The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization: The Influence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing[1]

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This article contributes to a more systematic understanding of movement outcomes by analyzing how organizational, tactical, political, and framing variables interact and combine to account for differences in the outcomes attained by 15 homeless social movement organizations (SMOs) active in eight U.S. cities. Using qualitative comparative analysis to assess ethnographically derived data on the 15 SMOs, the study highlights the importance of organizational viability and the rhetorical quality of diagnostic and prognostic frames for securing outcomes while identifying a contingent relationship between tactics and political environment. The analysis suggests that there are multiple pathways leading to movement outcome attainment, and therefore unidimensional rather than combinatorial and interactive approaches are misguided.

One of the major rationales for studying social movements is the belief that they have important consequences or effects typically conceptualized as outcomes.[2] Yet, relative to other movement processes—such as emergence, recruitment and participation, and tactical development—our un-

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[2] Throughout the article, we use the terms "outcomes" and "consequences" interchangeably, although we focus, as we indicate later, on the direct, intended consequences of movement activity.

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derstanding of the consequences of social movements is conspicuously underdeveloped (Amenta, Tamarelli, and Young 1996; Giugni 1998; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988). This lacuna is not due to disinterest or inattention. As noted in a recent review essay on movement outcomes, "there exists a considerable amount of work on this" topic, but "little systematic research has been done so far" (Giugni 1998, p. 371).[3] Furthermore, the development of a systematic understanding of movement outcomes is hampered by conceptual and causal confusion (Amenta and Young 1999; Burstein 1999; Diani 1997; Tarrow 1994). Conceptually, the range of outcomes attributed to social movements varies widely, extending from state-level policy decisions to expansion of a movement's social capital to changes in participants' biographies. Evaluating what counts as an outcome clearly is open to debate (Amenta and Young 1998; Diani 1997). On a causal level, the precise influence of social movement activity in relation to specifiable outcomes is difficult to ascertain (Giugni 1998). In addition, there is debate about which factors associated with social movements are most important in affecting the relative success of their outcome attainment efforts, with most approaches emphasizing the importance of one factor or set of conditions over others (Giugni 1998). And finally, the potential influence of cultural and ideational factors in the determination of movement outcomes has been glaringly absent in most theoretical discussions and research explorations of the problem.

Taking these lacunae and shortcomings into account, we seek to contribute to a more systematic understanding of social movement outcomes by drawing on our field research on the mobilization and protest activities of 15 homeless social movement organizations (SMOs) that were active in eight U.S. cities from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s. Toward that end, we first provide a conceptual framework for understanding movement outcomes based on the work of other scholars and the pursuits of the homeless SMOs. Second, we discuss and operationalize relevant organizational and political factors suggested by the three dominant perspectives on the determinants of social movement outcomes (Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1992; Amenta, Dunleavy, and Bernstein 1994; Amenta et al. 1996; Gamson 1990; Piven and Cloward 1977). We then extend these perspectives by including factors associated with the framing activities of the homeless SMOs in our assessment of their outcomes (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992). And third, using qualitative comparative analysis (Ragin 1987), we evaluate the ways

[3] Giugni (1998) provides the most recent and exhaustive overview of the movement outcomes literature. Other overviews that summarize the state of thinking on movement outcomes at different moments include Jenkins (1981), Marx and Wood (1975), and McAdam et al. (1988).

in which the organizational, tactical, political, and framing factors interact and combine to generate the various outcomes pursued by the homeless SMOs. The findings indicate that although there are multiple pathways of conditions leading to outcome attainment, the viability of movement organizations and the rhetorical quality of their diagnostic and prognostic frames are particularly influential conditions, while the influence of tactics and the political environment are contingent on how they interact and combine. The conceptual and causal implications of these findings are examined for understanding social movement outcomes more broadly.

CONCEPTUALIZING SOCIAL MOVEMENT OUTCOMES

The literature concerned with the consequences of social movements generally has focused on two categories of outcomes: direct outcomes, such as securing constituent benefits and winning new advantages from targets of influence (Burstein 1998; Gamson 1990; Issac and Kelly 1981; Piven and Cloward 1977), and indirect outcomes, such as changes in public perception regarding the issue in question, the generation of countermovements, and biographical changes, including the creation of career activists (Gusfield 1981; McAdam 1988; Zald and Useem 1987). Whereas direct outcomes are typically articulated as movement goals and are a reflection of a movement's primary ideological rationale, indirect outcomes are thought to reflect a movement's influence but are less likely to be ideologically based or articulated as proximate objectives. In this article, we focus mainly on what the homeless SMOs were able to obtain from the targets of their actions and thus speak primarily to the literature on direct rather than indirect outcomes.

Direct Outcomes

The point of departure for discussion of direct outcomes is Gamson's (1990) study of the success and failure of 53 SMOs in the United States between 1800 and 1945. Gamson examined whether these challenging groups received new advantages or acceptance. New advantages encompass constituent benefits that result from movement action and demands. Acceptance results when the challenging group or SMO is viewed by its targets as a representative of a legitimate set of interests; "it involves a change from hostility or indifference to a more positive relationship" (Gamson 1990, p. 31). The cross-classification of these two general outcomes, in terms of their presence or absence, yields four more specific outcomes: full response, co-optation, preemption, or collapse.

While this framework remains the most commonly used by social movement scholars (Tarrow 1994), it is not without its critics. The work of

Piven and Cloward (1977) challenges the inclusion of organizational acceptance as evidence of success. They argue that building mass organizations is detrimental to the poor and that acceptance matters little if beneficiaries do not gain anything directly. Subsequent work on movement outcomes has prioritized new advantages over acceptance (Amenta et al. 1992) and has examined acceptance as a condition for receiving new advantages (Ragin 1989). And others have argued for the inclusion of organizational survival as an indicator of success net of goal attainment, in large part because the goals of SMOs are often elusive, achieved in increments, and redefined over time. From this vantage point, organizational survival implies progress, if not attainment of goals (Minkoff 1993; Zald and Ash 1966).

In addition to the debate over whether to include indicators of organizational success, Gamson's criteria for new advantages have been challenged. Amenta et al. (1996) argue that the achievement of SMO goals is less relevant than whether those goals actually benefit challenging groups. They emphasize collective benefits, from which nonparticipants cannot be excluded, over the achievement of a stated program. Thus, benefits received only by participants would not be considered as indicators cf success even if they were among the SMO's goals. At the same time, challengers who obtained only some of their goals would not necessarily be considered failures. Relating this to the Townsend Movement, Amenta and his colleagues argue that: "The failure of the Townsend Plan does not imply the failure of the Townsend Movement" (1996, p. 3).

Representation, Resources, Rights, and Relief

Our conceptualization of movement outcomes, outlined in table 1, is based on both the work discussed above and on the range of outcomes sought by the homeless SMOs. We identify two categories of outcomes sought and obtained by homeless SMOs: organizational and beneficiary outcomes. While acknowledging the debate over the importance of organizational outcomes, we include them because they were actively sought by the homeless SMOs for good reason: when obtained, they helped the homeless SMOs by providing them with some degree of institutional voice as well as resources necessary to engage in collective action.

Thus, we identified two kinds of organizational outcomes: representation and resources. *Representation* refers to formal participation of SMO members on the boards and committees of organizations that are the targets of influence. For the homeless movement, it is indicated by homeless SMO operatives assuming positions on social service boards and city task forces that deal with the homeless issue. It is a more restrictive indicator of organizational acceptance than Gamson's (1990), which includes con-

TABLE 1

TYPES OF OUTCOMES SOUGHT BY HOMELESS SMOS

Outcome Recipient	Type	Examples
SMO	Representation	Position on city task forces addressing the homeless issue
		Position on service provider boards
	Resources	Office space and supplies
		Control of service provider organizations
Beneficiary	Rights	Securing the right to vote, go to school, and obtain welfare benefits
		Reducing or eliminating police harassment
		Reducing or eliminating merchant and service provider discrimination
	Relief	Securing accommodative facilities (shelter, soup kitchens, storage, showers)
		Securing restorative programs and facilities (employment programs, permanent housing)

sultation, negotiation, and recognition, as well as a form of representation he calls inclusion. We prefer the term representation, however, because it indicates not only formal involvement, but involvement for the purposes of representing the interests of a typically excluded and voiceless constituency. Thus, in the case of the homeless, representation provides a level of institutional voice for the homeless population by enabling the SMO to have input in policy decisions that affect homeless people.

Resources refer to material concessions received by homeless SMOs from the targets of their collective action. These material concessions sometimes included money but most often consisted of less fungible resources such as office space and supplies. As we have noted elsewhere (Cress and Snow 1996), material resources, as well as other types of resources—such as moral, informational, and human resources—were more often received from various facilitative organizations. Nonetheless, homeless SMOs often attempted to gain material concessions as part of collective action settlements with their antagonists. As with all of the resources the homeless SMOs depended on, these material ones facilitated their survival and enabled them to continue as an organizational entity to press for change on behalf of their homeless beneficiaries.

Improving the conditions of their beneficiaries—the local homeless population—was the primary objective of the homeless SMOs, with the organizational outcomes constituting a means to that end. Two types of beneficiary outcomes were routinely sought: rights and relief. *Rights* encompass outcomes that protect homeless people from discriminatory prac-

tices based on their impoverished status and those that acknowledge their citizenship. They typically included protection from police harassment and merchant discrimination as well as securing their right to vote and apply for welfare benefits. These types of practices, because they affected the everyday world of homeless people, were often the original issues around which homeless people mobilized. *Relief* refers to outcomes that help ameliorate the conditions of homelessness. More concretely, it is constituted by the provision of the basic necessities that accommodate daily survival on the streets and the creation of restorative facilities that enhance the chances of getting off the streets. Examples of accommodative relief include the provision of shelters, soup kitchens, showers, and restrooms; examples of restorative relief include jobs, job training, transitional housing, and more permanent low-income housing (Snow and Anderson 1993).

This typology of outcomes is consistent with the work mentioned above that emphasizes organizational and beneficiary success. In addition, we distinguish important subtypes of outcomes for both organizations and beneficiaries. Although these outcomes are grounded empirically in the pursuits of homeless SMOs, we think they are of broader generality and can be applied to other movement contexts. In addition, this range of outcome types allows us to think more systematically about outcomes as a dependent variable and about the factors associated with its variation across SMOs in the same family or sector. We turn now to this issue.

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH OUTCOME ATTAINMENT

While a number of studies have discussed the outcomes that particular social movements were able to achieve, there are few systematic attempts at theorizing social movement outcomes in general. The primary frameworks again come from the work of Gamson (1990; Gamson and Schmeidler 1984), Piven and Cloward (1977, 1992; Cloward and Piven 1984), and Amenta and his colleagues (1992, 1994, 1996), with attention focused on a movement's organizational characteristics, tactical repertoires, and political context.

Organizational Characteristics and Tactics

Gamson's (1990) analysis focuses predominantly on organizational characteristics, such as structure, goals, and tactics, to explain SMO success and failure. He argues that challengers that have single-issue and nondisplacement goals, provide selective incentives, are bureaucratic and centralized in structure, and use disruptive tactics are more likely to be successful. Subsequent reanalysis of his data generally has upheld his findings

(Frey, Dietz, and Kalof 1992; Mirowsky and Ross 1981; Ragin 1987; Steedly and Foley 1979).[4]

However, Piven and Cloward (1977, 1992; Cloward and Piven 1984) contest Gamson's emphasis on the importance of organizational characteristics for success, arguing that, at least for movements of the poor, organization-building is typically antithetical to their interests. Elites, they assert, respond not to organization, but to disruption of significant social institutions. The opportunities for effective collective action by the poor are limited to times of widespread discontent when there is a division among elites. In these instances, certain elites may ally themselves with the concerns of the poor to shore up their own power base, ultimately helping to legitimate the claims of the poor. Disruption of significant social institutions in these contexts, which are typically short lived, is what ultimately leads to concessions. Thus, Piven and Cloward contend that an emphasis on organization-building deflects energy from those moments when disruptive action might actually win concessions.

Political Context

Amenta and his colleagues (1992, 1994, 1996) provide the most recent systematic attempt to understand the determinants of movement outcomes. They refine and build on the above debate, arguing for the presence of both strong organizations and a sympathetic political context. Regarding the latter, they propose a "political mediation model," whereby successful mobilization typically requires mediation by supportive actors in political institutions. In particular, they look at the presence of sympathetic regimes and state bureaucracies that would benefit from protest outcomes in addition to the presence of strong SMOs. In the absence of sympathetic political actors, they argue that more aggressive tactics are likely to be required by SMOs in order to obtain desired outcomes.

Problems with Major Theoretical Perspectives

The foregoing approaches to understanding the precipitants of movement outcomes place different emphases on the role of organization, tactics, and political context. Gamson's analysis highlights the roles of organizational strength and disruptive tactics on movement success. Piven and Cloward argue against the efficacy of organizational strength, emphasizing, instead, disruptive tactics and divided elites. And Amenta and his colleagues high-

[4] For dissenting interpretations of Gamson's central findings, see Goldstone (1980) and Amenta et al. (1996).

light strong organizations and either sympathetic political regimes and bureaucracies or disruptive protest in the absence of the latter.

While these approaches provide a useful starting point for discussing factors associated with the attainment of movement outcomes, we believe they oversimplify the dynamics of outcome attainment. More specifically, there are at least four issues that are sidestepped or glossed over by these perspectives. First, each of the perspectives was developed by examining historical social movements that operated in a national context. Yet, a number of scholars have noted a shift in movement activity since the 1960s to more local arenas (Hutchinson et al. 1997; McAdam 1988). Thus, whether these factors hold for contemporary movements that operate in more localized contexts remains an empirical question.[5]

Second, the factors associated with outcome attainment have typically been analyzed in a correlate fashion, while the ways in which they interact with one another has remained less developed. Strong organizations, disruptive tactics, and sympathetic political contexts may all be associated with outcome attainment, but what is left unexplored is the ways in which they combine with one another to lead to an outcome. For example, Amenta et al. (1996) suggest that disruptive tactics may be less important in a strongly sympathetic political context, but the same context may require strong organizations. Thus, the importance of the factors does not reside solely in the strength of their association with a particular outcome, but in the more complex ways they interact with each other in relation to the attainment of various movement outcomes.[6]

This leads us to our third point. The factors associated with outcome attainment may vary in their importance depending upon the type of outcome in question. Most discussions of movement outcomes focus on only one type of outcome. For example, Piven and Cloward (1977) and Amenta and his colleagues (1992, 1994, 1996) highlight the provision of social programs by the state. How generalizable their findings are to other types of

[5] The national/local difference also has bearing on how these factors are operationalized. For example, the organizational characteristics of centralization and bureaucracy used by Gamson (1990) for SMOs with several thousand members may not be relevant for local SMOs with a much smaller number of members. Apropos this point, Edwards and Marullo's (1995) research on peace movement organizations in the United States during the 1980s revealed that not only were most small and local, but that relatively few had "a minimal formal structure" (p. 913).

[6] For example, Gamson's (1990) bivariate analysis suggests that each factor increases the likelihood of success for the SMO. Yet, none of the 53 SMOs in Gamson's sample had all of the organizational factors he identifies. This raises the question of the ways in which the factors may combine with one another to lead to an outcome. Apropos this concern, Ragin's (1989) reanalysis of Gamson's data using qualitative comparative analysis identified different combinations of organizational factors that led to success for the SMOs.

outcomes remains an empirical question. Gamson's (1990) work is suggestive of this point in that the organizational factors he identified differed in their influence depending upon whether the outcome was acceptance or new advantages.

Finally, while the organizational, tactical, and political mediation approaches point to a number of important factors that account for variation in movement outcomes, they do not exhaust the range of explanatory variables. In particular, they fail to consider how variation in outcome attainment might be influenced by cultural or ideational factors. One set of such factors that has been overlooked concerns the manner and extent to which the identification of targets or adversaries, the attribution of blame or responsibility, and the articulation of a plan of attack or resolution affects the attainment of desired outcomes. These factors take us to a consideration of framing processes.

Framing Processes

Framing processes are linked conceptually to the recently emergent framing perspective on collective action and social movements (Babb 1996; Gamson 1992; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992; Snow et al. 1986; Tarrow 1992). Rooted theoretically in the work of Erving Goffman, this perspective views movements not merely as carriers of existing ideas and meanings, but as signifying agents actively engaged in producing and maintaining meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders. The verb framing is used to conceptualize this signifying work, which is one of the activities that SMOs and their adherents do on a regular basis. In elaborating the relevance of framing processes to movement participant mobilization, Snow and Benford (1988, p. 199) argue "that variation in the success of participant mobilization, both within and across movements, depends upon the degree to which" movements attend to the core framing tasks of diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing. We think it is reasonable to assume that SMOs that attend to these tasks are likely to be more successful in securing their proximate goals as well. In particular, we think that the diagnostic and prognostic framing tasks play an important but unrecognized role in the attainment of desired outcomes.

Diagnostic framing is important because it problematizes and focuses attention on an issue, helps shape how the issue is perceived, and identifies who or what is culpable, thereby identifying the targets or sources of the outcomes sought; prognostic framing is important because it stipulates specific remedies or goals for the SMO to work toward and the means or tactics for achieving these objectives. If so, then attainment of the outcomes in question in this article—representation, resources, rights, and

relief—should be partly contingent on the development of coherent and well-articulated accounts of the problems and who or what is to blame (diagnostic framing), and what needs to be done in order to remedy it (prognostic framing).

Research on a number of different movements provides suggestive examples of this proposition. For example, the shift in the diagnostic framing of automobile-related deaths from auto safety to drunk driving has had profound influence on the impact of the drunk-driving movement (Gusfield 1981; McCarthy 1994). Likewise, the career of the peace movement in the United States during the early 1980s was profoundly influenced by the prognostic frame of "nuclear freeze" (Meyer 1990; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992). Similarly, the declining resonance of the nonviolence and integration prognostic frames within the black community and the emergence of competing black power and separatist frames were in part responsible for the weakening of the Civil Rights movement (McAdam 1982).

The above argument and the illustrative cases suggest that how SMOs attend to the tasks of diagnostic and prognostic framing may be just as important as organizational, tactical, and political contextual factors in accounting for variation in movement outcomes. This assumes, of course, that SMOs are likely to vary in the extent to which they sharply articulate diagnostic and prognostic frames and that these differences are consequential for obtaining movement outcomes, ceteris paribus.

Thus, in the following analysis, we draw on the various perspectives discussed above by assessing the ways in which organizational, tactical, political mediation, and framing factors interact and combine to account for variation in the outcomes achieved by the 15 homeless SMOs we studied.

CONTEXT, DATA, AND METHODS

The 15 SMOs we studied were local variants of a larger social movement that surfaced in numerous cities throughout the United States in the 1980s in protest to the dramatic growth of homelessness.[7] While this movement gained national visibility with Mitch Snyder's 60-day fast in 1983 and peaked publicly in October 1989, when an estimated 250,000 homeless and their supporters assembled at the foot of the nation's capitol under

[7] While there is extensive published research on the homeless issue in the United States (Burt 1992; Rosenthal 1994; Rossi 1989; Snow and Anderson 1993; Wright 1989), there is comparatively little published research on homeless protest events or on the homeless movement in general. But see the work of Barak (1991), Rosenthal (1994), Wagner (1993), and Wright (1997) for accounts of homeless insurgency in several cities across the country.

the banner of "Housing Now!," the vast majority of homeless collective actions—such as protest rallies and marches, housing takeovers, and encampments on government property—were local in organization and focus. Moreover, the scope of this activity was extensive, with the homeless engaging in collective action in over 50 cities during the 1980s,[8] and with over 500 protests occurring in 17 of these cities, mostly in the latter half of the decade.[9] Even though there was an effort to coordinate some of these local mobilizations by the National Union of the Homeless that originated in 1986 in Philadelphia, and even though some 15 local SMOs counted themselves as affiliates of the National Union, the movement was primarily a locality-based, city-level phenomenon.

Because of the local character of the movement, we focused our research on homeless SMOs and protest in eight cities: Boston, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Minneapolis, Oakland, Philadelphia, and Tucson. Two factors determined the selection of these cities. First, we wanted to select cities that exhibited variation in outcomes and in the range of mobilization activity that we had identified by content-analyzing newspaper accounts of homeless collective action in 17 U.S. cities that had a daily newspaper indexed throughout the 1980s.[10] Second, because our funding required that the fieldwork be conducted during a three-year period and our comparative analytic strategy required more cases than usual for an ethnography, we were constrained in terms of the amount of time and energy that could be devoted to gaining access and generating a semblance of rapport in each city. Consequently, we selected cities in which we had already established contacts with SMO leaders and activists during a previous year of pilot fieldwork in Minneapolis, Philadelphia, and Tucson.

Although the above criteria drove the selection of the eight cities, and

[8] This figure was derived from our inspection of newspaper reports assembled through the 1980s by the NewsBank Newspaper Index, which, at the time, collected selected articles from 450 newspapers in the United States.

[9] This figure comes from content coding the population of local daily newspapers that had been indexed between 1980 and 1992.

[10] We had originally hoped to conduct a random sample from among the 50 largest U.S. cities and then use the New York Times Index and Newsbank Newspaper Index to determine the incidence and intensity of homeless collective action across the sampled cities. However, prior fieldwork in Minneapolis, Philadelphia, and Tucson, including a summer working with the programs of the National Union of the Homeless in Philadelphia, made it clear that the incidence of homeless mobilization was dramatically underrepresented by these two services. It was in light of this observation that we were forced to turn to local dailies as the basis for information on homeless mobilization and collective action across U.S. cities. Our content analysis of the 17 dailies yielded a count of over five hundred homeless protest events during the 1980s across the 17 cities, ranging from a low of 6 to a high of 83, with a mean of 30.5.

thus the 15 SMOs analyzed, it is worth noting, as indicated in table 2, that these cities are quite representative of the 50 largest U.S. cities in size, region, and homeless rate. These apparent similarities notwithstanding, our primary concern is not with generalizing to the universe of homeless SMOs, but with using our case findings to refine and extend understanding of the determinants of movement outcomes. Given the similarities and differences among our cases in terms of the causal factors and the range of outcomes obtained, they are well suited for assessing the influence of factors thought to affect outcome attainment.[11]

Our major fieldwork objective was to map the organizational fields in which the SMOs were embedded in each city and to discern patterns of interaction, resource flows, and outcomes within these fields.[12] To accomplish this, we employed a variation of snowball sampling based on an onion/snowball strategy that began with a homeless SMO in each city and then worked outward in a layered fashion, contingent on the information and referrals secured, to supporters, antagonists, and significant bystanders in the organizational field. Thus, we began in each city with a homeless SMO with which we had already established contact, observing and participating in its meetings and protest actions and interviewing both leaders and rank-and-file members. Through these activities, we identified facilitative organizations, such as churches, activist organizations, and service providers, that provided a range of assistance to the homeless SMOs. We interviewed members of these organizations to discern the type and level of their support of the homeless SMOs (Cress and Snow 1996).

We then gathered information on the targets of homeless SMO collective actions. These included police departments, mayors' offices, city councils, service providers that were viewed by the SMOs as "pimping" the homeless issue, and federal agencies such as the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Finally, we interviewed members of organizations that, while not directly involved in the homeless protest, were identified by other organizations as having particular insight into the homeless issue and the political context in which it was embedded.

[11] The use of case studies to refine and extend extant theoretical positions is consistent with the recent literature exploring the rationale and uses of case studies (Burawoy 1991; Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg 1991; Ragin 1987).

[12] By organizational fields, we refer to a set of organizations that share overlapping constituencies and interests and that recognize one another's activities as being relevant to those concerns. This is an inclusive conceptualization that encompasses all organizations with which links might be established, be they facilitative or antagonistic. This conceptualization is consistent with the institutional perspective on organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and with work on multiorganizational fields in the study of social movements (Curtis and Zurcher 1973; Klandermans 1992).

TABLE 2

CITIES AND HOMELESS SMOS USED IN THE ANALYSIS

City	Population Rank among 50 Largest Cities, 1988	Region of Country	Homeless Rate Per 10,000, 1989*	Homeless SMOs	SMO Abbreviations
Boston	19	Northeast	46.7	Boston Union of the Homeless	BUH
				Homefront	HF
				Homeless Civil Rights Project	HCRP
Denver	25	West	29.7	Denver Union of the Homeless	DnUH
				Homeless People United	HPU
Detroit	7	Midwest	12.2	Detroit Union of the Homeless	DtUH
Houston	4	South	8.7	Heads Up!	HU
				Houston Union of the Homeless	HUH
Minneapolis	46	Midwest	32.8	Alliance of the Streets	AOS
				Minneapolis Union of the Homeless	MUH
				People United for Economic Justice	PUEJ
Oakland	44	West	11.7	Oakland Union of the Homeless	OUH
				Membership Caucus	MC
Philadelphia	5	Northeast	32.3	Philadelphia Union of the Homeless	PUH
Tucson	35	Southwest	27.2	Tucson Union of the Homeless	TUH

SOURCE.—This table is reprinted from D. Cress and D. Snow, "Mobilization at the Margins," *American Sociological Review* 61 (1996): 1093.

NOTE.—Other cities that compose the initial sampling frame include Atlanta, Chicago, Cleveland, District of Columbia, Honolulu, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York, St. Louis, and San Francisco.

* Derived from Burt (1992, app. A).

The onion/snowball strategy also enabled us to gather information on six SMOs no longer in existence during the course of our fieldwork from 1989 to 1992. In each case, former members were tracked down and interviewed, and other significant organizations were sought out for additional information as well.

Throughout our field research, we used the fieldwork roles that Snow and Anderson (1993) assumed in their research on the homeless in Austin, Texas: the role of the buddy/researcher when in contact with the homeless and their SMOs; and the role of the credentialed expert when dealing with other relevant organizational actors.[13] These fieldwork roles, coupled with the onion/snowball strategy, enabled us not only to map the contours of the relevant organizational fields for each SMO, but allowed us to triangulate our data and thereby have a number of interpretive validity checks on our various sources of information, including the claims made by those involved in homeless protests.

Ultimately, data were gathered on 15 homeless SMOs that had been active between 1984 and the end of 1992 in the eight cities, with nine of the SMOs still active during the course of our fieldwork from 1989 to 1992. The 15 homeless SMOs varied in size, ranging from a half-dozen active homeless members to those with 30 or more active members. All SMOs claimed broader support among their local homeless constituents, but they differed in their abilities to secure facilitative support, to mobilize the homeless for their collective actions, and in the outcomes they attained.

OPERATIONALIZATION AND ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES

In addition to the conceptual and theoretical issues associated with movement outcomes, there are methodological concerns about establishing the causal influence of movement activity on movement outcomes (Amenta et al. 1996; Giugni 1998). Of particular concern is the problem of determining what an outcome might have been in the absence of movement activity. Our research and analysis addresses these concerns in three ways. First, as already noted, we observed and discussed homeless mobilization with activists, allies, targets, and informed neutral observers. We thus had firsthand knowledge, as well as information from key players, that was relevant to assessing the impact of homeless SMOs and their activities on the outcomes attained. Second, because we conducted fieldwork in each

[13] Whereas the buddy/researcher assumes a sympathetic but curious stance with respect to those being studied, the credentialed expert assumes a nonpartisan stance and embraces his or her professional identity as a means of legitimating the research inquiry. See Snow, Benford, and Anderson (1986) for a more detailed discussion of the these and other fieldwork roles.

of the cities in which each of the SMOs were located, we were able either to observe the temporal relationship between movement activity and outcomes or reconstruct that relationship through the triangulation of sources discussed above. And third, our comparison of the 15 homeless SMOs across eight cities not only revealed considerable variation in outcome attainment, but enabled us to acquire a sense of whether the kinds of outcomes sought were generated or provided independent of movement activity. In light of these considerations, we are able to assess the importance of the organizational, tactical, framing, and contextual conditions for each SMO in relation to the outcomes they sought and those they obtained.

Operationalizing the Conditions

One of the primary difficulties in assessing the factors theorized to affect outcome attainment is operationalizing them in a fashion that is consistent with the literature and yet relevant to local contexts. In this section, we provide operationalizations of the causal conditions identified in the previous theoretical discussion, and we indicate whether and to what extent those conditions were modified to fit the local contexts in which the homeless SMOs operated.[14]

Since there was not sufficient variability among the 15 SMOs in terms of the organizational dimensions of bureaucracy and centralization, we assessed whether each of the SMOs was organizationally viable (Cress and Snow 1996). By viable, we refer to SMOs that engaged in organizational maintenance and protest activities over an extended period of time.[15] We

[14] We coded these conditions together, drawing on both the ethnographic and newspaper data. We began by operationalizing the theoretical factors in a fashion consistent with the homeless contexts we observed. For example, Amenta et al.'s (1992) operationalization of sympathetic allies in their discussion of the Townsend Movement looked at the presence of bureaucracies that stood to benefit from implementation of the Townsend Plan and at the presence of democratic control of state houses. In our case, we examined city councils and city bureaucracies. We then looked at each condition and evaluated whether it was present or absent for each SMO. More specific determinations for conditions that are not self-evident are provided in subsequent notes.

[15] Some students of SMOs might contend that viability be conceptualized exclusively in terms of temporal persistence. Our conceptualization of viability does not ignore temporal survival, but incorporates and accents SMO activity within a temporal frame. We think this conceptualization is justified for two reasons. Most important is the fact that movements, by definition, are action oriented and that what they do should thus be weighted as heavily as their temporal persistence. Additionally, the issue of what is an adequate temporal frame may vary by the scope and objectives of an SMO. National-level SMOs may require a longer period of time to establish an active agenda at that level. Local mobilization, on the other hand, may emerge quickly and last only briefly, yet still have a significant impact. Not-in-my-backyard movements often exemplify this pattern.

operationalize *SMO viability* by reference to three factors: survival, meeting regularity, and collective action campaigns. Our indicator of survival was whether an SMO existed for one year or more.[16] Next, we looked at how frequently an SMO typically met, categorizing them by whether they met at least twice a month. Finally, we examined whether SMOs planned and conducted protest campaigns that included a series of interrelated protest events. If all three conditions were met, then an SMO was classified as viable, which was the case for 7 of the 15 SMOs.

We define *disruptive tactics* as those that intentionally break laws and risk the arrest of participants, such as blockades, sit-ins, housing takeovers, and unauthorized encampments. In contrast, nondisruptive tactical action includes petitions, rallies, and demonstrations that typically have been negotiated and sanctioned in advance. Eight SMOs regularly used disruptive tactics in their collective actions.[17]

Sympathetic allies refer to the presence of one or more city council members who were supportive of local homeless mobilization. This was demonstrated by attending homeless SMO meetings and rallies and by taking initiatives to city agencies on behalf of the SMO. Seven of the SMOs had such allies.

The presence of *city support* refers to cities that had established agencies with the specific charge of addressing the homeless problem. Boston, Minneapolis, and Philadelphia provided significant levels of shelter for the homeless paid for with city dollars. Seven SMOs operated within these cities.

We assessed the contributions of SMO framing activities by looking for evidence of articulate and coherent diagnostic and prognostic frames. Such *diagnostic frames* clearly specify what is problematic and in need

[16] We use the one-year criteria because it elicited the most accurate responses from our informants in assessing the longevity of SMOs that were not in existence while we were in the field. For example, it was easier for respondents to recall whether an SMO had been in existence for one or two years than for 10 or 15 months. Our objective with this aspect of the viability concept was to find and incorporate a temporal threshold that seemed to link SMO activity and outcome attainment. Some might question whether one year is an adequate temporal threshold, but we believe that the context in which SMOs operate must be taken into consideration. One year of sustained activity by an organization of homeless people is quite an accomplishment given the highly precarious position of most homeless people and the absence of even the most basic resources assumed by other types of SMOs. See Cress and Snow (1996) for an elaborated discussion of this issue.

[17] By regular, we mean that half or more of an SMO's collective actions were disruptive. We gauged this through interviews with members of the SMOs, facilitating organizations, and other relevant actors in the organizational field. Six of the SMOs that were coded nondisruptive never engaged in disruptive protest, while one, the AOS, did so in conjunction with other homeless SMOs on one occasion.

of amelioration and identify the culpable agents or institutions. Articulate and coherent *prognostic frames* specify what needs to be done in order to remedy the diagnosed problem, such as the creation of permanent housing or the building of more shelters. Evidence of these frames came from a number of sources, including their articulation among speakers at rallies and protest events that we attended, in their thematic prominence in discussions with active SMO members, and in the media coverage of SMO homeless mobilization and their protest events.

To illustrate the difference between articulate and less than articulate framing, an SMO protesting "the homeless problem" by arguing that "the government" was to blame and that what was needed was "housing" was coded as an example of nonarticulate or unfocused framing. On the other hand, those SMOs that highlighted a specific issue, such as "shelter conditions," with specific agents at fault, such as "service providers," and that called for specific solutions, such as a city investigation into shelter operations, illustrated more highly articulate and focused diagnostic and prognostic framing and were coded as such. Seven of the SMOs were found to have articulate and coherent diagnostic frames, and 11 of them had clear and focused prognostic frames.

Qualitative Comparative Analysis

To assess how these factors affect outcomes, we use the technique of qualitative comparative analysis (Ragin 1987). Based on the logic of Boolean algebra, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) allows for identification of the multiple and conjunctural causes of some event when comparing a relatively small number of cases. It is not simply a substitute for quantitative procedures when dealing with a small number of cases, however, as the logics of analysis are different. Quantitative approaches generalize the influence of individual variables across a number of cases and have additive and linear assumptions about the influence of variables. QCA, on the other hand, is conjunctural in its logic, examining the various ways in which specified factors interact and combine with one another to yield particular outcomes. This increases the prospect of discerning diversity and identifying different pathways that lead to an outcome of interest and thus makes this mode of analysis especially applicable to situations with complex patterns of interaction among the specified conditions. In addition, QCA simplifies analysis by dropping irrelevant factors. When two combinations that lead to an outcome are identical on all but one condition, that condition becomes irrelevant in the context of the other conditions and can be eliminated, thereby reducing two combinations into one and simplifying the analysis.

To illustrate, Amenta et al.'s (1996) political mediation thesis is sugges-

tive of two possible pathways to policy outcomes: strong SMOs in the presence of a sympathetic political environment, or strong SMOs with disruptive tactics in the absence of a sympathetic political environment. In the former case, tactics would be irrelevant in the presence of the other conditions. In the latter, disruptive tactics would become necessary (along with strong organizations) in the absence of a sympathetic political environment. Thus, QCA not only increases the prospect of discerning multiple pathways to an outcome, but it allows us to identify the simplest combinations of factors that lead to a particular outcome from the many combinations that are possible.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The first step in conducting such an analysis is to discern whether the dependent and independent conditions in question are present or absent for each of the cases being compared. Table 3 summarizes that step by showing the presence and absence of the six causal conditions and four outcomes for each of the 15 homeless SMOs.[18]

In looking at table 3, we see that there is considerable variation across the SMOs in terms of the presence or absence of the causal conditions and the number of outcomes obtained. Five or more of the causal conditions were present for six of the SMOs, with two or fewer conditions present for seven of them. Similarly, seven SMOs achieved two or more of the outcomes, while five attained only one outcome and three failed to obtain any outcomes. It thus appears that there is a significant relationship between the number of causal conditions present and the number of outcomes obtained. And that is precisely what table 4 suggests. We are more interested, however, in the relative importance of some conditions in comparison to others and in the combinations of conditions that are necessary and sufficient for outcome attainment.

[18] It is reasonable to wonder about the temporal link between the theorized causal conditions and the outcomes. Were the presumed causal conditions operative prior to the outcomes in question? Our answer is a qualified yes. For both the nine SMOs that were in existence during our fieldwork and the six that were not, we were able to establish—through the fieldwork procedures discussed earlier—whether they secured each of the four types of outcomes and whether any of the six causal conditions were operative at that time. While we cannot pinpoint temporally exactly when a condition materialized prior to the attainment of an outcome, we can assert with confidence whether the condition was present at the time in which an outcome was secured. Although it is also plausible that the attainment of some outcomes might have been influenced by the attainment of other outcomes, we did not assess this possibility largely because of the limited number of conditions that can be examined through QCA (Amenta and Young 1999).

TABLE 3

PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF CAUSAL CONDITIONS AND OUTCOMES FOR HOMELESS SMOS

	CAUSAL CONDITIONS						OUTCOMES			
SMO	SMO Viability	Disruptive Tactics	Sympathetic Allies	City Support	Diagnostic Frame	Prognostic Frame	Representation	Resources	Rights	Relief
PUH	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
AOS	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
OUH	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
TUH	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1
PUEJ	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
DtUH	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
HCRP	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
BUH	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1
DnUH	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
HF	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
HUH	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
HU	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
MUH	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
HPU	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

NOTE.—"1" indicates the presence of a condition or outcome; "0" indicates its absence.

TABLE 4

NUMBER OF OUTCOMES OBTAINED BY NUMBER OF CONDITIONS PRESENT

NUMBER OF CONDITIONS	NUMBER OF OUTCOMES		Total
	0–1	2–4	
0–2	7	0	7
3–6	1	7	8
Total	8	7	15

NOTE.—$\chi^2 = 11.71$; $df = 1$. $P < .001$.

Thus, in what follows, we explore the combinations of factors that lead to the four outcome types and then assess the overall impact of the SMOs by looking at the combinations of conditions that led to two or more of the outcomes. We illustrate the pathways with case material from the 15 homeless SMOs. Table 5 lists the combinations of factors that yielded representation, resources, rights, and relief for each of the SMOs, as well as the pathways leading to a significant overall impact.

Representation

Six SMOs obtained positions on boards and task forces that addressed the homeless issue. Two pathways led to this outcome. Organizational viability, diagnostic frames, and prognostic frames were necessary conditions for obtaining representation. These conditions were sufficient in combination with either disruptive tactics, where allies were present, or nondisruptive tactics, in the context of responsive city bureaucracies. The first pathway was most prominent, encompassing four of the six SMOs.

The Philadelphia Union of the Homeless (PUH) is illustrative of the first pathway to representation. It was able to stack the city task force on homelessness with homeless people. The union was one of the most active and resource rich of the SMOs after applying for and receiving a $25,000 grant to open a shelter, the first in the nation operated by homeless people. In addition, the union counted as supporters two city council members whom they could rely on to help with homeless issues. The union's use of disruptive tactics had generated a great deal of publicity for the organization, but they sought a more institutionalized avenue for having input into the homeless problem. They blamed the homeless service provider industry for monopolizing the public policy discussion on the homeless

TABLE 5

PATHWAYS TO OUTCOMES FOR HOMELESS SMOS

Outcome Pathways	SMOs
Representation:	
VIABLE * DISRUPT * ALLIES * DIAG * PROG+	DtUH, TUH, OUH, PUH (PUEJ)
VIABLE * disrupt * CITY * DIAG * PROG	AOS, HCRP
Resources:	
VIABLE * DISRUPT * ALLIES * DIAG * PROG+	OUH, PUH (DtUH, PUEJ, TUH)
VIABLE * ALLIES * CITY * DIAG * PROG+	AOS, PUH (PUEJ)
viable * disrupt * ALLIES * CITY * diag * prog	HF
Rights:	
VIABLE * DISRUPT * ALLIES * DIAG * PROG+	DtUH, OUH, PUEJ, PUH, TUH
VIABLE * disrupt * CITY * DIAG * PROG	AOS, HCRP
Relief:	
VIABLE * ALLIES * CITY * DIAG * PROG+	AOS, PUEJ, PUH
VIABLE * DISRUPT * ALLIES * DIAG * PROG	TUH, OUH, PUEJ, PUH (DtUH)
viable * DISRUPT * allies * diag * PROG+	BUH, DnUH
viable * allies * city * diag * PROG	HU, HUH
Significant impact:	
VIABLE * DISRUPT * ALLIES * DIAG * PROG+	DtUH, OUH, PUEJ, PUH, TUH
VIABLE * disrupt * CITY * DIAG * PROG	HCRP, AOS

NOTE.—Uppercase letters indicate presence of condition and lowercase letters indicate the absence of a condition. Conditions not in the equation are considered irrelevant. Multiplication signs are read as "and" while addition signs represent "or." SMOs in parentheses are contradictory, i.e., the conditions were present but they failed to obtain the outcome.

issue. In addition, they insisted that homeless people be part of these discussions since their lives were most directly affected. The union's articulate diagnosis and prognosis of the issue is typified by one of the leaders of the Philadelphia Union of the Homeless, as he discussed their efforts to obtain representation on the Mayor's Task Force on Homelessness:

> Homelessness is a fast-growing industry. Poverty pimps have sprung up all over making money off our misery, and we haven't had anything to say about it. We have to be part of the decision making that governs our lives. The Mayor's Task Force on Homelessness originally had none of us on it. Then they said Chris [the union president] could come on. Instead, we went in with 45 homeless people and got 15 of them elected on the board. Service providers lack the urgency that we have. They go home at 5 P.M. Our troubles just begin at that time.

The PUH and three other SMOs combined organizational viability and articulate framing with disruptive tactics and their council allies to obtain representation for homeless people. But note that the same conditions were present for People United for Economic Justice (PUEJ), yet it failed to secure representation.[19] What accounts for its failure when four other SMOs were successful under the same conditions? We attribute its failure to a radical-flank effect (Haines 1984), as a more moderate competitor, the Alliance of the Streets (AOS), was able to secure representation for the local homeless population from the city of Minneapolis. PUEJ used disruptive tactics in a city that had been reasonably responsive to the homeless problem. This alienated PUEJ from decision makers that might otherwise have considered its input. The AOS was more likely to work with the system and use moderate tactics in its collective action. This relationship between disruption and responsive cities is underscored in the next pathway as well.

The second combination leading to representation encompassed two of the homeless SMOs. In these cases, viable SMOs with articulate diagnostic and prognostic frames used nondisruptive tactics in cities with agencies

[19] In computing QCA, one needs to decide what to do with contradictory combinations—those that result in both success and failure—with regard to the outcome in question. By omitting contradictory combinations from the analysis, the results show combinations where the outcome was certain, while including contradictory combinations shows the combinations where the outcome was possible (Amenta et al. 1992). We opt for the latter strategy for two reasons. Theoretically, the former approach is overly deterministic. None of the work discussed has argued that the posited factors would ensure outcomes, only that they increased the likelihood of success. Empirically, by including contradictory combinations in our analysis, we encompass all homeless SMOs that received the outcome and thus have more cases to draw on for understanding the factors that lead to mobilization outcomes.

established to deal with the homeless problem. This pathway differed from the first one in that the SMOs used more legitimate and institutional forms of collective action in cities that had already demonstrated some attentiveness to the homeless issue. Disruptive action was considered inappropriate and potentially damaging in these contexts. We look at the Homeless Civil Rights Project (HCRP) in Boston to illustrate this pathway.

The HCRP, as its name implies, focused on issues of civil rights for the homeless. HCRP was able to obtain representation on a citizen advisory board for the local police department. In addition, it conducted workshops for police officers dealing with homeless people. This outcome, which provided a significant opportunity to influence the policing of homeless people, grew out of a campaign to free the Boston Common of a notorious police officer. The leader of HCRP discussed the situation prior to the campaign:

> If you were up in the Boston Common, and if you were perceived as homeless, you were going to get kicked off the bench. . . . They had a guy. He was infamous among homeless circles; he was called Robo Cop. He was a Boston motorcycle cop, and his beat was the Commons. This guy was unbelievable. . . . He was convinced that he had the right to kick you out of the park because it was his park, and it wasn't yours. . . . When he first come onto you he'd say, "Hi guys, how you doing today? You know, geez, it's a nice day. Listen, I'll be back in 10 minutes, and you better be gone, okay?" Very nice. But when he came back 10 minutes later, if you weren't gone, he'd fuckin' manhandle you, arrest ya. And if you said, "Gee Paul, I ain't doing nothing," he'd go to a trash barrel, and he'd come out with an empty bottle, and he'd say, "public drinking." And when we first went into business, we put out flyers, and we went up to the Commons and talked to people, and we said, "you know, if we get together, we can get rid of Robo Cop." And they thought we were talking about getting rid of God.

So the HCRP put together a petition to get Robo Cop removed. This process ultimately led to negotiations with the city to gain representation on the citizen advisory committee and provide training to police officers in dealing with homeless people. The HCRP had strong resource support from a benefactor organization (Cress and Snow 1996). In addition, their framing activities were focused on civil rights issues. They identified police harassment as a particularly onerous civil rights violation and saw the ultimate solution in representation on oversight committees of the police. Finally, they were nondisruptive in their approach, using the institutional process through gathering petitions and affidavits to make their case. As we mentioned above, nondisruption appears to be more effective in cities that are sympathetic and responsive to homeless issues and SMO campaigns.

Resources

As indicated in table 5, four homeless SMOs were able to obtain material concessions for organizational use from the targets of their collective actions. At the same time, the pathways leading to resources also contained three contradictory cases, the most of any of the outcomes.[20] Resources were the most difficult of the four outcome types to obtain because targets were understandably reluctant to provide material support to homeless SMOs that were challenging them or making demands that might alter their current resource-allocation calculus.

Three combinations led to resource concessions, with allies on city councils a necessary condition in each. In the first pathway, allies combined with viable SMOs that had articulate diagnostic and prognostic frames and that were disruptive. The case of the Oakland Union of the Homeless (OUH) is illustrative. The union, with strong organizational support from American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), had been involved in an extensive and long-term campaign not only to get more services for the homeless, but to control and operate those services as well. The union eventually won control of a multimillion-dollar housing and service project for the homeless.[21] Their leader discussed a segment of the collective-action campaign that resulted in this "stunning" victory:

> We went over that first night, and we took over three houses and had them barricaded real tight. Then the cops came down and busted us. When our supporters found out we were locked up and the cops had arrested us for taking over the houses, they demanded that some of the council members do something on our behalf. Hours after that, we were released. We don't know how many of them pushed for it, but two city councilmen helped us out. We did that like two more times in the next two months, and the city council got totally freaked. So we kept doing these takeovers. That is the key reason why the city said, "We are willing to negotiate, what do you want?" And we said, "(permanent) housing." So out of our protest, we have a 26-unit 4.7 million-dollar construction program that breaks ground next month and will be completed in 12 months.

Thus, as a result of their organizational strength, disruptive tactics, and city council allies, the Oakland Union of the Homeless came to control extensive resources consisting of a multimillion-dollar housing project.

Yet, three other SMOs combined the same factors and failed to obtain

[20] It also should be noted that for some of the outcomes a number of the SMOs are implicated in more than one pathway. This is because qualitative comparative analysis reduces any set of conditions to its simplest combination. In the case of the PUH, e.g., all six conditions were present, but not all six were necessary to attain resources. Thus, it was encompassed by both pathways.

[21] It is the control of the program and the assets that accompanied this control that qualifies the placement of this outcome into the resource category.

resources. What explains these contradictory cases? Like the OUH, both the Detroit Union of the Homeless (DtUH) and the Tucson Union of the Homeless (TUH) operated in cities that had been nonresponsive to the homeless issue. But the OUH utilized disruptive tactics more often than either the Detroit or Tucson unions. We think it was this qualitative difference in the amount of disruption, which is not fully captured by our dichotomization of tactical disruption, that accounted for the difference in resource attainment.[22] As for PUEJ, it competed with a more viable and less disruptive SMO, the AOS, in Minneapolis, a city that had been responsive to the homeless problem, thus suggesting the operation of a radical-flank effect.

The second set of factors leading to resources combined viable SMOs with articulate diagnostic and prognostic framing in responsive cities where the SMO had allies on city councils. The PUH exemplified this pathway. Like the OUH, the PUH was able to gain control of homeless services, including a housing program that encompassed more than 200 housing units. One of the founding members discussed how this came about: "We were told by some people that we ought to try and get a shelter together that would be run by homeless people themselves. We applied for a grant through the city and received $21,000. We figured we were given the money in order to fail, that the city knew we would fail and could say, 'see, we gave 'em a chance, and they fucked it up.' We had been meeting in a Methodist church as a base for our organizing, and we used this space to begin sheltering people."

The PUH had a well-articulated diagnosis of and prognosis for the homeless issue, which were embodied in its slogan, "Homeless Not Helpless." Just as with representation, the PUH recognized the homeless people had little control over the institutions that shaped their lives. Obtaining resources to run the services that homeless people depend on was seen as a significant step toward empowerment. In addition, the PUH was the oldest and most active of the homeless SMOs. As such, it had developed council allies who pushed for its initiatives.

The third pathway to resources also highlighted the importance of contextual factors, combining nonviability and nondisruptive tactics in responsive cities where the SMO had allies on city council. The city of Boston had been more active than most cities in providing shelter to the

[22] This shortcoming is inherent in the QCA method, which requires the dichotomization of conditions so that they are either present or absent. At the same time, this underscores the benefits of combining qualitative comparative analysis with traditional ethnographic approaches. We are thus able to interpret contradictory cases by bringing to bear additional field data on the specific circumstances of the homeless SMOs.

homeless and its mayor had chaired the League of Cities Homeless Commission. Homefront (HF) was a Boston SMO that emerged during the course of a demonstration organized by local service providers. After the demonstration ended and the service providers and supporters went home, the homeless, who had nowhere to go, continued the demonstration and formed their organization. The support of two city council members was critical to the success of the demonstration, however. An aid to one of the city council participants explained their involvement:

> It's public knowledge our office was very helpful in giving the moral and physical support for the demonstration to continue. Our staff people went down and fixed coffee for them in the morning and helped them find [photocopying] for their flyers. I myself spent weekends down here talking to them. We helped them to organize into a little government thing where they did cleaning and stuff like that. We lent logistical support. The demonstration lasted for a long time. Finally, they came to an agreement with the city, and the city gave them an office and some stuff.

Thus, the combination of active allies on the city council, a city generally responsive to the homeless issue, and nondisruptive protest eventually enabled HF to obtain an office and supplies for its operation.

Rights

Seven of the SMOs were able to secure basic rights for the homeless, such as the right to vote, to go to school, or to obtain welfare benefits, as well as protection from discriminatory practices by police, service providers, and merchants. The same combinations leading to representation also lead to rights. Again, SMO viability and diagnostic and prognostic frames were necessary conditions that, in combination with disruptive tactics and allies or the absence of disruptive tactics in responsive cities, led to the realization of one or more rights. The experiences of the DtUH illustrate the first combination.

One of the DtUH's primary concerns was to address problems of homeless children. The union was particularly troubled by the fact that in many shelters children were unable to go to school for lack of transportation. The union argued that education was a right and that the Detroit Board of Education was responsible for making sure that homeless children could get to school. One of the leaders of the union discussed its efforts to help alleviate this problem:

> We have many concerns about the conditions of the shelter and the people that were there. And one of the issues that first came up was the children that were in a transient situation. Once they got to [a local shelter], there was no schooling because of [the lack of] transportation. The union, along with [a local welfare rights group], demanded and got meetings with the

> Detroit Board of Education. This went on for a month's time extensively. Out of those meetings, transportation not only from [the local shelter] but to all the other shelters was arranged.

Thus, the DtUH was able to get a meeting with the school board through the help of their city council allies and the threat of disruptive tactics, which they had used regularly in other campaigns. Equally important, their diagnostic and prognostic framing activities succeeded on two levels: by targeting children the DtUH focused attention on a population that could not be blamed for its homelessness and that was most likely to be viewed in a sympathetic light; and by targeting education, it focused on an issue that the city was mandated to address. It was through the combination of these factors, then, that the DtUH ultimately succeeded in ensuring that homeless children in Detroit could continue to attend their schools.

The second combination of factors leading to rights included SMO viability and diagnostic and prognostic frames in conjunction with the absence of disruptive tactics in more responsive cities. We look at the HCRP to illustrate this pathway. One issue it addressed, in addition to police harassment discussed earlier, was merchant discrimination against homeless people. After documenting numerous cases of homeless people being refused service or told to leave restaurants while other people were allowed to linger over their meals, HCRP decided to target a national chain of coffeehouses that had a particularly notorious record of such discrimination. Its leader discussed what occurred:

> We were going to set up a picket, but then we got calls from two people who were the co-chairs of the Board of Directors. They have like 200 restaurants. And they said, "Hey, we're not bad guys, can we sit down and talk?" We had been set on picketing, but we had also had an idea all along about writing up guidelines that would tell merchants how homeless people expected to be treated. Then we got to thinking, wouldn't it be better, it wouldn't be as much fun, but wouldn't it be better if they co-drafted those things with us? So that's what we asked them to do. We had a work meeting, and we hammered out the guidelines. Then we called a press conference to sign the agreement between [the chain] and the Homeless Civil Rights Project.

The subsequent publicity around the event helped to reduce the level of discrimination by local merchants. In part, this was because the approach of the HCRP showed a different side of homeless people to local merchants and also because the City of Boston retreated from its use of the police force to remove the homeless from local businesses. Thus, the presence of a strong SMO with articulate diagnostic and prognostic framing, which used nondisruptive tactics in a responsive city, led to increased protection from harassment for the local homeless population.

Relief

Relief in the form of accommodative or restorative facilities was the most widely obtained outcome. Nine SMOs were able to obtain relief within their respective cities for the local homeless population. These included such things as shelters, soup kitchens, public restrooms, showers, job programs, and permanent housing. There were multiple pathways to relief, with four combinations leading to the outcome. In addition, these combinations diverged from each other more than for the other outcomes in that only one condition was necessary to obtain relief.

The AOS in Minneapolis illustrates the first pathway to relief, which combines viability, allies, responsive cities, and articulate diagnostic and prognostic framing. The AOS led a campaign to save 150 units of low-cost housing in a downtown area of the city slated for demolition to make way for a new convention center. The AOS was the most prominent of three homeless SMOs in Minneapolis and received strong resource support from a local church, which included a clubhouse for members. The AOS's diagnostic frame blamed the city for backing out of an agreement guaranteeing one-for-one replacement for low-cost housing lost in construction, and its prognostic frame insisted that the city honor its commitment to housing the poor by building new, affordable housing. The city, in part because of its severe winters, had played an important role in sheltering homeless people. As such, the AOS had worked with and was on reasonably good terms with decision makers in the city agency dealing with the homeless issue. In addition, the AOS counted two councilmen as allies who had attended their rallies and pledged support. The AOS's leader discussed the outcome of the campaign: "We were the front lines on the Laurel Village Development project, which came out of the convention center demonstrations and a Labor Day rally that drew over fifteen hundred homeless people. Eventually, six million dollars was slated to revamp Paige Hall for low-income people in addition to the convention center housing we saved."

The second pathway to relief encompassed SMOs that combined viability and articulate framing with disruptive tactics and allies on city councils. The TUH illustrates this pathway. With significant resource support from a local Catholic Worker community, the TUH's diagnostic frame was strongly influenced by the social gospel stance of the Catholic Workers. The union argued that the presence of homeless people in the midst of affluence was something that public officials at all levels of government needed to address. Its prognosis thus included providing jobs and housing to homeless people and, short of that, improving the quality of life on the streets. The TUH utilized disruptive tactics in their protest and had allies on the local city council as well.

One particular campaign during the Christmas season typified the TUH's approach to protesting the homeless problem. The TUH organized a Posada, a traditional Mexican procession that reenacts Joseph and Mary's search for a place to stay. In the union's version, hundreds of homeless people paraded from the federal building to the city offices. The Posada, led by banners proclaiming "Still No Room at the Inn," visited various agency offices that the TUH felt should be addressing the homeless issue. The procession ended at the county building where a two-week encampment at the front of the building ensued. The county ultimately made $50,000 available to homeless service providers to expand homeless services.

Although this combination resulted in relief for four SMOs, it was not a guarantee of relief, as the same conditions failed to generate this outcome for the DtUH. In this case, we believe that a closed political opportunity structure was particularly significant. With a strong mayor/weak council form of government, and a mayor hostile to expanding programs for the poor, the DtUH tactics and allies were less effective in securing relief than was the case for many of the other successful homeless SMOs.

The third pathway to relief encompassed SMOs that combined disruptive protest and prognostic frames with the absence of viability, allies, and diagnostic frames. The Denver Union of the Homeless (DnUH) exemplifies this pathway. This SMO had a punctuated history, with episodic bursts of protest followed by periods of dormancy. This instability prohibited it from developing and establishing connections with political allies. A dynamic and assertive leader who believed in using dramatic and disruptive protest to call attention to the homeless issue ran the DnUH. The DnUH lacked a coherent diagnostic frame that guided their actions. Rather, it used disruptive protest to call for specific actions by the city to alleviate some aspect of the homeless problem of concern to its organizer. A leader of a local activist organization that worked with the DnUH elaborated:

> Dorothy (DnUH's leader) had this idea. She was setting up this shelter, she talked to some people, and she got a house down here. So we helped her get a board together, and helped to work out an agreement with the people she got the house from, and helped her start to raise some money. Well, in the process of doing that, Dorothy is looking around and saying, "Jesus, there are all these HUD [Department of Housing and Urban Development] houses with nobody living in these places. What the hell, we should be living in those. I mean, homeless people." So we talked with her and talked with her. Dorothy is the kind of person who moves on instinct, not a lot of strategy necessarily, particularly in a group sense. But individually, she decides that there are some houses not far from where her shelter is that would be excellent places for people to live. So they [the DnUH] go down and take a crowbar and rip the doors open and start spending time in the houses.

As a result of this takeover, HUD entered into negotiations with a number of local service providers and 55 houses were made available for housing for the poor. One of the HUD officials involved in the negotiations recalled the resolution to the housing takeovers:

> The regional administrator at that time had made a decision that he would try to facilitate the leasing process and make more homes available more quickly in response to a need. For that reason, he called in a couple of the local providers who were already working in the program and another local church community who had called him and expressed interest, and he invited Dorothy as well. He asked the attendees if he were to make available rather quickly a number of homes, how many did they feel that they could manage, that meant financially and property management responsibility? And then each of those groups responded with a number, and it was at that time he said we will make 55 homes available to these three organizations.

This pathway suggests that sometimes very little is necessary beyond disruption and a target to get relief. In the next pathway, even disruption is unnecessary.

The final pathway to relief encompassed SMOs that had developed prognostic framing combined with the absence of viability, allies, a responsive city, and diagnostic framing. Two SMOs in Houston—Heads Up (HU) and the Houston Union of the Homeless (HUH)—were associated with this pathway. Neither SMO survived beyond a year, mainly because of the lack of resource support from other organizations. Because of this, they met irregularly and conducted only one significant event, a march and rally to bring attention to the homeless issue. Houston had done very little to address the homeless problem in the city, relying primarily on private initiative to address the issue. While the march drew approximately six hundred homeless people and their supporters, it lacked a coherent and robust diagnosis of the homeless problem. This was clearly indicated in a conversation with one of the organizers from HU: "Well, the march was one of our activities, and I wanted to support it because we needed publicity and we needed to get involved in activities which would put the Heads Up name out there. And the march itself I didn't think was too negative. I mean, the march was just to highlight the fact that homeless people aren't getting all the services that could be provided and to just keep the homeless issue up front."

At the same time, both SMOs had more specific ideas of what needed to be done. An organizer with the HU discussed what it was seeking: "The march, the intent of the march was to stress the need for more low-income housing, also for emergency shelters and also to demand that the city does something about returning funds to the federal government for non-use because they don't have programs in place to utilize the funds."

The city responded to the march by fixing drinking fountains and set-

ting up portable toilets in a park where homeless people congregate. Thus, while this pathway suggests that relatively little is required to secure some forms of relief, the level of response also appears to be rather minimal.

Significant Impact

The above scenario underscores one of the weaknesses of our analysis: it fails to differentiate amounts of an outcome received. This is due not only to the highly variable accounting practices of the SMOs, but also because we found it more reliable to discern whether an outcome had ever been obtained by an SMO than to try and track and measure the level of the outcome received.[23] Yet, the problem of distinguishing SMOs that made a significant impact on the local homeless issue from those whose influence was more modest remains. We assess significant impact by looking at whether the SMOs received two or more of the outcome types excluding resources. We focus on representation, rights, and relief because these outcomes had the most direct impact on the local homeless population. Using this criterion, seven of the homeless SMOs were able to have a significant impact on the homeless problem in their respective communities.

As shown at the bottom of table 5, two pathways led to significant impact, with no contradictory cases in either. Once again, viable organizations with articulate diagnostic and prognostic frames were necessary conditions. These conditions combined with disruptive tactics and city council allies, or the absence of disruption in responsive cities. The first pathway encompasses five SMOs. The most successful of these were the Oakland and the Philadelphia unions. Both came to control housing assets in the multimillion-dollar range, and both expanded the accommodative resources for homeless people in their cities. In addition, they were able to protect and establish rights for homeless people around the issues of voting and welfare benefits. Finally, they were able to secure for the homeless a significant voice in policy discussions regarding the homeless problem. Thus, they were considered major players regarding poverty issues in their respective cities.

The other three SMOs in the first pathway were less effective but were still able to obtain two of the three types of outcomes and keep attention on the homeless issue. While the TUH and PUEJ never controlled housing assets, they did help save significant numbers of low-cost housing in their

[23] It also is important to keep in mind that the significance or marginality of a particular level or amount of an outcome is somewhat relative because it is highly context dependent. For example, is it better for the homeless if 150 units of low-cost housing are saved or if a new shelter is built? It might depend on whether the outcome occurred in Minneapolis or Tucson.

cities. In addition, they were both able to help change the treatment of homeless people by the police. The DtUH, on the other hand, never obtained relief for homeless people, but it did provide voice in policy debates and on task forces and fought for welfare benefits for people without an address. These accomplishments made it one of the more visible and important poor people's organizations in Detroit.

The second pathway to significant impact combined viable SMOs with articulate diagnostic and prognostic framing and the use of nondisruptive tactics in sympathetic city contexts. Both the HCRP and the AOS tended to work "with the system" whenever possible; when they protested, they tended to utilize institutional channels of redress. The AOS was able to save hundreds of units of low-cost housing and improve the conditions in local shelters. In addition, it provided homeless people with input into the decision over who should have access to permanent housing. It also helped the homeless to secure the right to vote and to obtain welfare benefits. The HCRP focused more on rights protection. As such, it was able to reduce significantly the harassment of homeless people by merchants, police, and service providers. It was also able to improve conditions inside shelters and provide homeless people with a voice on policing and shelter policies in Boston.

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

We noted at the outset that, relative to other social movement processes, there is a paucity of research that attempts to systematically understand the outcomes of social movements. These efforts have been hampered by both conceptual and causal issues. We have attempted to shed additional light on these concerns by examining ethnographically the outcomes of 15 homeless SMOs in eight U.S. cities. Specifically, we identified the range of outcomes pursued and obtained by the homeless SMOs, discussed and operationalized four sets of explanatory conditions, and identified the conjunction of factors that led to attainment of various combinations of the outcomes pursued across the 15 SMOs. We summarize our findings below in the course of discussing their relevance for thinking about social movement outcomes more broadly and their implications for understanding more thoroughly the causal dynamics underlying the attainment of movement outcomes.

Conceptualizing Social Movement Outcomes

One implication stems from our identification of the range of outcome types pursued by the homeless SMOs. Much of the discussion of movement outcomes emphasizes the passage of governmental policy or legisla-

tion (Giugni 1998), ignoring or treating superficially the various outcomes we have identified. The homeless SMOs we studied rarely attempted to pass legislation, however. This is not to suggest that there was disinterest in national legislation that benefited the homeless. In fact, homeless SMOs and activists from around the country have coalesced on a number of occasions to appeal to the federal government for assistance in dealing with the problem of homelessness. A case in point was the previously mentioned 1989 "Housing Now!" march on Washington D.C. In general, however, the homeless SMOs we studied, as well as others we have learned about secondhand, worked to achieve more proximate goals, such as getting homeless people off the streets, and short of that, to improve the quality of life on the streets for those unfortunate enough to become homeless. In addition, they sought to represent the voice of homeless people in policy discussions and enrich their organizations in order to further their mobilizing capacity. The kinds of outcomes we identified were significant not only to those homeless individuals whose lives benefited concretely from them, but to the ongoing mobilization of homeless protest in general.

We think the emphasis on social policy outcomes is largely a function of the national-level emphasis of much social movement scholarship rather than the empirically demonstrated result of what most social movements actually attempt to accomplish. Researchers have tended to study large and presumably successful movements at the expense of more localized or failed ones (Voss 1996), and the passage of national policy is often seen as the pinnacle of movement impact. Yet, even movements that appear to have a national focus tend to have a broader range of concerns that we believe are captured by our typology. For example, research on the Civil Rights movement clearly shows how SMOs worked to extend rights, secure various forms of relief, and represent the voices of blacks in policy discussions (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984), as well as secure resources from the state for their own organizations (Haines 1984; Jenkins and Eckert 1986).

We believe the outcome types pursued by the homeless SMOs are common to other movements as well. For example, the mobilization of the Communist Party during the 1930s was built not on national policy initiatives, but through locally organized demonstrations to improve the immediate circumstances of those impoverished during the depression (Goldberg 1991). Securing welfare benefits and demanding rent relief are only a few of the several kinds of outcomes that were significant not only to those whose lives were eased, but to building the communist movement. Likewise, the main thrust of many neighborhood movements has been to provide official representation of neighborhood communities within institutional political structures.

These observations suggest that focusing on broad policy outcomes may capture only a fragment of what some, and perhaps most, SMOs actually do. It glosses over the more proximate impact that social movements can have for their beneficiaries by missing much of what is pursued in SMO collective action campaigns at a local level. Our findings and analysis provide a partial corrective to this tendency. Whether other movements operating in other contexts pursue the outcomes we identified is, of course, an empirical question. But at the very least, our outcome typology underscores the more local agendas of some varieties of SMOs and thus suggests that social movements may sometimes have greater impact than often presumed or theorized.

Causal Implications for Understanding the Dynamics of Social Movement Outcomes

One of the more general implications of our findings is that most social movement outcomes are probably obtained through multiple pathways rather than through one surefire pathway or set of conditions. As shown in table 6, which lists the multiple pathways to the outcomes of interest and their general level of impact, the four outcomes we identified were obtained through six different combinations of the six causal conditions. This suggests that the search for a single general framework that explains outcome attainment is misguided. But does it necessarily follow that each outcome requires its own unique combination of underlying conditions, thereby calling into question the utility of theoretical generalization regarding the relationship between causal conditions and outcomes? Or are there particular combinations of conditions that are more potent or efficacious than others in generating outcomes?

Looking at table 6, it would appear at first glance—with six different combinations of the six causal conditions—that the relationship between the conditions and outcomes is rather indeterminate and bereft of much theoretical utility. But closer scrutiny of the relationship between the six pathways and their respective impact indicates that such a conclusion is unwarranted. In particular, three observations stand out. First, all of the six pathways were not equally potent or successful, as measured by the number of outcomes they obtained: one pathway facilitated attainment of all four of the outcomes; two combinations led to two of the outcomes; and three of the combinations were associated with only one outcome. Thus, some pathways or combinations clearly had a more pronounced impact than others. Second, the three combinations that led to two or more outcomes were characterized by the presence of viable organizations with articulate diagnostic and prognostic framing. Where they differed was in terms of the interaction of political context and tactics. Disruptive

TABLE 6

MULTIPLE PATHWAYS TO OUTCOMES AND LEVEL OF IMPACT

Pathways	Outcomes	Impact
1. VIABLE * DISRUPT * ALLIES * DIAG * PROG	Representation, Resources, Rights, and Relief	Very strong
2. VIABLE * disrupt * CITY * DIAG * PROG	Representation and Rights	Strong
3. VIABLE * ALLIES * CITY * DIAG * PROG	Resources and Relief	Moderate
4. viable * DISRUPT * allies * diag * PROG	Relief	Weak
5. viable * allies * city * diag * PROG	Relief	Weak
6. viable * disrupt * ALLIES * CITY * diag * prog	Resources	Weak

NOTE.—Uppercase letters indicate presence of condition and lowercase letters indicate the absence of a condition. Conditions not in the equation are considered irrelevant. Multiplication signs are read as "and."

tactics were effective in conjunction with city council allies, whereas nondisruptive tactics were more effective in responsive cities. Where both responsive cities and council allies were present, tactics were irrelevant. Third, in contrast to these basic combinations of conditions that characterized the three most consequential pathways, the remaining pathways shared few common conditions and were associated with SMOs that were idiosyncratic in terms of their origins or careers.

Based on these observations, it seems reasonable to conclude—at least for the cases we examined—that while there is some variation in the relationship between combinations of conditions and types of outcome, there are a number of combinations that clearly are more potent or efficacious in terms of the outcomes secured or attained. We examine these combinations and discuss their relevance to the outcome frameworks proposed by Gamson, Piven and Cloward, and Amenta and his colleagues, as well as to the framing perspective.

Political mediation and tactics.—The three pathways that yielded the most outcomes, and thus were most potent, extend and refine the political mediation arguments of Amenta and his colleagues (1992, 1994, 1996) and the emphasis placed on disruptive tactics by Gamson (1990) and Piven and Cloward (1977), among others. At least one of the political mediation conditions was typically required for some level of outcome attainment. In addition, the political mediation condition interacted with the use of disruptive tactics in various ways: Disruptive tactics worked in conjunction with allies on city councils, but nondisruptive tactics were necessary in more responsive cities. We think the reasons for these interactions are twofold: the presence of elite allies provides a legitimate voice for putting a positive spin on disruptive protest and for placing the SMO's grievances and objectives on a city's calendar as something that warrants positive attention and action. However, when such attention and action are present in the context of an already responsive city, disruptive protest is unnecessary and likely to be counterproductive. In turn, when both allies and a responsive context are present, protest tactics should be irrelevant, which was the case in the third pathway in table 6.

These findings call into question the generality of the significance Piven and Cloward (1977), and to a lesser extent Gamson (1990), place on disruptive tactics in relation to movement success and are more in line with the research of Amenta and his colleagues (1992, 1994, 1996), who suggest that disruption may be required only in the absence of political mediation. But even though Amenta and his colleagues provide a more robust understanding of the relationship between political mediation and disruptive tactics, they are relatively silent on the role of disruption in the presence of these conditions. Our findings refine this relationship further. In the case of the homeless SMOs, disruption was ineffective in the absence of

allies, and it was detrimental in the presence of responsive contexts. Thus, for the homeless SMOs, disruption in its own right was never sufficient to secure desired outcomes. Rather, it typically required the additional presence of allies, and, if pursued in responsive cities, could even backfire, particularly in the presence of a more moderate SMO.

Organizational viability and framing.—Our analysis also suggests that the attainment of movement goals is strongly facilitated by viable organizations that are skilled at diagnostic and prognostic framing. We argued in an earlier article that organizational viability was predicated on successful resource mobilization and suggested that viable organizations were also more likely to be successful (Cress and Snow 1996). This was consistent with Gamson's (1990) emphasis on strong, "combat ready" organizations in contrast to Piven and Cloward's (1977) argument that investment in organization-building undermines successful mobilization by diverting energy from disruptive protest. Our earlier argument was confirmed by the finding that significant outcome attainment was predicated, in part, on having viable organizations. While nonviable SMOs were sometimes able to obtain an outcome, this was much more the exception than the rule. In addition, the level of response tended to be less. For example, HU in Houston was able to obtain relief in terms of public toilets and drinking fountains. But this paled in comparison to the relief acquired by the viable SMOs, all of which created or salvaged low-cost housing worth hundreds of thousands of dollars or more.

We also have seen that the framing activities of SMOs are important for successful outcome attainment. However, framing activity associated with the development of reasonably articulate and coherent diagnostic and prognostic frames is not so likely to occur in an organizational vacuum. Rather, such activity is more likely to flourish in the micromobilization contexts provided by viable SMOs. Why? Because viable SMOs are more likely to provide the raw materials (e.g., alternative ideas) and interactional venues (e.g., meetings) and mechanisms (e.g., talk and debate) conducive to frame articulation and elaboration. We were continually struck by the differences in the SMOs we examined in this regard. The viable ones were more adaptive in that they could strategically develop or modify both diagnostic and prognostic frames in a fashion that facilitated outcome attainment. For example, the DtUH, which had difficulty securing outcomes under conditions that favored other SMOs, was able to attain desired outcomes when their message emphasized the educational consequences of homelessness for children. Had they merely pushed for rights and relief for the homeless in general, it is likely that their appeal would have fallen on deaf ears.

Even though our findings indicate that viable SMOs and articulate and coherent framing activities are mutually facilitative, they also indicate

that working prognostic frames may sometimes develop in the absence of articulate diagnostic frames and viable organizational contexts (pathways 4 and 5). This is not so surprising as it may appear when two considerations are taken into account. First, the grievances associated with some movements, such as the homeless one, are often so palpable because they are rooted in the disruption of constituents everyday routines, that many, and perhaps most, of them have a good sense of some aspect of the problem, thus making the articulation of a diagnostic frame less of a troublesome mobilization issue. However, the specification of some line of action is still likely to be a problematic issue in such contexts, thus requiring the development of a prognostic frame (Snow et al. 1998, pp. 18–19). This takes us to the second consideration: that functional prognostic frames may sometimes be elaborated by a few ardent activists in nonviable organizational contexts, which is exactly what occurred in the cases of the four SMOs associated with pathways 4 and 5 (Boston Union of the Homeless [BUH], DnUH, HU, and HUH). It is our sense, based on the careers of these four SMOs, that prognostic frames developed in these contexts are useful for guiding one or two collective actions but not for mounting a sustained challenge. In order for that to occur, viable organizations that are able to accumulate resources and engage in elaborated and focused framing discussions appear to be requisite conditions.

Whatever the sources or correlates of articulate and coherent diagnostic and prognostic frames, however, it seems clear that they are no less important to movement outcome attainment efforts than organizational structure, tactical considerations, and political context. In fact, our findings indicate that framing activity was the most persistently present condition across all six pathways. As shown in table 6, not only was both diagnostic and prognostic framing present in all three pathways associated with two or more outcomes, but prognostic framing was also present in two of the three pathways associated with only one outcome. In contrast, none of the other conditions were present in more than three of the six pathways. Thus, for the 15 homeless SMOs we examined, it is apparent that articulate and focused framing activity comes more closely than any of the other conditions to constituting a necessary condition for attainment of the outcomes in question. This is not so surprising, since both diagnostic and prognostic framing not only help define and bring into sharp focus grievances, targets of blame, targets of action, and lines of action, but, in doing so, may also help SMOs secure or enhance organizational legitimacy within the organizational fields in which they are embedded. And, in turn, this legitimacy is likely to increase the prospect of securing sympathetic allies and official, city support. Thus, just as Gamson and Meyer (1996) have argued that framing can affect political opportunity, so it appears that organizational viability and legitimacy may be affected by framing

activity as well. In the absence of either type of framing, then, any concerted collective action is unlikely, and this seems particularly clear in the case of prognostic framing.

We believe that the neglect of framing processes in understanding movement outcomes is one of the more glaring oversights in the social movement literature. One need only note some of the century's seemingly most consequential movements—the communist movement, the Civil Rights movement, and the women's movement—to underscore the important role of articulate and coherent diagnostic and prognostic framing. Indeed, our analysis underscores and vitalizes the notion that collective definitions and perceptions matter in social movements. People do not typically respond to abstract notions like political opportunity structure and grievances apart from the creative and inspirational ways in which they are interpreted by movement leaders and activists (Gamson and Meyer 1996). While the framing literature generally has emphasized the role that these factors play in movement mobilization, we have argued here that they also make an important contribution to understanding more fully the factors and dynamics accounting for variation in outcome attainment across movements and contexts.

Summary

Taken together, our findings identify the importance of organizational viability and framing activities for obtaining targeted outcomes by homeless SMOs. When these conditions are present and occur in conjunction with political mediation, the particulars of which affect the types of tactics that are associated with successful outcome attainment, we found that the homeless SMOs are likely to have their greatest impact. While it is an empirical question whether this conjunction of conditions holds for other movements, the findings and analysis suggest that attempts to understand movement outcomes that focus on the ways in which different conditions interact and combine are likely to be more compelling and robust, both theoretically and empirically, than efforts that focus on the conditions specified by a single perspective or that pit one perspective against another. Additionally, while we suspect that different combinations of conditions are likely to be associated with different categories of outcomes for different movements, we would be surprised if the framing processes elaborated here did not figure prominently in successful outcome attainment efforts among most other movements. We say this not only because either articulate and focused diagnostic or prognostic framing, or both, was a necessary condition for securing all four categories of outcomes sought by the 15 SMOs studied, but also because a consideration of framing processes forces analysts to consider not only structural factors, such as orga-

nizational form and political context, but also the various activities movement adherents engage in within the context of SMOs.

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