

“ARE YOU ONE OF THOSE WOMEN?” WITHIN-MOVEMENT CONFLICT, RADICAL FLANK EFFECTS, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT POLITICAL OUTCOMES*

Holly J. McCammon, Erin M. Bergner, and Sandra C. Arch[†]

Studies of social movement outcomes rarely consider the impact of conflict between groups within movements on the ability of movement actors to achieve their political goals. In this examination of the Texas women's movement from the late 1950s until the early 1970s, we consider the role of within-movement conflict as organized women worked to gain an Equal Legal Rights Amendment. Our analysis reveals that conflict within movements can benefit activists by fueling a radical flank effect and, in the end, helping activists achieve important political goals. Our study also reveals the agency of movement actors as one group distances itself from another to seek political elite support. Such efforts can help activists open largely closed political opportunity structures. We conclude that researchers studying movement political outcomes should consider the potentially beneficial role of within-movement conflict.

Social movement scholars have made great strides in explaining the circumstances that allow collective actors to achieve their goals. With its focus on movement outcomes, this body of research considers a variety of consequences that movement groups can bring about, including significant cultural shifts in larger society and even biographical impacts for movement participants (Earl 2004; McAdam 1989). A core concern of movement-outcome scholarship has been political change, particularly the enactment of new laws, which are often a primary demand for movement activists (Amenta, Caren, Chiarello, and Su 2010). Numerous studies reveal that when individuals coordinate their actions and press collectively for legal change, they can succeed in winning political reforms (e.g., Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005; Andrews 2001; McCammon, Campbell, Granberg, and Mowery 2001). We learn from this growing body of research that political-elite receptiveness to movement demands (that is, a political opportunity), movement mobilization, and strategic adaptation by activists can produce positive political outcomes (Amenta 2006; McCammon 2012b; Soule and Olzak 2004).

In studies of social movement efforts to change law and policy, however, researchers often ignore how tensions or factionalism among movement groups might influence the ability of collective actors to achieve their overall political goals.¹ And yet, as is well documented, many movements experience dissent within their ranks, which is often publicly visible and well known to political elites and other observers (e.g., Benford 1993; Ghaziani 2008). As Melucci (1988) makes clear, unity within movements does not always exist. The U.S. women's movement has been no exception to such internal divisiveness. In the national movement, the earliest efforts to gain an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) were marked by well-known disagreement over whether the goal should be “blanket” legislation or whether an equal rights amendment would harm protective laws for women in the workplace (Rupp and Taylor 1987). When studies of movement political outcomes ignore movement discord,

* We thank *Mobilization* reviewers and the editor for their helpful comments on our manuscript.

[†] Holly J. McCammon is a Professor in the Department of Sociology at Vanderbilt University. Erin M. Bergner and Sandra C. Arch are Ph.D. candidates in sociology at Vanderbilt University. Please direct all correspondence to holly.mccammon@vanderbilt.edu.

scholars limit their ability to understand how such dynamics may influence a movement's capacity to achieve its political goals.

This article investigates how conflict between groups within a movement may influence the ability of collective actors to achieve political success. We provide a case study of the women's movement in Texas from the 1950s to the 1970s, as debates over a state Equal Legal Rights Amendment, which was ultimately enacted, became the central focus of early second-wave feminism in the state. We find that the Texas women's movement initially confronted a highly resistant political system. That is, this conservative southern state for the most part lacked a political opportunity for broadening women's legal rights. But when one group in the women's movement introduced an Equal Legal Rights Amendment (ELRA), another faction in the movement was able to create an opportunity for broadening women's rights in a more limited fashion by distancing itself, particularly in the eyes of lawmakers, from the organization proposing the broader ELRA, which helped propel a positive radical flank effect. Once a more limited political reform was passed, the new law then helped provide a political opening for the ELRA, in the form of a policy feedback effect. This, in turn, helped fuel a second phase of activism in which movement actors again invoked within-movement conflict and used distancing, producing another positive radical flank effect. These dynamics further opened the opportunity structure, this time for passage of the state's ELRA.

This episode in Texas illustrates an incremental process of political change, in which conflict within the movement played an important role. This gradual political change involved ongoing meaning making, in which social movement actors participated as *active agents* in framing radical and moderate flanks within the movement, which helped them open the political system to change. Increasingly, social movement scholars give greater attention to the agency of social movement actors (Jasper 2004; Maney, Kutz-Flamenbaum, Rohlinger, and Goodwin 2012; McCammon 2012b). We find such agency in the Texas women's movement as one group invoked conflict with another movement group—by labeling itself moderate while defining the other movement group as radical—to encourage lawmakers to support its demands. Our investigation shows that, at least in the case we examine, when movement actors publicly pointed to and emphasized divisions within the movement, with one group distancing itself from another group, this helped the movement achieve political change through a positive radical flank effect. In the end, through two cycles of invoking within-movement conflict in this way—two cycles that we define below—activists opened a largely closed political opportunity structure and won important legislative changes.²

The Texas case, however, is not likely to represent the kinds of processes leading the majority of social movements to win important policy changes. In fact, highly mobilized movements, typically with a strong coalition among movement groups rather than within-movement divisiveness, often succeed in winning political reform (Banaszak 1996; Dixon, Danaher, and Lennox 2013). But the Texas case, we believe, illustrates an important alternative path to political reform, one that may occur for some movements. We use the Texas case to suggest that, in certain circumstances, conflict between movement groups can help activists win political goals. Our examination of the Texas women's movement suggests two contexts in which activist agency may be able to propel a positive radical flank effect: (1) where political decision makers initially staunchly oppose reforms posed by activists or the tactics activists use, and where this opposition creates a strong desire among political actors to defeat "radicals," and (2) where one social movement group is willing to distance itself from another movement group and to articulate and even promote conflict within the movement in order to create this distance. A positive radical flank effect can then, in turn, help movement actors achieve political change. The Texas case thus presents intriguing evidence of this alternative route to a successful political outcome and suggests that within-movement conflict may, in some circumstances, help activists gain their political goals.

A CLOSED POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE, WITHIN-MOVEMENT CONFLICT, RADICAL FLANK EFFECTS, AND POLITICAL OUTCOMES

Disagreements between groups within social movements have not been a major preoccupation for social movement scholars studying movement political outcomes. However, movement researchers more generally have closely attended to within-movement conflict (for early statements, see Melucci 1988; Zald and McCarthy 1980). In fact, such strife is frequent in movement activism. Gamson (1975) found factionalism, where one group broke away from another, in 43 percent of the social movement organizations he studied. More recently, Rucht (2004), citing numerous examples, remarks on the routine occurrence of conflict within movements, and Polletta's (2002) investigation of deliberation in a variety of activist organizations reveals significant conflict. Barkan (1986) and Balser (1997) examine the causes of discord, and numerous researchers describe within-movement dissent by discussing ideological disputes, differing views on movement identity and inclusion, and conflicting approaches to strategy and tactics (Armstrong 2002; Benford 1993; Ghaziani 2008, 2009; King 2008; McCammon 2003).

In our study, we focus on conflict within the Texas women's movement—specifically, discord between different branches or groups within the movement, which centered largely on differences over preferred legislative goals and tactical approaches. Scholars differ in the particular type of within-movement conflict they examine, with some, for instance, exploring groups that splinter apart into factions, often becoming separate organizations (Gamson 1975). Others consider instances where members attempting to deliberate together voice different opinions on critical movement matters and engage in "infighting" (Ghaziani 2008, 2009). Here we focus on distinct groups within a movement that hold different views on legislative goals and appropriate tactics. But more particularly, we examine how an activist group can invoke these group differences by drawing attention to them as it labels its own efforts as moderate and those of another group in the movement as radical. This is how "moderates" take steps to distance themselves from "radical" activists, and we find that they do so in order to gain political support from lawmakers who are willing to support moderates to block radicals.³ This may be a deeper kind of conflict between movement groups than, say, infighting, given that one group is willing to take steps that disadvantage another movement group in order to advantage itself.

Scholars only rarely ask the question of how tensions and even outright conflict between movement groups can influence the ability of movements to achieve their political goals. In his seminal study comparing various social movement groups, Gamson (1975) concludes that factionalism within a social movement—that is, groups splitting apart—is a strong predictor that the group will fail to attain a movement's general goals of acceptance by elites and new advantages (see also a brief statement by McAdam [1982] 1999: 186-90). While Gamson's research remains a rare investigation of the influence of movement conflict on broad movement political goals, researchers have explored conflict's role in shaping other aspects of social movements. For instance, in their study of the National Woman's Party (NWP), Rupp and Taylor (1987) echo Gamson's insight that conflict is harmful to activism and describe infighting within the NWP that caused member resignations and significant interruptions in the group's work (see also Freeman [1975] 2000; Gamson 1995). Polletta (2002) describes tensions in the 1970s women's liberation movement and negative individual and organizational consequences.

Some scholars (Ghaziani and Baldassarri 2011; Vanhala 2011) recognize a complex influence of conflict within movements, wherein conflict can simultaneously benefit and harm movement activism. Benford (1993: 696), for instance, finds that disputes over framing strategies in the nuclear disarmament movement demobilized activists and diminished funding, but at the same time such conflict compelled actors "to clarify their framings and to engage in critical reflection." Others also emphasize benefits that discordant groups can provide. Ferree

and Hess ([1985] 2000: 125-27) note that tensions within the 1970s women's movement led to the formation of new and often more inclusive groups. Ghaziani (2008) traces the "dividends of dissent" by describing the development of collective identity that can occur in oftentimes intense exchanges over strategy in the gay and lesbian movement. Both Armstrong (2002) and Levitsky (2007) show how movements with diverse groups can successfully build unity on a foundation of diversity, and McCammon (2012b), in a study of women's efforts to gain the legal right to sit on juries, finds that disagreements over strategic decision making within and between groups produces a more fully vetted strategic assessment, which then can have positive implications for broader political success.

To this discussion of the possible benefits of within-movement conflict, we add the concept of a *radical flank effect* (Freeman [1975] 2000: 236; Haines 1984, 1988). Although Haines develops the concept in important ways, he does not focus explicitly on possible conflict between flanks in movements nor does he discuss how movement groups themselves might actively utilize such conflict to help cultivate a positive radical flank effect. Haines concentrates instead on outside elite reaction to movement flanks and develops the useful flank-effect concept by examining the emergence of a radical flank for the civil rights movement—specifically, Black Power activists. With his focus on elite perceptions, he finds that when a radical flank was present, elites were more willing to fund moderate groups. Haines shows that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People saw funding levels climb as the radical branch became more prominent. He attributes the benefit for moderate groups to the contrast that a radical flank provided for potential funders. Moderate activists, when compared to radicals, appeared less threatening to elites and more fundable by outsiders.⁴

In our examination of the Texas women's movement, we take the idea of a radical flank further by considering that groups within social movements may attempt to heighten and even exacerbate within-movement differences and conflict in an effort to persuade political decision makers to enact more moderate reforms. In short, we give greater *agency* to movement activists. Our look at the Texas case suggests women's movement leaders, when confronted with a relatively closed political opportunity structure, invoked movement conflict to help them open the political structure. Counterintuitively, when political leaders are highly resistant to a movement goal or a movement group—that is, when the political system is largely "closed"—this can provide an opportunity for a segment of a social movement to achieve what comes to be viewed as a more limited goal. Tarrow (1998: 149) suggests a process of "selective facilitation," in which political leaders "negotiate with some elements among a spectrum of contenders" to "encourage moderation and split off the moderates from their radical allies." Power holders may be eager to find ways to block demands or tactics they staunchly oppose, and thus political decision makers may be willing to work with certain movement groups, those presenting themselves as moderates, as a means of defeating more radical groups.

Our case study suggests that when such a closed political system initially exists and when one faction of a movement is willing to distance itself from another segment of the movement, this can open up opportunities for political change for the more "moderate" group and lead to its political success. Other researchers (Alimi 2006; Jasper 2004; Koopmans 2005) have considered that social movement actors are not passive recipients who simply confront opportunity structures in the broader environment, but instead can be active agents working and even succeeding in opening largely closed opportunities. Unlike earlier treatments of a radical flank effect, we examine the agency of social movement activists by considering that some activists may play an important role in propelling a positive radical flank effect forward by working to deepen the divide between activist groups. Our case study reveals an ongoing process of social construction in the gendered politics in Texas during this time as factions within the movement, and those outside the movement as well, engaged in public meaning making that labeled the factions as distinct movement flanks. We argue that distinctions are

typically first made on the basis of the groups' demands and/or their tactics. Initial differences might be subtle or pronounced. But in either case, through reactions to the differing groups by elite decision makers, the public, the media, and, importantly, movement members themselves, the meaning-making process unfolds and differences as well as tensions between the flanks are clarified and magnified.

In figure 1 we situate our study among other investigations of social movement political outcomes. For instance, several examinations of movement political outcomes focus on open political opportunity structures and how political elite receptiveness to movement demands and other forms of political opportunity can aid a movement in achieving its political goals—studies that often at least implicitly assume a unified movement (see figure's first cell; Amenta, Dunleavy, and Bernstein 1994). However, a divided movement, one experiencing important within-movement conflict, even when confronting an open political opportunity structure, may not be able to achieve its political goals because conflict within the movement could undermine the movement's ability to mobilize and present its demands (Gamson 1975). Haines's (1988) study of the civil rights movement indicates that radical flank effects can be positive and help activists gain significant political reforms. While the implication of the political opportunity literature is that closed structures substantially reduce activists' chances of winning political reforms (see fourth cell; Jeydel 2000), few scholars consider whether, in the face of a closed political opportunity, some circumstances may allow movement actors to achieve their goals (see Einwohner 2003, however, for a focus on closed opportunities and collective mobilization).

We posit that when movement actors face staunch opposition—that is, a largely closed political structure—and one group responds by actively cultivating conflict within the movement by distancing itself from another group, painting the other group as "radical," and thereby fostering a radical flank effect, it can succeed in winning the political reforms it seeks (see fifth cell in figure 1).⁵ In the end, the Texas women's movement won a state equal legal rights amendment, and we conclude that discord between movement groups can sometimes aid activists in winning important political reforms.

Figure 1. Studies of Movement Political Outcomes: Opportunity Structures, Movements with and without Internal Conflict, and Flank Effects.

	<i>Unified Movement</i>	<i>Within-Movement Conflict</i>	<i>Radical Flank Effect</i>
<i>Open Political Opportunity Structure</i>	(1) <i>Political success:</i> A unified movement is able to win political reforms from receptive political elites (e.g., Amenta, Dunleavy, and Bernstein 1994).	(2) <i>Lack of political success:</i> Within-movement conflict may undermine movement mobilization and prevent activists from achieving their political goals (Gamson 1975).	(3) <i>Political success:</i> Receptive elites willing to side with moderates against radicals (positive radical flank effect) allowing movement to win moderate reforms (Haines 1988).
<i>Closed Political Opportunity Structure</i>	(4) <i>Lack of political success:</i> Even a unified movement is unlikely to win political gains due to a lack of political elite receptiveness (Jeydel 2000).	Within-Movement Conflict and Radical Flank Effect (5) <i>Political success:</i> Initially unreceptive elites are persuaded to side with moderates against radicals (positive radical flank effect) when one movement group actively invokes within-movement conflict, allowing the group to win moderate reforms (current study).	

DATA AND METHODS

We employ a case study approach to investigate the Texas women's movement, the relatively closed political opportunity structure it initially confronted, and the steps activists took as they framed themselves as moderate and invoked within-movement conflict to distance themselves from a group they labeled radical. We consider how this conflict between flanks in the Texas women's movement led to a broadening of women's legal rights in the state. We examine the Texas women's movement as our case because it allows us to provide an in-depth look at the possible connection between within-movement conflict and a political outcome for the movement. Thus, we believe the case is important because it brings into focus a process linking within-movement conflict and political success. We view our efforts here as theory generating rather than theory testing, in that the Texas case permits us to articulate a causal argument that may be useful in understanding other cases (Gerring 2006). Additionally, in our concluding discussion, we consider external validity, or the kinds of cases to which our argument may be generalized.

We examine the Texas women's movement from 1957 until 1972, dividing the years into two phases, 1957-67 and 1968-72. We begin in 1957 because in this year distinct branches within the Texas women's movement began to emerge. We end in 1972 because in this year the state's electorate voted in favor of the Equal Legal Rights Amendment. The year 1967 marks a transition point in our study when the existing moderate flank won an important, but limited, political reform and the victory triggered a policy feedback effect and a renewed effort on the part of the previous radical flank, which in time became the new moderate flank. In the later period as well, a new radical flank emerges, and developments in this second phase bring about enactment of the Texas ELRA.

Our data derive largely from primary sources, namely, manuscript collections for key organizations and individuals involved in the efforts to change Texas law (i.e., the Texas Federation of Business and Professional Women collection, Texas Woman's University; League of Women Voters of Texas records, Texas Tech University; Louise Raggio collection, Southern Methodist University; Hermine Tobolowsky papers, Texas Tech University, Texas Woman's University, and University of North Texas), legislative histories (Texas General Laws 1967, 1971), newspaper accounts, recorded oral interviews with participants (e.g., Saxon 1980, 1981), and biographies for movement leaders (Bird 1989; Raggio 2003). We also rely on a handful of secondary sources (e.g., Fink 2003; Gammage 1976). We conducted an extensive search for materials surrounding campaigns for the Texas ELRA as well as the property law campaigns (the earlier moderate reform). We used a variety of search tools to locate these records, and the lead author spent substantial time at Texas libraries viewing archival materials. To the best of our knowledge, we examined all available historical materials concerning these efforts.

As a means of organizing the rich and sizeable historical record for the case study, we produced a 170-page detailed chronology, which documents the actions and events involving the organizations, individuals, campaigns, and laws for our period of study.⁶ We then open coded our chronology using an inductive approach that resulted in the emergence of main concepts (e.g., distancing, positive radical flanks effects) (Corbin and Strauss 2008). After open coding, we shifted to axial coding, as we traced key connections among our concepts, for instance, initial political resistance, responses to this when groups invoked conflict by distancing themselves from others groups and framing moderate and radical flanks, and the resulting positive radical flank effects and political outcomes. In the following discussion, we present our findings for the two phases in the Texas women's movement.

FINDINGS

Phase One, 1957-67: A Married Women's Property Act

In 1957, Hermine Tobolowsky, leader of the Texas Business and Professional Women's Clubs (BPW), an organization with nearly 8,500 members in 185 clubs across the state, went before a state senate committee to speak in favor of expanded property rights for married women (Gammage 1982: 136). In the 1950s, Texas remained one of a small number of states that had not yet granted married women the right to control property (*Houston Post* 1957). Once married, women in Texas had little legal control over their separate property and no legal right to participate in decisions concerning the couple's community property.⁷ For instance, a married woman could not sell her separate property unless her husband was a signatory on the conveyance, nor could she sign other contracts without her husband as co-signer (Texas Federation of Business and Professional Women 1958). A growing number of professional women in the state, including women running their own law firms, keenly felt this legal hindrance in their business activities (Raggio 2003). Various Texas women's groups, including the BPW, the League of Women Voters, the Federation of Women's Clubs, and the American Association of University Women, coalesced in 1957 in an attempt to abolish these unequal gender laws.⁸ At this point in time, the women's movement in the state was unified around the demand for reform in women's marital property rights (Texas Legislative Council 1956; Texas Tech 1956a, 1956b).

Tobolowsky's appearance before state lawmakers was ill received by a number of senators. When she presented a list of hardships confronted by married women whose husbands were incapacitated, had abandoned their wives, or refused to comply with a wife's desire to convey her property, a senator responded by asserting that "there's no woman who has sense enough to sign a deed or to convey stocks without the advice and consent of her husband" (Lesh 1986: 2). Tobolowsky, as a practicing attorney, knew well the intricacies of Texas family law and did not hesitate to share her knowledge with the political leaders. Lawmakers responded strongly to Tobolowsky's forthrightness. During the hearing, they began to target her personally, asking if her motivations came from trouble within her own marriage or if she would like to smoke a cigar "like a man" (Korosec 1990: 1; Wyden 1961). She reminded the senators that their salaries were paid by the citizens of Texas and one-half of those citizens were women (Miller 1994). In the conservative gendered political culture of Texas at the time, where women were widely expected to be agreeable and accommodating, Tobolowsky's rebuke was not viewed favorably by the male lawmakers.

While a property law was passed in 1957, it was a substantially watered-down version compared to what the women's groups demanded and, in the end, the new law was labeled a defeat (McKnight 1971; Wyden 1961). This setback sparked a revision in strategy by BPW leaders, and their reorientation led to a bifurcation in the Texas women's movement. Over the next year, the BPW altered its strategy and began working instead for an Equal Legal Rights Amendment (ELRA), the Texas version of the ERA (*Dallas Morning News* 1958; Fox, Tobolowsky, and Hodges 1957). BPW leaders decided that, given the resistance, the piecemeal approach of changing laws one-by-one would take too long. They resolved instead to seek a constitutional amendment barring gender inequality across the board in Texas law.⁹ They began by launching a public educational campaign, traveling the state giving speeches to women's organizations, and sharing BPW brochures detailing inequality in state law (Fox 1958; Texas Federation of Business and Professional Women Clubs 1958).

The BPW's momentum around the ELRA grew in the next few years, and the organization succeeded in getting the amendment introduced in legislative sessions (*Denton Record-Chronicle* 1961a; *Texas Business and Professional Woman* 1959). At the same time, however, a division among women's groups became apparent. The League of Women Voters, which had partnered with the BPW for married women's property reforms, refused to support the

ELRA, arguing that the amendment would invalidate women's workplace protective laws and that a constitutional change was too broad of an approach (Texas Tech 1961, 1962a). The League stated that it viewed itself as a citizens' organization rather than a feminist group (Texas Tech 1956c, 1959a, 1962b), and it distanced itself from the BPW and campaigned only for property reforms.

Also, female members of the Texas State Bar Association, such as Margaret Amsler, law professor at Southern Methodist University, publicly voiced concerns about the ELRA, stating that an amendment would create "chaos" in Texas law (Amsler 1963: 13-A; Banks 1961). Amsler, like the League of Women Voters, favored a more moderate goal, granting married women the desired property rights by individual statute. Louise Raggio, also an attorney and active member in the Bar Association, was a prominent supporter of rights for women, routinely giving public talks on ways in which Texas law treated women unequally (*Denton Record-Chronicle* 1962; Saxon 1981). However, at the time she also opposed the ELRA and helped further articulate a position for the moderate flank. She did so on practical grounds, saying the amendment was unlikely to pass and organized women should either target specific laws for change or wait for a Supreme Court ruling that would establish precedent for broader rights (Dunnigan 1970d; Saxon 1981: 33). By 1965, Raggio was chairperson of the Texas Bar Association's Family Law Section, and she began a renewed effort to reform marital property laws (Saxon 1981: 31). As the BPW continued to press for the ELRA, factions in the women's movement became decidedly more pronounced, with Amsler and Raggio working within the Bar Association, mobilizing that organization's resources and female membership to promote their moderate, specific-statute-based reform, an approach at odds with the BPW's more far-reaching blanket-amendment goal (Patrick 1965; Raggio 2003).

As the BPW's efforts grew, elite opposition to an ELRA became more vigorous, revealing a political opportunity structure that was staunchly resistant to broad change. Political opponents began to characterize the amendment as a threatening legal change. Lawmakers, male members of the State Bar Association, and newspaper reporters branded the BPW's goals as extreme. Some lamented that the ELRA would introduce "sweeping" reforms that would jeopardize the state's laws concerning women, including "demolish[ing]" workplace protective legislation (*Denton Record-Chronicle* 1961b: 1-2). A Texas Bar committee stated that the ELRA would "open a veritable Pandora's box of litigation" (*Big Spring Herald* 1963: 3-A). Others criticized the BPW's approach, with one lawmaker labeling the BPW's actions as "intimidation and threatening tactics" when BPW members reminded politicians that they could be held accountable in the next election (Gammage 1976: 55). One policymaker, picking up on the differences between segments in the women's movement, encouraged BPW members to act more like the moderate flank when he lectured that "sugar draws more flies than vinegar" (University of North Texas 1957). While there were some ELRA supporters in the legislature who helped introduce the amendment, House and Senate members prevented the proposed amendment from coming up for debate and engaged in ridicule and "dirty tricks" (for example, making personal accusations against Hermine Tobolowsky which were later revealed to be fabricated), all to stymie the ELRA activists (Fox, Forson, and Tobolowsky 1959; Gammage 1976, 1982). The historical record indicates a largely hostile environment for proposing a state equal rights amendment.

Raggio and female members of the Bar Association sensed an opportunity in this opposition and bolstered their efforts for the property reform. As Raggio's statement reveals, her group began to emphasize differences between the two women's groups: "by watching what happened to the B&PW-sponsored legislation, I had learned a lot. I knew we would get absolutely nowhere by pushing and threatening. I knew we had to use other tactics to gain the legal rights we so richly deserved" (Raggio 2003: 178). By the mid-1960s, Raggio had increased efforts to mobilize Texas State Bar Association resources and pursue the limited-statutory route to legal reform, rather than the broad-amendment approach. Raggio used her position as chair of the Bar's Family Law Section and mobilized female support in the

business and legal community. She brought together a committee of legal experts to reformulate marital property law, and her approach granted this group legitimacy in the eyes of lawmakers as they worked largely within the legal profession to devise the new law. Under Raggio's leadership, this segment of the women's movement began to create a political opening for ultimately successful but limited political reform.

Lawmakers and male members of the State Bar began to favor the moderate flank's demand for more limited legal reform, and they did so to forestall the constitutional amendment (Texas Tech 1963). One representative in the Texas House suggested the ELRA be supplanted by a change in property law, saying, "We think this will solve the problem which the women are seeking to solve by constitutional amendment" (Morehead 1963: 6). A media report recommended a property law instead of "the danger of disruptive effects" that "the constitutional amendment approach" would entail (*Fort Worth Star Telegram* 1963; see also *Dallas Morning News* 1963). As one commentator reported,

When the legislature convened in January of 1965, the constitutional amendment was again proposed, and bar leaders cast about for means of defeating it. Thereafter, almost by inadvertence, the organized bar became the sponsor of statutory matrimonial property law reform. (McKnight 1971: 129)

A positive radical flank effect was unfolding, with the ELRA increasingly labeled dangerous and unreasonable. In order to blunt the BPW's demand, the moderate flank's pursuit of change solely in property law was increasingly viewed as a workable reform. Political elites' desire to defeat the ELRA helped create a political opportunity for a more moderate change in women's rights.

While Raggio viewed her work as part of the Texas women's movement and her mission ultimately as one of gender equality (Raggio 2003; Vrato 2002), her approach was also pragmatic and incremental—one designed to work within male-led institutions by relying on traditional gendered expectations to bring about gradual change. Raggio preferred a low profile, desiring to appear non-threatening to male lawmakers (Raggio 2003: 178; Shepard 1993). Unlike Tobolowsky, who verbally challenged and criticized lawmakers during legislative hearings, Raggio differentiated herself by working to fulfill traditional female stereotypes—as she put it, drawing on her feminine "charm" and even using "sweet-talk" to help persuade lawmakers (Vrato 2002: 45; Shepard 1993: 5-6). Raggio also tempered her motivational frames for a change in property law. Where the BPW framed its demand for the ELRA in terms of equal rights for women, Raggio repeatedly stated her rationales for changes in marital law in terms of modernizing Texas law and "bring[ing it] into the twentieth century" (Shepard 1993: 9). Her work within the State Bar and before the legislature contrasts sharply with the BPW's approach. As one historian remarks, the BPW's Tobolowsky "never used traditional feminine wiles to cajole her opponents or take the sting out of her arguments" (Gammage 1982: 130). In fact, she approached lawmakers using the opposite tactic, one of assertive demands that remained without a "sugar coating."

While Raggio aligned herself ideologically with the progressive women's movement, she took active steps to distance her efforts for legal reform from that of the BPW, which solidified the flanks within the Texas women's movement. Raggio spoke publicly in 1967 against the ELRA and called the BPW's approach too "strident" and potentially "disastrous" (Raggio 2003: 178; Shepard 1993: 7). At the same time, the BPW worked to distance itself from Raggio and the Bar's Family Law Section's efforts by opposing the property bill and saying it did not go far enough because community property was not included in its provisions and it did not address other discriminatory laws (*Texas Business and Professional Woman* 1967). The approaches of these two flanks in the Texas women's movement were very different. One drew on traditional gender stereotypes and took an insider approach through the largely male Bar Association to build status and legitimacy and to align itself with lawmakers. By defining itself as distinct and even opposed to the BPW, Raggio and the Bar Association

women helped fuel an understanding of their efforts as moderate and acceptable. The other faction's use of an assertive, confrontational style that challenged traditional gender norms, provoked lawmakers, and urged legal changes that were far broader made it easy for Raggio's group to label them "strident."¹⁰

Lawmakers, as they made their decision about how to proceed, assessed the two flanks and sided with the moderates to defeat the radicals. Raggio recounts a key exchange with a senator during her bill's 1967 Senate hearing:

The chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee asked me only one significant question. "Little lady, are you one of those women?" I knew exactly who he was referring to [that is, the BPW]. Even though the question startled me, I knew what I had to do. "No, Senator," I said, "they testified against my bill." "That's all I wanted to know," he responded, and promptly voiced his approval [for the property bill]." (Raggio 2003: 180-81)

As this exchange shows, lawmakers took steps to make sense of the property bill's relationship to the ELRA. When they understood that Raggio opposed the ELRA, while the BPW opposed the property bill, lawmakers were willing to side with the moderate wing in order to block the BPW's broader agenda.

According to Raggio, the flanks in the movement were crucial in winning passage of the property bill. She states that the BPW's testimony against the property bill "was probably the reason that the legislation was passed, because there was so much feeling against the [BPW] women, and here, I suppose, I was the perfect foil against this women's group" (Saxon 1981: 39-40). As Raggio states, "I was able to get the 1967 reform of Texas family law through the legislature . . . because I didn't threaten anybody" (Shepard 1993: 6). Conflict between the two branches of the movement and the contrast in their approaches, with Raggio presenting her group as insiders with a more traditional and acceptable feminine style, helped the moderates succeed. In the eyes of lawmakers, the more radical, far-reaching demands of the BPW for an equal rights amendment made the property bill appear tame—a nonthreatening, moderate request for partial reform. In the end, to derail the BPW's pursuit of the ELRA, lawmakers were willing to enact the married women's property bill, and passage of the property bill was a distinct victory for the Texas women's movement, giving married women legal control of their separate property (University of Texas at Arlington 1967). A largely closed opportunity for the ELRA and a positive radical flank effect resulted in a political opening for the property bill.

Phase Two, 1968-72: The Equal Legal Rights Amendment

With passage of Texas married women's property rights in 1967, the terrain on which advocates for the ELRA fought their fight was fundamentally altered. A core concern of many feminists in Texas during this era had been married women's constricted power over property. The passage of the property bill addressed a major portion of this grievance—that concerning separate property. Yet, because Texas is a community property state and therefore real estate, securities, and other forms of property acquired by individuals during marriage are classified as community rather than separate property, even with the 1967 change in law, husbands in Texas still retained unequal control over community property (*Dallas Morning News* 1967; Texas Tech 1967). Additionally, the BPW listed a myriad of other legal domains in which Texas women, both married and single, lacked equal legal standing compared to their male counterparts, citing examples in criminal and tax law and employment opportunities (Bright 1969). Even Raggio (2003) noted that during her work to revise property law she began to realize how many Texas laws discriminated against women. These persisting inequalities led the BPW to continue its efforts to gain an equal rights amendment.

As the BPW pressed forward with its ELRA campaign, the context was quite different, due to passage of the property law and for another reason as well. By the late 1960s, the national

women's movement was expanding and developing and, as we will show, a new radical flank was emerging, in the form of a women's liberation mobilization. In this changed context, the BPW adapted its strategy to better position itself to win the ELRA. It did so largely by reframing its claims by moderating its demands and tactics to better align itself with law-makers and to distance itself from the new radical flank. In the end, the political opportunity structure opened further because of a policy feedback effect and because the BPW used its agency to recalibrate its tactics and invoke within-movement conflict, which led to another radical flank effect. As the history shows, in this second phase of the movement the moderate and radical flanks were redefined and different tensions in the Texas women's movement, along with other dynamics, produced a positive political outcome.

Policy Feedback Effect

Political sociologists write of a "policy feedback effect" when passage of one law establishes a political opportunity for passage of additional laws along the same legal trajectory (e.g., Fernández and Jaime-Castillo 2012). This occurred with the moderate flank's success in winning the 1967 Texas property reform. With this change in marital property rights in place, the next demand in legal reform—enactment of the Equal Legal Rights Amendment—seemed less radical. The ELRA appeared less radical because one of the primary arguments in opposition to the ELRA held that passage of the blanket amendment, which would render laws deemed discriminatory against women unconstitutional, would lead to "legal chaos" and clog the Texas courts with numerous cases to determine the reach of the new amendment (Amsler 1963). But the enactment of the new marital property law swept away a significant body of gender-unequal law concerning separate property, a body of law that had received much public attention (Erwin 1967; Raggio 2003). Passage of the 1967 law, thus, importantly weakened opponents' claims that the ELRA would produce "legal chaos," because a number of the provisions expected to clog the courts when challenged simply no longer existed (Gammage 1982: 155). In the new context, with more gender-equal law in place, the changes anticipated with the ELRA began to appear less far-reaching and less radical.

The policy feedback effect played out in another way. The new legal rights gained by married women over their separate property helped shift gender norms toward greater gender equality. Women's movement activists aided in this process. Raggio (2003) reports that after passage of the new property law she toured the state educating lawyers on how the new, more egalitarian property law would work. In the process, her work and the law itself propelled a normative shift in legal circles, with married women now being seen by legal professionals as having a greater voice in marital relations.¹¹ Moreover, widespread publicity around the new property law increased public awareness about the importance of removing restrictions on married women and the need "to strike out laws discriminatory to women" (Erwin 1967: 5; Moss 1967). The new married women's property law helped revise the broader cultural context and weakened the notion that an equal rights amendment was a radical idea.

Shifting Moderate and Radical Flanks

At the same time that a policy feedback effect influenced gender politics in Texas, the BPW also took steps to redefine itself as more moderate, both in its goals and tactics. McCammon (2012b) writes of the ways in which activists strategically adapt their tactics to increase their chances of winning political change. Instead of a confrontational, outsider strategy, as the group pursued in the past, BPW members now implemented a more conciliatory approach with more moderate framing around the ELRA. Like Raggio and others before them, they began to position themselves as insiders in the political process. When the ELRA confronted resistance in the 1969 Texas House, Tobolowsky, as BPW leader, decided to work more closely with male political leaders. She appealed to the Speaker of the House in an

attempt to learn about the legislature's opposition (*Dallas Morning News* 1969; Gammage 1976, 1982). Tobolowsky appears to have established rapport with the Speaker because in late 1970 he invited her to sit on an oversight committee to review the duties of the state legislature, and in 1971 he alerted her when he called upon the House's Committee on Constitutional Amendments to release the amendment for a floor vote (Bird 1989; *Dallas Morning News* 1970c). In addition, during Tobolowsky's service on the 1970 oversight committee, she worked with Waggoner Carr, former Speaker of the Texas House. Just shortly after this committee work, the BPW launched perhaps the ultimate insider tactic—during the 1971 legislative session the organization hired Carr, a well-known political insider, as BPW lobbyist (Gammage 1982). The BPW's new approach drew on the expertise of a legislative veteran and signaled the growing legitimacy and insider status of the BPW, positioning it in the eyes of lawmakers as a more politically acceptable group.

In addition to utilizing insider lobbying, the BPW also moderated its framing around the ELRA. Beginning in the late 1960s, the group began to articulate a more general equality argument in favor of the amendment, arguing that the ELRA was important to "all citizens," not solely women, and, in addition, activists argued that the new constitutional amendment was not a major change in law but would simply clarify an existing provision in the Texas constitution (Bullock 1969; Cobler 1972b; Miller 1994).¹² In the past, the BPW focused on the hardships for women brought on by discriminatory elements in the law, and such arguments often vilified men and their treatment of women (Gammage 1982). But now, in its publicity pamphlets, the BPW stated that Article I, Section 3 of the constitution already held that "All free men...have equal rights," and the ELRA was thus simply a "logical conjunction" to Section 3 (Texas Federation of Business and Professional Women's Club 1967). Activists pointed out that the proposed amendment was needed to reduce any confusion about whether Section 3 applied to women. The pamphlet went on to say that the proposed amendment would articulate "the broad principle that all laws must apply equally to men and women," stressing that the principle already existed in Texas law and was only being reasserted in the ELRA (see also Texas Tech 1972a, 1972e, 1972f). The BPW's new and more moderate framing was an effort to reign in any understanding of the ELRA as feminist legislation designed specifically to broaden women's rights, and instead portrayed the proposed amendment as upholding widely held equality beliefs. As Tobolowsky later acknowledged, it was important for the BPW at this juncture to "be part of the mainstream" (Korosec 1990: 9).¹³

While the BPW's moderation of its approach worked to shift it into the moderate flank, another development cemented its new position. Flanks within the Texas women's movement were being reconstructed more broadly, and the rise of women's liberation reveals how conflict within the movement and a positive radical flank effect continued to play a role in broadening Texas women's rights law in this second phase. By the late 1960s a new segment emerged in the national women's movement and by 1970 it was evident in Texas as well. In 1969, the *Dallas Morning News* ran a nationally syndicated article describing a new radical flank within the national movement, the women's liberation mobilization (Glaser 1969). The article suggested that this branch of women's activism might even contain the "seeds of violence," and would likely entail some extreme actions, such as mass demonstrations, and a growing political consciousness among women that could translate into a large voting bloc able to alter the course of U.S. politics. A few months later, Texas journalists published a series of articles documenting local women's liberation activism in both Dallas and at the University of Texas in Austin (Dunnigan 1970a, 1970b; Gammage 1982: 163-64; Schwartz 1970). As one commenter noted at the time, these "extremes of the movement make those in the middle look less radical" (Dunnigan 1970c: 1). This new radical flank on the national stage, but also increasingly in Texas itself, helped further situate the BPW and its demand in the more moderate flank. When compared to women's liberationists, the BPW's approach seemed quite tame, and increasingly the BPW and the ELRA were categorized with the more moderate branch of the Texas women's movement (*Dallas Morning News* 1971; Moss 1970).

One clear indicator of this was that previous moderate leaders of the Texas women's movement, including Louise Raggio, were now willing to support an equal rights amendment (Brinkerhoff 1971, 1972).

The BPW itself was willing to invoke this new division within the women's movement, like the Bar Association women before it. The BPW did so by taking steps to distance itself from more "radical feminism," stating explicitly that the BPW "shouldn't be considered a 'radical' feminist movement" (Crosby 1967: 1; see also *Dallas Morning News* 1970a; Miller 1967). It also assured audiences that the ELRA was "definitely not a women's liberation-related effort," because the Equal Legal Rights Amendment had been around much longer than women's liberation (Texas Tech 1972c, 1972d). In 1970, the National Organization for Women (NOW) pursued more militant tactics by calling for a women's strike for equality. The group encouraged women around the country to stay home from work or decline to do housework, and Texas NOW members agreed to participate (Schwartz 1970). In response, Tobolowsky reported in a newspaper interview:

A strike isn't my way of promoting women's rights. I have always believed laws should be changed by the legislature and you contact Congress and legislators to get them changed. (Dunnigan 1970d)

The BPW's reaction to the strike put distance between the BPW and NOW's effort and helped define feminist groups such as NOW as more radical and the BPW, with its increasingly measured insider legislative approach, as more moderate.

The new radical flank provided a militant foil for the BPW, highlighting the BPW's more restrained and less disruptive approach. In Texas at the time, many viewed women's liberationists as too extreme and as antimale, and opposition to the liberationists' more militant tactics and demands began to grow (*Amarillo Globe-Times* 1970; *Dallas Morning News* 1970a; Korosec 1990). This made support for the BPW and its demand for an ELRA—an amendment that simply reasserted already-existing beliefs in "equality for all"—seem like a reasonable alternative, at a time when there was growing sentiment for taking women's interests more seriously (Dunnigan 1970d; Texas Tech 1972d). As one member of the public interviewed by a newspaper reported, "I do not believe that militant paths are the proper means for achievement" (Dunnigan 1970d: 1). Tobolowsky herself stated, "The label of man-haters turned so many men and women off, particularly in a state like Texas" (Korosec 1990: 9). Another contemporary observer suggested that the ELRA would not have succeeded if the BPW had been "a group of radical women" (Vélez 1994: 33).

The BPW also drew upon a growing national political opportunity in its effort to bolster a local opportunity for passage of the Texas ELRA. At this same time, the U.S. Congress had begun to debate a proposed national ERA, when in 1970 Michigan Representative Martha Griffiths convinced a House committee to discharge the amendment where it had been stymied for many years (Freeman [1975] 2000). Most Texas lawmakers in Washington voted in support of the ERA (*Dallas Morning News* 1970b) while, on the other hand, at least at this point in time, some women's liberation advocates took a stand against the national amendment and this stand was publicized in Texas (Presley 1970). The juxtaposition of responses to the national amendment, with Texas' lawmakers supporting it and women's liberationists on the national stage opposing it, sent a clear signal that a state-level equal rights amendment also could be construed as moderate in scope, and that siding with the ELRA was siding against the women's liberation mobilization. The Texas BPW took steps to use this situation to its advantage. In its publicity for the Texas ELRA, the BPW emphasized support for the national ERA by Texas lawmakers in Washington, the national political parties, and American Bar Association (Texas Tech 1972c). At the same time that the BPW drew on a growing national political opportunity to further augment a political opportunity at home, it continued to distance itself from women's liberation activism, explaining that the ELRA should not be "dubbed a 'Women's Lib' issue" (Texas Tech 1972d).

A positive vote in the 1971 Texas House was the critical turning point for the ELRA (Texas Tech 1971a, 1971b). With both Texas legislative bodies now supporting the amendment, in November of the following year it easily won the votes needed from the Texas electorate by a four-to-one margin, becoming part of the state constitution (*Dallas Morning News* 1972b). The BPW along with other women's groups canvassed the state before the electorate's vote to publicize the need for an ELRA, with speakers, newspaper ads, radio and TV announcements, printed brochures, bumper stickers, and buttons, continuing to emphasize an equality-for-all frame, rather than specifically focusing on women's rights (Gammage 1982; Kreidler 2001; Peyton 1983). To be sure, the amendment still had its opponents, including some members of the state's more conservative women's organizations (Cobler 1972a). But as contemporary commentators noted, the ELRA handily won the needed votes (Dalrymple 1997; Vélez 1994: 31).

The amendment had, by this point in time, been reframed in Texas to be a moderate legal change, one that many lawmakers and voters now found acceptable and, in the end, few opposed. Support for the ELRA amendment was also a move against the more radical women's liberationist mobilization. Just a few months before Texans voted on the state's ELRA, the U.S. Congress passed the national ERA with the Texas legislature ratifying one month later, and this, too, helped the cause in Texas (*Dallas Morning News* 1972a). The BPW, again, pointed to Congress' support, but also warned that it could take many years for the federal amendment to be ratified and take effect (Texas Tech 1972c); now was the time to implement this legal change in Texas. Texas gained an equal legal rights amendment for women at a point in time when important changes were happening on the national stage, and this certainly contributed to the developments in Texas. But Texas feminist activists themselves successfully defined a blanket amendment as a moderate reform—not a reform supported by the new radical flank in the women's movement and not one that entailed momentous changes in law—and this played an important role in the win in Texas. The BPW also benefited from a policy feedback effect from the earlier change in property law and actively utilized the broad national-level political opportunity to help bring about passage of the Texas amendment. The BPW successfully propelled the ELRA forward by distancing itself from a radical flank and using an insider strategy to achieve its political goal. In the end, the overall gradual process of political change continued to unfold in this second phase of Texas women's efforts to win legal reform, resulting in the only conservative southern state to pass an equal rights amendment.¹⁴

CONCLUSION

Our examination of the Texas women's movement reveals a gradual process of political change. Staunch initial opposition to the "radical" ELRA in Texas made lawmakers willing to side with a more limited proposal for marital property reform. Moderate activists helped propel this process forward by emphasizing the differences between their calls for women's marital property reform and the radicals' demand for passage of the ELRA. This fueled a positive radical flank effect and opened a political opportunity for the limited political change in women's legal rights. Once the initial moderates achieved the limited reform, the new law caused a policy feedback effect that aided in further legal reform. That is, the new property provision opened the political opportunity structure further, setting the stage for a new moderate flank to again invoke conflict in the women's movement and foster another positive radical flank effect, this time involving women's liberationists. These developments helped open the political opportunity structure, ultimately convincing political leaders and the public to support the ELRA.

The agency of activists played a critical role in this process, as they helped define the moderate and radical flanks, invoked conflict within the women's movement to cultivate radical flank effects, and, in the end, fully opened a political opportunity by convincing lawmakers and the electorate to vote in favor of the ELRA. We believe our study contributes to a

broader discussion in the social movement literature on the agency of collective actors (Jasper 2004), including the political agency of mobilized women (Robnett 1997; McCammon 2012b). Previous treatments of radical flank effects have not considered how social movement actors themselves can encourage positive flank effects (Haines 1988). We find evidence that participants in the Texas women's movement accomplished precisely this: they utilized within-movement conflict to aid them in winning political change.

Our examination of the Texas case reveals likely conditions under which within-movement conflict can lead to positive political change: (1) when there is an initially closed political opportunity structure and (2) when a social movement group is willing to invoke within-movement conflict to foster a positive radical flank effect. Our examination of the Texas women's movement shows that when lawmakers or the public generally opposed more far-reaching demands or the militant tactics of a movement group (that is, when the political system was largely closed), this staunch resistance helped foster a willingness among political elites to side with more moderate proposals, specifically to undermine the more radical flank. Moreover, when a group of activists was willing to distance itself from another group by portraying its demand as moderate and the other group's as radical, the moderate group was able to tap into this lawmaker willingness to oppose radicals. Moderates were able to gain legislator support because lawmakers wanted to block the more radical demands. The moderate group, then, helped propel this positive radical flank effect, by framing itself and its goals as substantially more reasonable and acceptable than those of the other group, and thereby persuaded lawmakers to support its demands. In the end, this is how within-movement conflict for the Texas women ultimately translated into broader rights for women.

Our findings may be generalizable to other social movements. For instance, some evidence suggests that conflict between more radical and moderate groups within the environmental movement may have helped that movement gain successes (Hoffman and Bertels 2010), and more radical groups may have fueled a positive radical flank effect in the LGBT movement (Raeburn 2004). While much existing scholarship exploring how movements succeed in gaining new policy reveals that preexisting political opportunities, a mobilized and strategically-adaptive movement, and often coalitions (not conflict) among movement groups can produce political victory for collective actors (Amenta 2006; Andrews 2001; Banaszak 1996; McCammon 2012b; Soule and Olzak 2004)—and we suspect that this is a common set of circumstances allowing activists to achieve success—our examination of the Texas women's movement indicates another route to reform. This may be a less common path to political success compared to one in which an already-sympathetic political system and movement alliances lead to a favorable outcome. But the evidence we present for the Texas women's movement suggests that a causal process involving movement conflict and radical flank effects can also occur. We, therefore, encourage researchers studying other social movements to consider this possible alternative route to political reform, a path in which movement actors are agents in opening a closed political opportunity structure.

Moreover, it may be that additional conditions can help produce a circumstance in which conflict between movement groups can lead to a positive political result. For instance, a group's willingness to distance itself from another group may not be enough to explain how invoking within-movement conflict can matter. It may be that such distancing must be accompanied by a certain type of tactical approach. We note that for the Texas case both Louise Raggio and the women in the Texas Bar Association (in the first phase of the Texas movement) and Hermine Tobolowsky and the BPW (in the second phase) were able to successfully portray themselves as moderates largely because they utilized "insider" strategies to gain legitimacy in the eyes of lawmakers and the public: Raggio and her group by working from inside the state's bar association and gaining legitimacy from its stature in Texas politics, and Tobolowsky and the BPW later by revising their strategy to work closely with the present and past Speakers of the Texas House, themselves consummate insiders. The particular way in which movement groups invoke conflict, beyond simply framing moderates and radicals, may

be consequential. Groups invoking conflict by depicting themselves as moderates may also need to utilize insider tactics, to portray themselves as legitimate and acceptable in the eyes of political decision makers.

An important question about the link between within-movement conflict and political outcomes is, will such conflict between movement groups always help the movement achieve its political goals? The likely answer is no. Strong and mobilized opposition to moderate demands may succeed in painting even moderate movement groups as too extreme for consideration. This points to another condition that may be needed for movement conflict to translate into a positive political outcome. In Texas in the period we examine, there was no organized counter-movement to the women's movement. While there was important and staunch initial opposition from political leaders to the ELRA, outside the government opponents of property reform and the ELRA were not organized nor engaged in a framing contest with the women's movement. In short, a strong opposition movement with an effective framing strategy, as ultimately occurred against the national ERA (Mansbridge 1986), may disrupt and impede a positive radical flank effect. Researchers exploring the link between movement conflict and political outcomes will want to factor in possible opposition mobilization.

It is possible as well that other circumstances could prevent discordant groups and positive radical flank effects from aiding activists in reaching their goals, including a weakly mobilized movement or dissent occurring within a particular movement organization in a way that paralyzes the group's ability to pursue reform. Or it may be that other circumstances (movement financial resources, for instance) are simply more important in producing the positive political outcome. In the end, there is no guarantee that invoking conflict within movements will successfully fuel radical flank effects and produce a positive political outcome. But we argue that under certain conditions it is quite likely.

Our study, of course, is influenced by the specific dynamics of our case. Therefore, we encourage researchers to assess our argument in studies using multiple cases, where possible alternative causes can be weighed more fully alongside movement conflict. This could include a selection of cases with variation in the strength, organizational infrastructure, professionalization, and network embeddedness of movement organizations, in the degree of political openness, and in levels of cultural receptivity to activists' claims.¹⁵ We hope that future research will explore further how a group's willingness to distance itself from another group can influence political change. Within-movement conflict can take a variety of forms and can occur in a variety of larger circumstances. Exploring within-movement conflict's influence further would benefit our understanding of how movements achieve political change.

NOTES

¹ A recent review of the social movement political outcomes literature (Amenta et al. 2010) does not mention research concerning how within-movement conflict may influence the ability of the movement to achieve its political goals.

² We acknowledge here that conflict between groups within a movement and radical flank effects are not the same thing. While the two can occur together, it is also possible that radical and moderate flanks exist (and political leaders respond positively to moderates), and yet no conflict occurs between the flanks.

³ While we do not explore what generally constitutes "radical" and "moderate" groups ideologically in social movements (see, e.g., Buechler 1990; Gamson 1975; McCammon 2012a; Snow and Cross 2011 for helpful discussions), we adopt Snow and Cross's (p. 116) perspective that "radicalism and radicals are often defined by their context." That is, perceptions of the threat posed by a movement group held by other movement groups, political leaders, the media, or the public can play an important role in leading to radical or moderate labels. However, Gamson (1975: 46-9) points out that the nature of the demands made by groups and whether those demands threaten to displace elites or pose fundamental questions about the authority of elites can also help us understand radicalism. In the case of the "radicals" in the Texas women's movement (which, as we will show, shifted over time), both a process of framing along with the nature of the group's demands as well as its tactics (especially when contrasted to another group) helped produce the label.

⁴ Haines (1988: 162-3) also suggests that passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was an outcome of a positive radical flank effect, which we discuss further below. Additionally, Haines posits a "negative radical flank effect," in which a radical flank can harm moderates if outside elites classify moderates with radicals and condemn both groups. Although empirical research is limited, studies suggest that a positive flank effect is more common (Anner 2009; Killian 1972).

⁵ We acknowledge that our figure is simplified and does not consider other factors that may influence movement political outcomes. Also, it does not consider different types of within-movement conflict, nor does it consider the possibility of degrees of openness or closure in the political structure. The figure is also simplified in that it does not provide all possible cells for the variables presented (e.g., in the presence of a closed opportunity structure, a radical flank effect but not movement conflict). Our goal in presenting the figure is not to account for all of these variations, but rather simply to help readers situate our work among other studies of movement political outcomes to gain a broader understanding of where our work resides. We thank *Mobilization's* editor for suggesting inclusion of a figure along these lines.

⁶ Our chronology is part of a larger project (McCammon 2012b), and the full chronology is 220 pages and details events well before this phase of women's activism in Texas. Our chronology was also indexed in a way that allows us to return to the original source(s) of information.

⁷ Separate property, at the time, was defined by Texas law to consist of property of any kind (e.g., real estate, stocks, bonds, and personal property) that the individual owned prior to marriage (Texas Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs 1958). Community property was property acquired by the couple once married.

⁸ These unequal property laws were holdovers from an earlier legal system of common-law coverture in which married women were presumed "covered" by their husbands who would, in principle, act in their wives' economic interests (Basch 1982). Women in Texas had long agitated for changes in married women's property rights, beginning in the first decade of the twentieth century, although this was later than in many other states (McArthur 1998). From the 1950s to 1970s, the efforts to change property laws as well as the campaign for the ELRA was an ongoing movement largely of middle-class, educated, white women, although some African-American women played important roles (e.g., state Senator Barbara Jordan helped sponsor the ELRA in 1971; Jones and Winegarten 2000).

⁹ The national BPW organization had supported an equal rights amendment since 1937 (National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs 1944), and the Texas group adopted the language of the national amendment, specifically, "Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex" (Texas Tech 1958).

¹⁰ The BPW was not a radical movement organization in the sense of using direct-action tactics, but it did pose a feminist challenge to the patriarchal culture within Texas in the mid-twentieth century and disrupted expected gender norms. In this sense, the BPW posed what Buechler (1990: 108) describes as a "fundamental challenge to a particular system of power relations," specifically, gendered political power.

¹¹ A reviewer noted that Raggio's efforts are akin to the bridging work by leaders in other movements (Robnett 1997).

¹² In time in its efforts to broaden the appeal of the ELRA, the BPW also framed arguments for audiences of male, African-American, and Latino voters (Texas Tech 1972a, 1972b, 1972f).

¹³ We acknowledge here as well a larger cultural shift occurring in the U.S. by the early 1970s—with increasing public attention given to women's issues as Congress more seriously debated the national ERA and passed it in 1972—and the role of this broad shift in opening an opportunity in Texas (Freeman [1975] 2000). This growing receptiveness toward the ERA, at least at this moment at the national level, made it easier for the Texas BPW to reposition itself as a moderate group, one aligned with the shifting national mood. As we mention below, however, the BPW was an active agent in taking steps to draw state lawmakers' and the public's attention to these national-level developments. Broad political and cultural shifts and BPW tactics cannot be treated strictly as independent of one another. The BPW actively emphasized the growing national political opportunity (Texas Tech 1972c). Below, we discuss this further.

¹⁴ In the 1970s, ten additional states enacted state-level equal rights amendments and five more instituted new state constitutions with gender-equality provisions (Gladstone 2004; Treadwell and Page 1977). Texas was the only southern state to enact an equal rights amendment, although two other southern states, Louisiana and Virginia, included gender-equality provisions while implementing new constitutions during this period. Wharton (2005) reports that, while the Texas ELRA was an effective and far-reaching reform, the Louisiana and Virginia provisions were constructed in limited ways that rendered them largely ineffective (for instance, Virginia's provision was limited to only governmental workers). Information on the circumstances leading to these state-level changes is sparse. However, events in Illinois and Virginia suggest that perceptions of moderate and more radical reforms and reformers may have played a role in the outcomes in these states as well. Both Illinois and Virginia enacted significantly limited state equal rights provisions that applied only to governmental agencies and did so with the backing of moderate women's groups, such as the League of Women Voters (Kleinman 1970; Howard 1974; Wharton 2005), but both state legislatures also staunchly resisted ratifying the national ERA in part because of the assertive tactics used by more militant ERA activists in their states (Lentz 1982; Rosenfeld 1978). It may be that dynamics similar to those in Texas can shed light on ERA politics in other states. We hope our study will help future researchers consider why some state-level ERAs were enacted while others failed. Finally, we note that a party or gender shift in the composition of the Texas legislature is unlikely to have played any role in the legal changes we examine here. During the period from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, conservative Democrats retained their dominant hold on the legislature and women lawmakers did not make any sizeable inroads into the legislature until after this period (Cox 1996; Maxwell, Crain, and Santos 2011; Young 2010).

¹⁵ We thank the *Mobilization* editor and reviewers for help in naming these factors.

REFERENCES

- Alimi, Eitan Y. 2006. "Constructing Political Opportunity: 1987-The Palestinian Year of Discontent." *Mobilization* 11(1): 67-80.
- Amarillo *Globe-Times*. 1970. "50th Annual B&PW Convention Opens Tonight." June 12, p. 21.

- Amenta, Edwin. 2006. *When Movements Matter: The Townsend Plan and the Rise of Social Security*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Amenta, Edwin, Neal Caren, Elizabeth Chiarello, and Yang Su. 2010. "The Political Consequences of Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology* 36: 287-307.
- Amenta, Edwin, Neal Caren, and Sheera Joy Olasky. 2005. "Age for Leisure? Political Mediation and the Impact of the Pension Movement on U.S. Old-age Policy." *American Sociological Review* 70(3): 516-38.
- Amenta, Edwin, Kathleen Dunleavy, and Mary Bernstein. 1994. "Stolen Thunder? Huey Long's 'Share Our Wealth,' Political Mediation, and the Second New Deal." *American Sociological Review* 59(5): 678-702.
- Amsler, Margaret Harris. 1963. "Equal Rights Measure Misleading in Content." *Waco News-Tribune* February 14, p. A-13.
- Andrews, Kenneth T. 2001. "Social Movements and Policy Implementation: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty, 1965-1971." *American Sociological Review* 66(1): 71-95.
- Anner, Mark. 2009. "Two Logics of Labor organizing in the Global Apparel Industry." *International Studies Quarterly* 53(3): 545-70.
- Armstrong, Elizabeth A. 2002. *Forging Gay Identities: Organizing Sexuality in San Francisco, 1950-1994*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Balser, Deborah B. 1997. "The Impact of Environmental Factors on Factionalism and Schism in Social Movement Organization." *Social Forces* 76(1): 199-228.
- Banaszak, Lee Ann. 1996. *Why Movements Succeed or Fail: Opportunity, Culture, and the Struggle for Woman Suffrage*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Banks, Jimmy. 1961. "Legislative Battle Ready to Begin over Women's Equal Rights in Texas." *Dallas Morning News*, January 29, p. 4.
- Barkan, Steven E. 1986. "Interorganizational Conflict in the Southern Civil Rights Movement." *Sociological Inquiry* 56(2): 190-209.
- Basch, Norma. 1982. *In the Eyes of the Law: Women, Marriage, and Property in Nineteenth-Century New York*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Benford, Robert D. 1993. "Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement." *Social Forces* 71(3): 677-701.
- Big Spring Herald*. 1963. "Women Would Lose by Equal Rights, Panel Says." March 29, p. A-3.
- Bird, Paula E. 1989. "'A Matter of Simple Justice': Hermine Tobolowsky and the Texas Equal Legal Rights Amendment." Unpublished manuscript, Hermine Tobolowsky papers, Southwest Collection, Special Collections Library, Texas Tech University, Box 1, Folder 1.
- Bright, Jo. 1969. "The Professionals." *Big Spring Herald*, October 12, p. C-1.
- Brinkerhoff, Mary. 1971. "Seminar Tells Women How to Get Action." *Dallas Morning News*, March 4, p. 1.
- . 1972. "Aggressive Action Needed to Advance." *Dallas Morning News*, May 20, p. 1.
- Buechler, Steven M. 1990. "Conceptualizing Radicalism and Transformation in Social Movements: The Case of the Woman Suffrage Movement." *Perspectives on Social Problems* 2: 105-118.
- Bullock, Susie. 1969. "Conflicting Ideas Enclose Amendment." *Avalanche Journal*, February 12, p. 16.
- Cobler, Sharon. 1972a. "TFWC Body Shows Women's Faces." *Dallas Morning News*, May 11, p. 1.
- . 1972b. "Woman's Status Examined." *Dallas Morning News*, October 16, p. 4.
- Corbin, Juliet, and Anselm Strauss. 2008. *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory*. 3rd edition. Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.
- Cox, Elizabeth M. 1996. *Women State and Territorial Legislators, 1895-1995*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company.
- Crosby, Kay. 1967. "Improvement of Woman's Status Is Goal." *Dallas Morning News*, June 9, p. 1.
- Dallas Morning News*. 1958. "Legislation Workshop Set for B&PW Meeting." June 7, p. 2.
- . 1963. "Rep. Ball Favors Giving Equal Rights by Statute." April 26, p. 5.
- . 1967. "Dallas Woman Lawyer Appeals for Bill." February 8, p. 7.
- . 1969. "Rights Measure Kept Off Floor." May 17, p. 7.
- . 1970a. "Community Projects Snare Prizes for Women's Clubs." June 12, p. 2.
- . 1970b. "How Texans Voted." August 16, p. 36.
- . 1970c. "Dallas Countians to Study Legislators' Duties." October 27, p. 5.
- . 1971. "Abortion Bill Is Doubtful, Says Senator." March 27, p. 1.
- . 1972a. "Smith Praises Legislature." April 1, p. 17.
- . 1972b. "State Returns Amendments." November 9, p. 5.

- Dalrymple, June Rae. 1997. "Ladies, Libbers, and Lesbians: The Movement to End Sexual Discrimination from the Property Laws of Texas." Master's Thesis, Department of History, University of Texas at Arlington.
- Denton Record-Chronicle. 1961a. "B&PW Club Pushing for Equal Women's Legal Rights." January 5, p. 2.
- . 1961b. "Senate Stalls Off Women's Rights Bill." February 23, p. 1-2.
- . 1962. "Married Women Face Long Struggle for Equal Rights." March 18, n.p.
- Dixon, Marc, William F. Danaher, and Ben Lennox Kail. 2013. "Allies, Targets, and the Effectiveness of Coalition Protest: A Comparative Analysis of Labor Unrest in the U.S. South." *Mobilization* 18(3): 331-50.
- Dunnigan, Carolyn. 1970a. "We Ask Men to Remove the Barriers." *Dallas Morning News*, July 5, p. 1.
- . 1970b. "Dallas Lib Members Seek Release." *Dallas Morning News*, July 6, p. 2.
- . 1970c. "NOW Marks the Path to Self Value." *Dallas Morning News*, July 7, p. 1.
- . 1970d. "Women View Liberation." *Dallas Morning News*, August 23, p. 1.
- Earl, Jennifer. 2004. "The Cultural Consequences of Social Movements." Pp. 508-30 in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Einwohner, Rachel L. 2003. "Opportunity, Honor, and Action in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943." *American Journal of Sociology* 109(3): 650-75.
- Erwin, Dorothea. 1967. "Family Law Code Being Worked Out." *Dallas Morning News*, July 7, p. 5.
- Fernández, Juan J., and Antonio M. Jaime-Castillo. 2012. "Positive or Negative Policy Feedback? Explaining Popular Attitudes towards Pragmatic Pension Policy Reforms." *European Sociological Review* 29(4): 803-15.
- Ferree, Myra Marx, and Beth B. Hess. [1985] 2000. *Controversy and Coalition: The New Feminist Movement across Four Decades of Change*. 3rd edition. New York: Routledge.
- Fink, Rob. 2003. "Hermine Tobolowsky, the Texas ELRA, and the Political Struggle for Women's Equal Rights." *Journal of the West* 42(3): 52-57.
- Fort Worth Star Telegram. 1963. "Major Step toward Women's Rights." April 21, n.p.
- Fox, Ruth. 1958. "Legislative Chairman." *Texas Business and Professional Woman* May, pp. 11, 13.
- Fox, Ruth, Gertrude Forson, and Hermine Tobolowsky. 1959. "Legislative Steering Committee." *Texas Business and Professional Woman*, May, p. 13.
- Fox, Ruth, Hermine D. Tobolowsky, and Jewel Hodges. 1957. "Legislatively Speaking." *Texas Business and Profession Woman*, November, p. 4.
- Freeman, Jo. [1975] 2000. *The Politics of Women's Liberation: A Case Study of an Emerging Social Movement and Its Relations to the Policy Process*. Lincoln, NE: iUniverse.
- Gammage, Judie K. 1976. "Pressure Group Techniques: The Texas Equal Legal Rights Amendment." *Great Plains Journal* 16: 45-65.
- . 1982. "Quest for Equality: An Historical Overview of Women's Rights Activism in Texas, 1890-1975." Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of History, North Texas State University.
- Gamson, Joshua. 1995. "Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct? A Queer Dilemma." *Social Problems* 42(3): 390-407.
- Gamson, William A. 1975. *The Strategy of Social Protest*. Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press.
- Gerring, John. 2006. *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ghaziani, Amin. 2008. *The Dividends of Dissent: How Conflict and Culture Work in Lesbian and Gay Marches on Washington*. Chicago: University of Chicago.
- . 2009. "An 'Amorphous Mist?' The Problem of Measurement in the Study of Culture." *Theory and Society* 38(6): 581-612.
- Ghaziani, Amin, and Delia Baldassarri. 2011. "Cultural Anchors and the Organization of Differences: A Multi-Method Analysis of LGBT Marches on Washington." *American Sociological Review* 76(2): 179-206.
- Gladstone, Leslie W. 2004. "Equal Rights Amendments: State Provisions." *Congressional Research Service: Report for Congress*. Order Code RS20217, August 23.
- Glaser, Vera. 1969. "Seeds of Violence Sown in Rights Push." *Dallas Morning News*, March 19, p. 4.
- Haines, Herbert H. 1984. "Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957-1970." *Social Problems* 32(1): 31-43.
- . 1988. *Black Radicals and the Civil Rights Mainstream, 1954-1970*. Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press.

- Hoffman, Andrew J., and Stephanie Bertels. 2010. "Who Is Part of the Environmental Movement?" Pp. 48-69 in *Good Cop/Bad Cop: Environmental NGOs and Their Strategies toward Business*, edited by Thomas P. Lyon. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future Press.
- Houston Post*. 1957. "Texas Now Only State Denying Equal Rights to Married Women." February 6, p. 8.
- Howard, A.E. Dick. 1974. "Constitutional Revision: Virginia and the Nation." *University of Richmond Law Review* 9(1): 1-48.
- Jasper, James M. 2004. "A Strategic Approach to Collective Action: Looking for Agency in Social-Movement Choices." *Mobilization* 9(1): 1-16.
- Jeydel, Alana S. 2000. "Social Movements, Political Elites, and Political Opportunity Structures: The Case of the Woman Suffrage Movement from 1890-1920." *Congress & the Presidency* 27: 15-40.
- Jones, Nancy Baker, and Ruthe Winegarten. 2000. *Capitol Women: Texas Female Legislators, 1923-1999*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Killian, Lewis M. 1972. "The Significance of Extremism in the Black Revolution." *Social Problems* 20(1): 41-48.
- King, Leslie. 2008. "Ideology, Strategy, and Conflict in a Social Movement Organization: The Sierra Club Immigration Wars." *Mobilization* 13(1): 45-61.
- Kleinman, Carol. 1970. "A Breakthru for Women's Equality." *Chicago Tribune*, August 20, p. N-10.
- Koopmans, Ruud. 2005. "The Missing Link between Structure and Agency: Outline of an Evolutionary Approach to Social Movements." *Mobilization* 10(1): 19-33.
- Korosec, Thomas. 1990. "Hermine Tobolowsky." *Fort Worth Star Telegram*, June 27, Section 5, pp. 1, 9.
- Kreidler, Tai. 2001. "Hermine Tobolowsky: Mother of Texas's Equal Legal Rights Amendment." Pp. 209-21 in *The Human Tradition in Texas*, edited by Ty Cashion and Jesús F. de la Teja. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
- Lentz, Philip. 1982. "Protest Tactics Seen as a Danger to ERA." *Chicago Tribune*, June 8, p. 1.
- Lesh, Carolyn. 1986. "Hermine Tobolowsky." *Dallas Morning News*, October 19, pp. E1-2.
- Levitsky, Sandra R. 2007. "Niche Activism: Constructing a Unified Movement Identity in a Heterogeneous Organizational Field." *Mobilization* 12(3): 271-86.
- Maney, Gregory M., Rachel V. Kutz-Flamenbaum, Deana A. Rohlinger, and Jeff Goodwin. 2012. *Strategies for Social Change*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Mansbridge, Jane J. 1986. *Why We Lost the ERA*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Maxwell, William Earl, Ernest Crain, and Adolfo Santos. 2011. *Texas Politics Today*. Boston, MA: Wadsworth.
- McAdam, Doug. 1989. "The Biographical Consequences of Activism." *American Sociological Review* 54(5): 744-60.
- . [1982] 1999. *Political Process and Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*. 2nd edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McArthur, Judith N. 1998. *Creating the New Woman: The Rise of Southern Women's Progressive Culture in Texas, 1893-1918*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- McCammon, Holly J. 2003. "'Out of the Parlors and into the Streets': The Changing Tactical Repertoire of the U.S. Women's Suffrage Movements." *Social Forces* 81(3): 787-818.
- . 2012a. "Explaining Frame Variation: More Moderate and Radical Demands for Women's Citizenship in the U.S. Women's Jury Movements." *Social Problems* 59(1): 43-69.
- . 2012b. *The U.S. Women's Jury Movements and Strategic Adaptation: A More Just Verdict*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McCammon, Holly J., Karen E. Campbell, Ellen M. Granberg, and Christine Mowery. 2001. "How Movements Win: Gendered Opportunity Structures and U.S. Women's Suffrage Movements, 1866-1919." *American Sociological Review* 66(1): 49-70.
- McKnight, Joseph W. 1971. "Texas Community Property Law: Its Course of Development and Reform." *California Western Law Review* 8: 117-145.
- Melucci, Alberto. 1988. "Getting Involved: Identity and Mobilization in Social Movements." *International Social Movement Research* 1: 329-48.
- Miller, Gertrude. 1994. "Hermine Tobolowsky." *Dallas Jewish Life*, March, pp. 6-8.
- Miller, Joy. 1967. "New National B&PW President to Support Equality for Women." *Dallas Morning News*, July 27, p. 2.
- Morehead, Richard M. 1963. "House Passes Bills to Give Women Equal Legal Rights." *Dallas Morning News*, April 18, p. 6.
- Moss, Marquita. 1967. "'Little Woman' Now Can Spend Her Paycheck as She Wishes." *Dallas Morning News*, May 31, p. 1.

- . 1970. "Woman Activist Says Ground Lost." *Dallas Morning News*, August 30, p. 12.
- National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs. 1944. *A History of the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc.* New York: National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs.
- Patrick, Carolyn. 1965. "Rights Bill for Women Fails Again." *Dallas Morning News*, March 3, p. 4.
- Peyton, Ellen. 1983. "Interview: Hermine Tobolowsky." Interview for Texas Women Biofiles, The Woman's Collection, Texas Woman's University.
- Polletta, Francesca. 2002. *Freedom Is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social Movements*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Presley, Merikaye. 1970. "Lib Group Turns Back on Paper Offerings." *Dallas Morning News*, May 6, p. 3.
- Raeburn, Nicole C. 2004. *Changing Corporate America from Inside Out: Lesbian and Gay Workplace Rights*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Raggio, Louise Ballerstedt. 2003. *Texas Tornado: The Autobiography of a Crusader for Women's Rights and Family Justice*. New York: Citadel Press Books.
- Robnett, Belinda. 1997. *How Long? How Long?: African-American Women in the Struggle for Civil Rights*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rosenfeld, Megan. 1978. "Va. Group Seeks ERA Approval." *Washington Post*, January 14, p. B-1.
- Rucht, Dieter. 2004. "Movement Allies, Adversaries, and Third Parties." Pp. 197-216 in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Rupp, Leila J., and Verta Taylor. 1987. *Survival in the Doldrums: The American Women's Rights Movement, 1945 to the 1960s*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Saxon, Gerald. 1980. "Hermine Tobolowsky: An Oral History Interview," October 29. Dallas Public Library.
- . 1981. "Interview with Louise Raggio, October 31, 1980." North Texas State University Oral History Collection, Number 527.
- Schwartz, Marylyn. 1970. "Women Planning Various Strikes." *Dallas Morning News*, August 26, p. 6.
- Shepard, Alan. 1993. "Interview with Louise Raggio," March 30, Louise Raggio Papers, Box 3, Folder "LBR Personal," DeGolyer Library, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.
- Soule, Sarah A., and Susan Olzak. 2004. "When Do Movements Matter? The Politics of Contingency and the Equal Rights Amendment." *American Sociological Review* 69(4): 473-97.
- Snow, David A., and Remy Cross. 2011. "Radicalism within the Context of Social Movements: Processes and Types." *Journal of Strategic Security* 4(4): 115-130.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. 2nd edition. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Texas Business and Professional Woman*. 1959. "Legal Rights Resolution Will Be Presented Soon." February, p. 3.
- . 1967. "1967-Our Year for Legislation." January, p. 2.
- Texas Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs. 1958. *Legal Discriminations against Women in Texas*. Fort Worth, TX: Texas Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs.
- . 1967. *A Study of the Equal Legal Rights Amendment*. Fort Worth, TX: Texas Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc.
- Texas General Laws. 1967. *Act of May 22, 1967*, 60th Legislature, Regular Session, Ch. 309, 735.
- . 1971. *Texas Senate Joint Resolution 16*, 62nd Legislature, Regular Session, 4129.
- Texas Legislative Council. 1956. *Legal Status of Married women in Texas: A Report to the 55th Legislature*. Austin, TX: Texas Legislative Council.
- Texas Tech University. 1956a. "Legal Status of Women," Speech by Mrs. L. K. Richards, April 23, League of Women Voters of Texas Records, Box 74, Folder 20, Southwest Collection and Special Collections Library, Lubbock, Texas.
- . 1956b. Letter to Marie McCutcheon, President, Texas Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, May 8, League of Women Voters of Texas Records, Box 74, Folder 20, Southwest Collection and Special Collections Library, Lubbock, Texas.
- . 1956c. "Legal Status of Women: A Kit for Action," July, League of Women Voters of Texas Records, Box 13, Folder 49, Southwest Collection and Special Collections Library, Lubbock, Texas.
- . 1958. "Are You a Married Woman in Texas . . ." pamphlet, League of Women Voters of Texas Records, Box 75, Folder 1, Southwest Collection and Special Collections Library, Lubbock, Texas.
- . 1959a. "Legislative Outlook: Part II. State Continuing Responsibilities," February, League of Women Voters of Texas Records, Box 8, Folder 13, Southwest Collection and Special Collections Library, Lubbock, Texas.

- . 1961. Letter to Katy from Mrs. George C. Boller, President, League of Women Voters of Texas, December 11, League of Women Voters of Texas Records, Box 75, Folder 1, Southwest Collection and Special Collections Library, Lubbock, Texas.
- . 1962a. Letter to Murphree from Nolle cc: Boller, President of Texas League of Women Voters, March 17, League of Women Voters of Texas Records, Box 75, Folder 1, Southwest Collection and Special Collections Library, Lubbock, Texas.
- . 1962b. "Discussion Guide: Legal Status of Women," n.d., League of Women Voters of Texas Records, Box 116, Folder 18, Southwest Collection and Special Collections Library, Lubbock, Texas.
- . 1963. "Resume of Meeting," Banking Committee of the Bar Association, April 12, Hermine Tobolowsky Papers, Box 2, Folder 9, Southwest Collection and Special Collections Library, Lubbock, Texas.
- . 1967. "Report of Legislation Committee," June 10, Hermine Tobolowsky Papers, Box 2, Folder 13, Southwest Collection and Special Collections Library, Lubbock, Texas.
- . 1971a. "Legislative Bulletin," March 9, Hermine Tobolowsky Papers, Box 7, Folder 8, Southwest Collection and Special Collections Library, Lubbock, Texas.
- . 1971b. "Legislative Bulletin," March, Hermine Tobolowsky Papers, Box 7, Folder 8, Southwest Collection and Special Collections Library, Lubbock, Texas.
- . 1972a. Business and Professional Women's Clubs bumper sticker "Yes, if you're a Texan", n.d., Hermine Tobolowsky Papers, Box 8, Folder 27, Southwest Collection and Special Collections Library, Lubbock, Texas.
- . 1972b. Business and Professional Women's Clubs bumper sticker "Happiness is", n.d., Hermine Tobolowsky Papers, Box 8, Folder 27, Southwest Collection and Special Collections Library, Lubbock, Texas.
- . 1972c. "A Matter of Simple Justice" kit, n.d., Hermine Tobolowsky Papers, Box 8, Folder 27, Southwest Collection and Special Collections Library, Lubbock, Texas.
- . 1972d. "Hazelwood Backing Equality Amendment," newspaper clipping, n.d., Hermine Tobolowsky Papers, Box 2, Folder 30, Southwest Collection and Special Collections Library, Lubbock, Texas.
- . 1972e. "ELR in '72," text of speech, n.d., Hermine Tobolowsky Papers, Box 5, Folder 10, Southwest Collection and Special Collections Library, Lubbock, Texas.
- . 1972f. "ELR in '72, #4 - Men," text of speech, n.d., Hermine Tobolowsky Papers, Box 4, Folder 26, Southwest Collection and Special Collections Library, Lubbock, Texas.
- Treadwell, Lujana Wolfe, and Nancy Wallace Page. 1977. "Equal Rights Provisions: The Experience under State Constitutions." *California Law Review* 65(5): 1086-1112.
- University of North Texas. 1957. Letter to Hermine D. Tobolowsky from Representative L. DeWitt Hale, April 12, Box 775, Folder 1, Hermine Tobolowsky Papers, Archives, Willis Library, Denton, Texas.
- University of Texas at Arlington. 1967. "Legislative Bulletin: Equal Rights Amendment," April 18, Box 7, Folder 1, Margaret B. Carter Papers, Library Special Collections, Arlington, Texas.
- Vanhala, Lisa. 2011. "Social Movements Lashing Back: Law, Social Change and Intra-Social Movement Backlash in Canada." *Studies in Law, Politics, and Society* 54: 113-140.
- Vélez, Maria Beatriz. 1994. "The Texas Equal Legal Rights Amendment: An Historical and Legal Analysis." Master's thesis, Department of Government, University of Texas.
- Vrato, Elizabeth. 2002. *The Counselors*. Philadelphia, PA: Running Press.
- Wharton, Linda J. 2005. "State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited." *Rutgers Law Journal* 36(4): 1201-93.
- Wyden, Peter. 1961. "The Revolt of Texas Women." *The Saturday Evening Post*, January 14: 25, 55-56.
- Young, Nancy Beck. 2010. "Democratic Party." Retrieved September 15, 2013 (<http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/wad01>).
- Zald, Mayer N., and John D. McCarthy. 1980. "Social Movement Industries: Competition and Cooperation among Movement Organizations." *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 3: 1-20.