Class 9: Aspects of Social Movement Activity

State responses

Opening notes

Presentation groups

Presentations line-up
Date Presenters Method
4 Dec: Daichi, Seongyeon, Jehyun ethnography
18 Dec: Ayla, Tara, Theresa, Annabelle TBD
15 Jan: Luna, Emilene, Raffa, Sofia TBD

State responses

  • opening questions
  • overview
  • one policy change example
  • repression/social control
  • DE state responses to climate movement
    • FFF and LG

Opening questions

How (in what different ways) can state actors respond to movements?

Who/which state actor is taking action? What kind of action is it? How visible is it?

State responses overview

  • ignore / dismiss
  • oppose
  • accommodate

State responses overview

  • ignore / dismiss
  • oppose
    • close opportunities (‘problem depletion’)
    • ‘channel’, restrict access to resources
    • repress, apply force
  • accommodate
    • encourage institutionalisation
    • engage in relevant decision-making processes
    • change policy

Movements and policy change (Jones 2022)

anyone know what this place is?

Movements and policy change (Jones 2022)

  • Valley of the Fallen (incl., Catholic basilica), outside Madrid
  • monument constructed under Franco, using forced/convict labour
  • burial place for Franco (exhumed 24.10.2019) and Primo de Rivera (exhumed 23.4.2023)

Ley de Memoria Histórica: recognises and broadens “the rights and establishes measures in favour of those who suffered persecution or violence during the civil war and the dictatorship.”

\(\leftarrow\)
Orban government’s Memorial to the Victims of the German Occupation
\(\leftarrow\)

\(\rightarrow\)
Counter-monument by independent historical memory activists
\(\rightarrow\)

3 dimensions of repression/social control (Earl 2003)

Identity of repressive agent State agents tightly connected with national political elites (e.g., military units) State agents loosely connected with national political elites (e.g., local police departments) Private agents (e.g., counter-demonstrators)
Character of repressive action Coercion (e.g., use of tear gas and rubber bullets) Channelling (e.g., restrictions on registered organisations)
Whether repressive action is observable Observable (i.e., overt; e.g., Tiananmen Square) Unobserved (i.e., covert or latent; e.g., COINTELPRO)

What sort of repression/social control in cases do you know of? Was it effective? Why/How?

DE climate movement - FFF

  • March 2019: Chancellor Merkel praises FFF (link)
  • April 2019: government minister (for Economy and Energy, Peter Altmeier) requests to speak at FFF demo (rejected by organisers) (link)
  • August 2020: Chancellor Merkel meets with FFF representatives (link)
  • March 2021: constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) declares federal climate protection law (Bundes-Klimaschutzgesetz) insufficient, requiring more goverment action
  • influence on United Nations Climate Change conferences, COPs 25-28

DE climate movement - Letzte Generation

  • 2022: Green party (potential elite allies) distance themselves from LG
  • December 2022/May 2023: police searches of LG properties, related to prosecutions (link and link)

  • April 2023: violent police tactics to remove blockaders (link)
    • ‘pain grips’ (Schmerzgriffe): wristlocks and other ‘control/restraint holds’
  • use of preventive detention in Bayern (link) and calls for it elsewhere by police union chief (link)
  • politicians, some from governing parties, refering to ‘climate terrorists’ (Klimaterroristen) and ‘climate RAF’ (Klima-RAF)

Poll: State responses

A QR code for the survey.

Take the survey at https://forms.gle/jkBAGEAx5Ub9LeoT6

  • good when state agrees to protest demands?
  • non-violent protest inviolable?
  • state response to movement disruption of services?
  • is state surveillance of a movement ever acceptable?
  • what determines whether movement treated as ‘threatening’?
  • what typically happens after a state violently represses a movement?
  • states respond more harshly to ‘marginalised group’ movements?

good when state agrees to protest demands?

determines whether movement treated as ‘threatening’?

Poll - harder state responses

state response to movement disruption of services?

state surveillance of a movement ever acceptable?

If yes, when?

what after a state violently represses a movement?

Poll - motivated state responses

states respond more harshly to ‘marginalised group’ movements?

non-violent protest inviolable?

Even if protest is anti-democratic/ hateful/discriminatory?

Research closer look

  • Berntzen and Weisskircher (2016) - mobilisation differences and state responses
    • PEGIDA background
    • research questions and design
    • cases and data collection
    • findings
    • discussion question

PEGIDA background: movement framing

PEGIDA as a ‘serious civil rights movement’? (H.C. Strache)

PEGIDA background: a demonstration in Wien

Wien, 2 February 2015

Berntzen and Weisskircher (2016) - RQ

  • why did PEGIDA mobilize to some extent in Austria and Norway, while failing in Sweden and Switzerland?

case selection: two countries from economically and culturally similar regions (German-speaking Central Europe [Switzerland and Austria] and Scandinavia [Norway and Sweden]), each with variation on the ‘dependent variable’ of street mobilisation

  • sort of paired ‘most similar systems design’ (MSSD)
  • key IVs: state bans, parliamentary strength of the radical right, counter-mobilisation by anti-racist groups
    • why these IVs? are there other important factors? what are the hypothesised effects?

Berntzen and Weisskircher (2016) - cases

thickness of grey stream shows aggregate online activity by PEGIDA groups. Circles indicate protesters in month, number inside circle shows demos per month

Austria: significant mobilisation

Switzerland: insignificant mobilisation

Norway: significant mobilisation

Sweden: insignificant mobilisation

Berntzen and Weisskircher (2016) - data collection

gaps in this data collection? anything other data needed?

PEGIDA Facebook memberships

Berntzen and Weisskircher (2016) - findings

  • supports negative impact of established radical right parties on street mobilisation
  • no strong finding on counter-mobilisation:

“it is possible that the massive level of resistance has curtailed PEGIDA to a certain extent by making it costlier for people to march under their banner. Nevertheless, this cannot explain cross-national variation as anti-racists mobilised strongly in all four countries”

Berntzen and Weisskircher (2016) - network

Austrian group: largest, most popular (ties to 11 other PEGIDA groups)
Norwegian group: low relevance in the wider community
Swiss group: many national ties, few external ties
Swedish group: few connections

Berntzen and Weisskircher (2016) - findings

Attempts to mobilise and spread propaganda online by the transnational radical right are therefore vulnerable to police and state bans, especially if they are put in place at an early stage in their mobilisation efforts. This lays bare the potential for curtailing far-right activism in multiple arenas by targeting and denying them the opportunity of rallying and getting attention through street activism.

Berntzen and Weisskircher (2016) - findings

  • Sweden PEGIDA: restrictively policed due to high counter-mobilisation
    • new mobilisation: no strong benefit of pre-existing radical right activism; in all other cases, PEGIDA label was used by established radical right actors
  • Switzerland PEGIDA: protests banned by local authorities
    • banning demonstrations (offline) also negatively impacted online activism
  • Norway PEGIDA: outgrowth of pre-existing radical right activism
    • bans on demonstrations in Oslo—also negatively impacted online activism
  • Austria PEGIDA: deeply embedded in national and transnational far-right scene, some support from FPÖ (large, radical right political party)
    • establishing stable online presence reshapes (expands) online far-right scene
  • counter-mobilisation and radical right party strength do not explain differences in mobilisation—state action (esp. banning) does
    • are you convinced by this?

Berntzen and Weisskircher (2016) - discussion question

All PEGIDA events in Austria were met with much greater countermobilisation. Some PEGIDA activists were reported to the police because of engagement in National Socialist activities, such as Hitler salutes.

Is counter-mobilisation needed to provoke a state response?

some random researcher strongly contending ‘yes’: Zeller (2021), Zeller (2022), Zeller and Vaughan (2024), Zeller (2025)

to be continued with next session, on ‘counter-mobilisation

Any questions, concerns, feedback for this class?

Anonymous feedback here: https://forms.gle/AjHt6fcnwZxkSg4X8

Alternatively, please send me an email: m.zeller@lmu.de

References

Berntzen, Lars Erik, and Manès Weisskircher. 2016. “Anti-Islamic PEGIDA Beyond Germany: Explaining Differences in Mobilisation.” Journal of Intercultural Studies 37 (6): 556–73. https://doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2016.1235021.
Earl, Jennifer. 2003. “Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes : Toward a Theory of Movement Repression.” Sociological Theory 21 (1): 44–68.
Jones, Sam. 2022. “Spanish Fascist’s Family to Exhume Remains from Valley of the Fallen.” The Guardian, October, 2.
Zeller, Michael C. 2021. “Patterns of Demobilization: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of Far-Right Demonstration Campaigns.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 26 (3): 267–84. https://doi.org/10.17813/1086-671X-26-3-267.
———. 2022. “Demobilising Far-Right Demonstration Campaigns: Coercive Counter-Mobilisation, State Social Control, and the Demobilisation of the Hess Gedenkmarsch Campaign.” Social Movement Studies 21 (3): 372–90. https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2021.1889493.
———. 2025. “Pragmatic Rather Than Principled: Organisational Bans in Democracies.” European Journal of Political Research 0 (0): 1–30. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1475676525100121y.
Zeller, Michael C, and Michael Vaughan. 2024. “Proscribing Right-Wing Extremist Organizations in Europe: Variations, Trends, and Prospects.” Terrorism and Political Violence 36 (8): 985–1007. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2023.2240446.