post and when to post:

> There was a Confech meeting a couple of weeks ago. . . , and I saw at least three leaders tweeting that "there was an ideological rupture within the Confech" . . . We had not seen this in a long time. . . , and I told them, "Hey guys, what happens in the Confech (meeting) stays in the Confech (meeting)." [...] There must be a systematic respect for the political organizations, and their leaders have to restrict or limit certain things with respect to the social media. . . . There is a code that has been built through trial and error, and somehow the organizations that have lived the process have internalized this[27].

This informal "code" of Twitter usage was implemented in these institutionalized settings, to effectively control the use of social media by individual leaders. However, other uses of Twitter, in other settings, put into check the ability of organizations to control the message. In discussing this issue, a participant in one of the focus groups gave the example of the use of social media to organize flash mobs:

> There was the possibility that groups of students that were not part of any federation leadership could organize a marathon around *La Moneda.* [This became a flash mob. People ran around the Presidential Palace in Santiago and around other public buildings in other cities] […] They did not clash with the federations, but it was a new factor. People who shared in the cause could participate in the student movement without studying in a mobilized university, and could participate in street protests without having previously attended an assembly in the university.

As this participant mentioned, in the case of the marathon flash mobs (and of the other flash mobs mentioned in this article), the initiative "did not clash with federations," but complemented the traditional repertoire of action. In other cases, however, visibility strategies did clash with organizations and with the overall communication strategy they tried to implement. These included, for example, the launching of false rumors to catch the attention of the mainstream media (and gain followers). One student leader from outside the capital city recalled when he decided to write a fake tweet about a fight between Camila Vallejo and Giorgio Jackson, the two most popular leaders of 2011. Others were "free riders" that engaged "super users" in endless controversies on Twitter, again with the goal of gaining visibility.

In these cases, it is much harder to implement digital control strategies, the effectiveness of which seems to be largely limited to the institutionalized arenas analyzed above: the management of leaders' accounts within formal organizations and the establishment of an informal code of Twitter use during meetings. Even in these cases, however, the lack of a unified strategy of use of social media by the student movement and the asymmetries of power that have historically affected the movement indicate that the "paradoxes of participation" will continue to be a challenge in the digital age.

FINAL COMMENTS

There is no single "logic of collective action" (Olson 1971), and there is no single "logic of connective action" (Bennett and Segerberg 2013) either. The analysis of the process of social media appropriation by the Chilean student movement showed that this is a heterogeneous and dynamic process, which cannot be explained simply by differences in types of organizations or by asymmetries of resources. Findings of this article are in line with Mercea's cautionary argument: "It seems unlikely that SMOs would follow a linear path to a technologically mediated

democratization of their organizational form" (2013: 1308). Indeed, the analysis of the Chilean student movement underscores the relevance of understanding how actors respond to the dilemmas and challenges that arise as they include digital media in their traditional repertoire.

This article argues that the appropriation of social media can, at least in a first stage, reproduce and even reinforce asymmetries of power among actors within social movements. These results seem to confirm the more pessimistic visions about the impacts of the Internet on inequality. As Pattie has argued, "Far from being a potential 'weapon of the weak' or even just a leveler of the participatory playing field, it seems, web technologies in practice are far more likely to entrench existing inequalities in political access" (2015). Such a conclusion, however, does little to enlighten the often contentious and contingent nature of the process of appropriation of digital technologies by social movement organizations. Only looking at the asymmetries in actor centrality says nothing about how actors reacted to this new context.

The analysis of the networks of retweets presented in this article shows that what Philipps called "paradoxes of participation" remains relevant. While formal organizations and leaders survive (some even thrive) in the digital age, the appropriation of social media obligates them to adapt, learn, and rediscuss their roles. Thus, it is crucial to go beyond acknowledging the existence of hierarchies to analyzing the strategies pursued by actors to control the use of social media. Changes in actors' centrality in the retweet networks throughout the period studied were not merely a natural result of the use of the platform, nor of the yearly turnover in the students' official leadership. In fact, changes in visibility on Twitter are remarkably difficult to achieve. As many have noted[28], the way the platform works benefits early arrivals and makes it hard for latecomers to compete with them in terms of numbers of followers (and the reach of their retweets).

In such a context, actors opted to manage the asymmetries in Twitter, by adopting control strategies that regulated the uses of Twitter by individual leaders. In this article, I mapped three types of control strategies implemented by student organizations: the takeover of individual accounts, the muting of accounts, and the bonding of individual and organizational accounts. However, the analysis also showed that, by implementing them, student organizations sometimes contributed to reinforcing hierarchies, instead of neutralizing them.

My findings extend beyond the particular case of the Chilean student movement; indeed, they confirm what scholars have been arguing based on very different cases of mobilization. For instance, my findings agree with how González-Bayón, Borge-Holthoefer, and Moreno (2013: 960) qualified the "horizontal networks" created by the Indignados movement, which, they argue, are in fact "very centralized and hierarchical." The analysis also seems to confirm the findings of Gerbaudo (2012; 2016) and Hensby (2016) on the roles of leaders and new hierarchies produced through the use of social media.

At a minimum, the question of the survival of leaders and organizations should be part of an ongoing research agenda, of interest regardless of the specific case in focus. Furthermore, the control strategies mapped in this article can be thought of in terms of "portable" mechanisms (Falletti and Lynch 2010) that might "alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations" (McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow 2010: 24). Future work would profit from a comparison with other instances of organizations and leaders' incorporation of digital tools.

I understand the emerging technological era as a new and important, but nondeterministic, context for collective action, meaning that actors may respond to it in different, contingent ways. Furthermore, actors also change the way they use digital tools through time. This may sound obvious, especially given the dynamic nature of technological developments, but it is a point worth emphasizing. We have few systematic studies on the dynamics and variation of digital media use. Most of the literature focuses on short periods of time. Our research proposes a longer timeframe, seeking to understand the impacts of the use of digital platforms by actors through a period of three years. In this article, we focused on organizations' responses to the high popularity of a few leaders on Twitter. We only mentioned some of the implications of this for leaders, as they face new challenges on how to communicate to a broad and demanding online audience. Much more research is needed on this topic.

APPENDIX. List of Event Numbers and Dates (2011-2013)

Protest Event	Date
1	May 12, 2011
2	May 26, 2011
3	June 01, 2011
4	June 16, 2011
5	June 23, 2011
6	June 30, 2011
7	July 14, 2011
8	August 04, 2011
9	August 18, 2011
10	August 24, 2011
11	September 22, 2011
12	September 29, 2011
13	October 18, 2011
14	April 25, 2012
15	May 16, 2012
16	August 08, 2012
17	August 28, 2012
18	September 27, 2012
19	April 11, 2013
20	May 8, 2013
21	May 28, 2013
22	June 13, 2013
23	June 26, 2013
24	July 11, 2013
25	September 5, 2013
26	October 17, 2013

Source: García et al 2014: 337.

NOTES

[1] A cellphone video of the Genki Dama for Education, organized in front of the Chilean Presidential Palace on July 19, 2011, can be watched here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a5v9uqPlpwI (last accessed November 11, 2015).

[2] For a critique of how part of the literature on digital activism has based its arguments on a narrow Olsonian view of the roles of organizations, see Sidney Tarrow (2014).

[3] The number of federations affiliated to the Confech has grown steadily through time, from twenty when it was created, in 1984, to 54 in 2015, but this number has fluctuated. For a more detailed analysis of this organizational structure, see Mella Marcelo Polanco, Héctor Ríos Jara and Ricardo Rivera Gallardo (2016).

[4] Interview with Magdalena Paredes, communications team of the FECh, Santiago, October 2014. See the zombies in action in the video of the flash mob uploaded in the FECh YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PGr2rHLqp-s&list=RDPGr2rHLqp-s, accessed November 6, 2016.

[5] For example, see the statutory document of the Federation of Students of the University of Chile, available at http://fech.cl/estatutos/, accessed November 6, 2016.

[6] The data gathering efforts described here were part of a broader collective effort of the "Web in Movement" project that I coordinated in Chile together with Cristobal Garcia, in which several cohorts of students and other researchers participated. A previous social network analysis of the Twitter data produced by this project was published in 2014 (García et al 2014).

[7] Access to Twitter was possible by contracting Topsy ProAnalytics, a certified Twitter partner at the time of the research. Use of the Topsy search engine was funded by the Chilean National Comission for Scientific and Technological Research (CONICYT). The following public information was obtained: time and date of the message, language, content of the message, user profile, user profile's location, user profile's generation date, user name, and user time zone.

[8] Interview with Sebastián Vielmas, FEUC Secretary-General 2010-2011, Santiago, June 6, 2013.

[9] Interview with Angello Giorgio, President of the Federation of Students of the Universidad Adolfo Ibañez between 2011 and 2012, Santiago, August 23, 2013.

[10] Interview, Giorgio Jackson, president of the FEUC and spokesperson for the CONFECH in 2011, Santiago, July 7, 2016.

[11] See, for example, the QS University Rankings: Latin America 2016, available at http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/latin-american-university-rankings/2016#sorting=rank+region=+country=+faculty=+stars=false+search=, accessed October 22, 2016.

[12] According to the data published by Twitter, on September 23, 2011, Camila Vallejo's account had 279,516 followers, while the FECh account had, on November 8, 2011, only 28,008 followers.

[13] The Coordinated Assembly of High School Students (Asamblea Coordinadora de Estudiantes Secundarios—ACES) is one of two national-level organizations of high school students in Chile.

[14] For a review of the literature on the "power-law network," see Bennett and Segerberg (2014, esp. pp. 424-425).

[15] One media outlet printed that 235 students were imprisoned that day (see http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/internacional/fuerte-represion-policial-contra-estudiantes-chilenos, last accessed July 4 2015).

[16] Our own translation. This was the original message: "Hoy a las 21 horas cacerolazo en todo Chile en repudio a la represión contra los estudiantes… DIFUNDIR!"

[17] Interview with Francisco Figueroa, Vice President of the FECh 2011, Santiago, August 2, 2013.

[18] Interview, Giorgio Jackson, op. cit.

[19] Interview with Sebastián Vielmas, op.cit.

[20] Interview with Camillo Ballesteros, President of the Federation of Students of the University of Santiago 2011, Santiago, July 22, 2013; Recaredo Galvéz, President of the Federation of Students of the Universidad de Concepción 2012, Concepción, August 30, 2013, and with Victoria Moreau, President of the FEUSAM 2013, Santiago, September 2, 2013.

[21] Interview with Camillo Ballesteros, op.cit.

[22] Interview with Rodrigo Durán, Vice President of the Federation of Students of the University Adolfo Ibañez 2012, Santiago, August 22, 2013.

[23] Interview with Marco Velarde, president of the Federation of Students of Universidad Central, Santiago, August 21, 2013.

[24] Interview with Sebastián Vielmas op.cit.

[25] Interview with Cristobal Orellana, President of Federation of Students of the University of Antofagasta 2012, Antofagasta, August 1, 2013.

[26] Participant of the second focus group, Santiago, December 2013.

[27] Participant of the second focus group, Santiago, December 2013.

[28] See, for example, the arguments in this blog post written by Cody Brown, available at http://techcrunch.com/2014/03/02/twitters-root-injustice/.

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