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The Dynamics of the Demobilization of the Protest Campaign in Assam

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ABSTRACT

This study highlights the role that critical events play in the demobilization of protest campaigns. Social movement scholars suggest that protest campaigns demobilize as a consequence of polarization within the campaign or the cooptation of the campaign leaders. I offer critical events as an alternative causal mechanism and argue that protest campaigns in ethnically divided societies are particularly combustible, as they have the potential to trigger unintended or unorchestrated communal violence. When such violence occurs, elite strategies change, mass support declines, and the campaign demobilizes. An empirical investigation of the dynamics of the demobilization phase of the anti-foreigner protest campaign in Assam, India, between 1979 and 1985 confirms this argument. A single group analysis is conducted to compare the dynamics of the campaign before and after the communal violence by using time series event data collected from *The Indian Express*, a national newspaper. The study has wider implications for the literature on collective action, as it illuminates the dynamic and complex nature of protest campaigns.

KEYWORDS

Assam; critical events; demobilization; protest campaigns; time series

The year 2014 was marked by intense protests against the police after the killings of Michael Brown in Ferguson and Eric Garner in New York and the subsequent failure to indict the police officers that killed them. While large-scale protests were held across the United States, an unexpected event happened: Two police officers were shot to death in New York on December 20, 2014, by a man who was allegedly outraged by the Brown and Garner cases. The momentum for the Black Lives Matter movement in New York City was derailed as the police killings generated a backlash effect against demonstrators by critics and local leaders who maintained that it was not appropriate to keep protesting given the horrific nature of the police killings. Meanwhile, the New York City police blamed the protesters for those killings. These events show that in the midst of a mobilization process, protesters can withdraw from the streets when unexpected events occur and external pressure encourages them to stop demonstrating.

This study highlights the role that critical events play in the demobilization of protest campaigns. In the context of an ongoing protest campaign, critical events may alter protesters' tactics and their willingness to continue demonstrating, leading to the demobilization of the campaign. Typically, social movement scholars argue that protest campaigns demobilize as a consequence of a polarization between radical and moderate protesters or the cooptation of the campaign leaders. I offer critical events as an alternative causal mechanism and argue that protest campaigns in ethnically divided societies are particularly combustible, as they have the potential to trigger unintended communal violence.¹ When such violence occurs, elite strategies change, mass support declines, and campaigns demobilize.

The connection between critical events and the demobilization of a campaign has remained largely undertheorized mainly because scholars have typically associated critical events with increased protest activity (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Rasler 1996). For instance, Rasler (1996) shows that the burning down of the Abadan cinema resulting in 400 deaths was one of the important critical events that escalated the protests during the Iranian revolution. Similarly, Lohmann (1994) argues that President Gorbachev's visit to East Germany in October 1989 where he publicly urged East German leaders to implement reforms was seen as a signal that the Soviet military forces would not intervene if people started protesting. In both cases, critical events are seen as having an escalatory effect on mass protests against the regime. Nonetheless, critical events can also have a de-escalatory effect. According to Staggenborg (1993:320), critical events are significant turning points that, whether intentional or not, alter expectations and perceptions of threats and opportunities, affecting the outcomes of protest campaigns. This definition allows for the possibility that critical events can lead to the demobilization of a protest campaign. For instance, the 1990–1991 Gulf War was responsible for the demobilization of the First Intifada protest campaign. Until the Gulf War, Palestinian leaders used nonviolent tactics to convey their message to the international community, knowing that Israel's military response would evoke international criticism. The onset of the Gulf War, however, shifted international attention away from the campaign and created an opportunity for the Israelis to clamp down on the Palestinian activists by imposing a total curfew, limiting the Intifada's activities significantly (Alimi 2009:228–229).

To investigate how critical events can demobilize a protest campaign, I conduct a quantitative analysis of a single case study, the anti-foreigner protest campaign in the northeast Indian state of Assam between 1979 and 1985. The critical event in the Assam protest campaign proved to be the

¹*Communal violence* refers to an intense, sudden, though not necessarily wholly unplanned, lethal attack by civilian members of one ethnic group on civilian members of another ethnic group, with the victims chosen because of their group membership (Horowitz 2001:1). The intention to kill and the civilian nature of the perpetrators and the victims are the defining characteristics of communal violence.

unexpected rise of communal violence in February 1983. By using original and fine-grained data collected from *The Indian Express*, a daily newspaper, I demonstrate that the 1983 communal violence played a major role in the demobilization of the campaign in this ethnically divided state. Though the communal violence was neither planned nor directed by the protesters, it had a significant impact on the campaign by compelling the campaign leaders to suspend protests temporarily and leading to the withdrawal of one of the main ethnic groups that originally supported the campaign. Consequently, protests declined dramatically, never reaching the levels they did during the first four years of the campaign.

This study makes several important contributions to the theoretical literature. First, it examines the link between critical events and the demobilization process of a protest campaign. Second, this research expands our understanding of how protest campaigns demobilize. So far, scholars have mostly identified the use of violence or the creation of formal organizations as the main determinants of demobilization (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Nepstad 2011; Piven and Cloward 1977; Tarrow 1989). This study identifies communal violence in ethnically divided societies as another causal explanation. In societies where multiple ethnic groups compete for power, communal violence that occurs during a protest campaign, yet is not directed by the campaign leaders, is likely to lead to demobilization. Communal violence pushes protest leaders to change strategies and results in the withdrawal of and rank-and-file support. Third, this research brings a more nuanced understanding to the effects of violence on the demobilization of protest campaigns. Traditional studies of nonviolent resistance campaigns assume that opposition groups choose to pursue nonviolent strategies and strictly adhere to such tactics even when faced with severe repression. If they fail to maintain nonviolent discipline, then the campaign is more likely to fail to achieve its political goal as protesters leave the streets in the face of violence. In short, the use of nonviolent tactics is an important factor that avoids the premature demobilization of the campaign before groups gain important concessions from the government (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Nepstad 2011; Schock 2005, 2013; Sharp 1973). Nonetheless, social movement scholars who have studied the dynamics of protest campaigns note that radical groups frequently use violence, and this development allows the state to distinguish the radicals from the moderates. By making concessions to the moderates, state leaders are able to demobilize the protest campaign by coopting the moderates while isolating the radicals (Della Porta and Tarrow 1986; Tilly 1978). Both of these strands of research assume that violence is a tactical choice designed to achieve political goals.² Yet, I argue that violence is not necessarily

²My understanding of protest campaign is similar to that of social movement scholars in that it involves both types of actions: nonviolent ones as well as low-level forms of violence, short of organized military operations. While demonstrations, boycotts, or strikes are nonviolent tactics typically used during protest campaigns, the potential for a violent outbreak exists, as people might throw stones, break windows, or set vehicles on fire.

strategic, and when it is unorchestrated in the context of a protest campaign, it can produce a shock that may demobilize a protest campaign, as happened in Assam. Thus, the aim of this study is to examine protest campaigns and improve our understanding of their dynamics in terms of how and when the scale and scope of protest actions escalates or de-escalates.

Theoretical foundations: The demobilization of protest campaigns and critical events

Scholars who have studied protest campaigns frequently suffer from two limitations. First, scholars have mostly focused on the factors that predict success and have only included failed nonviolent campaigns as negative cases to identify the conditions for the achievement of the campaign's stated goals (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Nepstad 2011; Schock 2005). This approach tends to overlook dynamics that are unique to unsuccessful outcomes. Second, scholars of protest campaigns usually pay more attention to the origins and spread of mobilization rather than the demobilization process (Koopmans 1997; McAdam 1983; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). Although demobilization is a crucial process that occurs within the trajectory of protest campaigns, it has attracted surprisingly little theoretical attention.³ Of the few scholars who do study demobilization, the focus is on the cooptation or polarization processes. For instance, Piven and Cloward (1977) argue that the development of formally structured organizations greatly increases the prospects for elite influence and the cooptation of campaign leaders, thus, diminishing the campaign's disruptive potential. Others such as Tarrow (1989) and Della Porta and Tarrow (1986) maintain that demobilization is the inevitable outcome of the expansion of a protest campaign and is largely driven by the polarization between moderates and radicals.

I advance a causal mechanism for demobilization that is different from either cooptation or polarization. I suggest that protest campaigns can demobilize because of critical events that constrain the leadership's protest strategies. Critical events are important turning points that affect public and elite attention to campaigns (Staggenborg 1993:320).

Scholars have examined critical events in different contexts in political science. For instance, several International Relations scholars have studied the impact of critical events or shocks in the de-escalation or termination of strategic rivalries (Goertz and Diehl 1995; Rasler, Thompson, and Ganguly 2013). While critical events are not sufficient to terminate or de-escalate

³*Demobilization* refers to the process by which protesting decreases in scale and scope and eventually ends (Tilly and Tarrow 2007). While demobilization typically evokes an unsuccessful outcome, these two concepts are distinct. Although the demobilization of a nonviolent campaign often leads to its failure, demobilization might also precede a successful outcome. For example, the demobilization of the Baltic and Crimean Tatar protests in 1987 and 1988 under coercive measures eventually led to a successful outcome, as they triggered other protests, ending with the fall of the Soviet Union (Beissinger 2002).

rivalries, they can contribute to a process of de-escalation of rivalries when political leaders take advantage of the uncertainty caused by the disruption of routine expectations (Rasler et al. 2013:13–19). Scholars of Historical Institutionalism also have sought to understand institutional change via critical junctures (Collier and Collier 2002; Mahoney 2001; Polanyi 1957). Critical junctures relax structural influences (economic, cultural, organizational, and ideological) on political action significantly for a short period of time, widening the options available to political actors. The consequences of powerful actors' decisions during critical junctures typically have long-term consequences (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). Both strands of research, however, mostly emphasize the relaxation of structural constraints and the widening of political options, rather than structural changes that narrow the options available to political actors.

While studies of protest campaigns have examined the escalatory impact of critical events (Rasler 1996; Shawki 2012), with the notable exception of Staggenborg (1993), few scholars have provided theoretical guidelines as to how to identify critical events. Staggenborg (1993:322) suggests six types of critical events based on the extent of control the actors exert: large-scale socioeconomic and political events, natural disasters and epidemics, accidents, critical encounters, strategic initiatives, and policy outcomes. Large-scale socioeconomic and political events such as wars and depressions, natural disasters and epidemics, and industrial or nuclear accidents are critical events that neither campaign actors nor their opponents exert much control over. In contrast, strategic initiatives and policy outcomes are orchestrated by the campaign actors or their opponents. In strategic initiatives, campaign actors or the countercampaign create events designed to mobilize support. Policy outcomes are official state responses to mobilization. States might adopt favorable or unfavorable policies that affect levels of support for campaigns.

Critical encounters, which the communal violence in Assam falls into, are events that involve face-to-face interactions or physical contact between authorities or other actors who are somewhat associated with the campaign. Such events occur when other social actors attempt to assert control using methods ranging from ridicule to violence, causing a sudden change in the trajectory of the campaign (Staggenborg 1993:327–328). Staggenborg (1993) argues that the level of control in critical encounters ranges from full control by the state or campaign leaders to little or no control. Thus, critical encounters might include events that occur during the campaign with the full knowledge and sanctioning of the elites or campaign leaders as well as events that are unauthorized or not approved by them. The shootings of the two police officers in New York during the Black Lives Matter campaign in the United States, for instance, happened within the context of the campaign but were not sanctioned by the elites or the campaign leaders. Similarly, in Assam, the killings of the mostly Muslim peasants by Assamese villagers

during the protest campaign were critical encounters that were beyond the campaign leadership's control. While the campaign leaders had called for a boycott of the 1983 State Assembly elections that increased violence associated with protests in major towns, the violent attacks in rural areas were not controlled by the leaders of the Assam protest campaign (Kimura 2013:7). Therefore, the communal violence in Assam is distinct from the protest campaign in the sense that neither the protesters nor the campaign or the state leadership planned it. Nonetheless, the communal violence occurred in rural areas when ethnic tension was significantly elevated in the region.

The causal mechanism

In societies where communal divisions are salient, opposition leaders broaden the base of resistance to include members of different ethnic groups. Nonetheless, the inclusion of different ethnic groups makes the unity of the campaign precarious, particularly if campaign activities highlight ethnic cleavages (Horowitz 2001; Svensson and Lindgren 2011). Mass actions can exacerbate tensions by provoking fear or anger between different communal groups. When an ethnic group demonstrates strength by protesting in large numbers, others feel threatened—especially if the protesters' claims have ethnic overtones. In such instances, protest campaigns become highly combustible, increasing the chances of communal violence. For instance, Uzbek demonstrations over ethnic claims to land and housing led to communal violence in Kyrgyzstan in 1990. Similarly, the Azeri protests against Armenian demands for the unification of Karabakh with Armenia triggered communal violence, resulting in mass killings of Armenians (Horowitz 2001; Varshney 2002).

Although communal violence occurs outside the control of the protest leadership, it can dramatically affect the trajectory of the campaign. Opposition elites face pressure to shut down the campaign to prevent more ethnic violence. Moreover, protesters who are members of the ethnic groups targeted during the violence withdraw their support from the campaign as a result of the increased prominence of ethnic allegiances. The leaders also face the challenge of finding ways to reinvigorate enthusiasm and maintain solidarity, particularly when political elites or the media call for a slowdown to give the communities time to heal. Even if the campaign resumes, the loss of momentum leads to a decline in protest activity and lower levels of support. A striking example is the collapse of the civil disobedience campaign in India as a result of Hindu-Muslim violence in the early 1920s. As the British were fighting against the Ottoman sultan during World War I, the Muslims in India turned against the British, providing Gandhi the opportunity to unite Hindus and Muslims in a civil disobedience campaign for the freedom of India. Even though Muslim-Hindu unity was created for some time, in mid-1921, Muslim clerics in Malabar in the state of Kerala started to

protest against the British treatment of the caliph in Turkey. These protests first turned into a violent rebellion against the British and then degenerated into Hindu-Muslim violence (Varshney 2002:142), creating a Hindu-Muslim divide within the Indian national movement across the country. Gandhi and the Congress Party were unable to maintain the campaign, as communal divisions became too obvious. Consequently, Gandhi ended the campaign in 1922, and the Congress Party withdrew from mass mobilization until 1929 (Varshney 2002:134–135).

Communal violence leading to the demobilization of a protest campaign differs from previously identified causal pathways in the literature. For Piven and Cloward (1977) and Tarrow (1989), the broadening of the support base leaves campaigns vulnerable to internal divisions, resulting in a withdrawal of support and finally, demobilization. However, the factors that trigger the withdrawal of public support are different. According to Piven and Cloward, the expansion of the protest campaign prompts the government to coopt the opposition to channel their disruptive behavior into organized forms of contention. Yet, campaign leaders usually overestimate their ability to keep the campaign strong and effective via organizations while simultaneously underestimating the amount of resources needed to maintain an organization. As leaders get isolated from the protesters, disruptive behavior declines, leaving the remaining agitated protesters discouraged and vulnerable to repression.

Alternatively, Tarrow (1989) highlights the competitive dynamics among groups and its potential to lead to internal divisions before governments can coopt campaign leaders. When protest campaigns first emerge, disruptive protests diffuse to different locations and segments of the society. Competition for mass support intensifies as both established groups, such as trade unions or political parties, and new groups join the campaign. Nonetheless, the early enthusiasm for protesting wanes over time and the personal costs of participation wear people down. The decline in participation further encourages competition for mass support. While moderates lead the shift toward conventional forms of collective action such as strikes and demonstrations, smaller and newer groups turn radical as they employ violent tactics to distinguish themselves from the moderates. Similar to Piven and Cloward's (1977) cooptation model, the state represses the radicals selectively while accommodating the moderates, reinforcing the polarization between these groups. Faced with repression, the radicals resort to more violent tactics, resulting in a further withdrawal of public support. The split between the moderates and the radicals eventually leads to the demise of the protest campaign (Tarrow 1989).

The causal mechanism I offer, however, allows for a disruption of the trajectory of protests by an unexpected and unorchestrated event. As Figure 1 illustrates, if a critical event such as communal violence occurs in an ethnically divided society, the campaign leadership refrains from employing strategies that might exacerbate ethnic tensions. Governing elites usually assert




Figure 1. Causal pathway for the demobilization of a protest campaign.

their authority and criticize campaign leaders for mobilizing ethnic political demands and bringing ethnic issues to the forefront. In addition, political elites often pressure campaign leaders to suspend their activities in a highly tense ethnic and political environment to prevent the outbreak of more violence. As Horowitz (2001:286) suggests, ethnic groups can be provoked more easily to engage in large-scale violence during mass demonstrations or processions, particularly if the core issues closely relate to ethnic demands. Given the elevated tension as well as the political elite's pressure in the aftermath of communal violence, campaign leaders will typically avoid organizing protests.

Furthermore, as communal violence highlights the divisions within the society, ethnic groups, particularly those that have been victimized by the violence, withdraw their support from the protest campaign as it becomes more difficult to act collectively across ethnic lines. When the protest campaign secures the support of different ethnic, religious, and/or socioeconomic groups, protest leaders face challenges in keeping these different groups together after a major shock like communal violence. If one of the groups included in this broad coalition has affiliations to the group that has been targeted, campaign solidarity declines. The group affiliated to the victims questions the purpose of the campaign and pressures the leaders to modify campaign policies that undermine the interests of the targeted groups. Other groups also make demands to strengthen their profile, further undermining the campaign's broad coalition. Thus, the ability of the leaders to organize mass events decreases. Furthermore, the leaders spend more time and energy into finding ways to reenergize the campaign and rebuild solidarity.

Assam and the anti-foreigner protest campaign, 1979–1985

Assam is an ethnically heterogeneous society that has also witnessed large-scale immigration from many parts of the subcontinent (particularly East Bengal) over the last hundred years (Baruah 1986). According to the 1971 census records

(before the anti-foreigner protest campaign started in 1979) 72.5% of the population in Assam was Hindu, 24.6% was Muslim, and 2.61% was Christian. The Muslim population in Assam includes ethnic Assamese and Muslims of Bengali descent, while Hindus also include ethnic Assamese and Hindu Bengalis that immigrated to Assam. People are divided along linguistic lines, which simultaneously also stands for the division between “indigenous” and “immigrant” groups. As of 1971, approximately 68% of the population in Assam spoke languages or dialects that are considered to be of “indigenous” people, while 29 % of the population spoke “immigrant” languages or dialects (Baruah 1986:1188).

The protest campaign in Assam emerged to drive out both Hindu and Muslim immigrants (Kimura 2013). Threatened by rapid population growth following a large influx of Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh and concerned by the growing political power of the middle-class mostly Hindu Bengali immigrants, ethnic Assamese started a statewide protest campaign in 1979 to pressure the Indian Government to identify illegal immigrants, delete their names from voting lists, and deport them to Bangladesh. The campaign was led by the All Assam Students Union (AASU) and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP), an umbrella organization formed in 1979 to direct the protest activities against illegal immigrants (Baruah 1999). While the campaign leaders demanded the deportation of all those who entered after 1951, the Indian state felt a humanitarian commitment toward the Hindu refugees who crossed into India from East Pakistan to escape the atrocities of the Pakistani state before it became Bangladesh in 1971. Therefore, the Indian Government insisted that 1971 should be the baseline year, allowing foreigners who entered before that year to stay (Kimura 2013).

The campaign gained mass support among ethnic Assamese, including indigenous Muslims who had settled in Assam before colonization. The leaders of the campaign made a deliberate attempt to frame the immigration issue along secular lines by highlighting the illegality of it rather than identifying certain ethnic immigrants, especially the Muslims, as the unwanted population (Baruah 1986; Kimura 2013). Thousands of students, government employees, peasants, and workers participated in demonstrations, strikes, and sit-ins throughout the first four years. The government responded with a mix of repression and accommodation as it used force against the protesters at times while also periodically negotiating with the campaign leaders. In early 1983, the campaign intensified in the wake of the state legislative assembly elections scheduled for February. The central government insisted on using the electoral rolls of 1979 without deleting the names of foreigners, while the campaign leaders strongly opposed and called for an electoral boycott. Both nonviolent and violent protests intensified before the elections, as many Assamese citizens supported the boycott. In addition to the strikes aimed at preventing election preparations and the filing of nominations, the AASU and the AAGSP organized a general strike that

was supported by state employees. As clashes between the police and the protesters increased, the Assam government brought in additional police from other states. In the midst of this tense political environment, communal violence occurred when Assamese and Tiwa (an indigenous minority group) peasants in the rural areas attacked mostly Muslims of Bengali descent (Kimura 2013). The first large-scale ethnic violence took place in the Darrang District on the northern bank of the Brahmaputra River on February 11. One week later, about 1,600 to 2,000 Muslims of East Bengali origin were killed in several villages around Nellie in the Nagaon District (Kimura 2013:68). According to Kimura (2013), the Nellie incident was one of the largest incidents of ethnic violence in India's rural areas since India gained its independence in 1947.⁴

After the communal violence, the AASU and AAGSP suspended the campaign for a few months, resuming protest activities in August 1983. Yet protest activity remained at dramatically lower levels after the ethnic violence of 1983. As a result of extensive negotiations, the campaign leaders and the Indian Government signed the Assam Accord in August 1985, both agreeing to disenfranchise all the foreigners that entered Assam between 1966 and 1971 for 10 years and deporting those that came after 1971 (Baruah 1999). Figure 2 illustrates the trajectory of the protest campaign and the occurrence of communal violence in Assam in 1983.⁵

Assam as a “least likely” case

Assam is an ideal case to examine the effects of communal violence on a protest campaign because it is a “least likely” case, meaning that it is harder to prove the argument, as opposed to a case that easily fits the argument (George and Bennett 2005). First and foremost, communal violence took place in the spring of 1983, but the campaign ended in August 1985, more than two years later. In most other instances, communal violence ends protest campaigns rather abruptly, as in the case of the Tamil protests against the declaration of Sinhalese as the sole official language in Sri Lanka in 1958 (DeVotta 2004). In Assam, though, protests actually resumed a few months after communal violence and continued intermittently for two more years. Therefore, demonstrating the demobilizing effects of communal violence is more challenging in the Assam case. Moreover, the campaign in Assam was well established since 1979, long before the ethnic violence took place. Protests were organized regularly and were usually well attended. A strong campaign like the one in Assam should be less vulnerable to the negative effects of communal violence than other more ad hoc campaigns like the one

⁴Smaller-scale communal violence in 1980 in Assam is not considered as a critical event as it did not change the overall trajectory of the protest campaign. See Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) for a discussion of identification of critical events.

⁵This figure is generated by using the count of events.




Figure 2. Weekly protest activity before and after communal violence in Assam.

in Nigeria after the reelection of Goodluck Jonathan in 2011. Therefore, a demonstration of the decline in protest activity as a result of communal violence in Assam should provide strong support for the demobilizing effect of ethnic violence in the context of ongoing protest campaigns.

Research design

Data⁶

The analysis is based on data collected from *The Indian Express*, a national daily newspaper, from January 1, 1979, to August 16, 1985. The data set covers both nonviolent and violent forms of protest action, such as demonstrations, strikes, and clashes with the police, as well as incidents of communal violence.⁷ Events were coded for the date, actor, location, target, number of participants, number of injured, and number of deaths.⁸ The state's repressive and accommodative actions were also coded for the same time period. Events that lacked information on the exact date, actor, and type of action were omitted from the data set. In total, 8,488 events⁹ were hand coded by the author¹⁰ based on a list

⁶The codebook used for this data set is in the appendix.

⁷Ethnic violence is distinguishable from protest violence as communal violence occurred in rural areas, whereas protest activity typically took place in major cities. Ambiguous cases were excluded.

⁸Ambiguous events were excluded.</FN8

⁹Every action of every actor was coded separately. For instance, if students shouted slogans and threw stones, two separate actions were coded. Clashes are coded for both protesters and the police.

¹⁰Since only one coder was involved, potential issues of intercoder reliability do not arise.

of events compiled mostly from Krain (2000) and Moore and Lindstrom's (1996) Violent International Conflict Data Project (VICD) and weighted by a scale that is based on Krain's (2000) scale for opposition and state actions ranging from 1 to 25.¹¹ A detailed explanation of the weighting scheme and its modification of Krain's scale can be found in the appendix. The data were then aggregated in weekly intervals.

The underrepresentation of the frequency of the actual events, the over-reporting of violent events, and the selective reporting of events are three obvious issues that could potentially challenge the validity of the data as a consequence of coding from a single newspaper. In terms of underrepresentation, *The Indian Express* had correspondents based in Assam throughout the protest campaign directly reporting from the area and providing detailed information regarding a wide range of collective actions, thus reducing the chance of underrepresentation. Moreover, the data illustrate similar trends to those found by scholars who have studied the anti-foreigner protest campaign and communal violence in Assam (Baruah 1999; Kimura 2013), somewhat minimizing concerns over validity. Regarding the issue of overreporting violence and underreporting nonviolence (Day, Pinckney, and Chenoweth 2015), I used secondary sources (Baruah 1986, 1999; Kimura 2013) to check the accuracy of the reporting whenever possible. Nonetheless, given the media attention on Assam and the protesters after the mass killings, underreporting of nonviolence seems unlikely. Finally, selective reporting of events might introduce bias to the data because reporters do not (and cannot) report every single collective action that occurs in the public domain. Therefore, they are left to make decisions regarding what to report and how much detail to present. The concern is that newspapers report events that are likely to attract more attention and underreport minor events, thus, disregarding the vast majority of contentious activity (McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996). Nonetheless, others have argued that selective reporting is an issue when and where protests occur frequently. In locations like Assam in the late 1970s, when protests were less frequent, they are more newsworthy and receive greater coverage (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, and Soule 2004:71). Moreover, the longitudinal design of the study reduces potential challenges to the internal validity of the analyses, since selective reporting would be an issue both before and after the communal violence.

Model and estimation

To understand the effect of communal violence on protest activity, I conduct a single group time series analysis that is commonly used in epidemiology, which compares a pre-intervention time series with a post-intervention time

¹¹The correlation coefficients for all variables between the number of events and the weighted data range from .87 to .98.

series (Linden and Adams 2011). Accordingly, I model communal violence as an “intervention” on the protest activity series, the dependent variable, to examine two types of changes in protest activity: the immediate change in protest activity right after the first occurrences of communal violence and the long-term change in the trajectory of protest activity until the end of the campaign.

Protest activity, the dependent variable, is the total weekly score of nonviolent and violent forms of collective action including demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, and arson. The minimum values of protest typically reflect the weeks when protesters use few nonviolent tactics; while the maximum values reflect the weeks when protesters resort to nonviolent tactics more frequently and/or resort to violent tactics such as clashing with the police. Hence, the demobilization phase represents the period before the end of the campaign when the values of the dependent variable are declining, indicating that protesters used both nonviolent and violent forms of tactics less frequently.

To assess the changes of the communal violence on *protest activity*, I construct a *time* variable denoting the number of weeks from the start of the campaign until its end. The coefficient of this variable represents the trajectory of *protest activity* until the communal violence begins. The *intervention* variable is a dummy variable coded 1 for the weeks the communal violence is occurring (weeks 7 to 12 in 1983) and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of *intervention* is the intercept at the time when communal violence occurs and indicates any immediate changes in *protest activity* right after the communal violence. Finally, a *post-intervention time* variable is constructed to denote the number of weeks after the communal violence. The coefficient of this variable represents the change in the slope of *protest activity*. If the communal violence indeed has a demobilizing effect, then the coefficients of either *intervention* or *post-intervention time*, or both, should be negative and have significant *p* values. A significant negative coefficient for *intervention* would signify a sudden drop in *protest activity*, and a significant, negative slope after intervention would suggest a decay, which could be steep or gradual, depending on the slope.

I also control for state actions, as both *repression* and *accommodation* have the potential to affect *protest activity*. While several studies have shown that repression increases protest activity by creating a backfire effect (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Francisco 1995; Rasler 1996), others have found that carefully targeted and consistent repression is likely to demobilize protesters (Beissinger 2002; Tarrow 1989). *Repression* is the total weekly score of repressive actions carried out by the lower-level authorities, typically the police, directly confronting the protesters, such as blocking the roads; as well as those sanctioned by higher-level authorities, including the imposition of curfews or restrictions on civil liberties.

Similarly, the state’s accommodative tactics can have a positive or negative effect on protests. Accommodation can increase protest activity, as it signals

weakness (Rasler 1996), or it can lead to a decline in protests, as it creates splits between the moderates and the radicals (Tarrow 1989) or coopts the protesters (Piven and Cloward 1977). *Accommodation* is measured as the total weekly score of state concessions that include actions like negotiations, removing restrictive laws and regulations, or withdrawing the army from the region.¹²

I estimate both a Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression (ZINB) and a Poisson autoregressive (PAR) model of order (p) to examine the effects of communal violence on the protest campaign. Both ZINB and PAR are count models that are appropriate for the nature of the dependent variable in this analysis. A ZINB analysis is appropriate for count models that are overdispersed¹³ and have a high number of zero observations of the dependent variable (Long 1997).¹⁴ The data are also ordered in time, meaning that past values influence future values.¹⁵ As Brandt, Williams, Fordham, and Pollins (2000) show, estimating event counts that are time dependent with a standard count model might lead to inefficient estimates. The systematic dynamics of the data have to be taken into account while working with time series event count data such as the series on the Assam protest campaign, which a PAR analysis is able to do. The PAR model is suitable for cyclical and short-memoried processes that are mean reverting (Brandt and Williams 2001). As Figure 2 demonstrates, the protest activity series has a cyclical pattern, as the peaks in the series are followed by declines. The plot for the Autocorrelation Function (ACF) of the series (Figure 3) shows autocorrelation only in the first four lags, indicating that the process has a short-term memory. Therefore, I use the PAR model developed by Brandt and Williams (2001) to account for the time-series nature of the data and a ZINB to deal with the high frequency of zero observations.

Findings

Table 1 shows the results of the ZINB and PAR (2)¹⁶ analyses for the protest activity in Assam between January 1979 and August 1985.¹⁷ The Critical Event Model with the single group analysis controlling for *repression* and *accommodation* suggests that *protest activity* decreased significantly when

¹²Descriptive statistics for the variables can be found in the appendix.

¹³The variance of *protest activity* is greater than its mean, indicating overdispersion.

¹⁴Vuong test statistics indicate that ZINB is preferable to a regular negative binomial.

¹⁵A transfer function model assessing the impact of intervention on a time series is not suitable, as the data are based on event counts (Brandt and Williams 2001).

¹⁶The AR parameters in larger lags were insignificant.

¹⁷The same analyses were conducted on the unweighted data, and the results are similar. Also, the Critical Event Model was run on nonviolent and violent protest activity separately. Overall, the results still confirm the findings of the Critical Event Model. The short-term positive impact of communal violence on violent protests can perhaps be explained due to the radicals' initial desire to show their continued determination to carry on. The results of robustness checks can be found in the appendix.




Figure 3. Autocorrelation function plot for protest activity.

communal violence began in the middle of February 1983. Both *intervention* and *post-intervention* are statistically significant ($p < .001$ and $p < .05$ respectively) in the ZINB analysis. The PAR results are also similar, as both variables significantly decrease *protest activity*, indicating that *protest activity* declined immediately after communal violence began and continued to decline in its aftermath.

These findings confirm that the communal violence led to a sudden drop in *protest activity* and continued to stifle the campaign until the Assam Accord was signed in August 1985. Table 2 illustrates the factor changes in the rate of *protest activity* for a clear interpretation of the coefficients. Accordingly, protest activity decreases by a factor of 0.06 after the communal violence begins and continues to decline by a factor of 0.99 after the communal violence is over.

The Critical Event Model also shows that *repression* leads to an increase in *protest activity* in both the ZINB and PAR analyses, suggesting the existence of a backfire effect (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Francisco 1995; Rasler 1996). This effect is relatively strong, as *repression* increases *protest activity* by a factor of 1.01, holding other variables constant (Table 2). This finding is particularly interesting because it suggests that the campaign continued to demobilize despite the backfire effect of repression. *Accommodation* has a

Table 1. ZINB and PAR Estimates of Protest Activity in Assam.

Variable	Critical Event Model		Protest Violence Model		Pre-Communal Violence Model		Post-Communal Violence Model	
	ZINB	PAR	ZINB	PAR	ZINB	PAR	ZINB	PAR
Time	0.001 (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-	-	-	-
Intervention	-2.774*** (0.657)	-2.090*** (0.529)	-1.598*** (0.491)	-1.054 [†] (0.621)	-	-	-	-
(Communal Violence)								
Post-Intervention	-0.015* (0.006)	-0.036*** (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)	-0.018** (0.006)	-	-	-	-
Repression	0.005*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.004 (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)
Accommodation	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.033*** (0.008)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.019** (0.007)	0.019 (0.012)	-0.014 [†] (0.007)	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.042)
High violence	-	-	0.003** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-	-	-	-
Constant	4.112 (0.311)***	3.003*** (0.246)	4.896*** (2.502)	3.506** (0.205)	4.379*** (0.205)	3.925*** (0.129)	3.727*** (0.195)	2.325*** (0.242)
AR parameter 1	-	0.573*** (0.055)	-	0.529*** (0.056)	-	0.670*** (0.071)	-	0.440** (0.090)
AR parameter 2	-	-0.123** (0.041)	-	-0.084 [†] (0.051)	-	-0.081 (0.051)	-	0.008 (0.087)
(lag two)								
N	345	343	345	343	215	213	125	123
Probability>chi-square	0.000	-	0.000	-	0.000	-	0.106	-
Adjusted R ²	-	0.56	-	0.54	-	0.57	-	0.29

Note. All significant tests are two-tailed, standard errors in parentheses.

[†] $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 2. Factor Change in Expected Rate of Protest Activity^a.

	Critical Event Model	Protest Violence Model	Pre-Communal Violence Model	Post-Communal Violence Model
Time	–	–0.99		
Intervention (Communal Violence)	–0.06	–0.20	–	–
Post-Intervention	–0.99	–	–	–
Repression	1.01	1.00	1.00	–
Accommodation	–	–	0.98	–
High Violence	–	1.00		

Note. ^aOnly the expected rates of significant coefficients are listed.

significant and negative effect only in the PAR analysis. The negative impact of *accommodation* indicates that, independent of communal violence, accommodative actions might have contributed to the demobilization of the protest campaign, confirming Piven and Cloward's cooptation model or Tarrow's polarization model. To understand the effects of *accommodation* and *repression* more precisely, I examine the impact of these variables on *protest activity* during the pre- and post-intervention phases in Models 3 and 4 respectively.

In the Protest Violence Model, I control for *high levels of protest violence*, as previous studies have shown that heavy protest violence leads to the demobilization of a campaign as participation declines when violence erupts and polarization between the radicals and the moderates occurs (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Della Porta and Tarrow 1986; Tarrow 1989).¹⁸ For this model only, I construct a new dependent variable for protests that does not include heavy violence and create a new control variable, *high violence*, representing acts such as abductions, armed attacks, and clashes with security forces that occur during the protest campaign.¹⁹ The results of the ZINB and PAR analyses suggest that *high violence* is significant, but in the opposite direction. *High violence* does not seem to deter protests in Assam and instead increases it by a factor of 1.00 (Table 2). Thus, the Protest Violence Model shows that high levels of violence during the elections was not the cause of the demobilization of the campaign. The heavy violence in Assam was primarily associated with the protesters' election boycott as anti-election groups, mostly ethnic Assamese, tried to intimidate pro-election groups (mostly Bengalis) from participating (Baruah 1999; Kimura 2013).

The Pre- and Post-Communal Violence models examine the effects of state actions before and after communal violence respectively to understand if state policies had differential effects across the two time periods. For

¹⁸Although studies have demonstrated that elections are associated with high levels of violence (Dunning 2011), elections did not have a significant impact on *protest activity*. Parliamentary elections in December 1979 and the State Assembly elections in February 1983 were the only two elections held in Assam during the time period under study. The 1984 parliamentary elections were postponed and held in December 1985. A dummy variable coded 1 for three months before and after each election was statistically insignificant in the ZINB estimates of the Critical Event Model.

¹⁹The full range of events are listed under the High Intensity Collective Action category in the Codebook in the appendix.

instance, Indian leaders could have been more inclined to make concessions to the protesters after ethnic violence began to alleviate the tension in the region. Alternatively, the leaders might have resorted to more repressive measures in order to crush the protesters and bring order to Assam. Both ZINB and PAR analyses show that *repression* has a positive and significant effect on *protest activity* during the pre- and post-communal violence periods, suggesting that the effect of repression remained relatively consistent across the protest campaign. *Accommodation* has no significant effect in the pre- and post-intervention period, indicating that the negotiations between the Indian government and the campaign leaders and the attempts to coopt the opposition did not demobilize the campaign. As Figure 1 also shows, *protest activity* had already declined dramatically when the parties agreed to participate in the last round of negotiations, which started in April 1985, almost two years after the ethnic killings took place. Thus, neither model suggests that state actions led to the decline in *protest activity*.

Predictive margins generated based on the ZINB analysis of the Critical Event Model provide a more nuanced understanding of the effect of the communal violence on *protest activity* (Figure 4). The predicted number of weekly protest events declines steadily over the course of time. As Figure 4 illustrates, the predicted number of protest events is 60 immediately after the communal violence. About six months later, however, the number of protest events goes down to 40, and in about a year, the number is below 30, indicating a more than 50% decrease in *protest activity*. In approximately two years after the communal violence, the predicted number of protest




Figure 4 Predicted number of events after the communal violence.

events further declines to slightly above 10 a week. When these numbers are put into context, the first year in particular seems quite significant. One year after the communal violence, none of the issues the protesters were campaigning on had been resolved, and the leaders of the campaign were still trying to mobilize support. So, a more than 50% decline in the first year suggests that the communal violence had a significant effect on the demobilization of the campaign.

To evaluate the predictive power of the Critical Event Model, I generated out-of-sample forecasting, which is an ideal tool for cross-validation. The main idea is to compare the predicted values generated by the model to the observed values.²⁰ Moreover, these forecasts can be easily compared to those of other models. Since polarization did not occur in the Assam case, forecasts on a polarization model (Tarrow 1989) cannot be tested.²¹ However, because the Indian government used accommodative tactics to coopt the protesters, I am able to generate out-of-sample forecasts based on a Cooptation Model that has the *accommodation* variable only (Piven and Cloward 1977) and compare them to the out-of-sample forecasts of the Critical Event Model.

To obtain the out-of-sample forecasts, I first run ZINB regressions to estimate the parameters for both models by holding back the weeks after the communal violence ends.²² Based on these estimates, I then generate out-of-sample probabilities of *protest activity* for the period after the critical event and calculate Theil's U to evaluate the predictive power of each model. Theil's U is a ratio where the numerator is the sum of squared prediction errors and the denominator is the sum of squared prediction error from a naïve model, which expects no change from one observation to the other (Farnum and Stanton 1989:26). Values below 1 indicate a better performance of the statistical model compared to the naïve model.

The plots in Figure 5 illustrate the number of observed protest events and the out-of-sample predictions based on the Critical Event and the Cooptation Models after the intervention. Even though neither one of the models predicts *protest activity* very accurately, the Critical Event Model performs much better than the Cooptation Model.²³ The Theil's U statistics for the Critical Event and the Cooptation Models are 0.99 and 3.36 respectively, indicating that although neither greatly outperforms the naïve model, the Critical Event Model is still a better predictor of *protest activity* during the demobilization period. As Figure 5 shows, the Cooptation Model

²⁰Generating predicted values of observations that are not included in any of the analyses is another option for cross-validation.

²¹The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), a separatist insurgent group, was established in 1979 but did not actively challenge the state until the late 1980s.

²²I hold back the weeks after June 1983, approximately 33% of the observations, after the communal violence. These estimates can be found in the appendix.

²³The AIC scores for the Critical Event and Cooptation models are 1427.15 and 1535.25 respectively.




Figure 5 Out-of-sample forecasts for the critical event and cooptation models.

predicts higher values of *protest activity*, while the Critical Event Model predicts no activity during the demobilization period.²⁴

Overall, the empirical analyses show that the communal violence in February 1983 led to the demobilization of the protest campaign. Until the communal violence, the campaign was strong and had most of the characteristics identified by scholars of nonviolent resistance as likely to lead to a successful outcome. First, the campaign started off by employing nonviolent tactics and secured substantive mass support from ethnic Assamese as well as from nonimmigrant Muslims, the most important factor for pressuring the government to change its unfavorable policies according to Chenoweth and Stephan (2011). The campaign leaders mobilized thousands of people, including students, teachers, peasants, state government officials, and oil workers, and brought them out into the streets. For instance, in November 1979, nearly 2 million people in Assam participated in the civil disobedience campaign (Baruah 1999). Second, the high level of participation allowed for tactical innovation throughout the first four years, increasing the campaign's resilience in the face of state repression (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; McAdam 1983; Schock 2005). For instance, in late December 1979, shortly after launching a civil disobedience campaign, the protesters imposed an economic blockade, stopping the transportation of crude oil, plywood, and jute from Assam to the rest of the country (*The Indian Express*, December 30, 1979). Moreover, many state police and government officials

²⁴The Critical Event plot suggests that the variables present in the model are not sensitive enough to *protest activity* occurrence to be able to detect those spikes. This might be due to the inability of the model to account for the autoregressive component of the series.

supported the campaign against illegal immigrants, dramatically reducing the level of repression used against the protesters (Kimura 2013). According to Nepstad (2011) and Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), such loyalty shifts are crucial for the success of a campaign. Finally, potentially more radical supporters of the campaign did not have a violent insurgent group to turn to (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), keeping the mass support for the campaign relatively intact. In short, the protest campaign in Assam featured several mechanisms that should have enabled the leaders to continue to mobilize people and put pressure on the government before communal violence began.

So, how exactly did the communal violence set the demobilization process of the campaign in motion? Communal violence turned into a critical event that significantly limited the campaign leader's available strategies. After the extent of the violence became known, members of the Indian central government repeatedly called for peace and calm in the region (*The Indian Express*, February 22 and March 15, 1983), while political actors and civil society groups offered competing explanations for the occurrence of such brutal violence. The campaign leaders blamed the Indian Government for imposing the elections without changing the electoral rolls (Kimura 2013), whereas several members of the government accused the protesters of inciting violence in the region. For instance, right after the most publicized mass killings in Nellie on February 18, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi publicly blamed the protest leaders for the violence in Assam (*The Indian Express*, February 22, 1983). The campaign leadership was also criticized for their failure to condemn violence immediately after the communal violence started (Gandhi 1983). When the temporary suspension of the campaign was finally announced in late March, the leaders emphasized the need to focus on relief, rehabilitation, and integration (*The Indian Express*, March 28, 1983). Even though protests resumed in August 1983, the intensity of the campaign decreased dramatically (Figure 2).

The communal violence further entrenched ethnic divisions within the society, alienating ethnic Assamese and immigrant Muslims (Gupta 1983). The tension between these two groups had important consequences for the campaign. After the extensive killings of Muslim peasants, many Muslim protesters withdrew their support, including those who had settled before colonization and, hence, were seen as indigenous. For instance, one of the top Muslim student leaders resigned from his position after the occurrence of communal violence (Kimura 2013). Consequently, the campaign leaders had to devote considerable time and resources into addressing internal divisions. Several Muslim members of the AASU issued an ultimatum to the AASU leadership demanding a correction in what they perceived as a pro-Hindu communal tilt (Baruah 1999). Similarly, several other indigenous groups, such as the Bodos, began to make demands that emphasized their distinctiveness from ethnic Assamese. In January and December 1984, the AASU organized two separate national conventions to address the rifts among

such groups by emphasizing the urgent need to provide a unified political platform (Baruah 1999). While the lack of primary sources makes it impossible to pinpoint which of these two causal mechanisms (the leaders backing off versus withdrawal of support) is more important, the secondary sources clearly demonstrate the role of communal violence in the demobilization process.

Two significant concessions by the central government in New Delhi led to the end of the protest campaign. First, in 1984, the Election Commission of India decided that the electoral rolls in Assam were to be revised based on the 1971 electoral rolls, which meant that the immigrants who entered after 1971 would be disenfranchised (*The Indian Express*, July 13, 1984). The campaign leaders saw the Election Commission's decision as a confidence-building measure, as many illegal immigrants who settled in Assam after the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 would be disenfranchised. Second, the Indian government left the state government out of the negotiations, recognizing the power of the campaign leaders, who insisted that the current government was not elected by the people of Assam in 1983, as many ethnic Assamese boycotted the elections (Baruah 1999). Therefore, they argued, the state government was illegitimate and should not participate in any discussions (Narayan 1985).

In early 1985, the lack of enthusiasm for continued protests was already evident. Many Assamese defied the campaign leaders' call to boycott the Republic Day celebrations in early 1985 by joining them in the main stadium in Guwahati (*The Indian Express*, May 8, 1985). The final round of negotiations between the campaign leaders and the central government began in April 1985, and the Assam Accord was eventually signed on August 15, 1985. Accordingly, all foreigners who had entered between 1966 and 1971 would be disenfranchised for 10 years, and those who had entered after 1971 would be deported. The current state government would be dissolved, and new elections would be held in December 1985 based on the new electoral rolls (*The Indian Express*, August 16, 1985).

Conclusion

This empirical analysis of the dynamics of the demobilization of the protest campaign in Assam has several implications for the study of nonviolent campaigns. First, it offers an alternative causal mechanism for the demobilization of a protest campaign by demonstrating that critical events can trigger demobilization. Communal violence in ethnically divided societies can curtail mass support for the protest campaign and force campaign leaders to suspend protest activities. While scholars have often highlighted the escalatory effects of critical events, this analysis shows that they can also be important turning points in the demobilization of a protest campaign.

Second, this study suggests that the participation of large numbers of people and the inclusion of various sectors and groups do not always set off mechanisms that lead to success. Even if repression triggers a backfire effect and motivates larger number of people to participate, campaigns can still demobilize. Indeed, similar to Piven and Cloward's (1977) and Tarrow's (1989) models, the Assam case shows that broadening the support base makes coalition maintenance challenging in ethnically divided societies. When communal violence against Muslim immigrants occurred in Assam, Muslim protesters withdrew their support, forcing the campaign leadership temporarily to shift their strategy from confronting political authorities to trying to unify the different groups within the campaign.

Third, the Assam case shows that violent protest activity does not necessarily undermine the strength of a protest campaign, as scholars of nonviolent resistance maintain. Although protesters resorted to violent tactics, mobilization levels remained high throughout the first four years of the campaign. Instead, a critical event, communal violence, eventually led to the demobilization of the protest campaign. In line with Davenport and Moore's (2012) call for better mapping and understanding of diverse forms of political conflict and violence, this study indicates that various types of violence can have differential effects on protest dynamics.

From a policy standpoint, the implications of the Assam campaign for states and activists are quite alarming. In ethnically divided societies, protests that highlight ethnic differences can have unintended violent consequences and lead to deeper societal cleavages in the long term. States should be aware of this potential and calculate the costs of repressing and fueling protests by taking into account the possibility of large-scale communal violence. Likewise, protesters should develop strategies to prevent the escalation of ethnic tension, as it can have detrimental effects on the campaign.

At a more general level, the Assam case illustrates the unpredictable nature of protest dynamics. Scholars of political contention have long recognized the challenges associated with identifying causal pathways due to the unpredictability of contentious interactions between multiple actors. This study explains how an unpredictable event can demobilize a protest campaign. Although this study has limitations in its generalizability across different campaigns due to the unique communal patterns and protest dynamics in Assam, it highlights an alternative causal path to demobilization and, thus, brings scholars one step closer to understanding the complex dynamics of contentious politics.

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Appendix

Explanation of coding procedures and the codebook

Coding procedures

I followed multiple steps to construct the codebook and weight the data. First, I identified the four broad event categories that I needed data for: (1) state accommodation, (2) state repression, (3) group collective action, and (4) external support to the group. These categories were followed by the lists of actors involved in the Assamese protest campaign.

For state actions, I relied on a majority of Krain's (2000) list of repressive and accommodative events.²⁵ Krain includes a variety of repressive state actions, ranging from *seizing assets* to *use of torture*, as well as a comprehensive list of accommodative actions ranging from *increasing security of target group* to *incorporation into government*. Even though these lists cover a wide range of events, I discovered some additional categories that were essential to my four cases throughout the coding process. Therefore, I added *violent arrests of opposition leaders*, *halt negotiations*, *curfews*, *declaration of President's Rule or Governor's Rule*,²⁶ *teargassing*, *violent disruption of group organization*, *beating up*, *clashes with group*, *damaging property*, *bombing*, *burning houses and bridges*, and *burning entire villages* to the repressive events lists. These events came up with some frequency and provided detailed information about the exact form of events.

I then labeled the repressive events based on their objectives and decision-making agencies. *Preventive repression* corresponds to repressive acts imposed by higher-level authorities, such as the government or the judiciary, to demobilize the contenders and to prevent future acts of contention. The declaration of

²⁵ I did not include *mass killings* because some form of military armed attack, burning villages, or bombing already covered this category.

²⁶ Article 356 of the Constitution of India grants the President the right to dissolve or suspend a state legislature and place the state under direct federal rule if he is satisfied that there has been failure of the constitutional machinery in the state.

martial law and the restriction of the right of assembly, for instance, fall into this category of repression. *Reactionary repression*, on the other hand, stands for repressive acts of lower-level agents, such as the police, applied during the course of a contentious episode in an attempt to respond to collective action and maintain or reestablish order. Teargassing the protesters or damaging property are examples of reactionary repression. I consider *arrests* as a separate category because it is not always clear if arrests result from centralized policy directives or if they are consequences of ad hoc decisions made by the local police. Finally, I grouped all repressive events under six broader categories: Restrict; Seize; Warn; Judicial Actions; Nonjudicial Actions; and Use of Force.

Regarding the state's accommodative policies, I expanded Krain's list by adding *organizing discussion meetings or committees* and *withdrawal of army*. The Indian state used these two types of policies during the protest waves and insurgencies as a form of accommodation. Again, I grouped similar types of events under broader categories: Negotiations; Judicial Accommodation; Nonjudicial Accommodation; and Group Recognition. For the purpose of systematic coding, I arbitrarily assigned the broad categories a three-digit code and the specific event types a four-digit code that started with the first two digits of the broader category. All repressive events that involve violence were assigned a 9 at the very end (thus, violent actions are all five-digit codes ending with 9). All the codes for accommodative events start with a 1, and the repressive ones start with a 2. This code assignment was particularly helpful later throughout the data management process because it made it easier to identify similar types of events and their respective broader categories for aggregation purposes. It also helped me to detect miscoding, if any, more easily. The following are examples of categories of accommodation and repression with their respective codes.

For group actions, I used a majority of the Violent International Conflict Data Project (VICDP) events list (Moore and Lindstrom 1996). The VICDP is a data project that has generated conflict and cooperation data at the subnational level. Events from the Integrated Data for Event Analysis Framework (IDEA) (Bond, Bond, Oh, Jenkins and Taylor 2003) was also helpful in identifying specific events that were not included in the VICDP project, such as *hijacking* and *taking hostages*. For the purpose of distinguishing between situations in which violence is or is not used, I added the "violent" versions of demonstrations, strikes, and sit-ins to the list. I also created two separate categories for demonstrations based on size. Demonstrations with fewer than 200 participants are coded as small scale, and the ones with more than 200 are coded as large scale. Even though the cutoff point of 200 participants is arbitrary, there is a pragmatic reason behind it. The *Indian Express* usually reports massive demonstrations as featuring "hundreds" or "thousands" of demonstrators. I am conservatively interpreting "hundreds" as at least 200 and therefore, using it as my cutoff point.

After completing the list for group actions, I grouped those under five broader categories: Accommodative Group Actions, Low-Intensity Collective

Action, Medium-Intensity Collective Action, and High-Intensity Collective Action. Again, the broader category was assigned a three-digit code, and the specific events were assigned a four-digit code. All the events that involved violence were assigned a 9 at the end. All collective action events start with a 5.

In addition to collective action, I included a “Splits” category for groups to code information about group cohesion. The list of events in this category does not reflect a wide range of group characteristics because the scope of the study is not on organizational aspects of the groups. Instead, it includes the events that are the results of splits within a group. These specific events are *disagreement between factions*, *forming an organization as a result of split*, *expelling members*, *armed attack against other factions*, and *militants surrendering*. These events also have codes starting with a 5 because they are related to groups.

For the list of acts of external support to the group, I built on Heraclides’ (1990:368–369) list of events that are specifically designed to fit cases with external involvement in secessionist conflicts. For example, some of the events in his list, including *providing access to communication*, *providing sanctuary and training*, or giving direct military assistance such as *armed intervention*, constituted the basis of the list for external support to the group. I also added *firing across borders* and *granting asylum to leadership of group* to the list to make it more comprehensive. All the events for external support to the group are arranged under two larger categories: Material and Diplomatic/Political Support. Material Support has three subcategories based on the level of involvement: Low, Moderate, and High. The three-digit codes for these main categories start with an 8, and the specific events have five-digit codes, just like the rest of the codebook.

While compiling the list of events for state, group, and external actor actions, I deliberately attempted to include similar policy options across the board. Obviously, the same exact policy options that are available to the state are not available for the group and vice versa. However, if the state has the option of *putting down a demonstration*, then *demonstration* is included on the list of group actions, and so is *allowing demonstrations in state’s own territory* for external support actions.

Finally, for the list of actors and targets, I used the actor/target list in Moore and Lindstrom’s (1996) VICDP as a starting point for my initial deliberations on what kind of actors to include. The specific party names and factions, names of governors, chief ministers, names of religious or ethnic groups along with broader categories of students, peasants, workers, and businessmen, for instance, are listed in the codebook. These specific actors were organized based on seven types of actors and targets: State, Social Actors, Political Parties, Religious Groups/Populations, Insurgent Groups, State Enforcement, and External Actors. All the broader categories have five-digit codes, and the specific actors and targets have six-digit codes. If

there is more detailed information available, then those more-specific ones have seven-digit codes. For example, in Assam, the code for the State is 33100, for the Governor 331011, and for Governor Shri T. S. Misra, it is 3310113.

Once the entire list of events was compiled, I assigned scores to each event to reflect the intensity of these events more realistically. It would simply not be accurate to assume that the state's restriction of assembly has the same impact as launching an armed attack. If both of these events would be assigned a score of 1 (or simply counted by frequency), it might very well be possible that restriction of assembly ends up having more weight in the statistical analysis than launching armed attacks against the group if its frequency is higher. In order to make the analysis more accurate, the weights of those events needs to be taken into consideration.

For assigning weights, my starting point was, once again, Krain's (2000) scale of repression and accommodation. Krain's scale is initially based on the rankings of 30 experts in the field. The experts were asked to rank the repressive and accommodative events on a 1 to 5 scale. The average scores for each event were calculated and then rounded to the nearest whole number. To be able to make finer distinctions, Krain took the square of the raw average score and assigned new scores to the events ranging from 1 to 25 (Krain 2000:42–43). So, for example, while *arresting opposition leader* and *armed attack* received a score of 3 by the expert rankings, Krain scored them as 7 and 12 respectively. By expanding the range of the weights, Krain gained enough flexibility to rank events that originally fell into the same score category.

As a wider range of scores allows me to rank the events with more precision and thus to see the increases or decreases in the intensity of the actions, I decided to use a range between 1 and 25 as well. I first assigned similar scores to the repressive and accommodative events that Krain had on his list. Then I ranked the events that I had added in the previous step that were not in Krain's list. For example, while *arresting opposition leaders* is on Krain's original list, I included *violent arrests of opposition leaders* into my list of repressive events. These additions inevitably led to the modification of several scores. The addition of a violent event to the list meant that it had to have a score higher than the nonviolent version of it. So, the score was assigned based on other violent events with similar intensity. As a general principle, the violent events were assigned a 4-point-higher score than the nonviolent versions.²⁷ Once this rule was established, similar events were modified based on the same principle. Finally, I made some adjustments to the scale based on case-specific characteristics. Throughout the data

²⁷This 4-point difference is enough to account for the difference in intensity, yet does not place the violent and nonviolent versions of the same event at the extreme ends of the scale.

collection process, I read thousands of newspaper articles on the same subject, which gave me a good understanding of the actions of the state and the groups. I was, therefore, able to understand how the state used certain types of policies in what kind of context and used this insight to modify the scale. For example, while *declaration of martial law* has a score of 10 in Krain's scale, it is 21 in my scale because the Indian state declared martial law in situations where other repressive measures had already been taken and martial law was seen as the only option left to halt the further deterioration of law and order. Therefore, *declaration of martial law* was assigned a dramatically higher score than *violent* or *nonviolent putdown of demonstrations*. Even with these various modifications, the correlation coefficient for accommodative and repressive events between the new scale and Krain's scale is relatively strong (.92 and .78 respectively).

I then applied these similar guidelines to assign scores to group actions and external support events. The most severe forms of collective action and external support events were assigned scores closer to 25, and the least severe were assigned scores closer to 1. Actions included as options under both the state actions or group actions received similar scores. For example, *armed attack* receives a score of 20 both in the list of state's repressive actions and the group's most threatening actions list. Similarly, *negotiating* receives the same score of 6 in both the state's and group's conciliatory actions lists.

This systematic and consistent procedure of assigning weights was particularly important in ensuring some degree of balance and objectivity in this otherwise subjective process. Subjectivity is a legitimate concern both with Krain's scale and also with my scale as, indeed, it is with any other weighting scheme. As there are no objective criteria used to rank such events, any ranking inevitably involves some kind of a judgment call on the researcher's part. However, the application of the same principles across all types of actions will reduce the bias to a minimum and prevent it from affecting the analysis in a significant way.

Table A1. Codebook.

EVENT LIST FOR ACCOMMODATION

Main Category	Specific Category	Code	Adjusted Weight (W)
NEGOTIATIONS		110	
	Broad statement of guarantee of rights	1111	4
	Low-level concession	1112	1
	Compromise reached	1113	15
	Negotiations begun	1114	6
JUDICIAL ACCOMMODATION		120	
	Reduction in fines, taxes, fees, punishment for compellance	1211	4
	Removing restrictive law/regulation	1212	5
	Allowing emigration	1213	7
	Allowing return from exile	1214	8
	Outlawing repressive apparatus institution, practice	1215	8
	Prosecution of enemies of target group	1216	1
	Stays of execution	1217	5
	Freeing prisoners	1218	10
	General amnesty	1220	14
	Legalizing group membership	1221	12
NONJUDICIAL ACCOMMODATION		130	
	Organizing discussion meetings, committees	1311	3
	Increasing access to information	1312	4
	Providing selective incentives	1313	8
	Giving positive publicity	1314	4
	Introducing enabling mechanisms/entitlement	1315	6
	Increasing opportunities for participation	1316	9
	Small-scale diversion of resources to group	1317	5
	Abandoning project hurtful to group	1318	4
	Increasing security of target group	1320	1
	Increasing access to markets	1321	9
	Large-scale redistribution of assets/resources	1322	10
	Direct aid (money, forces) to challenger	1323	12
	Withdrawal of Army	1324	16
GROUP RECOGNITION		140	
	Encouraging/allowing separatism	1411	18
	Incorporation into government	1412	25
OTHER		910	

EVENT LIST FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION

Main Category	Specific Category	Code	Adjusted Weight (W)
RESTRICT		210	
<i>Preventive Repression</i>	Restricting access to resources, necessities, jobs	2111	6
	Restricting assembly	2112	5

(Continued)

Table A1. (Continued).

Main Category	Specific Category	Code	Adjusted Weight (W)
	Restricting freedom of communication, speech and distribution of information	2113	5
	Restricting emigration, mobility	2114	6
	Prohibitive fines, taxes, fees, regulation	2115	4
SEIZE		220	
<i>Preventive Repression</i>	Seizing assets	2211	7
<i>Arrest</i>	Arrests/detentions	2212	9
	Mass arrests (>25)	2213	14
	Nonviolent arrest of opposition leaders	2418	10
	Violent arrest of opposition leaders	24199	14
WARN		230	
<i>Preventive Repression</i>	Public threat of violence/punishment	2311	5
	Show of force	2312	6
	Exemplary punishment/deterrent	2313	9
	Show trials/political trials	2314	8
	Compellance: Punishing nonperformance	2315	4
	Expulsion/purge from party or ruling elite	2316	3
	Making groups more visible, easily spotted	2317	4
	Halt negotiations	2318	6
JUDICIAL ACTIONS		240	
<i>Preventive Repression</i>	Curfew	2411	10
	Martial law declared	2412	21
	"Special" extralegal courts set up	2413	8
	Suspension of parts of constitution or the regular workings of government/issuing ordinance	2414	16
	Outlawing organizations, groups, industries	2415	15
	Suspending or censoring news media/speech	2416	14
	Ousting groups from government	2417	15
	Exiles/expulsions	2420	10
	Trials in absentia	2421	14
	Forced conscription	2422	8
	President's Rule/Governor's Rule	2423	18
	Religious suppression/persecution	2424	9
NONJUDICIAL ACTIONS		250	
<i>Reactionary Repression</i>	Nonviolent putdown of demonstration/strikes/hartals	2511	7
	Violent putdown of demonstration/strikes/hartals, lathi-charging and teargassing	25119	11
	Nonviolent disruption of group organization	2512	7
	Violent disruption of group organization	25129	11
	Calling in additional police posts/ secret police/special forces	2514	6
USE OF FORCE		260	
<i>Reactionary Repression</i>	Beating up	26119	11
	Clashes with group	26129	14
	Use of torture	26139	16
	Forced resettlement	26149	18
	Armed attack	26159	20
	Forced labor	26169	12

(Continued)

Table A1. (Continued).

Main Category	Specific Category	Code	Adjusted Weight (W)
	Forced subjugation/integration of communities	26179	9
	Disappearance	26189	21
	Damaging property	26199	14
	Bombing	26209	21
	Burning houses, bridges, etc.	26219	21
	Burning entire villages	26229	25
	Manufactured famine or draught	26239	20
	Mass rape	26249	21
	Concentration camps	26259	18
OTHER		920	
<i>Note.</i> All actions that involve violence end with 9.			
EVENT LIST FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION			
Main Category	Specific Category	Code	Weight (W)
ACCOMMODATIVE ACTIONS		510	
	Broad statement of guarantee of rights and security of government officials	5111	4
	Low-level concession	5112	1
	Compromise reached	5113	15
	<i>Negotiations begun</i>	5114	6
	Freeing hostages/prisoners	5115	10
	Abandoning plans/actions/strikes/boycotts/demonstrations, etc., hurtful to state	5116	4
	Allowing government access to resources, mines, oil facilities, etc.	5117	9
	Renouncing secessionist goals	5118	16
	Acceptance of an agreement	5120	18
	Termination of separatist movement	5121	20
	Announcing ceasefire	5122	15
CONTENTIOUS ACTIONS			
LOW-INTENSITY COLLECTIVE ACTION		520	
	Mild negative statements about federal government	5211	1
	Mild negative statements about local government	5212	1
	Strong negative statements about federal government	5213	3
	Strong negative statements about local government	5214	3
	Organizing meetings	5311	6
	Distributing information	5312	5
	Forming an organization	5313	8
MEDIUM-INTENSITY COLLECTIVE ACTION		540	
	Nonviolent strike (hartal)	5411	7
	Violent strike (hartal)	54119	11
	Nonviolent bandh (general strike)	5412	9
	Violent bandh (general strike)	54129	11
	Nonviolent Small-scale demonstrations (less than 200 participants)	5413	7
	Violent small-scale demonstrations (less than 200 participants)	54139	11

(Continued)

Table A1. (Continued).

Main Category	Specific Category	Code	Adjusted Weight (W)
	Nonviolent large-scale demonstrations (more than 200 participants)	5414	10
	Violent large-scale demonstrations (more than 200 participants)	54149	11
	Nonviolent sit-ins	5415	7
	Violent sit-ins	54159	11
	Commercial boycotts	5416	7
	Electoral boycotts	5417	10
	Halt negotiations	5418	6
	Forming a political wing/party	5420	12
	Running candidate in the election	5421	12
	Threat of violence/agitation	5422	5
	Violation of curfew, martial law, etc.	5423	5
HIGH-INTENSITY COLLECTIVE ACTION		550	
	Surveillance, links with spies, acquiring information through clandestine means	5424	7
	Assaults	55109	11
	Robbery/stealing-damaging property	55119	14
	Clashes	55129	15
	Direct confrontation with army or paramilitaries	55299	20
	Sabotage	55139	17
	Abduct tourists/journalists/citizens	55149	15
	Abduct and execute tourists/journalists/citizens	55249	20
	Abduct politicians	55159	16
	Abduct and execute politicians	55259	20
	Seizing buildings	55169	17
	Using training camps	55179	16
	Securing access to arms	55189	16
	Armed attack	55199	20
	Bombing	55209	21
	Riots	55219	17
	Burning houses, bridges, etc.	55229	21
	Burning entire villages	55239	25
OTHER		950	

All actions that involve violence end with 9.

SPLITS

Main Category	Specific Category	Code	Weight (W)
	Disagreements between factions	5611	5
	Forming an organization as a result of splits	5612	10
	Expelling members	5614	7
	Armed attack against other factions	56139	20
	Militants surrendering	5615	10

EVENT LIST FOR EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO THE STATE

Main Category	Specific Category	Code	Weight (W)
MATERIAL SUPPORT		810	
LOW	Humanitarian aid	8111	2
MEDIUM		820	
	Providing financial assistance	8211	10

(Continued)

Table A1. (Continued).

Main Category	Specific Category	Code	Adjusted Weight (W)
HIGH	Providing vital access to communication	8212	10
	Threatening to use force against group on state's behalf	8213	5
		830	
	Non-injury destructive action against group	8311	13
	Providing arms	8312	15
DIPLOMATIC/POLITICAL	Providing military personnel	8313	17
	Border seal	8314	15
	Border skirmishes (support state)	8315	17
	Full-scale military intervention support	8316	21
	SUPPORT	840	
	Mild verbal statements	8411	1
	Strong verbal statements	8412	3
	Support in intergovernmental organizations	8413	10
	Campaigns in support of state	8414	10
	Banning groups to exist/function in the state's own territory/expulsion of group	8415	8
	Banning demonstrations/protests, etc., in the state's own territory	8416	8
	Detaining or arresting group members	8417	10
	OTHER	981	
EVENT LIST FOR EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO THE GROUP			
Main Category	Specific Category	Code	Weight (W)
TANGIBLE SUPPORT		850	
LOW	Humanitarian Aid	8511	2
MODERATE		860	
	Providing sanctuary/training	8611	14
	Providing base of operation	8612	14
	Providing financial assistance	8613	10
	Providing vital access to communication	8614	10
	Threatening the state to intervene on group's behalf	8615	5
HIGH PHYSICAL INVOLVEMENT		870	
	Non-injury destructive action against state	8711	13
	Providing arms	8712	15
	Providing military personnel under secessionist command	8713	17
	Border closures	8714	15
	Border skirmishes (support group)	8715	17
	Firing across borders	8716	16
	Full-scale military intervention	8717	21

(Continued)

Table A1. (Continued).

Main Category	Specific Category	Code	Adjusted Weight (W)
DIPLOMATIC/POLITICAL SUPPORT		880	
	Mild verbal statements	8811	1
	Strong verbal statements	8812	3
	Support in intergovernmental organizations	8813	10
	Campaigns in support of groups	8814	10
	Allowing groups to exist/function in the state's own territory	8815	8
	Allowing demonstrations/protests, etc., in the state's own territory	8816	8
	Freeing detained/arrested group members out of prison	8817	10
	Granting asylum to leadership of group	8818	14
OTHER		985	
ACTORS /TARGETS FOR ASSAM			
STATE		33100	
	Federal Government	331001	
	Local Government	331002	
	Governor	331011	
	Shri L.P. Singh, ICS	3310111	
	Shri P. Mehrotra	3310112	
	Shri T.S. Misra	3310113	
	Shri B. N. Sing	3310114	
	Shri Harideo Joshi	3310115	
	Shri Justice Anisetti Roghuvir, Chief Justice, Assam	3310116	
	Shri D. D. Thakur	3310117	
	Shri Lok Nath Misra	3310118	
	Chief Minister	331003	
	CM Shri Golap Borbora	3310031	
	CM Shri Jogenda Nath Hazarika	3310032	
	CM Shrimati Anowara Taimur	3310033	
	CM Shri Kesab Chandra Gogoi	3310034	
	CM Shri Hiteswar Saikia	3310035	
	CM Shri Prafulla Kumar Mahanta	3310036	
SOCIAL ACTORS		33110	
	Media	331101	
	Students	331102	
	Workers	331103	
	Peasants	331104	
	Educators	331105	
	Politicians	331106	
	Political activists	331107	
	Elites	331108	
	Local tourists	331109	
	Foreign tourists	331110	
	Foreign journalists	331111	
	Foreign politicians	331112	

(Continued)

Table A1. (Continued).

Main Category	Specific Category	Code	Adjusted Weight (W)
	Bengali nationals trying to immigrate	331113	
	Civil servants	331114	
	Nepali nationals trying to immigrate	331115	
	Businessmen/traders	331116	
	Foreign businessmen/traders	331117	
	Other	33910	
POLITICAL PARTIES		33120	
	Congress Party	331201	
	Janata Party	331202	
	BJP	331203	
	Asom Gana Parishad (AGP)	331204	
	Asom Gana Parishad (Splinter)	3312045	
	United Minorities Front	331205	
	Other	33920	
RELIGIOUS GROUPS		33130	
	Muslims	331301	
	Hindus	331302	
	Sikhs	331303	
	Buddhists	331304	
	Christian	331305	
	Other	33930	
ETHNIC GROUPS		33140	
	Population	331401	
	Assamese	331402	
	Bangladeshi immigrants	331403	
	Tribals	331404	
	Nepalese	331405	
	Bodos	331406	
	Hindi-speaking people	331407	
	Other	33940	
AGITATING/INSURGENT GROUPS		33150	
	United Liberation Front of Assam	331501	
	All Assamese Student Union (AASU)	331502	
	All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP)	331503	
	Asom Sahitya Sabha	331504	
	All Assam Minority Students Union (not insurgent)	331505	
	Lok Parishad	331506	
	Assam Jatiyatabadi Yuva Chhatra Parishad (AJYCP)—	331507	
	Assam Nationalistic Youth and Students Forum		
	Other	33950	
STATE ENFORCEMENT		33160	
	Police	331601	
	Paramilitary troops	331602	
	Army	331603	
	Border security force	331604	
	Other	33960	

(Continued)

Table A1. (Continued).

Main Category	Specific Category	Code	Adjusted Weight (W)
EXTERNAL ACTORS		33170	
	United States	331701	
	United Kingdom	331702	
	United Nations	331703	
	Regional Organizations	331704	
	China	331705	
	Bhutan	331706	
	Bangladesh	331707	
	Nepal	331708	
	Burma (Myanmar)	331709	
	Pakistan	331710	
	Other	33970	

Descriptive statistics

Table B1. Descriptive Statistics for the Main Variables (Weighted).

Variable	Observation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Protest Activity	345	45.81	131.57	0	1278
Repression	345	38.95	110.18	0	866
Accommodation	345	5.60	13.19	0	96
Heavy Violence	345	32.56	80.22	0	780

Robustness checks

Table C1. ZINB and PAR Estimates for Number of Protest Activity in Assam (Unweighted Data).

Variable	Critical Event Model		Protest Violence Model		Pre-Communal Violence Model		Post-Communal Violence Model	
	ZINB	PAR	ZINB	PAR	ZINB	PAR	ZINB	PAR
Time	-0.003 (0.002)	0.003* (0.001)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-	-	-	-
Intervention (Riot)	-1.953** (0.704)	-1.266* (0.532)	-1.304* (0.634)	-0.761 (0.633)	-	-	-	-
Post-Intervention	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.024*** (0.005)	0.009 (0.008)	-0.015* (0.006)	-	-	-	-
Repression	0.051*** (0.010)	0.044*** (0.004)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.039*** (0.004)	0.041*** (0.009)	0.040*** (0.004)	0.075† (0.043)	0.226*** (0.036)
Accommodation	-0.077 (0.050)	-0.085* (0.037)	-0.049 (0.053)	-0.068* (0.039)	-0.040 (0.050)	0.072* (0.036)	-0.192 (0.138)	-0.064 (0.210)
High violence	-	-	0.053* (0.023)	0.005 (0.009)	-	-	-	-
Constant	2.296*** (0.310)	1.172*** (0.208)	2.736*** (0.309)	1.414*** (0.203)	2.059*** (0.171)	1.577*** (0.113)	1.190*** (0.320)	-0.018 (0.224)
AR parameter 1 (lag one)	-	0.567*** (0.056)	-	0.520*** (0.054)	-	0.658*** (0.069)	-	0.437*** (0.089)
AR parameter 2 (lag two)	-	-0.102* (0.047)	-	-0.066 (0.048)	-	-0.138* (0.057)	-	0.004 (0.087)
N	345	343	345	343	215	213	125	123
Probability>chi-square	0.000	-	0.000	-	0.000	-	0.029	-
Adjusted R ²	-	0.59	-	0.54	-	0.62	-	0.33

Note. All significant tests are two-tailed, standard errors in parentheses.

† $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table C2. ZINB and PAR Estimates for Violent and Nonviolent Protest Activity in Assam.

Variable	Nonviolent Protest Activity		Violent Protest Activity	
	ZINB	PAR	ZINB	PAR
Time	−0.006*** (0.002)	−0.001 (0.001)	0.012** (0.004)	0.022** (0.007)
Intervention (Riot)	−1.259* (0.532)	−1.788* (0.726)	2.743* (1.357)	3.215*** (0.529)
Post-Intervention	−0.006 (0.006)	−0.014* (0.006)	−0.037* (0.018)	−0.090* (0.036)
Repression	0.003*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.008** (0.003)	−0.000 (0.000)
Accommodation	−0.017* (0.008)	−0.025** (0.007)	−0.047 (0.030)	0.030* (0.012)
Constant	4.887*** (0.258)	3.580*** (0.195)	2.611** (0.797)	0.923 (1.389)
AR parameter 1 (lag one)	—	0.492*** (0.055)	—	0.088 [†] (0.046)
AR parameter 2 (lag two)	—	−0.048 (0.049)	—	0.087 (0.059)
<i>N</i>	345	343	345	343
Probability>chi-square	0.000	—	0.000	—
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	—	0.59	—	0.32

Note. All significant tests are two-tailed, standard errors in parentheses.

[†] $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

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