Who is Afraid of the Istanbul Convention? Explaining Opposition to and Support for Gender Equality

“… four pathways for ratification, driven by feminist egalitarian norms, international conditionality, pro-European governments at odds with social opposition, and societies unwilling to mobilize for conservative religious institutions.”
Istanbul convention
gender
violence
anti-gender mobilisation
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA)
process tracing

Andrea Krizsán, Conny Roggeband, and Michael C. Zeller, “Who is Afraid of the Istanbul Convention? Explaining Opposition to and Support for Gender Equality,” Comparative Political Studies 0, no. 0 (2024): 1-41, doi: 10.1177/00104140241290205

Authors
Affiliations

Central European University, Vienna, Austria

University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, München, Germany

Published

October 2024

Doi
Other details

Rotation principle. Each author contributed equally. We are indebted to Penelope Bollini for gathering much of the raw data. We thank Vera Messing for advice on relevant survey data. We also thank Ioana-Elena Oana and Carsten Q. Schneider for guidance on applying their QCA robustness test protocol.

Abstract

Across Europe, contention has emerged over the Istanbul Convention, a treaty combatting violence against women. The Convention has become a main arena for contention over gender and sexual equality. Right-wing forces mobilize nationally—and transnationally—to advocate for traditional values and oppose so-called ‘gender ideology’, while progressive actors resist efforts to curtail women’s rights. Consequently, while many have ratified the Convention, several countries have not. This article asks which causes motive ratification; which causes underlie non-ratification? We present a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) on 40 European states to disentangle the causal complexity of ratification decisions. We identify four pathways for ratification, driven by feminist egalitarian norms, international conditionality, pro-European governments at odds with social opposition, and societies unwilling to mobilize for conservative religious institutions. We unpack these causal patterns in four minimalist case studies. The article reveals causation underlying contention between pro-gender, anti-gender, and state actors, and resultant policy outcomes.

Important figures

Ratification of the Istanbul Convention by Council of Europe member states (EU member states in bold). An asterisk indicates countries considering withdrawal from the IC; Two asterisks indicates countries withdrawn from the IC.
Ratification status Countries
Ratified in 2012 Turkey**
Ratified in 2013 Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Italy, Montenegro, Portugal, Serbia
Ratified in 2014 Andorra, Denmark, France, Malta, Monaco, Spain, Sweden
Ratified in 2015 Finland, Netherlands, Poland*, Slovenia
Ratified in 2016 Belgium, Romania, San Marino
Ratified in 2017 Cyprus, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Norway, Switzerland
Ratified in 2018 Croatia, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, North Macedonia
Ratified in 2019 Ireland
Ratified in 2022 Ukraine, United Kingdom
Not ratified as of March 2021 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Latvia, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Slovakia

Istanbul Convention adoption and solidly right-wing governments in 40 countries. Periods covered by a grey bar represent times when a solidly right-wing government was in power. \(\circ\) marks the date of signing the Convention. \(\smallblackdiamond\) marks the date of ratification. \(\times\) marks the date of Turkey’s withdrawal.
Summary of calibration strategy.
Condition (abbreviation) Raw data source Range (min., mean, max.) Calibration method Calibration thresholds Set scores
Liberal democracy backsliding (LDB) V-Dem (2013, 2021): v2x_libdem -0.41, -0.035, 0.35 direct full incl.: -0.1
crossover: -0.08
full excl.: 0
Solid right-wing government (RGOV) ParlGov assignment 1: all RW gov.
0.75: RW gov. after signing
0.45: RW gov. at signing, not after
0.25: some RW gov. after signing
0: no RW gov.
Strong social opposition to gender equality (OPPG) European Values Survey (EVS), European Social Survey (ESS) 0.04, 0.44, 0.93 assignment 1: strong opp.
0.66: fairly strong opp.
0.33: somewhat strong opp.
0: not strong opp.
Homogenous religious majority (HRM) European Values Survey (EVS), European Social Survey (ESS) assignment 1: majority Catholic, Orthodox, or Islamic
0: no such majority
Strong women’s empowerment (WPOW) V-Dem (2020): index of v2x_genpp and v2x_cspart 0.97, 0.842, 0.35 direct full incl.: 0.97
crossover: 0.9
full excl.: 0.35
Strong social support for women’s equality (WEQU) European Values Survey (EVS), European Social Survey (ESS) 0.02, 0.234, 0.57 assignment 1: strong support
0.66: fairly strong support
0.33: somewhat strong support
0: not strong support
EU candidacy (EUC) 2020 EU candidates list assignment 1: EU candidate
0: non-candidate

Set intersections of QCA model. The light grey bars represent truth table rows with the outcome; dark grey without; the black bar represents the one contradictory truth table row (i.e., row 25).

To produce the most parsimonious solution we reduce the complexity of the truth table. Minimization of our truth table produces four configurations of conditions that seemingly motivate ratification of the Istanbul Convention:

WEQU + LDB * EUC + LDB * RGOV + OPPG * HRM → IC

This expression reads as follows:

  • strong social support for women’s equality (WEQU) or
  • not liberal democratic backsliding (\(\sim\)LDB) and EU candidacy (EUC) or
  • liberal democratic backsliding (LDB) and not solid right-wing government (\(\sim\)RGOV) or
  • not strong social opposition to gender (\(\sim\)OPPG) and a homogenous religious majority

are sufficient for Istanbul Convention ratification (IC).

Sufficiency solution.

Solution (parsimonious) terms and overlaps

Paths of Istanbul Convention ratification. The rounded rectangles name the four groupings found in our sufficiency analysis for IC ratification. The conditions, in rectangles, that comprise those groupings, are sufficient causes for IC ratification through the mechanisms, in trapezoids, that we described in our discussion of typical cases.

Citation

Add to Zotero

@article{KrizsanRoggebandZeller2024,
  title={Proscribing Right-Wing Extremist Organizations in Europe: Variations, Trends, and Prospects},
  author={Zeller, Michael C and Vaughan, Michael},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  volume={0},
  number={0},
  pages={1--41},
  year={2024},
  publisher={Sage}
}